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ABSTRACT

This is a study o f political com petition in one P N G H ighlands society, that o f H agen, w ithin
w hich som e o f the country’s m ost pow erful and wealthy m en operate. It is about how and why
people in H agen com pete for prestige, pow er and influence. T he study examines the m ajor
arenas, fields and sub-fields o f com petition w ithin H agen politics.
This study examines state-society relations from a local perspective. It is a study o f com peting
legitimacies, o f conflicting identities and loyalties, and o f parallel m oral w odds. It is a study o f
political strategies, subcultures, and inteigenerational pow er struggles w ithin a weak state.
T he study explores the interactions betw een ‘traditional’ H agen and m odem P N G state
structures, through a systematic analysis o f the m ajor arenas o f political com petition and
cooperation w ithin w hich individuals and their groups com pete for prestige, pow er and
influence. Political com petition and leadership roles are analysed in a num ber o f contexts,
specifically by studying political action by prom inent individuals, in both ‘traditional’ and
m odem spheres o f com petition. T he ‘traditional’ arenas o f com petition and cooperation, such as
cerem onial exchange, group warfare and the various types o f com pensation paym ent, now exist
side by side w ith, and in m any ways have been incorporated into, new form s such as elections
and business enterprise.
T he study deals w ith questions o f how and to w hat extent one system has captured the other, if
at all, and also examines the w ider im plications o f such developm ents, particularly in the context
o f state-society relations and com peting legitimacies o f political systems. It also addresses som e
key issues, such as the conflicting role o f politicians in local conflicts and the use o f state
resources in prom oting local interests, thereby raising questions o f conflicting loyalties betw een
state and society. In the final analysis, the state itself has been incorporated into the H agen
political com petition.
Several case studies are presented in this thesis to show that ‘traditional’ H agen ideologies and
cultural practices have been useful in rationalising political strategies adopted by groups and
individuals in attem pting to achieve political goals. T he H agen ideology o f tepam nga kangm
(‘father’s son3) has been used in justifying claims to leadership status, even in cases w here there is

clearly n o indication th at a claim ants father was a leader; just as th at o f tepam tenta; mema tenta
(‘one father; one blood3) ideology governing group solidarity. G roup solidarity, o r tribal loyalty,
as expressed in block-voting and in w arfare, is a central feature in b oth elections and in inter
group w arfare and peace-m aking in the case studies presented here. A bove all else, the
reputation o f th e group m ust n o t be allow ed to suffer: group solidarity is th e overriding political
value. Leaders m anipulate this ideology for their individual enhancem ent M assive financial and
o th er resources are used in attem pting to extend personal prestige, pow er and influence.
H ageners, like o th er H ighlands peoples, often justify huge disparities in personal w ealth and the
flaunting o f such w ealth during elections by using the ‘traditional3 ideology o f big-m en as a
m agnet fo r attracting w ealth, expressed in M elpa language as kung~mel mbo wua nmm kin petim
(‘pigs and o th er w ealth stays w ith th e big-men!).

T his is essentially a study o f political change and cultural continuity, o f how H ageners react to
structural changes im posed upon them , o f their engagem ent w ith state systems and o f how at
tim es they subvert th e state w hen it suits th e m Ultim ately these political responses and cultures
affect th e strength and viability o f th e state o f Papua N ew G uinea, w hich, despite its w eakness, is
far from collapsing.
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Chapter

1

IN T R O D U C T IO N

Introduction

2

Introduction
T he Papua N ew G uinea H ighlands region has a history o f perm anent hum an settlem ent, based
on agricultural intensification and surplus production, that goes back nearly 10,000 years. A nd
the people have a reputation for remarkable cultural innovation, vigour and resilience. But some
o f the m ost revolutionary changes — such as colonisation bringing a state system and the cash
econom y — have occurred during the last sixty-five years. T he analytical focus o f this study is
on the resilience o f indigenous political fields o f com petition and the innovative m anner in
w hich H ighlanders have responded to the massive changes that have accom panied the transition
from pre-colonial autonom y to colonial autocratic kiapdom to post-colonial statehood, with
particular emphasis on the last decade.
The social and political im plications o f such changes, however, are n o t quite fully understood,
despite num erous studies covering various aspects o f Highlands societies. M uch o f w hat is
presently w ritten about the Highlands people comes initially from ethnographic accounts by
social anthropologists and secondly from m ore specifically focused studies on particular topics
by observers from other disciplines in the social sciences. It is how ever evident in the literature
that m ost observers have failed fully to appreciate the complex processes that take place when
state systems are superim posed on to tribally fragmented societies, which are sometimes called
acephalous, literally ‘headless’, w ithout centralised political structures. A m ajor contributing
factor lies in the historical emphasis on Euro-centric approaches to analysing non-w estem
societies.
In political studies, the application o f W estern models o f state and society in the analyses o f
T hird W odd societies has proved less fruitful than perhaps originally anticipated The
‘m odernisation’ approach, for instance, was based on the assum ption that newly decolonised
countries would develop progressively towards ‘m odem ’ state-hood, replicating those found in
W estern societies. D espite political and cultural diversities, people in the newly created nations in
Africa, South East Asia, Latin America and Oceania were expected to integrate quite sufficiently
in order to form national identities, to foster com m on ideas o f purpose and pride in national
achievem ents, and to create undivided loyalties and acceptance o f the state’s authority and
m onopoly over the legitimate use o f force. But why has it n o t happened in PN G , o r w ider
M elanesia, and indeed the rest o f the Third W orld? Chazan et al (1988:15) quite rightly rebuked
developm ent theorists for even thinking about such a direction in developm ent: “the
supposition that the W estern m odel o f developm ent was both feasible and desirable smacked o f
a type o f arrogance n o t easily acceptable in countries that had only recently emerged from a
period o f colonial rule”, especially w hen newly created nations and their leaders at independence
inherited from the colonial pow ers poorly developed infrastructure, underdeveloped economies
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primarily based on agriculture and extractive m ineral exploitation, severely limited and poorly
equipped social services facilities, and a predom inantly illiterate population (including a largely
unskilled labour force).
A nother problem area is the traditional epistemological issue in anthropology: the personal and
professional dilemma faced by field-observers in attem pting to deal w ith the contradiction
betw een ‘inside* and ‘outside* perceptions o f society; how to reconcile presum ed differences
betw een how people perceive themselves and anthropological interpretations o f them . D espite
the best intentions o f anthropologists to report on the ‘native’s point o f view*, the social science
literature on the PN G Highlands represents alm ost exclusively an outsider’s view o f society. As
one anthropologist asked: “H ow is anthropological knowledge o f die way natives think, feel,
and perceive possible?**, o r “if we are going to cling to die injunction to see things from die
native’s point o f view, where are we w hen we can no longer claim som e unique form o f
psychological closeness, a sort o f transcultural identification, with our subjects?” (Geerfcz

1983:56).
W hilst it is possible for fieldworkers to develop a close attachm ent to members o f their host
com m unities, they probably can never fully relinquish their ow n cultural identities, for doing so
w ould o f course underm ine their own socialisation processes. A nd, their interpretations are thus
largely influenced by their own cultural values, personal experiences, and educational
backgrounds. As a m em ber o f one Highlands society and having benefited from both
indigenous Melanesian and the introduced W estern systems o f socialisation (often called the
‘informal* and ‘formal* education systems), I present here a study o f state-society relations — o f
com peting legitimacies and parallel m oral worlds — from the perspective o f an ‘insider*. An
‘insider* w ho sometimes operates on the ‘outside*, but one who is equipped w ith ‘academic
blinkers* with which to lo o k in* from the ‘outside*. My interpretations are also influenced by
cultural and educational factors, but if the study suffers, o r conversely, becomes strengthened by
these, then it is because I share w ith Highlanders their cultural values and understand their
political practices. But, as w ith outside observers, an insider’s view o f society can also suffer
from limitations o f objectivity: for example, a certain aspect o f hum an behaviour that may
appear quite striking to an outsider may n o t be considered by an insider as o f great significance
because it occurs every day and may n o t be seen as anything other than ordinary. However,
w here an insider can make a valuable contribution is in com bining inside knowledge o f how
m em bers o f society operate, taking into account the norm s and values that govern political
behaviour, enriched by insights gleaned from the literature — the methodological discussions,
theoretical approaches, and comparative studies o f Third W orld societies. T hat is, com bining
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abstraction w ith em pirical knowledge, o r in G eertz’s (1983) form ulation, ‘experience-near’ w ith
‘experience-distant*.1 This is precisely w hat I attem pt here.
H ighlanders have, over the centuries, developed com plex social and econom ic networks
through w hich knowledge, valued scarce resources and surplus products have been passed from
one group to another. Specialised knowledge and econom ic resources are rare com m odities and
thus universally valued. A n alm ost inevitable and som ewhat endless pursuit o f pow er to control
such com m odities is the stuff o f Highlands politics, as is the case in all hum an societies
throughout the w orld. T hose w ho gain control o f such netw orks invariably rise to the top,
regardless o f w hether societies are hierarchical in structure, as in feudal E urope, o r egalitarian in
ideology, as in pre-colonial Highlands societies.
In many parts o f the P N G H ighlands, those w ho dom inated exchange networks became leaders
o f groups, coalitions and factions. Such individuals were identified by anthropologists as ‘bigmen*, on the basis o f certain attributes — principally entrepreneurial skills in surplus production,
the m anipulation o f wealth and pre-em inence in cerem onial exchange, oratorical abilities and
forceful personalities, (see A.J. Strathem 1966a, 1969b, 1971; see also Ryan 1961; LowmanVayda 1971; Sillitoe 1979; R appaport 1984 [originally 1968]; and Feil 1987). A ccording to this
m odel o f leadership, big-m en were perceived as managers and directors o f corporate activities
upon w hich group prestige and individual renow n are derived. These particular type o f leaders,
w hilst appearing to som e as alm ost obsessively preoccupied with exchange relations, are claimed
to have been at the apex o f the political order w hen confronted with new challenges brought
about by the incorporation o f their universe into the national and global econom y nearly 65
years ago (For som e early im pressions, see V icedom and Tischner 1943-8; G itlow 1947;
Sim pson 1954. See also Standish 1978 and 1992; A.J. Strathem 1984; G ordon and Meggitt 1985;
and Feil 1987 for discussions on how the indigenous political and econom ic systems may have
been radically altered by the im pact o f colonisation).
Since European contact in the early 1930s, PN G Highlands societies have experienced dramatic
and m onum ental changes in the sphere o f politics, and their social, religious and econom ic
systems. Some o f the changes have had alm ost catastrophic effects on indigenous econom ic and
political systems. In fact, there has been some interpretation that indigenous systems may have
been substantially tam pered w ith, o r radically altered, o r corrupted by foreign influences. A
1.

Adopting a distinction formulated by the psychoanalyst Heinz K ohut between what he called ‘experiencenear* and ‘experience-distant’ concepts, Geertz views an experience-near concept as one that “an
inform ant might him self naturally and effortlessly use to define what he or his fellows see, feel, think,
imagine, and so on, and which he would readily understand when similarly applied by others.” And
experience-distant concept, he says, “is one that specialists o f one sort or another — an analyst, an
experimenter, an ethnographer, even a priest or an ideologist — employ to forward their scientific,
philosophical, or practical aims” (1983:57).
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num ber o f observers from various disciplines and sub-disciplines w ithin the social sciences, w ith
differing views and theoretical approaches, have all com m ented on the devastating and farreaching effects o f colonisation, particularly by the deliberate flooding o f the local econom y with
large quantities o f shells during the first tw o decades o f Australian rule in the H ighlands and its
im pact on the exchange netw orks w hich are a m ajor elem ent in H agen politics (see A.J.
Strathem 1966a, 1971; H ughes 1978; Standish 1978; and Feil 1982). “European tam pering w ith
rates and the supply o f exchange valuables”, as argued by Feil (1987:95), directly led to the
“destruction o f indigenous econom ies and polities during the early colonial period”, which
m eans that the so-called ‘traditional’ leadership patterns observed by anthropologists from 1945
onw ards may have n o t been so ‘teaditional’ after all. This argum ent is pardy based on the
assum ption th at anthropologists w ho w orked in the 1960s may have been guilty o f
overem phasising particular aspects o f leadership while down-playing the dem ocratising effects
o f colonial rule (see Standish 1978; and Feil 1982), a significant point to w hich I shall return later
(see Chapter Two).
T he H agen2 people — w hose cultural values and practices, political strategies and ideologies,
and social netw orks are currently under scrutiny here — received special attention from the
com bined efforts o f gold prospectors, M ichael and D an Leahy, Lutheran and Catholic
m issionaries, and colonial adm inistration officers. Early accounts o f Hagen society by Ross
(1936), V icedom and Tischner (1943-8) and G itlow (1947) indicate that in pre-colonial times
there was a rather high degree o f social stratification, involving w ell-defined classes o f ‘rich and
pow erful’, a large ‘m iddle class’, ‘poor*, ‘serfs’ o r ‘servants’ and even ‘slaves’ (compare A J.
Strathem 1971,1987; Feil 1987).
M en o f the upper class were described as chiefs, w ho passed on the pow er to their eldest sons
and com prised about six per cent o f the total male population (Gitlow 1947:35; quoted in Feil
1987:118). Feil {ibid) Haims that these m en alone were m em bers o f the moka cerem onial
exchange com m unity and controlled the large pearlshells, the m ost prestigious and pow er

2.

I use ‘Hagen’ to refer generally to the administrative district (formerly sub-district) and its inhabitants,
‘M ount Hagpn’ for the town and provincial headquarters, H agen society* for die cultural-linguistic area,
which includes both Melpa and Tem boka speakers. Such usage o f terms is quite consistent w ith the way
Hagpners view themselves: n ot as Melpa or Tem boka but as Hageners w ho speak different dialects o f the
same language; and also consistent with the analysis o f the Strathems (see, for example, A J. Strathem
1971, 1972; A M . Strathem 1972a). The cultural-linguistic area called Hagen had a population o f over
160,000 during die 1990 Census and covers two districts: Hagen Central (Hagen Central, Anglimp and
Nebilyer Census Divisions) with a population o f 99,549) and Hagen North (Mul and Dei Census
Divisions) with a population o f 60,653 (excluding Baiyer-Lumusa, pop. 25,479, w ho are Enga speakers).
M ount Hagen town, which had a population o f 17,500, and Kagamuga station, with 1,572 persons in 1990,
were n o t included in Hagen district because o f a predominantly migrant population (see National
Statistical Office 1993; 1994),
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concentrating item s o f value.3 Vicedom and Tischner (1943-8) and A.J. Strathem (1971) were
virtually in agreem ent that before European contact big-m en m onopolised shell moka payments
in Hagen. This situation, som e say, was later m odified by the presence o f Europeans (A.J.
Strathem 1971:205), m ore specifically through the im portation by the colonisers o f large
quantities o f shell valuables (see, for example, Hughes 1978; Connolly and A nderson 1987).
lik e shells during the eady colonial period, m ore recently it has been the incorporation o f cash,
cattle, beer, m otor vehicles and guns — as highly valued econom ic resources — into arenas o f
political com petition that has had a m ajor im pact on the indigenous political and economic
systems. Equally significant had been the incorporation o f Hagen and other small-scale societies
into a national entity to form the m odem state o f Papua New Guinea. T he cumulative effect o f
all these processes involving phenom enal transform ations has been the radical alteration o f the
political status quo o f pre-colonial Hagen society, perhaps n ot once but several times over.
This study looks at the ‘transform ed’ o r ‘altered’ H agen, which is changed fiom w hat essentially
and com m only — and sometimes incorrectly — is viewed by social scientists as ‘traditional’ or
‘pre-colonial’ society. Tre-colonial’ strictly refers to the period before colonisation, but w hat we
often find in the PN G literature are models and depictions o f society heavily m odified by the
presence o f foreigners. It is extremely difficult, even where fairly reliable oral historical accounts
are available, to reconstruct pre-colonial society because no one knows the exact details o f pre
colonial political and econom ic systems. Some o f these term s require clarification. In discussing
politics, I use ‘indigenous’ to distinguish systems o f H agen origin from introduced systems such
as the state, ‘pre-colonial’ for the situation and practices that existed before European contact in
1933, ‘traditional’ for customary practices whose origin predates the colonial period, and
‘historical’ for processes and networks with roots gping back to pre-colonial times. Rather than
using historical evidence to reconstruct pre-colonial Hagen society, this study focuses on
contem porary political strategies and traces backwards in search o f the historical origins o f
cultural values and ideologies that are regulady utilised in contem porary situations. It is therefore
a study o f contem porary H agen politics and the ways in which current practices and political
behaviour have been shaped by historical processes and greatly influenced by relations between
local groups, factions, neo-traditional coalition-style alliances and their leaders.
a.

Moka is the Hagen term for reciprocal exchanges o f wealth between partners, in which the rule is that a
main gift should exceed an initial or initiatory one (A.J. Strathem 1981:10). The Hagen moka system
involves a complex network o f individuals, as pivotal points o f linkage between different groups, through
which periodical exchanges o f wealth items o f live pigs, cash and other economic resources are exchanged.
Hagen leaders traditionally acquire their eminence by virtue o f oratorical abilities and through success in
competitive exchanges, particularly through moka, reparation payments and warfare (see A>J. Strathem
1966a; 1969a; 1971; Brandewie 1971; 1981; Burton and Keher 1997). Moka, however, does m ore than
build up big-men; it acts to create links o f debt and trust between individuals in an otherwise atomised
society (Burton and Keher 1997:156). For further discussion on leadership roles in moka, reparation
payment and warfare, see Chapter Five.
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M ore specifically, this is basically a local-level study w hich deals w ith questions o f how and why
H ageners com pete for prestige, pow er and influence. T he com petition is often expressed
through both positive and negative reciprocity, w here <positive> includes reciprocal gift
exchanges and ‘negative’ includes payback killing. Such exchanges are conducted w ithin the
rarefied confines o f highly developed indigenous spheres o f com petition, now linked to state
systems by way o f systematic m erging o f ideologies and political practices (though, paradoxically,
influenced by often conflicting sets o f values).
A fundam ental reason for such com petition lies in the Hagen conviction that a person’s local
group’s ‘nam e m ust n o t go dow n’ {mbi mana nepangkd)> as expressed through localised support
for politicians even after they may have been dismissed from office a n d /o r jailed for
m isconduct It is mainly because o f the particular concept o f ‘the nam e’ and pride in group’s
reputation that a lot o f corrupt and incom petent politicians get re-elected, that massive resources
are gam bled (and lost) in elections, and that violence is regularly preferred over m ore peaceful
avenues for resolving conflicts. M obilisation o f support for im portant events such as warfare,
cerem onial exchange and elections are usually organised in the nam e o f the group. M ost
m em bers o f a group tend to agree that their clan o r tribal ‘nam e’ is far m ore im portant than
them selves, even w here prom inent individuals clearly do stand to benefit personally from
making such com m itm ent It did not m atter in the W estern Highlands, for instance, that only
few businessm en were in a position to prosper under the national adm inistration o f local m an,
Paias W ingti, and that the province as a w hole probably did n o t get as m uch attention as it
deserved, because in the final analysis the voter regulady sacrificed personal benefits to gain ‘the
nam e’ o r renow n that goes w ith the office o f the prim e m inistership. F or the H agener, the
expression, ol lain Hagen hotim praim minista (the H agen ‘line’ has the prim e m inistership), had a
nice ring to it. W hy w orry about lack o f developm ent o r the appointm ent o f non-H ageners or
non-H ighlanders as departm ental heads, w hen, after all, you have got the prim e m inistership?
Paias W ingti, a clever political strategist w ho outm anoeuvred Michael Somare to gain re-election
as Prim e M inister in 1987 (see T urner and Hegarty 1987), apparently saw no great danger in
overlooking senior H ageners and other H ighlanders for top public service jobs. Some o f them
eventually turned against him , including fellow Jika tribesm en, but his stunning defeat in 1997
was ironically at the hands o f a rather mild m annered Catholic priest w ho com es from the same
group as M ichael M el— a form er Treasurer w ho was endorsed by W ingti in 1997 in attem pt to
block Paul Pora in H agen O pen. A lthough all o f his opponents played a part in W ingti’s election
loss, that defeat is now seen by many H ageners as resulting from a m ajor conspiracy to pull
W ingti dow n to their level o f politics because he, like Iambakey O kuk in 1982, was seen as
becom ing far too big for a H agen big-man.
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Traditional ideas, infighting and practices thus becom e factors in contem porary state political
institutions, just as m odem econom ic resources and com m odities have entered traditional
cerem onial exchanges. T he incorporation o f new econom ic resources into indigenous arenas o f
com petition, such as the use o f cash, cattle and m otor vehicles in moka exchanges, is a
m anifestation o f cultural continuity. B ut the use o f cash itself and being part o f the w orld
econom y indicates change in society. These sim ple examples are essentially a m irror image o f a
m uch broader change in society, involving a significant m erging o f ideologies and cultural
practices. A m ajor case o f m erging or, m ore precisely, incorporation, presented in this study is
th e way in w hich H ageners have skilfully orchestrated 'traditional’ local events, such as
cerem onial gift exchanges and com pensation paym ents, to coincide w ith, and culm inate in, both
national and provincial governm ent elections.
Local groups have thus created w hat I call a H agen m eg acy cle in w hich the state and its events
have been incorporated into their political system, w hereby H agen values seem to be overriding
state values, and political action at provincial and national levels is heavily influenced by
com petition at the local leveL Several case studies on w arfare and elections show th at existing
military alliances, strengthened by frequent interm arriage and intense moka exchange, are die
prim e resources w hich aspiring politicians seek to m obilise o r c o n tro l This is because election
cam paigns are essentially tied in w ith moka sequences, reparation paym ents fo r losses in w arfare
and military alliances. It is based on the principle that once you fight one way, you are bound to
vote th e same way because it speeds up the reparation paym ent process. In practice, how ever,
there are inherent problem s w hich m ust be overcom e. Individuals, by virtue o f their free
w heeling and dealing nature, can som etim es act as loose cannons, defying corporate policy to
support candidates o th er than the one sponsored by the group. Such practices, on the one hand,
highlight the contradictions betw een ideology and practice and betw een loyalty and betrayal,
w hilst o n the oth er hand, em phasise the diverging goals and interests o f individuals and groups,
thereby reinforcing CTHanlon’s (1989:57) poin t th at the ideally solidary group in fact harbours
w ithin it traitors.
Essentially, the study contains an analysis o f political com petition betw een pow erful individuals,
backed by even m ore pow erful groups, factions and coalitions. M ost o f these groups have over
the last decade accum ulated arsenals o f sophisticated firearms w ith w hich they can hold their
ow n against any fo rce— including that o f the state. Some o f their leaders, w ho are distinguished
from the m asses by enorm ous w ealth and pow er, can be described as 'super-big-m en’. These
type o f leaders, w hilst operating in patron-client relations w ith other types (such as businessm en,
big-m en, fight-leaders, and leaders o f raskol gangs), control the coffee and tea industries, in
addition to real estate, haulage, retail, and oth er business in H agen and elsewhere in the country.
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By exam ining the com position o f local groups and the m ajor arenas o f political com petition and
cooperation w ithin w hich m em bers o f such groups and their leaders interact, this study provides
significant insights into the processes w hich take place w hen stateless, pre-capitalist societies
com e into contact w ith W estern state systems and the m arket economy. It is fundamentally a
study o f state-society interaction; o f how people in H agen deal w ith the superim position o f
m odem state structures onto their tribally fragm ented groups. By analysing political com petition
at the local level w here nationally prom inent leaders such as Paias W ingti, M ichael M el and Paul
P ora operate, this study presents valuable insights tow ards understanding the behaviour o f
politicians w ho interact w ithin and betw een tw o separate m oral realms.
Furtherm ore, this study explores the level and extent o f interpenetration betw een state and
society in order to determ ine w hether one system has dom inated the other. N ational politics, for
instance, is characterised by parochial struggles, nepotism and the various types o f clientelism,
while at the same tim e being concerned — at least in nam e and law — w ith the governance o f
the country o r nation as a w hole. Clearly these are m anifestations o f a w ider process o f
com peting legitimacies, particularly w hen one set o f m oral values is superim posed onto another.
Parochial loyalties overriding national sentim ents and the pervasive practice o f looking after
people o f the same language, tribe, clan and lineage are deeply entrenched in M elanesian cultural
traditions. T he prevalence o f nepotistic patronage in governm ent, for instance, is a m anifestation
o f a w ider cultural practice in P N G called wantok system. As noted by Standish:
Most PNG people retain a mind-set o f primary attachment and loyalty to their clan and tribal
groups, sometimes known as wantoks, the Tokpisin word for people who speak the same
language. Wantok identities extend into notions o f region, such as the Highlands and the New
Guinea Islands, and often lead to the belief that nepotistic patronage prevails in government
(Standish 1994:60).
As expressed through the re-election o f num erous politicians after being found guilty o f
m isconduct in office, the P N G voters seem to have a remarkable capacity for forgiveness. A n
explanation may be found in the concept o f ‘us-versus-them ’, w hereby crimes against the state
o r similar organisations are deem ed morally acceptable, w hilst offences com m itted against
m em bers o f one’s ow n group are n o t In Hagen society, the origins o f such ethical beliefs are
firmly rooted in traditional rivalries betw een groups w ith a recent rem em bered history o f
warfare. T hat is, stealing from rival groups (and the state is very m uch viewed in the same way as
another clan o r tribal group) is n o t only acceptable but also encouraged because o f the virtual
certainty th at som e o f die wealth will find its way into the local economy. Public servants w ho
abuse their privileged positions to maximise personal gain are n o t branded as thieves b ut rather
are adm ired for inking advantage o f their opportunities. P N G how ever is n o t unique in
developing such a system o f largesse, based on the conflicting roles o f public servants and
politicians w ho them selves, as m em bers o f local com m unities, are tom betw een their social
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obligations tow ards their kinsm en (rnntoks) and their official duties as public office holders. A
sim ilar type o f wantok system has been reported in an A frican co n tex t
Most educated Africans are citizens o f two publics in the same society. O n the one
hand, they belong to a civic public from which they gain materially but to which they
give only grudgingly. O n the other hand they belong to a primordial public from which
they derive htde or no material benefits but to which they are expected to give
generously and do give materially. To make matters more complicated, their
relationship to the primordial public is moral, while that to the public is amoral.. .A
good citizen o f the primordial public gives out and asks for nothing in return; a lucky
citizens o f the civic public gains from the civic public but enjoys escaping giving in
return whatever he can. But such a lucky man would not be good man were he is to
rharmel all his lucky gains to his private purse. He will only continue to be a good man
if he channels part of his largesse from the civic public to the primordial public. That is
the logic o f the dialectics. The unwritten law o f the dialectics is that it is legitimate to
rob the civic public in order to strengthen the primordial public (Ekeh 1975:108).
Parochial political culture thus im pacts on national politics. A nd because practices such as

wantoks looking after wantoks at national and provincial levels are largely based on, o r justified by,
ideologies o f custom and group solidarity, one may ask: can the behaviour o f national politicians
be viewed as instances o f local values dom inating state values? O ther similar issues and
questions raised here are:
•

C om peting values and duties (kinship obligation versus outright bribery and corruption).
D oes fulfilling a kinship obligation leads to bribery o r corruption? K inship obligation
requires m oney, hence corruption (theft) o r the acceptance o f bribes. A re cash handouts
during elections perceived as bribery o r the fulfilm ent o f kinship obligations?

•

T he often conflicting roles held by politicians, policem en and other state officials (as
gnyernm ent legislators o r state em ployees, and as tribesm en). Should legislators always
uphold the laws they make o r do they have a deeper obligation to their group to
participate in local arenas o f com petition such as tribal warfare? A re there short-term
gains in instigating warfare and the use o f raskol gangs in intim idating rivals and their
supporters? D oes involvem ent in local conflicts ultimately underm ine their integrity as
national leaders?

•

D oes w hat I call the H agen m ode o f politics (largely based on nepotistic patronage o r

wantok system , horse-trading after elections and tribal loyalties), ultimately contribute
tow ards bankrupting P N G , morally and economically? Such a process may well be
under way b u t is surely far from com plete.
W hile these questions may relate to politics in H agen, the answers relate to other parts o f Papua
N ew G uinea, arid indeed help explain politics in many T hird W orld societies. In fact, the
answers should help explain the P N G political culture, and by im plication, higjiligfit the
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similarities and differences between Ih ird World societies, different types and styles of
leadership and their modes of operation. Understanding local politics, however, requires a good
knowledge o f cultural values and practices. Whilst the Hagen cultural values and practices will be
discussed in the relevant parts of the thesis, it is necessary here to briefly outline the culturallinguistic area called Hagen (see Map 2, below).
M ap 2: T he H ag en C ultural-L inguistic Area

Sourve:

AJ. Strathem (1971) and Merlan and Rumsey (1991).
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Some notes about H ageners
H ie cultural-linguistic area know n as Hagen is situated in the Central H ighlands region o f Papua
N ew Guinea. A population o f over 160,000 people (1990 Census) occupy part o f the central
valley system o f the Highlands. H ageners live in hom esteads and villages on the fertile floor and
the side walls o f the m ajor valleys (upper W ahgi, N ebilyer and eastern Baiyer), the Togoba
(pronounced Tokpa in Melpa) and O gelbeng plains, and the foothills o f M ount Hagen. M ost
settlem ent in these areas, as noted by B urton and K eher (1997:154), is at an altitude o f 1,500 to
1,600 m etres.
T he people are predom inantly subsistence fanners w ho depend alm ost exclusively on the land
for their livelihood. Land is communally ow ned and individual access to gardening land is by
virtue o f m em bership o f local groups, tribes and clans. A lthough access to clan land, especially
that covered by virgin forest, was traditionally regulated by the principle o f usufructuary rights, it
is nowadays com m only inherited through immediate family ties. A n explanation for this may be
found in the fact that “shifting, forest-fallow cultivation is virtually unknow n in these areas and
the population densities rise locally above 100 persons per square kilom etres” (Burton and
K eher 1997:154). T he population density on the floor o f the W ahgi and the Ogelbeng plains is
believed to be m uch higher, perhaps at 200 o r m ore persons per square kilometres. How ever, in
the absence o f any systematic study linking population pressure to land tenure, it is difficult to
make any firm statem ents about land rights and population grow th in this part o f the country.
T he principal sources o f m onetary incom e for these people are cash crops o f coffee, tea,
cardam om and food crops, including a large variety o f tropical fruits (such as bananas,
pineapples, pawpaws, guavas, avocados, oranges, m andarins, lem ons, passionfruit, tom atoes,

marita pandanus) and num erous types o f vegetables (lettuces, cabbages, abiha> beans, pum pkins,
cucum ber, com , capsicum , carrots, broccoli, cauliflower, chilli peppers, winged bean) in addition
to tubers (notably the staple sweet potato, and taro, yams, husbin (tuber o f winged bean), cassava,
Kngtish potato, ginger) and som e nuts (mostly peanuts and occasionally karuka pandanus) and
sugarcane sold at local markets. Some o f these food crops are freighted in trucks and planes to
the coastal tow ns o f Lae, M adang and P ort M oresby w here they are sold at exorbitant prices.
Coffee is the principal cash crop in Hagen. Like bananas and sugarcane, coffee is a
predom inantly ‘m ale-crop7, grown by m en and, although the cherries are picked from the trees
and prepared m ostly by w om en, the proceeds from the sale o f dried beans are largely controlled
by m en. Accordingly, coffee is an im portant status symbol: for example, a m an w ho has many
coffee gardens is regarded w ith high esteem , while one w ho has none is treated w ith contem pt
T he exceptionally high value placed on coffee is reflected in the speeches m ade by big-m en. In
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public oratory, for instance, it is culturally fashionable for orators to associate leadership w ith
lo n g pigs houses’ {kung manga rukJ) and ‘ocean o f coffee trees’ (kvpi pana kutd)> thereby
suggesting th at coffee has now been accepted as an im portant political resource, like pigs, cash
and previously peadshells.
In the w ider context, coffee is an im portant symbolic indicator o f the incorporation o f the
H agen people into the global econom y. As a prim ary source o f incom e, coffee helps ease som e
o f the pressures o f the capitalist econom y. R ecurrent expenses, including im ported food item s,
travel and clothing, in addition to constantly increasing school fees, airfares and fuel prices, can
only be m et by the proceeds from coffee. In recent years, how ever, the sm all-holding coffee
industry has been m arred by marginally dim inishing returns. D espite recent increases in coffee
pnces, the returns have been relatively p o o r due to years o f neglect o f th e coffee trees.
T he people o f H agen speak M elpa, a N on-A ustronesian language classified as part o f the
Central Language Family, E ast N ew G uinea H ighlands Stock, Trans-N ew G uinea Phylum
(W urm and H attori 1981). People in the neighbouring N ebilyer Valley speak a closely related
language called Tem boka (see M edan and Rumsey 1991). Some H agen groups — including the
Jika, Kukilka and Penam be tribes — are split across this m inor linguistic and cultural boundary.
M oreover, as noted by A.J. Strathem , H ageners them selves make a num ber o f distinctions
w ithin and pardy cross-cutting this linguistic classification:
They divide themselves into speakers o f Melpa, Temboka and Kowul [also pronounced
as Kami, or Kawigfl. Temboka talk’, with a number of named sub-dialects, is spoken in
the Nebilyer Valley and by persons who belong to groups which have migrated
northwards from the Nebilyer. ‘Kouwul talk’ belongs to certain groups along die slopes
o f Mount Hagpn, stretching across to TambuL Melpa talk’ is co-extensive with Wurm’s
Hagen language. Around Hagen township people are often bilingual in Melpa and
Temboka, and if they understand the latter they can follow ‘Kowul talk’ (and
Imbonggu) also. Within this category o f Melpa, which they are more likely to refer to as
mbo-iky [‘stock talk5] or ‘native talk’, the people distinguish further between Kama (or
Komd)-ik and Kopon-ik. The high plains rolling down from [the foothills] o f Mount
Hagen out to the Wahgi Valley are the Kama or ‘cold region’, where a dialect or sub
dialect which is closer to Temboka-talk is spoken. Over the range o f hills which bounds
this region on its north side, is the area spoken of as Kopon, bush country’, and thought
o f as hot and heavily forested; although the people in this area themselves reserve the
tprm Kopon for the much low-lying Jimi Valley and refer to their own area as ‘Korkaplace’ (AJ. Strathem 1971:6; see also Medan and Rumsey 1991:21-22 for comparable
discussion).
T he Korka-kona (‘place o f scarcity’) is in fact a term used n o t by people w ho live there, b u t by die
K opon people w hen referring generally to people w ho live on the southern slopes o f the SepikW ahgi Divide. In contrast w ith their ow n tem perate zones at a relatively low altitude o f less than
1,500 m etres above sea level, w here food — particularly the marita fruit pandanus, taro and
breadfruit — is thought o f as being plentiful, the Korka-place on the m ountain slopes has fewer
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varieties and people here are seen as being dependent on those in the Kopon-roan-kona (hum id
tropics’) fo r tropical fruits and vegetables.
A ndrew and M arilyn Strathem distinguished die K om a and K opon areas as die C entral and
N orthern M elpa, respectively, and it was at the Kawelka territories at M bukl — a ridge
overlooking th e W ahgi, Baiyer and Jim i valleys — w ithin this northern part o f the M elpaspeaking area diat m ost o f their initial w ork was done (see, for exam ple, A j. Strathem 1971:6;
A J. and A M . Strathem 1971:12*13. T he distinction is o f course a geographical one and
linguistically does n o t apply to som e groups, such as the Kawelka, w ho have territories in both
K opon and K om a areas and are currently in d o se association w ith som e Jika groups with w hom
they have intensive marriage and exchange relations. F o r m e, there is no difference betw een
K um a and K opon "talk’, as I speak ‘modem* M elpa, which is a com bination o f b oth K opon (my
father's sub-dialect) and K um a (my m other's sub-dialect), as well as Tem boka (my m aternal
grandm other's dialect) and can understand Kauil ‘talk'.
Ideally, people in H agen live in territory-claim ing nam ed groups. These groups, called tribes in
English, are m ade up o f (at least nominally) patrilineal dans w hich often claim rem ote com m on
ancestry (see Chapter Four). T hese groups can be very com petitive and often try to outdo each
other w ith gifts o f m oney and pigs in the never ending politics o f reciprocal exchanges (see A J.
Strathem 1971; see also A J. & A.M. Strathem 1971:3; R ubd and Rosman: 1978:195-196). The
M ount H agen moka cerem onial exchange system is one such arena o f inter-group com petition
b u t electoral politics is arguably fast becom ing an attractive arena for such com petition in the
m odem era.

W hy H agen?
T he selection o f M ount H agen as an area o f study for this thesis was intentional and purposeful
H agen is a significant choice for this study n o t only because I, as a m em ber that sodety, have
‘inside’ knowledge o f how the system operates, b u t m ore im portantly because o f the following
factors. Firstly, M ount H agen is believed to be the birthplace o f agricultural intensification,
w hich initially gave rise to the exchange com plex, upon w hich political com petition is largely
based.4 Cerem onial exchanges o f wealth item s, such as pigs, previously pearisheUs and nowadays

T he evidence for Kuk, near M ount Hagen, as a “so rt o f the birthplace’ o f PN G Highlands agriculture and
the efflorescence o f social and cultural associated with an intensified agricultural regime” (Fell 1987:18),
com es from Jack G obon’s archaeological w ork at Kuk, which places the origins o f agriculture at the
surprisingly early date o f 9,000 years, agricultural intensification at around 6,000 years, domestication o f
pigs at around 2^00 years, and the adoption o f sweet potato at 300 years ago (see G obon 1977, 1981,
1982; see also SwadKng 1981:31, 1998; Swadlmg, G olson and Muke 1998; Feil 1987:Chap.2). In other
words, P N G Highlanders were am ong die earliest — perhaps the very earliest— gardeners in the world
(see T urner 1994:117), and the intensity o f Hagen agriculture, exchange systems and political com petition
may well have a deeper tim e span than w hat m ost people think.
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cash, are particularly highly elaborated in H agen, w here they have crystallised into a specific
institutional form know n as the moha, in w hich groups and individuals attem pt to repay gifts at a
higjher level than those received previously (see A.J. Strathem 1992). The link between moha and
a type o f leadership called ‘big-m en’ (uma mum in M elpa language) and its remarkable resilience in
the face o f rapid social change has im pressed many people, including A ndrew Strathem , a keen
observer o f H agen politics since 1964, w ho recently w rote that:
This has introduced a pervasive process of competition for prestige, and those individuals
most successful at moha emerge as £<big-men”, or leaders o f factions, networks, and at times
even segmentary groups. Far from disappearing as a result o f social change, moka exchanges
has tended to effloresce and ramify. They have made their own contribution to the widening
o f spheres of political action in contemporary society (AJ. Strathem 1992:231).
D espite the m ajor transitions in Papua N ew G uinea and the constant econom ic pressures
exerted on the people’s lives by the harsh realities o f the im posed capitalist econom y, H ageners
continue to use moha as an im portant arena for political com petition and, at tim es, incorporating
state systems and resources into their exchanges.
Secondly, this is a chance to study the innovative m anner in w hich Hageners have captured and
m odified the state system to suit their lifestyle w hich may have few parallels anywhere in Papua
N ew G uinea, o r in M elanesia, o r elsewhere in the w odd.5 Cleady there are local mechanisms at
w ork here, such as:
•

In m obilising support and resources for elections, candidates rely heavily on big-m en from
w ithin their ow n group, as leaders o f their own factions, to secure assurances o f support
from other leaders o f similar factions in other groups with which they often have exchange
ties. It is the local big-m en, w ith oratorical skills and historical knowledge o f relations
betw een groups (either o f alliance o r enmity), w ho tend to be successful in making
arrangem ents betw een groups, ensuring that one group supports the other’s candidate and
n o t endorse its own. By applying the principles o f moka, such support creates a
disequilibrium (of obligation) w hich m ust be balanced through reciprocal action on the part
o f the group that receives the su p p o rt T he support itself may even take the form o f moka, as
occurred in a recent election (see Chapter Eight),

•

H uge econom ic ‘investm ent’ to ensure group allies’ support, including thousands o f kina
and hundreds o f pigs, in election campaigns.

5.

As pointed out by Bill Standish, there are some parallels (for example, Simbu). State politics in Simbu is
perhaps n o t as integrated with an exchange cycle, but neither Paula Brown, nor Standish, nor anyone else
had studied the links in detail (personal communication, December, 1997).
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T he ever increasing use o f force, including threat o f force and actual physical violence, as a
m eans to coerce voters to vote in a certain way, is in part associated w ith the use o f massive
am ounts o f econom ic resources.
T he ideology o f group solidarity, as often expressed through the practice o f ‘bloc-voting’ for
a trib e /d a n candidate. This becom es the candidate’s ‘base-vote’. D efectors are neady always
punished for w hat is com m only perceived as betrayal o f tribal o r d an loyalty. In die H agen
w orld view, defecting from a local candidate and supporting the opposition is like betraying
a fellow tribesm an o r clansm an to enem ies during warfare.
Elections are, in fact, viewed as a form o f warfare w hich requires the full cooperation o f all
m em bers o f the group, especially w hen a lo t o f things are at stake here, induding the
reputations o f leaders and the group w hose ‘nam e m ust n o t go dow n’ {min mana nepanhd).
W hile the big-m an, orators and factional leaders — representing the interests o f churches,
youth, w om en, and ‘name-list’ groups — play an im portant part in m obilising support for
candidates, politicians rely on other types o f leaders to convert assurances o f support into
actual votes. H ere, candidates depend heavily on despotic councillors and fight-leaders,

mskol gang leaders and other violent and ‘hot-headed’ (pcng kuncti) m en to protect the ‘basevote’ and to direct voters along parochial lines so that no one votes for the ‘wrong’
candidate.
Politicians also depend on a variety o f other (modem) organisations, such as business
developm ent associations, political parties and large business corporations for financial
assistance in elections.
Politicians may even use w eapons, especially firearms, to intim idate and solidify the vote.
T he incorporation o f ‘traditional’ H agen ideologies and cultural practices into elections,
w hereby obligations are created through the exercise o f voting for a certain candidate. Again,
following moka principles but on individual basis (as opposed to group), this is based on the
understanding that such obligations m ust be repaid som ehow , conceivably through the
disbursem ent o f governm ent funds (in the event o f the candidate being voted into office), o r
alternatively, through personal m eans (for losing candidates, although n o t all o f them will
honour their obligations); and
A n apparently higher priority placed on elections, above alm ost every other arena o f political
com petition (and cooperation), as indicated by m utual truce agreements reached by w arring
groups during both national and provincial governm ent elections, and m oreover, by the
m anner in w hich moka sequences and the cycles o f w ar reparation payments have been
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skilfully orchestrated to coincide w ith elections. A num ber o f cases involving truce
agreem ents mutually reached by w arring groups are discussed in the relevant chapters o f the
thesis.
Thirdly, the W estern H ighlands is the second m ost populous province in Papua N ew Guinea.
T he province has a land area o f 8,897 square kilom etres and in 1990 had a citizen population o f
335,592, com prising 285,946 persons bo m in the province and 49,646 persons bom in other
provinces, and a non-citizen population o f 586 persons (N ational Statistical O ffice 1993,1994).
T he W estern H ighlands Province, w ith a total population o f over 336,000 persons, “is now 24.5
p er cent o f the population o f the H ighlands region and 9.3 per cent o f the population o f P N G
excluding N orth Solom ons Province” (NSO 1994:7). A t the tim e o f the 1990 Census the
province had a physiological (nutritional) population density o f 81 persons per square kilom etre
for all sectors and a density o f 76 persons per square kilom etre for the rural sector (NSO
1994:30).6 H ow ever, in m ost parts o f the province, especially w here large populations are
concentrated on the floor o f the W ahgi valley and on the O gelbeng plains around M ount
H agen, the population density is believed to be m uch higher at around 200 persons per square
kilom etre.
Fourthly, the provincial capital, M ount H agen, is the main com m ercial centre for the Highlands
region, providing banking, transport and com m unication facilities for individuals and businesses
operating in Enga, Sim bu and Southern H ighlands provinces. T he airport at Kagamuga, w hich
now offers a direct route to Cairns in Australia, is the m ain point o f entry and departure for
these provinces, and hence the tow n has becom e the main service centre for the oil and gold
exploration and exploitation. Econom ically, the W estern Highlands Province is Papua N ew
G uinea’s largest producer o f coffee and tea (Turner 1994:228), a p oint echoed in a recent study:
Its rural economy accounts for half o f Papua New Guinea’s coffee exports and almost
all o f the tea crop, while the provincial capital, Mount Hagen dominates h e regional
business economy by virtue o f its favourable location on the highlands road network, a
plentiful supply o f land for subdivision near the town, an airport capable o f handling jet
aircraft, and a service sector primed for expansion by the size o f h e plantation sector.
If5by h e mid-1980s, Mount Hagen did not surpass Goroka in hese respects, gpld, oil
6.

O n land area in h e W estern Highlands Province, h e re is a discrepancy between h e National Statistical
Office figure o f 8,897 square kilometres (1994:29) and a recent figure o f 9,147 square kilometres given by
Burton and K eher (1997:155). O n h e basis o f h e NSO figure, it was calculated h a t h e crude (arithmetic)
population density, which is defined as h e num ber o f persons per square kilometre, was 38 persons per
square kilometre at h e time o f h e 1990 Census (NSO 1994:30; Table 11:30). As pointed out by .h e
National Statistical Office, “crude population density gives however a rather misleading picture o f h e real
population-land situation and problem s, particularly in a province like W estern Highlands Province where
m ost people are engaged in agricultural activities. A far m ore meaningful measure o f population density in
h e case o f W estern Highlands Province is h e num ber o f persons per km2 o f land which can be used for
agriculture, (arable land*)” (NSO 1994:29). Citing a 1986 CSIRO figure o f only 4,135 square kilometres o f
land in the province being effectively used for agriculture, NSO arrived at h e physiological population
density figure o f 81 persons per square kilometre (NSO 1994:30; Table 11:13).
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and gas developments to the west at Porgera and Mount Kare, in Enga, and at Iagifu
and Hides, in Southern Highlands, have since given rise to an investment boom which
has assured Mount Hagen an unchallengeable position as the primary service centre of
the Highlands region (Burton and Keher 1997:152).
T he coffee industry alone, com prising large locally-owned plantations — notably G um anch,
K injibi, K otna, Penga, W urup, K indeng, Aviamp, Kimil, Warn K ar, and Kudjip — and small
holdings m aintained on an individual basis, is w orth about K250 million p er annum , a figure
w hich includes other provinces.7 Significantly, all o f these are located in the upper and middle
parts o f the W ahgi valley. T he operations in tw o other large plantations, Tigi in the eastern
Baiyer Valley and K orgua in the N ebilyer Valley, have been disrupted by tribal warfare.
Fifthly, the leaders o f the country’s m ajor political parties are based in M ount H agen, w ith partyaligned interest groups clearly at w ork here, perhaps reaching a level o f political integration that
is m uch m ore cohesive than in other parts o f the country. Names such as Paias W ingti, Paul
Pora and M ichael M el go way beyond local boundaries. A history o f com petition between partyaligned interest groups has been analysed in the context o f the W estern Highlan ds Provincial
G overnm ent and the rivalry between the People’s D em ocratic M ovem ent (PDM) Party and the
N ational Party (see Chapter Seven). B oth PD M , headed by Paias W ingti, and the two factions o f
the N ational Party, headed separately by Paid Pora and M ichael Mel, have strong following in
the M ount H agen Central area, b u t are n o t as strong in other parts o f the province. The other
m ajor P N G parties w ith H ageners as leaders are: Pangu Pad (with K om bukla tribesm an, Pati
W am p, as the national president); and the People’s Progress Party (PPP, with Jika Milakamb
r1ansmar>? G len K om om ga, as its national president). B oth Pangu and PPP are relatively weak in
term s o f party following in Hagen because m ost people view them as the nambis o r coastal
parties and their nom inal H agen leaders as m ere window dressing (bibs tasol). It is nonetheless
the com petition betw een such m en and their followings and the problem s that stem from such
behaviour w hich form the focus o f this study.
A lthough H agen politics may be influenced by unique circumstances, it has strong implications
for P N G political culture because Hagen leaders such as W ingti, Pora and Mel also operate at
provincial, regional and national levels. Furtherm ore, H agen shares w ith other Highlands
societies

com m on historical, cultural and linguistic characteristics. Conversely, there is

also considerable variation w ithin the Highlands and at times Hays s (1993) fuzzy-set’ seems
applicable. A ccording to Hays, ‘“the N ew G uinea Highlands’ as used in anthropological
discourse exemplifies well w hat cognitive psychologists would call a ‘fuzzy set”’, w hich m eans
7.

As indicated by Turner (1994:58), coffee is by far the m ost im portant cash crop in Papua New Guinea,
and the K103 million w orth o f beans exported in 1990 (55,000 metric tons) represented 9.2 per cent o f
total PN G exports. Every adult male in Hagen may be engaged in coffee smallholding. Tea, by contrast, is
n o t viewed as attractive because o f poor prices, and it is therefore grown by plantations. According to
Turner (1994:212), in 1990 K6.7 million w orth o f tea was exported, mainly to Australia.
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that “despite attempts to specify attributes (elevation, population density, agricultural techniques,
staple crops, settlement types, o r social institutions such as ceremonial exchange), when
anthropologists assign societies to ‘the Highlands’ these attributes are less often truly diagnostic
than loosely employed, with weightings on sliding scales” (1993:145).
While the cultural delineation o f the P N G Highlands may be blurred by overlapping
characteristics, the geographical, political and administrative region called the P N G Highlands is
made up o f five provinces: Eastern Highlands, Simbu, W estern Highlands, Enga and Southern
Highlands. Initially starting as the Central Highlands District, the area was divided into Eastern
Highlands, W estern Highlands, and Southern Highlands Districts in 1952. Enga and Simbu
provinces were subsequently creations from W estern and Eastern Highlands, in 1966 and 1973,
respectively (Iamo and Ketan 1992:22). It is easily the m ost densely populated region in PN G .
The resident population o f the Highlands region in 1990 was 1,371,000 persons, or 36.7 per cent
o f the total P N G population o f 3.7 million (NSO 1994). The highest concentration o f
population in the Highlands, according to the 1990 Census, is illustrated below (see Figure 1. /).

Figure 1.1: PNG Population by Region (1990)
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There are some seventy-two linguistic groups, ranging from the smallest (Some and Abaga), with
only 150 speakers, to the country’s second largest (Enga together with Kyaka), with over 200,000
speakers. There is a tendency for linguistic groups to become larger going from east to west in
the central mountain valleys, while the language groups on the Highlands fringe remain small
(Iamo and Ketan 1992:22; see also Feil 1987:140-167). The cultural, linguistic, geographical and
administrative region described here as the PN G Highlands is indicated in Map 3.
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Ethnographic Sources
T o date, the literature on P N G Highlands societies in general, and the Hagen area in particular,
is quite substantial, both in volum e and in the richness o f observation and analysis it contains.
M uch o f this literature contains anthropological debates on characteristics o f ‘traditional’ PN G
H ighlands societies, ranging from descent and kinship relations to group structures, social
organisation, leadership and politics. A significant part o f this literature extends back to the early
years o f European contact M uch o f social scientists’ knowledge o f pre-colonial and post
contact Hagen society is owed to the writings o f Lutheran missionaries, Geoxg Vicedom
(Vicedom and Tischner 1943-8) and H erm ann Strauss (Strauss and Tischner 1962). Vicedom
was based at O gelbeng from 1935 onwards and his w ork covers a wide range o f them es, ranging
from myths and genealogies to ceremonial exchange and leadership. H e w orked mostly w ith the
Jika and Yamka groups around O gelbeng and, mainly on the basis o f genealogies and originm yths, concluded that they were descendants o f a ‘m aster race* which colonised Hagen from the
West*. Vicedom , however, did n o t know that the W est’ from which Jika and Yamka came from
was in feet the Kaugel and Tam bul areas, n o t som e distant foreign places as he may have
thought (see A.J. Strathem 1987:253). O f particular interest is his picture o f Hagen with a high
degree o f stratification. H is publication, Die Mbowamb is massive (three large volumes), and o f
considerable value if read w ith a critical eye, for example, to its full-blown m aster race theory
(see M edan and Rumsey 1991-30-31; see also A.J. Strathem 1971, 1987 for a critical review o f
Vicedom ’s m aterial o f stratification and his ‘light-skinned m aster race* theory). Vicedom’s
countrym an and missionary colleague, Strauss came to O gelbeng in 1936 and his Die Mi-Kulture
is largely a study o f H agen cults, but contains observations on ceremonial exchange and other
aspects o f H agen society as w ell Strauss w orked mostly am ong the Nengka people o f Mul
Council. N oting discrepancies between Vicedom and Strauss’s interpretations, A.J. Strathem
says:
D espite th e fact th at they w ere m issionaries o f th e sam e church and th e sam e nation,
thpir p ictures o f H agen society differed considerably and it clear th at a political
dim ension underlies th is difference o f view. V icedom ’s hierarchical, blood-based,
pictu re reflects m ore th e G erm an ideology o f th e tim e. Strauss, w riting w ith m uch
b e tte r co n tro l o f th e language an d b etter rap p o rt w ith th e people, as w ell as th e defeat
o f his country in th e w ar b eh in d him , gives an account w hich is closer to th o se o f th e
academ ic anthropologists w h o w orked in neighbouring areas o f th e H ighlands in th e
1950s an d 1960s (A J. S trathem 1987:254).

O ther early works were by the Catholic missionary Father Ross (1936) and G idow (1947), an
Am erican military officer stationed in M ount Hagen during the war, w hose knowledge o f
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‘H agen econom ic relations* com es from Ross* notes (see Sim pson 1954; A J. Strathem 1987;
M edan and Rumsey 1991).8
Professional anthropologists began w orking in H agen during the 1960s, w ith Marilyn and
A ndrew Strathem am ong H agen Central and D ei C ouncil groups and E. Brandewie am ong Mul
C ouncil groups. Brandewie conducted his fieldwork in 1963-65 am ong the K um di people o f
W estern M elpa. H e has recently published a general ethnographic account o f the K um di, w ith
special em phases o n marriage and exchange. A ndrew and Marilyn Strathem have consistently
w orked in H agen since 1964. T heir initial fieldw ork in 1964-5 and 1968 (18 m onths) was
conducted mainly am ong m y people, the Kawelka o f N orthern and C entral Melpa. From this
and subsequent visits over the years, the Strathem s have published extensively, counting at least
ten books and countless papers. H aving read their w ork for m ore than 15 years, I have benefited
quite significantly from their w ork, particularly A ndrew Strathem ’s, w hich has had a m ajor
influence in my academic life.9 H is book The Rope of Moka (1971) is a study o f cerem onial
exchange and leadership, while One Father, One Blood (1972) looks at group structure and
ideology. Som e o f his o th er H agen volum es are Ongka: a Self-account by a New Guinea Big-man
(1979b), translated by A,J. Strathem ; A Line ofRower (1984), a study o f political and social change
in H agen and Pangia; Ru: Biography ofa Western Highlander (1993), translated by A.J. Strathem . Self

Decoration in Mount Hagen (1971), in collaboration w ith Marilyn Strathem , is a study o f facial and
body decoration as art in Hagen. Marilyn (A.M.) Strathem has produced four volumes: Official

and Unofficial Courts (1972a), a study o f indigenous and introduced dispute m anagem ent
procedures; Women in Between (1972b), a study o f M elpa marriage and the role o f w om en as links
betw een different groups; No Money on Our Skins (1975), a study o f H agen m igrants in P o rt
M oresby; and The Gender of the Gift (1988), a com parative study o f exchange addressing
anthropological theories o f gender in M elanesia.10

According to Colin Simpson (1954), Abraham L. Gidow, “a w ar history officer o f the U.S. Far E ast A ir
Service Command” visited M ount Hagen during the Second W orld War. “Gidow w ho had been trained
as an econom ist and was to study anthropology on his return to America, remained at M ount Hagen for
several weeks” during which “he gathered a great deal o f material on the native way o f life, m ost o f it from
Father William Ross, and he was also helped by M ajor George Greathead” (1954:106). I take up the
discussion in Chapter Two and Chapter Six, but at this stage it should be pointed out that both Ross and
Gidow’s material in particular m ust be treated with caution and we can question die validity o f their data in
view o f their lack o f training in anthropological fieldwork and Gidow’s in the context o f his severely
restricted time fram e o f “several weeks”.
9

10

In hindsight, it was perhaps no co-incidence that my high school headmaster presented me w ith brand
new copies o f A J. Strathem ’s m ajor volumes, The Ripe o fM oka (1971) and One Father, One Blood (1972),
during the 1982 Sogeri National High School Graduation, a ceremony which A J. Strathem kindly
attended at the school’s invitation.
B oth Andrew and Marilyn Strathem are amazingly prolific writers and whilst it is difficult to give an exact
figure, in 1993, at least for Andrew Strathem I counted 18 books, 138 articles, 10 com m ents, 91 reviews
and 8 papers in progress (all com plete manuscripts, som e subm itted for publication).
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I have also draw n from studies on people in neighbouring areas, notably Francesca M edan and
Alan Rumsey’s (1991) w ork am ong the Nebilyer, John Muke’s (1994) study on warfare am ong
die K um a o f South Wahgjt; M ichael O ’H anlon’s (1989) w ork am ong the K om blo o f N orth
WahgL O ther studies, including Marie Reay’s (1959) w ork on the Kuma, Roy R appaporfs
(1984[originally 1968]) w ork am ong the M ating and Paula Brown’s (1963; 1972) w ork in
Chim bu, are m entioned in the relevant discussions.

PNG Political Studies
Studies on P N G politics can be classified into two broad categories, depending on traditional
disciplinary em phasis on different levels o f political com petition. O n the one hand is the study
o f local-level, tribally-based politics, while on the other hand is the narional-provindal-level
politics. Generally, the form er involves com petition between individuals and groups in local
arenas o f com petition and cooperation, such as warfare and ceremonial exchange. This is the
kind o f stuff w hich anthropologists have traditionally been interested in. A nd the latter involves
com petition w ithin state structures and legitimising processes o f governance. T hat is the kind o f
stu ff which political scientists have traditionally been interested in. Recent evidence indicates a
third category w hich we may call ‘transitional studies’, involving changing and continuing
patterns o f leadership and political behaviour. Examples o f local-level studies can be found in
B em dt and Lawrence (ed. 1971), for ‘transitional studies’ (see, for example, W ard ed. 1970; A.J.
Strathem 1984; G ordon and Meggitt 1985; W arry 1987; Standish 1992), and for nationalprovincial-level, there are num erous election studies (Bettison, Hughes and van der V eur, eds.
1965; Epstein, Parker and Reay, eds. 1971; Stone ed. 1976; Hegarty ed. 1983; T urner and
Hegarty 1987; K ing ed. 1989; O liver e d 1989; Saffu e d 19%). The election studies cover the
seven national elections between 1964 and 1992 and all, except T urner and Hegarty (1987),
contain a collection o f papers by anthropologists, political scientists and others on different
electorates w ithin the country. T he problem s that stem from electoral behaviour and other types
o f com petition have also been analysed (see, for example, Clifford, M orauta and Stuart 1984;
D innen 1996b); as have Australian responses to PN G ’s security problem s (see, for example,
A nderson ed. 1990; Thom pson ed. 1994). In addition, there are some useful general studies
(D om ey 1990; Mangi 1992) as well as those dealing with specific them es, such as political parties
(W olfers 1970; Loveday and W olfers 1976; Loveday 1976); political decentralisation and locallevel governm ents (Conyers 1976; Standish 1979; W olfers, Conyers, Larm our and G hai 1982;
Larm our and Q alo eds. 1985; G hai and Regan 1992; Peasah 1994; May and Regan eds. 1997);
developm ent associations (Gerritsen, May and W alter 1981; May ed. 1982); social stratification
(A J. Strathem e d 1982; May ed. 1984); alcohol consum ption and associated problem s (Marshall
e d 1982; Iam o and K etan 1992); the cultivation and sale o f the marijuana drug (Iamo 1991);
dom estic violence (Toft and Bonnell 1985; T oft e d 1986); election-related violence (Iamo ed.
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1992; D ian ea 1996a; K etan 19% ; Standish 1996); tribal w arfare (see, for exam ple, Standish 1973;
K erpi 1976; M eggitt 1977; A.J. Strathem 1977; 1992; G ordon 1983; R appaport 1984 [originally
1968]; G ordon and M eggitt 1985; B urton 1989b, 1990a, 1990b; Muke 1994); raskol gangs (see
Reay 1982b, 1987a; M orauta ed. 1986; H am s 1988; K etan et al 1988; G oddard 1992 and 1995;
D innen 1993a, 1993b, 1995 and 1996b; R ulick 1993; Borrey 1994); and different types o f
conflict resolution procedures (see A.M. Strathem 1972a on ‘official and unofficial courts’;
Scaglion ed. 1981 on ‘hom icide com pensation’; and T o ft ed. 1997 on ‘com pensation for
resource developm ent3).
My study contains elem ents o f all three categories, linking local-level com petition to national
politics. T he approach I have taken here, in looking at the different ways in w hich local groups,
coalitions, factions and their leaders interact w ithin and betw een local and national arenas o f
com petition, is som ew hat similar to that taken by A ndrew Strathem and Bill Standish (see, for
exam ple, A.J, Strathem 1984,1992, 1993; Standish 1983, 1989, 1992). But there are im portant
differences betw een their studies and m ine. It is, for instance, evident in their studies that there is
significant em phasis on rigidity and solidity in A.J. Strathem ’s as well as Standish’s picture o f
society and groups in relation to the various spheres o f com petition and cooperation.
D iscussion o f arenas such as cerem onial exchange and elections reflect an extraordinarily high
quality o f analysis, yet neither A.J. Strathem n o r Standish was able to consistently link them
together in a systematic fashion because o f the disciplinary nature o f their studies. I have
deliberately selected these tw o observers because their w ork is directly relevant to this study and
if I appear to be hypercritical o f their w ork, then it is because o f the great influence their studies
— the m ajor w orks on P N G bridging local and national politics— have had on my w o rk
A.J. Strathem and Standish have consistently w orked in the H ighlands — their observations
spanning three decades — and w hilst they both recognised the resilience o f indigenous
institutions and rem arked on the innovative m anner in w hich H ighlanders have coopted
introduced and state resources for deploym ent in local arenas o f com petition, the interactive
relationship betw een com ponents o f the state and indigenous political institutions has n o t been
fully explored. F or them , th e ‘boundaries’ o f the various arenas o f com petition seem to be quite
constant and the types o f leaders w ho operate w ithin them appear clearly defined as ‘big-m en’,
o r ‘despots’, ‘fight-leaderi, o r w hatever, that is, o f one particular kind in a given context, n o t
‘com binatory’ o r ‘generalised’. T he nature o f ‘group’ needs further exploration too. A J.
Strathem , for instance, looked at groups (and their leaders) and the way they relate to each other
through w arfare and moka exchanges. A lthough he did point o u t the shifting nature o f alliance
system s, his considerations for political groups was mainly in solidary term s — alm ost as if these
w ere ready-m ade units.
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This study differs from theirs by cleady dem onstrating that political fields and the groups w ho
operate w ithin them are basically political ‘constructions’ which are created by different types o f
leaders for different purposes. T he boundaries o f political com petition are therefore constantly
shaped and reshaped by die actions o f leaders. A nd it is im portant to realise that the same ‘bigmen* w ho m anipulate wealth to gain prestige can also be shockingly despotic at tim es, o r take on
o th er attributes w hen it suits them . In other w ords, this study differs from A J. Strathem ’s by
arguing that ‘big-m an’ is n o t (and perhaps never has been) die defining character o f H agen
leadership. It will be argued that there are other types o f leaders and also that one leader can
assume different attributes at different times and in various contexts.
By studying electoral politics, Standish, like m ost other political scientists, was looking at the
output side o f political action (not the input side). From his detailed study o f different paths to
pow er in Simbu (Standish 1992) and other similar studies, especially the num erous election
studies (Standish 1976; 1983; 1989; 1996), it is quite possible to understand the process at work
here. It is evident from these studies that success in elections has its rewards, the reverse o f the
pain and suffering that failure brings. Also evident is the pervasive process o f patronage and
com peting values attached to the managem ent — and mismanagement — o f state resources.
Election studies and other similar studies that concentrate on the output side o f political action
are im portant because they present us the opportunity to understand the process involved in the
legifimisation o f leaders’ claims to govern states. Such studies, however, offer little insight to the
processes w hich take place before elections. This is precisely w here the current study can make a
contribution. It offers insights into the dynamics o f local politics and the way it relates to state
politics. In particular, it examines the processes that take place before elections, including the pre
selection phase, and the reasons why som e groups cooperate in order to com pete against others.
By looking at the contem porary netw ork o f pow er blocs operating in diveiging political fields
— such as D ei, M ul and H agen electorates — and the proclaimed historical ties between key
players (core groups and their leaders), this study is bringing into the literature a new phase (of
escalation and integration) o f Hagen politics. Despite their continued interest in political
developm ents in Papua N ew Guinea, the main strength/focus o f A.J. Strathem s m ajor studies
on H agen politics, like Standish’s in Chim bu, was the 1970s. There was in fact a massive am ount
o f academic w ork in the era o f independence, but then a general decline in interest In this study
I attem pt to help rectify that situation by looking at the trends o f the 1980s and their
m anifestations in the 1990s.

Trends and Patterns o f Political Competition
A n exam ination o f the patterns o f political com petition in Hagen indicate that the m odem state
o f P N G remains at a very rudim entary level o f integration and its leaders face m ajor difficulties
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in dealing w ith m ounting problem s o f internal security. R ecent developm ents, including
escalating levels o f violence in the P N G H ighlands and other parts o f the country, raise
considerable concern and, m oreover, indicate that the P N G state exists in the m idst o f a very
turbulent society (Standish 1994; K etan 1995; Saffu 1996). T he problem s associated w ith the
secessionist m ovem ent in Bougainville, the resurgence in tribal warfare in the five H ighlands
provinces, and o f urban crim e and violence in P o rt M oresby, Lae and other m etropolitan
centres are well know n through extensive m edia coverage, b oth locally and internationally. But
international observers in Australia, N orth A m erica and E urope hear very litde about the
enduring trials and tribulations o f the liberal dem ocratic process in the m odem state o f Papua
N ew G uinea. A glance at die recent literature on the P N G H ighlands, how ever, shows a
consistent pattern o f violence and lawlessness as a direct consequence o f political action by
prom inent individuals and groups com peting for pow er and influence (see, for example,
Standish 1992, 1994, 1996, 1997; A.J. Strathem 1992, 1993; K etan 1995, 1996; and D innen
1996a, 1996b). W hilst this study on M ount H agen is a small contribution tow ards identifying
som e o f the problem s that result from political action, w hich m eans that it does n o t drastically
differ from those m entioned above, it does, how ever, provide special insights into the
underlying traditional norm s and ideologies behind the political practices o f local groups and
their leaders. In other w ords, this study involves a shift in em phasis from one based on w hat
people are and w hat they do to why they do the things they do. This, in m y view, is taking a step
further along die lines o f T .E . Hays’s (1993) plea for a shift from studies o f m orphology to
studies o f process.
Although the thesis basically com prises interlinking case studies o f mainly local-level politics, it
does cover the m uch w ider issues o f com peting legitimacies and state-society interactions.
Escalating levels o f violence and the deliberate infringem ent o f PN G electoral regulations are
discussed in the context o f electoral m anoeuvring by pow erful individuals, as an innovative
extension o f rivalry betw een equally pow erful and, in som e instances, party-aligned interest
groups operating w ithin well established local arenas o f com petition and co-operation.
It can be argued, on the basis o f case studies on Hagen conflict and political action, that the
post-colonial P N G state has continuously failed to take control o f conflict situations in an
authoritative m anner, thereby exemplifying Migdal’s (1988) m odel o f V eak state versus strong
societies’ (see also Standish 1993,1994,1996; D innen 19 9 4 ,1996a, 1997b). Increasingly violent
elections, blatant disregard for electoral regulations, coupled w ith gun warfare and the general
breakdow n in law and orderi are prim e indicators o f governm ent w ithout political strength and
co n tro l W hen societies o p t for com pensation — as well as m ore violent m eans such as payback
killings — as an avenue for conflict resolution, this suggests a lack o f confidence in the state
judicial system , w hich was never fully in control o f the society. H aving realised the relatively
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weak nature o f the state, the people have on num erous occasions taken the law into their own
hands. A nd m any have gone unpunished. Elections, as will be show n, are a farce. V iolence is
com m onplace and voters are coerced to vote in a particular way.
Similarly, in tribal w arfare, the police are often powerless to intervene. Available data suggest that
n o m ajor arm ed conflict has been resolved as a result o f state intervention. Instead, it has been
local groups them selves w ho have reached peace agreements (often w ith local Christian m ission
leaders acting as m ediators). Politicians, to w hom people could look for guidance, are themselves
caught up in intricate w ebs o f social relations w hich underm ine their integrity as leaders. It is
widely believed that som e o f them (and som e policem en also) have supplied guns to tribesm en
as part o f electoral m anoeuvring. They on the one hand are lawmakers and on the other hand
are held responsible for lawlessness (see A J. Strathem 1993; see also Standish 1992 and 1996).
Recognising that “m any o f these problem s are political, and involve com plex social and state
structures” (Standish 1994:51), P N G H ighlands disorder can be best understood from a ‘statesociety interaction’ perspective. Accordingly, explored here are questions o f how and why
people in H agen respond to elections, and in ways that may seem peculiar to outsiders. W hy, for
example, are elections such extravagantly expensive exercises, coupled w ith correspondingly
high levels o f violence? W ho are the key players and w hat are the rules, if any at all, involved? It
can be argued that one cannot satisfactorily answ er such questions w ithout understanding the
cultural and historical background o f P N G Highlands societies. Electoral behaviour on the one
hand is tied in w ith traditional norm s and ideologies o f group solidarity in com petition for
tem porary advantages and on the other hand influenced by new econom ic resources and the
w ider process o f socio-political change. In a general context, people in Hagen and the
H ighlands, as in other parts o f the country, are trying to com e to term s w ith the rapid transition
from traditionally subsistence agricultural-based societies to a capitalist economy. But m ore
specifically, this study is about the strategies and ploys o f individuals and groups in com petition
for pow er and control over valued scarce resources.
From 1980 to 1995, provincial governm ent elections form ed an im portant arena o f com petition
fo r local leaders and their groups, and success in elections m eant access to governm ent funds
and resources, b u t the abolition o f the provincial governm ent system by the national
governm ent in July 1995 has som ew hat altered the level and possibly the intensity o f the
com petition. T he background to the demise o f the system o f elected provincial governm ent in
general and the W estern H ighlands Provincial G overnm ent in particular will also be explored in
this thesis.
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National and Regional Significance
W hile the thesis is prim arily based on field research conducted in just one part o f the PN G
H ighlands, and my discussions are based on H agen cases and events w hich may be influenced
by unique circum stances, the issues raised here are o f both regional and national significance.
A ccordingly, this study provides som e new evidence on w ider state-society interaction in Papua
N ew G uinea. Som e election strategies m entioned here, such as sponsorship o f a candidate by a
clan other than his ow n (as form o f solidtory gift requesting reparation paym ent from an ally for
w ar deaths), the courtship o f ‘name-list* groups and the protection o f a candidate’s ‘base-vote5
area, have n o t been previously reported elsewhere. Evidence presented here and elsewhere
(K etan 1995; Standish 1996) suggests that elections in recent times have n o t been free and fair.
W hile som e observers (Reay 1987; Standish 1992, 1994 and 1996; A.J. Strathem 1993; and
D innen 1996) and the participants them selves are aware o f the problem s such as voter coercion
and punitive and retaliatory raids organised by supporters o f losing candidates, these kind o f
stories are rarely brought to the attention o f authorities in the capital P ort M oresby, and
international observers probably hear m uch less.11

Competing Them es and Questions
T he key question here is w hat happens w hen the state (usually the colonial state) com es into
contact w ith ‘traditional5 (so-called stateless), pre-capitalist, indigenous societies? W hen analysing
society’s reaction to structural changes, one m ust consider the relative strengths and weaknesses
o f society, including its capacity to absorb, ignore and subvert state authority, and its resilience to
change. In H agen, as in other parts o f P N G and in Melanesia, it has been a com bination o f
resilience, as dem onstrated by a remarkable capacity to absorb change, and ‘strength5, as
expressed through subversive challenges m ade against state authority, disdainfully ignoring the
state’s traditional W eberian claim to a m onopoly over the legitimate use o f force (including
violence) and, m oreover, clearly and forcefully calling the state’s legitimacy into question.
A m ost rem arkable part o f externally induced social change in the P N G Highlands is the
resilience o f indigenous prestige institutions like the H agen ntoka, Enga tee; o r the Sim bu bugia

gende cerem onial exchange systems. Equally remarkable is the constant use o f local ideologies —o f custom ary use o f violence in conflict resolution, o r o f d an solidarity as expressed through
bloc voting, o r o f leaders as m agnets for attracting and distributing wealth — to justify political

11.

In view o f an official tendency for brusqueness and scant regard for inform ation on election-related
violence and the state’s incapacity o r weakness for maintaining public order, it was reassuring to read ihe
Electoral Commissioner's report to the sixth parliament on the 1997 National Election. Unfortunately, die
rather obscure and elliptical reference to “problem s that continue to plague the conduct o f elections in the
country" in Kaiulo (1997b) does little towards finding ways to solving such problem s.
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action in contem porary arenas o f com petition. Such processes have been described by som e
observers as indigenous values and ideologies ‘penetrating’, ‘capturingf, o r ‘colonising’ the state
(see, for exam ple, G ordon and M eggitt 1985; Standish 1992; 1994; D innen 1997a; 1997b). W hile
these are useful ways o f explaining som e o f the m ore com plex processes at w ork in PN G and in
M elanesia, I w ould suggest, on the basis o f data presented in this study, that the overall situation
is one o f incorporation rather than each having colonisedcom ponents o f the other.
My use o f the concept ‘incorporation’ is indeed appropriate for H agen, as it represents an
accurate sum m ation o f the m aterial presented here. By incorporation, it means that the state has
been fitted into the H agen political system, thereby emphasising the ‘mutually transform ing’ o r
m utuality aspect o f state-society interactions (see Migdal et al 1994). It is therefore necessary to
analytically distinguish ‘incorporation’ from ‘penetration’ (as in the penetration o f the state by the
Enga; G ordon and M eggitt 1985:181), ‘capture’ (which implies taking hold o f som ething), and
‘colonisation’, as in the “PN G State being colonised by Simbu political values” (Standish
1992:250), o r by “Melanesian ideologies and political strategies” (Standish 1994:60); o r “the
system (state and business) by the M elanesian ‘lifew odd’ [society]” (Dinnen 1997a:16; 1997b:22).
These are definitely pow erful concepts w hich can capture the imagination o f the reader, yet in
them selves represent a som ew hat misleading picture o f state-society relations. In seeking to
correct the Euro-centric view o f the colonial state which denies the ‘agency’ and autonom y o f
indigenous society, they tend to give an im pression o f a one-way process, whereby the mutuality
o f state-society interactions is n o t adequately represented.
T he incorporation o f the P N G state into Hagen society is, in essence, w hat this thesis is all
a b o u t It is a detailed local-level study about how and why local groups, coalitions, factions and
their leaders have brought the state into the Hagen m oral universe, incorporating com ponents
o f the state and the m odem econom y, as part o f their com petition. This study deals with
questions o f how and to w hat extent one system has ‘captured’ the other, if at all, and also
examines the w ider im plications o f such developm ents, particularly in the context o f statesociety relations and com peting legitimacies o f political systems. Also addressed are some key
issues, such as the conflicting role o f politicians in local conflicts and the use o f state resources in
prom oting local interests, thereby raising questions o f loyalty between state and society. Such
reactions to change are certainly n o t unique to Melanesia, as there are examples in Africa and
other parts o f the w orld (see, for example, Ekeh 1975; Randall and Theobald 1985; Chazan et al
1988; B oone 1994).

Some Analytical Concepts and Approaches
T he contem porary relations betw een the P N G state and the various indigenous political units
involve a high degree o f complexity and their description requires the use o f a range o f analytical
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tools w ith som e proficiency. But even the m ost accom plished analysts have encountered serious
problem s com ing to term s w ith trends and patterns in PN G and the Third W orld, so one can
imagine how difficult it is for a novice like m e com ing from a general social science background.
It is, how ever, hoped that my w ork can take an interstitial position betw een anthropology and
political science, and thus will draw from both fields as well as from other disciplines w ithin the
social sciences in order to construct suitable explanations for developm ents and associated
problem s in PN G .
T he difficulties encountered by social scientists in dealing with state-society relations in PN G ,
tropical Africa and other parts o f the T hird W orld is chiefly attributed to the inherent limitations
o f theoretical approaches. It is possible to distinguish two broad views, reflecting opposite sides
to the debate. O n the one hand is the overly optim istic view o f developm ent fostered mainly by
the 1960s m odernisation and political developm ent theories, which hold that recently
decolonised countries would progress to the level o f W estern societies, while on the other hand,
is a rather pessimistic view fostered by the 1970s dependency and underdevelopm ent theories,
which hold that T hird W orld states were economically dependent on the First W orld and for as
long as they m aintained ties w ith their form er colonial rulers, they would remain underdeveloped
and heavily dependent on foreign aid. As indicated by Chazan, et al (1988:14), m odernisation
theories em anated from the W est and were closely related to developm ents in the U.S. political
science in the 1950s.
T he m odernisation approach seems to have been heavily influenced by early social theories o f
societies, w ith a particularly disturbing evolutionary twist to i t Randall and Theobald (1985:2)
noted that it was probably inevitable that the pronounced evolutionary strain inherent in classical
sociology be transm itted via its contem porary exemplars to the study o f the T hird W orld. They
further say that:
A basic an d usually explicit assum ption o f th e m odernisation theories w e have been
considering w as th a t th e ‘developing’ societies o f A sia, A frica, an d L atin A m erica w ere
in th e pro cess o f bein g transform ed in to stable dem ocracies o f th e w estern pluralist
type. T h ere can b e little d o u b t th a t th e already-industrialised w orld, especially th e US,
p ro v id ed th e m o d el fo r political m odernity just as fo r m odernity in g en eral T he
dem ocratic ideal, it seem ed, h ad reached its zenith in th e W est an d this w as th e
co n d itio n tow ards w hich th e societies o f th e T h ird W o d d w ere evolving. T h e traum as
an d strains o f th is transform ation are frequently intense b u t they are w o rth enduring fo r
th e goal, once arrived at —- an d arrival w as th o u g h t to b e inevitable — w ill b e m ore
th an adequate com pensation (1985:2).

Basically, the W estern liberal democracies in Europe and N orth America were seen in the
W eberian sense as ideal-types and it was hoped w ith a fervent optim ism that the form er
European colonies in Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Pacific would ultimately end up as
‘carbon copies’ o f the political systems found in the W est The inherent fallacies o f this
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approach were recognised by both neo-M arxist and dependency theorists, am ong others, in
Africa and Latin America. Drawing from their own experiences with econom ic conditions in
Third W orld societies, particularly the hardships caused by scarce resources and unequal
distribution o f wealth from extractive mineral developm ent projects, Africans and Latin
Americans were sceptical o f the rewards prom ised by m odernisation theorists.
Theories o f dependency, with roots in neo-M arxist political theory, and underdevelopm ent
originating especially in Latin America were developed in direct opposition to the assumptions
o f the developm ent theory. In Africa, for instance, it was noted that:
T heories o f dependency and underdevelopm ent cam e in to vogue as a reaction to th e
prem ises an d sources o f political developm ent theory and w ere based o n th e opposite
assum ption th a t A frican progress has been, and continues to be, im peded by forces
(international a n d /o r dom estic) b en t o n th e ongoing exploitation o f th e co n tin en t and
its resources. A nd m oreover, these, prim arily capitalist, interests could only be held at
la y if th e global system underw ent a fundam ental change th at w ould alter th e structural
relations betw een th e T h ird W orld and th e industrialised w orld (underdevelopm ent) o r
betw een th e m asses and th e dom inant classes w ithin A frica (dependency). T hus, in
stark co n trast to th e m odernization approach, these theorists have focused n o t o n the
process o f developm ent b u t o n th e ro o ts o f underdevelopm ent (C hazan e td 1988:16).

Recent com m ents on PN G in Australia have tended to emphasise either optimism o r pessimism
w ithout m uch causal analysis. O ne is the rather paternalistic and benevolent view that
characterise PN G -A ustralia relations, a situation which many PN G politicians and bureaucrats
feel uncom fortable ab o u t This view is deeply rooted in the m odernisation approach and holds
that with a bit o f help from Australia, PN G can overcome its problem s and climb up that noble
path to good governance and economic prosperity (see, for example, Anderson ed. 1990).
T he other is the apocalyptic, o r to use the Australian Channel N ine’s Current Affairs presenter
Ray M artin’s concept, ‘tinderbox’, view fostered by the international media, which holds that
P N G is dangerously and precariously poised at the brink o f an abyss. H ere I sketch that view, in
order to contextualise my own study o f how local politics works in PN G .
Although ‘brinkm anship’, the practice o f gping near the edge o f the abyss before recovering, is
com m on in PN G , Australians have a tendency towards overreacting to crises situations, judging
from recent events associated w ith the infamous Sandline controversy o f March 1997 when
elem ents o f the PN G Defence Force rebelled against the ministers responsible for hiring
mercenaries ostensibly to eliminate rebel leaders on Bougainville. F or instance, there were
reports that the Australian Defence Force was preparing to invade the capital, P ort M oresby,
during the M arch 1997 political crises caused by the Sandline issue. In a subsequent Australian

Bulletin report, B rett M artin revealed that ‘O peration Baritone’ was set up to seize the Jacksons
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airport in P ort M oresby and evacuate up to 10,000 foreigners (including 5,000 Australians)
deem ed ‘at risk* (1997:20).
N oting that the political and civil malaise in P N G that led to the drafting o f O peration Baritone
goes deeper than the Sandline controversy, B rett M artin wrote:
C o rru p tio n is rife, m orale in th e [PN G ] defence force is low and th e general population
is angry th a t politicians have failed to deliver prom ised prosperity. A ustralian defence
analysts fear any perceived discrepancies in this m o n th ’s elections m ay be th e trigger fo r
a m ilitary coup o r p o p u lar re v o lt P N G is a dangerous place fo r foreigners in norm al
circum stances, b u t th e lives o f A ustralians an d o th er foreign nationals w ould be
seriously th reaten ed in any m ajor uprising (M artin 1997:20,22).

Such a view o f PN G is n o t uncom m on in Australia, despite PN G having dealt with the issue in
the June 1997 election, as it is evident in another Bulletin news article, in which Trevor W atson
reported that:
“T h e m o n ster is dead”, read th e b an n er draped o n th e fence surrounding defence
headquarters in P o rt M oresby to m ark C han’s stunning election d efeat T h e form er PM
w as perceived as arrogant, detached h o rn his people, to leran t o f high-level corruption
and incapable o f m anaging P N G ’s econom y. B ut m o st observers see h is defeat as
stem m ing fro m th e chaos th at follow ed his decision to spend $46 m illion hiring th e
Sandline m ercenaries to kill fellow Papua N ew G uineans o n Bougainville (1997:32).

PN G leaders, having grown accustomed to constant criticisms that accompany Australian aid,
are no longer surprised by the pessimistic picture o f PN G ’s future as depicted in the media by
journalists. All, however, cannot be dismissed as sensational journalism, because there is some
truth in reports o f violence and civil unrest in PN G . The apparent weakness o f the state is
forem ost am ong topics o f interest for PN G observers, and demands explanation.
So here I sketch several analytical concepts which may be useful in constructing suitable
explanations for the PN G situation, which have previously considered by others (see Hegarty
1989; A shton 1990; Standish 1994). They are: (1) Myrdal’s (1968) idea o f the ‘soft stated (2)
Tinker’s (1965) concept o f the ‘broken-backed’ state; (3) Lindblom’s (1959) notion o f ‘m uddling
through’; (4) the notion o f ‘upward colonisation’, or ‘Melanesian values colonising the state’
(G ordon and Meggitt 1985; Standish 1992); (5) Migdal’s (1988) concept o f V eak state versus
strong society5; (6) Filer’s (1992) notion o f ‘political disintegration’; and (7) A.J. Strathem ’s
(1993b) concept o f ‘disintegrative integration’. From this local level study I add to these my own
notion o f the Tlagen megacycle’, where the state and its events have been incorporated into the
Hagen political system.
David Hegarty (1989) found three concepts o r notions derived from the social science literature
useful: Myrdal’s ‘soft state’, Tinker’s ‘broken-backed’ state, and Lindblom’s ‘m uddling through’.
Hegarty says that “when liberally interpreted and appropriately m odified, these concepts provide
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a collective to both the overly pessimistic o r catastrophic view and to ovedy optim istic view,
w hich holds that P N G ’s problem s are akin to ‘grow ing pains”’ (1989:13).

A *soft state3?
Myrdal’s notion o f a ‘soft state’ is characterised by: a capacity for planning but little ability for
im plem entation; difficulty in enforcing laws; populist rhetoric for reform (land, population, etc.);
piecem eal policy action; a low level o f social discipline; and a tendency for corruption to increase
as opportunities for acquisition increase and standards o f probity am ong high-placed politicians
and officials is perceived to decline (Myrdal 1968; quoted in Hegarty 1989:13).

A ‘broken-backed’ state?
Tinker’s notion o f a ‘broken-backed’ state entails “a form o f quasi-governm ent which will
becom e familiar in the com ing years” (1965:114). Tinker predicted that “the centralised state will
cease to be” and that “the simulacrum o f governm ent will continue in the capital, but within
twenty miles there will be a total divorce between appearance and reality. The man with the gun
will have taken over” (1965:117). H e says that:
R epresentatives o f th e central governm ent w ill be stationed in th e districts. T hey w ill sit
u p o n th e verandahs o f th e im posing bungalow s o f th e o ld E u ro p ean d istrict officers,
an d they w ill b e called d istrict officers, b u t th eir w rit w ill n o t ru n as far as th e
com p o u n d wall. T h e real pow er in th e districts w ill be exercised by m en o f force. Som e
o f these w ill b e m inisters, w h o ru n th eir ow n sm all private arm ies, and w ho levy tribute
fro m all th e local m erchants an d traders, great and sm all T h en there w ill be d ie
u n d erground o r resistance leaders, w h o are quite frankly ban d its, and w h o levy th eir
trib u te fro m th e peasants as w ell as th e tow nsfolk. Finally, there w ill b e arm y o r m ilitary
police detachm ents, sen t to p ro tec t th e rural folk, and exercising th eir p ro tectio n w ith a
heavy h an d (T inker 1965:116).

D espite considerable violence and disorder, diminishing legitimacy o f the state and an almost
com plete breakdown o f the national machinery, society will not disintegrate into a state o f
anarchy. lif e will continue (as usual) in the rural areas (perhaps because o f the ‘strength’ and
resilience o f indigenous societies?). Tinker attributed this to the lo o se’ (or generalised?) nature o f
non-w estern societies:
W here th e w eb o f governm ent and econom ic life is so m uch loose, an d indeed m ore
p erfu n cto ry th an in o u r com plex, highly integrated w estern system s, does n o t entail a
gim ihr breakdow n in local life. A nd so there is n o dram atic national collapse: th ere is
ju st broken-backed governm ent. V ery few w estern journalists have u n d ersto o d this
p ro p o sitio n . ... B roken-backed governm ent m ay seem a p o o r th in g to th o se fortunate
en ough to live u n d er m ore dynam ic system s o f go v ern m en t B ut it has a quality w hich
h ard -b itten politicians rate highly, survival (1965:118-119).
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H ie ‘broken-backed’ state offers a m odel o f w hat m ight happen to the pluralist Third W odd
state if ‘things fall apart*, yet Hegarty was probably right in saying that Tinker presents a ‘bad
case*, rather than a V o rst case* outcom e:
In a ‘broken-backed’ state a fo rm o f quasi-governm ent exists; central institutions are
w eak; th e co n stitu en t elem ents (provinces) b o rd er o n secession and are interm ittently o r
sem i-petm anendy rebellious, b u t are capable o f cooperating w ith th e centre w hen
necessary (H egarty 1989:13).

Tinker’s concept o f the broken-backed state is applicable where the state cannot exert its
authority throughout the country and the application o f law is uneven (see Standish 1994:61).
A ccording to Chris A shton, a Sydney-based freelance journalist with African experience, PN G is
becom ing a broken-backed state:
T h at m eans th a t w hile a governm ent w ill continue in P o rt M oresby, funded by foreign
aid an d revenues h o rn resources developm ent projects, its w rit outside th e capital will
recede. Its relations w ith its provinces w ill be shaped by fluid, ad hoc arrangem ents
betw een national an d regional politicians holding pow er, rath er th an by over-arching
authority o f governm ent in P o rt M oresby (A shton 1990:35).

A shton also suggested that P N G could look forward to growing inequalities o f wealth stemming
from the m ining boom o f the 1990s, assuming it proceeded; to rising unem ploym ent and
popular resentm ent at failure by the governm ent to m eet rising expectations; and to interm ittent
challenges to the central governm ent’s dim inishing authority by localised groups seeking greater
autonom y (1990:36).
Some o f these claims will be considered in the relevant chapters o f the thesis, but it should be
noted here that recent problem s in PN G

— notably the Bougainville secession crises, the

Sandline controversy and the alleged corrupt deals involving Prime M inister Bill Skate and
Police M inister Thom as Pelika — suggest that a modified version o f the ‘broken-backed’ state
may be applicable.

\M uddling through V
T he third concept which Hegarty says that he finds useful in correcting the extreme views —
overly optim istic or overly pessimistic — on PN G is Lindblom’s notion o f ‘muddling through’,
which was developed in the context o f decision-making and administrative theory. H e defines it
in the following manner:
A s an approach to governing, ‘m uddling th rough’ w ould include an increm ental and n o t
necessarily ‘rational’ decision-m aking style, ‘ad hocery’ an d ‘seat-of-the-pants’ sem i
strategies fo r p ro b lem solving, d ie choice o f ends appropriate to th e available m eans
^ h e r th an a choice to adjust th e m eans, crises resolution th rough a trial-and-error
application o f sanctions and inducem ents o r sim ply by sitting o u t th e crises, and a
definite tendency tow ard th e ‘slow fix’, o r even ‘n o fix’ rath er th an th e ‘quick fix’.
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P olitical and bureaucratic practices becom e m odified (in th is instance, M eh n estamsed)
to su it th e political culture (L indblom 1959; q u o ted in H eggrty 1989:14).

*U pw ard colonisation*or M elanesian values colonising the state*?
G ordon and Meggitt’s (1985) notion o f ‘upward colonisation’ is similar to Standish’s (1992)
concept o f ‘Melanesian values colonising the state’, though both views were reached
independently, despite com m unications betw een G ordon and Standish. W hile com m enting on
state-society interpenetration between the P N G state and Enga, G ordon and Meggitt claim that:
T h e beliefs o f Engp. obviously d o n o t fit to o com fortably w ith th eir enforced entry in to
th e larger, contem porary w o rld , w h eth er colonial o r p o st-co lo n ial A s w e have said,
p erhaps th e p ersisten t p ro b lem o f th e breakdow n o f law and o rd er in E nga Province
should b e related n o t so m uch to th e p en etratio n o f th e state in to th e local affairs o f
E nga as to d ie in filtratio n o f agencies o f th e state by E nga in a process o f upw ard
co lo nisation (1985:181).

In a sim ila r way, Standish (1992) explains the m anner in which Simbu values have been utilised
within the new arenas created by the state and the use o f new political resources deriving from
the state w ithin Sim bu political arenas, com petition and conflicts. N oting the mutuality o f statesociety interaction and particularly the dom inance o f Simbu values in state politics, Standish says:
T h e pro cess w as th u s o n e o f interpenetration. I t could even be argued th at d ie
in tro d u ced state has b een co -o p ted in to Sim bu politics, o r b een colonised by Sim bu
p olitical values (1992350).12

W eak* State and ‘Strong* societies?
M elanesian societies’ remarkable capacity for resilience in the face o f rapid social c h a n ^ has
already been noted above. It is this tenacious character o f society, its ‘strength’, when opposed to
the relative ‘weakness’ o f the state that has contributed to m uch o f PN G ’s current problem s.
T he concept o f the Sveak state’ was developed by Joel Migdal (1987, 1 9 8 8 , 1994). H e defined
strength in te rm s o f state capabilities, which include:
...
to penetrate society, regulate social relationships, extract resources, and
appropriate o r u se resources in determ ined ways. S trong states are th o se w ith high
to com plete th ese tasks, w hile w eak states are o n th e low’ end o f a spectrum
o f capabilities (1988:4-5).

Arguing from

a state-society interaction perspective, Standish (1994), using MigdaPs

term inology, suggested that Papua N ew G uinea has ‘strong’ societies, autonom ous but divided
T he state, by contrast, is ‘weak’ (Migdal 1 9 8 8 ; Standish 1994).

12

See also Standish (1994:60) for “Melanesian ideologies and political strategies having colonised die state”;
and Dinnen (1997a;16 and 1997b:22) for “Melanesian Hfeworid having colonised the system”).
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In a book on internal security in Papua New Guinea, several observers noted the distance
betw een a relatively ‘weak’ state and ‘stro n g societies (see, for example, D innen 1994; Lawrence
1994; Standish 1994). As Lawrence says, the loose attachm ent o f individuals to the national state
and the strong attachm ent to the clan, family and language grouping has emphasised the V eak
state/strong society’ dichotom y (1994:118). The PN G state, according to Standish (1994:60),
does n o t conform to Max W eber’s ideal type, which suggests the state has a m onopoly on the
legitimate use o f force. Q uoting an approach proposed by Hewison etal for w hom the state is:
... an amalgam of social, political, ideological and economic elements organised in a
particular manner. In this sense the state is not so much a set of functions or a group of
actors, as an expression of power (quoted in Standish 1994:60).
Standish described “the loosening o f those relationships in PN G and the reduction o f state
power” {ibid).
The state-society m odel as applied by Standish is based on the assumption that Papua New
G uinea H ighlands societies, w hilst fragmented by political and cultural-linguistic differences and
w ithout any overarching central authority, were individually strong in terms o f social control and
a num ber o f other ways (see Figure 1.2). D espite all its impressive state structures and systems
and the raw pow er that it wields in term s o f superior firepower and a ready-made fighting force,
the state has been unable to assert its authority in conflict situations. Those issues are explored in
this study in relation to conflict resolution in Hagen (see Chapter Five", see also Chapter Six).

F igure L2: T h e state-so ciety m odel
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T he state-society m odel shows that PN G societies are individually strong but divided by cultural
and linguistic differences, and in the PN G Highlands there were no centralised systems that
could have been used to graft local politics onto the introduced colonial state.
T he colonial adm inistration utilised the divide-and-rule tactic with some degree o f success,
w hich perhaps overem phasised its apparent strength. Assuming that the ‘traditional* PN G
societies, like H agen were strong in themselves, precisely how strong is not dear. If they were
previously strong, then are they still strong? Indeed the whole concept o f the strong sodety
needs examination. It is true that local groups, like tribes and dans, have grown bigger in size
(see Chapter Three), b ut can the same thing be said o f their political integration and the strength o f
their political institutions, especially in reference to the accumulation o f guns, the control o f large
businesses, and access to resources through their connections w ith the outside world? These and
other questions will be considered in the relevant parts o f the thesis.

P olitical and social 'disintegration* or Cultured Innovation f
T he notion o f ‘political disintegration’ (Filer 1992) is slightly similar to the pessimistic view,
though perhaps n o t as apocalyptic as the journalistic view o f PN G . Filer, as Standish (1994:60)
observes, “writes w ith serious whimsy o f the ‘bits* o f the ‘H um pty D um pty state* fallen from the
wall’*. In his unusually dry sense o f hum our, Filer adds a typically British kindergarten
m elodram a to w hat is an otherwise serious problem in a Third W orld context Both Filer and
Standish write about the PN G state as an alien construct, as having failed to retain o r assert its
authority at the local level, and stress its inability to perform its functions and deliver basic social
services (Filer 1992; Standish 1994; see also G ordon and Meggitt 1985 and D innen 1994,
1996b).
B ut the m ost consistent and vocal proponents o f the disintegration theory comes from the
com m entaries o f B.A Santamaria (1989), w ho believes that the current problem s in PN G will
bring about the collapse o f the state. The ‘doomsday scenario* is also prom oted by some
y j ylpmifis formerly at the N ational Centre for D evelopm ent Studies, at the Australian N ational
University (see, for example, Cole 1993; quoted in D innen 1996b:284). W hile there are many
variations o f the disintegration theory in circulation in PN G today, D innen (1996b) has broadly
classified them according to their relative emphases upon w hat he calls institutional, cultural o r
material symptoms o f disintegration:
In stitu tio n al disintegration highlights th e progressive w eakening o f th e state and, in
particular, th e incapacitation o f state controls. P roblem s o f o rder, from this perspective,
are view ed largely in term s o f d ie absence o r dysfunctionaBty o f th e state. C ultural
disintegration, cm th e o th er h an d , draw s atten tio n to th e im pact o f W esternisation u p o n
resid en t social form s and th e m anner in w inch M elanesian societies are collapsing u n d er
th e w eight o f rapid change. T his view attributes problem s o f o rd er to th e corrupting
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influence o f external forces and their impact on ‘traditional’ social values. Material
disintegration emphasises economic dysfunctionality, growing levels o f unemployment,
failure o f entrepreneurship, mismanagement and die manner in which these have
contributed to the marginalisation [of some groups] and accompanying conflict [within
communities] (1996b:284).
D ata from the case studies and from the literature will be used to confirm o r reject such claims.
B ut I should m ention here that som e o f these processes seem to be currently under way, which
m eans that while a com posite picture o f social change and cultural continuity is possible,
measuring o r quantifying such processes, however, is difficult But one should be able to
conclusively say w hether o r n o t the system has disintegrated to levels o f absolute chaos o r
anarchy, and I will, in the concluding chapter.

‘D isintegrative integration* o r cW idening spheres o f p o litica l com petition’?
B oth concepts are A.J. Strathem ’s (1992, 1993b), though he develops the later m ore fully than
the form er, w hich he explained in the following words:
By integration here I refer to the incorporation of local areas into district, provincial,
and national political structures and processes. By disintegration I mean that the very
processes that link local dans to the state also produce within and between dans a
heightened potential for conflict through competition for resources and political office
(1993:57).
My ow n concepts o f ‘incorporation’, ‘merging spheres o f com petition and cooperation’, and
‘megacycle’ are som ewhat similar to A J. Strathem ’s (1992) V idening spheres o f political
com petition’. In the expanded field o f com petition, a num ber o f processes are at work. T he first
is the actual merging o f spheres, w here one event (for example, a reparation payment) follows
another (such as warfare), and the cycle finally culminates in elections, o r may even further
develop into ramifying sequences o f ntoka exchanges. O n the one hand, local events are built
around elections, while on the other hand, elections have been incorporated into the local
megacycle. Secondly, w hat appears to be an integration into the PN G state system is in fact a
process o f ‘tribalisation’, where new pow er blocs are continually created as a result o f the
incorporation o f the H agen people into a centralised national state (see A J. Strathem 1992:230).
A third process at w ork here is the physical o r geo-political widening o f the sphere o f
com petition, w here ‘traditional’ fields o f com petition expand to link into other fields, which
even extend beyond electoral boundaries. As indicated by A.J. Strathem (1992:236), die physical
w idening o f the political field is associated w ith the adoption o f guns in local conflicts and the
ambiguous role o f politicians — as lawmakers and as suppliers o f guns — particularly in the
context o f electoral manoeuvring. The systematic integration o f such local and state political
events is w hat I call the Hagen ‘megacycle’.

Methodology
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This study is based on my personal experiences as a H agener and eight m onths specific
fieldwork; tw o m onths in 1992 during the N ational Elections, w ith the help o f funds from the
P N G Electoral Com m ission and the P N G N ational Research Institute (NR3); and a further six
m onths betw een August 1994 and January 1995, with the help o f a scholarship from the
Australian International D evelopm ent Assistance Bureau (AIDAB, recently renamed Aus-AID),
and research funds from the P N G N ational Research Institute.
Initially, I had entertained the idea o f a survey, but the inter-actional nature o f Hagen political
com petition, w hich made the idea o f im personal and objective research untenable, dictated that
case studies was the best approach available to me. The local-level, o r ‘bottom -up’ approach that
I chose was n o t dictated by a predeterm ined epistemological position: either from ‘outside’ o r
‘inside’ perspective. R ather, it was a position which I eventually arrived a t an ‘insider’s
perception, o r a Hagen w orld view, o f events and processes that make up the phenom ena o f
local political behaviour. It was a ‘best-fit’ approach, one based on decisions about the best
possible strategies to collect data required for analysis. It was determ ined by questions o f how and

why H ageners behave in a particular way. By observing and participating in particular events,
such as voting in elections, I was able to docum ent the different ways in which Hageners
com pete for prestige, pow er and influence.
T he main arenas o f com petition and cooperation which I paid particular attention to were
cerem onial exchange, warfare, com pensation payment, bridewealth payments, elections and
business developm ent associations. I personally participated in two election campaigns, a m inor

mokoy several bridewealth payments and the initial stages o f a m ajor reparation paym ent
A lthough I observed the devastating effects o f warfare, including two spectacular funeral
cerem onies for w ar deaths, and docum ented the introduction o f guns into Hagen warfare, I have
never experienced com bat and therefore relied heavily on interviews. Similarly I have mostly
used interviews for data on business developm ent associations.
F or details o f particular events that took place outside o f the fieldwork penod, o r where it was
n o t possible to personally observe, I relied on die knowledge o f those w ho participated. A fter
returning to Australia, I have consistently followed events that began in 1994 through coundess
telephone interviews (running my telephone bills into thousands o f dollars). W hilst my
interpretations are largely influenced by the various approaches in the social sciences, the thesis
is simply a record o f the knowledge that Hageners collectively carry around in their heads. W hat
I have done here is basically following in die footsteps o f Hagen leaders w ho constantly
m onynlatp inform ation to prom ote their positions. I have merely collected and reoiganised their
knowledge to enhance m ine in order to make some general statements about Hageners so that
other observers can leam m ore about my people, my country, and our politics.
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Outline o f the Study
Political com petition and leadership roles are analysed in a num ber o f contexts, specifically by
studying political action by prom inent individuals, in both ‘traditional* and m odem spheres o f
com petition. T he ‘traditional* arenas o f com petition and cooperation, such as ceremonial
exchange, group w arfare and the various types o f com pensation payment, now exist side by side
w ith, and in m any ways have been incorporated into, m ore m odem forms like elections and
business enterprise. In fact, there are instances o f merging o r widening o f political spheres o f
com petition, as indicated by the m anner in which m ajor ‘traditional* events such as exchanges
and warfare are skilfully orchestrated to coincide with and culminate in elections, thereby
resulting in the creation o f a megacycle. O ne such megacycle o f im portant events presented here
covets a period o f fourteen years (1984-1997) during which a sequence o f events took place,
beginning w ith a seven-year period o f contracted alliance warfare between 1984 and 1990, briefly
punctuated by mutually reached truce agreements in June 1987 and in D ecem ber 1988, followed
by a com bined church and state-sponsored one-year truce period (1989-1990) during which two
separate peace settlem ents were reached between the com batants, and a six-year period o f
intensive reparation payments and gift exchanges (1990-1996) in an attem pt to secure assurances
o f support for the 1997 national elections. Tw o election studies, one national and the other
provincial, and tw o case studies o f group warfare illustrate these processes o f merging and
w idening o f spheres o f political com petition and die co-optative existence o f the political
systems.
The thesis is organised into nine chapters. The m ajor themes and questions have been
introduced here in this opening chapter. In the second chapter I present a brief sketch o f w hat is
essentially a retrospective view o f pre-colonial leadership, taking into account the differences in
emphasis placed on various attributes o f leadership, and the m ajor changes in spheres o f
com petition over time. It provides an historical account o f the pre-colonial Hagen political order
and the pow er o f leaders, die d em o cratizin g effects o f colonial rule, and the structural and
institutional changes that accompanied decolonisation in Papua New Guinea.
T he third and probably the m ost im portant chapter o f the thesis deals w ith the m ajor levels o f
social organisation in Hagen society. It is im portant in the sense that, like a kind o f blue-print,
the chapter establishes the parameters o f discussion in the rest o f the thesis. Basically, it
identifies the boundaries o f the various arenas, fields, and sub-fields o f political com petition in
Hagen. T he chapter begins with a critical review o f the literature on Highlands social structure,
w ith a view to assessing the applicability o f certain theoretical models, including the so-called
‘A frican models*, prevalent in the literature. It then moves on to deal with tw o different types o f
groups: (1) ‘traditional* groups such as tribes, dans, sub-dans and lineages; and (2) ‘neo
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traditional’ groups such as the coalition-style alliances which were set up in the early 1970s to
take advantage o f the plantation acquisition scheme. The coalitions and their factional leaders are
the m ajor players in Hagen politics, with their activities often systematically linked to state
politics. Because som e o f these local leaders are also national leaders, the two systems, Hagen
and the PN G state, feed o ff each other through the exchange o f ideas, values and resources.
M any o f these neo-traditional coalition-style alliances (cf. A.J. Strathem 1984), initially built on
som ewhat vague historical ties, have now consolidated into cooperative business groups, with
interests in coffee plantations, real estate and haulage. Chapter Four examines these registered
business associations. T he separation between Chapters Three and Tour is therefore an artificial
one because the discussion on cooperative business ventures follows on from that o f the groups
and alliances— the ow ners o f these businesses.
In Chapter Five I present tw o case studies on Hagen warfare in the late 1980s. It is a big chapter,
coveting a wide range o f issues, including the contexts o f leadership and the use o f new
resources such as guns in inter-group warfare. H agen warfare is viewed here as a cycle, with
different phases o f conflict, escalation, military engagement, casualties, com pensation, moka> and
peace. A com m on trend in all o f these phases is the conspicuous absence o f the state, despite
the m ost concerted effort on the part o f local groups to challenge the state’s claim o f m onopoly
over the legitimate use o f force. The military alliances form the core groups o f the coalition-style
alliances-cum business cooperative ventures described in Chapters 3-4.
N ext, Chapters 6-8 are case studies on elections. In Chapter Six I present an overview o f Hagenstyle electioneering, with an emphasis on political strategies, including the skilful use o f the
Hagen megacycle for mobilising support Also noted in this chapter is the rising costs o f
election campaigns and the correspondingly high rate o f election-related violence — with
predictions that the abolition o f provincial governm ents may in fact raise the intensity o f
com petition in Hagen and elsewhere in the country. The general discussion on election
m anoeuvring is followed by a case study o f the 1992 national election in Chapter Seven,, with
special emphasis on the military nature o f alliances and the different types o f election-related
violence. In Chapter Eight I present a special case study on the 1995 W estern Highlands
provincial governm ent election, w ith a view to provide special insights to understanding the pre
selection phase o f electoral politics. In the latter I present a 'fine-scale analysis’ (cf. Burton 1989a)
o f campaigning and voting in the Kotna-Tiki constituency o f the W estern Highlands Province.
It is p rim arily focused on the organisation o f the election campaign o f a particular candidate,
W illiam Pik, w ho ultimately became deputy prem ier o f the province.
T he final chapter o f the thesis explores the process described earlier as the Hagen megacycle,
w ith a view to dem onstrating that local values and practices have been transferred to state
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politics, in exchange for th e use o f state resources in local politics. T he chapter begins w ith solid
em pirical evidence, b u t then progressively becom es m ore speculative as it considers the w ider
im plications o f this study, in view o f contem porary events in Africa and elsewhere in the world.
It concludes by pointing out that, despite having a V eak state’ and the apocalyptic predictions by
certain com m entators in Australia, the nation-state o f Papua New Guinea is a robust democracy
w hich is far from collapsing. Yet it warns that the problem s that PN G is currently facing could
be far m ore serious than m ost observers actually think. W hat this means is that, if we are n o t
careful, we could end up the same way as those in tropical Africa, w here state collapse, which
was unthinkable only a decade ago, could becom e a reality (cf. N g’ethe 1995:256; Zartm an 1995).

Chapter 2

BACKGROUND TO H AG EN LEADRSHIP AN D POLITICS

Background to Hagen Leadership and Politics
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Introduction
This chapter introduces the discussion o f traditional Hagen politics and provides essential
background inform ation for subsequent chapters o f the thesis. It is primarily concerned with the
historical context o f Hagen political com petition and the different types o f leaders who operated
within the various phases o f Hagen history. Basically, the chapter deals with changing styles and
patterns o f leadership brought about as a result o f the colonially-imposed structural changes
which accompanied state form ation, including the superimposition o f state political institutions,
which created new arenas, fields and sub-fields o f political competition. The state political
institutions such as local governm ent councils and village courts offered aspiring leaders new
opportunities, while existing and new local groups and their leaders were introduced to new
arenas o f com petition and cooperation such as cooperative business ventures and elections. The
new political fields and sub-fields o f com petition, as indicated in the next chapter, were
established through the creation o f local governm ent councils, provincial government
constituencies, and national governm ent electorates.
The analytical focus o f this chapter is on the different phases o f Hagen history — from 1933 to
1997 — • in order to establish the parameters o f this study. W ith particular attention to the
contrast between ‘old style’ versus ‘new style’ leaders, the chapter examines the powerful external
forces that shaped contem porary Hagen society, and especially its political institutions such as
the moha ceremonial exchange system. By studying the activities o f the old style, colonial era bigm en such as Parua K uri and Mek N ukuntz, in relation to new style, second generation, younger
and educated leaders such as M elchior Pep, Matrus Mel and William Pik, this chapter starts to
outline the basic changes and continuities in Hagen political values and practices explored
throughout this thesis.
Particular attention is paid here to the impact o f colonialism on indigenous leadership and
politics, the traditional economy, and the principal arenas o f political com petition such as
warfare and ceremonial exchange. Accordingly, the relevant literature on PN G Highlands
leadership is reviewed, so as to ascertain w hether the ‘big-man’ model adequately accounts for
Hagen leadership patterns. In light o f the considerable variation in contem porary leadership
types and the markedly contrasting modes o f operation evident in the Hagen case studies
presented in this study, the chapter concludes by arguing that the ‘big-man’ model, if sufficiently
m odified, can be used to explain only a particular type o f leadership, but is otherwise
inappropriate because o f inherent fallacies within this m odel
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Phases o f Hagen History
T he recent history o f Hagen society can be viewed as an erratic cycle, alternating between times
o f peaceful inter-group relations and traumatic periods o f turbulence and violence (see Figure

2.1). Each period facilitated contrasting form s o f reciprocity, which we may call positive and
negative reciprocity. In times o f peace there was positive reciprocity between the high-level
nam ed groups, w hich involved the competitive exchange o f wealth items in moha transactions,
frequent interm arriage, and the exchange o f cultural innovations such as dance styles and
costum es. But in tim es o f warfare such positive exchanges were not possible and thus replaced
by negative reciprocity such as pay-back killings, and frequent accusations o f poisoning; these
were times w hen marriage partners were being chosen from either w ithin the tribe o r from
am ong allies, rather than from enemies, because wives, as evident in A.M. Strathem (1972b), can
be a ‘toad’ for the exchange o f econom ic resources as well as poison.
In each phase, it can be argued that a certain type o f leader with special skills rose above the re st
D uring w arfare, for instance, fight-leaders and despots tend to be m ore dom inant than other
types o f leaders, while big-m en (who manipulate wealth to gain prestige) appear m ore prom inent
during exchange cycles (cf. Standish 1978a). T hat other types o f leaders lack prom inence during
warfare does n o t m ean that fight leaders and despots are the defining types o f leaders in some
societies, as reported by som e early observers (see, for example, Salisbury 1964; W atson 1971).
Similarly, w hen we fail to find other types o f leaders in societies w here elaborate exchange
relations and big-m en are dom inant, it would be a mistake to conclude that the big-man type is
necessarily the defining type o f leader in such societies. This obviously raises serious questions
about the kind o f debate on leadership which began in the 1960s, a significant point to which I
shall return later in this chapter (see section on Big-man Modek see also the concluding section o f
this chapter).
A nthropologists began w orking in the PN G Highlands during the 1950s and 1960s when the
kiaps, the colonial district officers, banned warfare and licensed ceremonial exchange.1 W hat*
Systematic programmes o f anthropological research in the PN G Highlands were launched from Sydney
University and the Australian National University beginning in 1950 (see Hays 1992, 1993). A t the
Australian National University the Nadel program (in honour o f S.F. Nadel) which, according to Paula
Brown, whilst “then competing with anthropological research programmes at Sydney and W ashington”,
concentrated on the Highlands “because o f the concentration o f population and the excitement o f
studying people whose areas, social systems, and response to contact [with the outside world] could be
traced while Australia brought them into the m odem world” (comment in Hays 1993:149). The program
at Sydney University was headed by E.P. Elkin. Both programmes, as noted by Hays, were “informed by
‘structural-functional’ agendas”, with “a major emphasis on social organisation” (1993:160). Many pioneer
Highlands ethnographers were sent out by Elkin and Nadel during 1950-1955, including. Mervyn Meggitt
and Ralph Bulmer in Enga; D ’Arcy Ryan in Mendi; Robert M. Glasse in Huli; Marie Reay among the
Kuma o f South Wahgi; Catherine and Ronald Bem dt (m addition to James and Virginia Watson, who
were from a different institutional base) among the Kainantu; and Kenneth Read and Richard Salisbury in
the G oroka area (see Hays 1993:160). In their foot-steps followed Paula Brown, the geographer Harold
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they observed then was a new and alm ost an artificially created period in which organised
warfare rem ained dorm ant, large-scale ceremonial exchange prospered, and self-made leaders
called big-m en’, econom ic entrepreneurs, were perceived as having a m onopoly over exchange
netw orks and thus could establish themselves at the apex o f the prestige scale (see A.J. Strathem
1966a; 1969a; 1971; see also Read 1959; Bulrner 1960; Brown 1963; Salisbury 1964; Meggitt
1971). As noted by Feil (1987:97), such writers described either specific societies, o r the wider
H ighlands region; all using the term big-m an’, they debated the best depiction o f Highlands
leadership.
F or H agen society, and probably for many other PN G Highlands societies, it was the radically
altered political order o f the 1950s, swiftly transform ed by the presence o f foreigners and new
econom ic resources, which became accepted — perhaps uncritically — into the canon o f social
science literature as the defining character o f <traditk>naT o r pre-colonial Highlands societies. It
seems likely that many observers, apparently in pursuit o f evidence to support the big-man
m odel, either neglected o r paid little attention to the m onum ental and revolutionary im pact o f
European colonialism , the im position o f state structures, and the seductive powers o f W estern
consum erism on stateless societies such as Hagen. W hile some o f the problem s and issues raised
in die literature are specifically addressed in the relevant parts o f this and other chapters o f the
thesis, it is w orth m entioning here that H agen and other Highlands societies are in practice
m uch m ore flexible, innovative, and structurally less rigid than they appear from the ideological
and analytical constructs prevalent in the literature. W hat this means is that com m on
characteristics may often blind observers from seeing im portant variations within and between
the various Highlands societies.
T he different phases o f Hagen history, perhaps best described by the words ‘erratic cycle’
because o f its alternating periods o f violence and peace, are schematised below. Figure 2.1
represents a simplified version o f w hat is in essence a very complex situation. It should therefore
be viewed as an analytical tool with w hich to explain some o f the complexities o f Hagen history
and its political econom y as it has developed over a time span o f some 65 years, an era in which
remarkable changes were experienced by its people.

Brookfield and die linguist Stephen Wurm in Simbu beginning in 1958; Andrew and Marilyn Strathem
(field-work from 1964 onwards) and E. Brandewie (fieldwork in 1963-5 and 1968) among the Hagen
(Melpa); and numerous others in subsequent years (see Hays 1992; Brown’s com m ent in Hays 1993).
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F ig u re 2.1: M o u n t H a g e n histo ry as an erratic cycle

Pre-1933 a n d 1933-40

1940s a n d 1950s

1960s a n d 1970s

1980s a n d 1990s

European Contact in
1933: ‘First Contact5
made with Leahy and
Taylor
patrol;
Colonisation;
the
establishment
of
Christian
Missions
(Catholic at Wilya and
Lutheran at Ogelbeng);
and the great shell
trade.

Colonial Administration:

Establishment o f Native
Local
Governm ent
Councils,
Self
Government,
Political
Independence, and the
establishment
of
the
Provincial Governm ent
System;
Intensified
commercial
activities,
such as coffee buying,
trade stores, and the
competitive purchase o f
m otor vehicles.

Post-Independence:

WAR

PEA C E

Endem ic Warfare:
D espots
Leaders.

and

Fight

Bosbois (or headmen)
chosen by governm ent
and missions preceded
village officials (i.e., till
the end o f World War

IT).

Pacification, Conversion
to Christianity and the
adoption o f western
education;
Incorporation into the
global econom y via the
establishment o f coffee
plantations and later
local
Small-holdings;
and first trade stores.

PEA C E T H E N WAR

Rapid localisation o f the
public service; together with
the
proliferation
of
Businesses and Christian
Missions; Acquisition o f
Expatriate-owned
coffee
and tea plantations, in
addition
to
the
impoundment o f State land
and property; and Abolition
o f Provincial Governments.

WAR

Compensation o f Minor
Enemies,
AllyReparation
Payment,
and
Ceremonial
Exchange: Big-men.

Ceremonial
Exchange,
Sporadic Warfare, and
First Elections: Big-men,
som e Fight-Leaders, and
‘Older-style5Politicians.

M odem (Electoral) Politics,
Big Business and Warfare:
Big-men, Super-big-men or
E conom ic Leaders, and
som e
D espotic
Fight
Leaders.

Luluais
and
Tultuls
(Village Constables in
Papua); First luluais and
tultuls appointed post
war.

Local
Government
Councillors,
National
Parliamentarians
and
Provincial
Assembly
Members, and Village
Court Officials.

Politicians,
Millionaire
Businessmen, Official State
leaders such as Bureaucrats
and other Educated Elites,
Criminal
Raskot
Gang
Leaders,
Gunfighters,
D espotic Councillors, and
others.

T he Hagen area’s prehistory is o f course far richer in terms o f the considerable time depth o f
agricultural developm ent around the surprisingly eady date o f 9,000 years before present (cf.
G olson 1977, 1981, 1982) and the complex political institutions that arose from agricultural
intensification and the exchange o f surplus products (cf. Feil 1987), but that topic, though
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immensely intriguing, is unfortunately beyond the scope o f this study. I shall only deal with
m atters o f w ritten — and rem em bered — history here.
F or the post-1930s decades, Figure 2.1 shows different phases o f Hagen history since European
contact in A pril 1933. In chronological order, the analytically distinct but otherwise overlapping
phases are:
•

o f first contact w ith Europeans, people from Eastern Highlands and M orobean societies
and, perhaps m ore im portantly, the colonial state in 1933, followed by the establishment
o f Catholic and Lutheran missions in 1934 and 1936, respectively, which was followed
by the great shell trade;

•

o f colonially-imposed pacification in the 1940s and the subsequent incorporation o f
Hageners into the global econom y through the establishm ent o f coffee and tea
plantations in the 1950s and the introduction o f store goods;

•

o f intensified state-sponsored politics and state-imposed political integration through the
establishm ent o f local governm ent councils in the early 1960s, the territorial H ouse o f
Assembly in 1964, followed by self-governm ent in 1973, which culminated in political
independence from Australia in Septem ber 1975, and the subsequent establishm ent o f
the provincial governm ent system in 1977;

•

o f frenzied commercial activity through the setting up o f road-side trade stores in the
late 1960s, the incorporation o f new econom ic resources such as cash, cattle, beer and
m otor vehicles in moka exchanges in the early 1970s, the competitive purchase o f m otor
vehicles during the 1970s coffee boom , and the acquisition o f expatriate-owned
plantations in the m id 1970s and early 1980s;

•

o f the proliferation o f both genuine Christian and pseudo-Christian missions during the
1970s-1980s period, a trend w hich continues into the 1990s; and

•

o f intensified com petition through business, warfare, reparation payments and elections,
in the late 1980s and 1990s, and the abolition o f the provincial gpvem m ent system by
the N ational Parliam ent in July 1995.

T he cumulative effect o f these multi-dimensional processes led to an expansion in spheres o f
com petition, a key condition w hich undoubtedly facilitated the creation o f the Hagen megacycle,
a significant point to w hich I shall return later in the concluding chapter o f this thesis. It suffices
here to say that the widening sphere o f com petition, which involve geographical/adm inistrative
linking o f political fields as well as the systematic merging o f traditional arenas o f com petition
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w ith m odem ones, resulted in the proliferation o f different types o f leaders. The new types o f
leaders, som e o f w hich have n o t been encountered before, include ‘super-big-m en’ (or
millionaire businessm en), criminal raskol gang leaders, military strategists and gun fighters,
despotic councillors, senior bureaucrats, professionals (such as academics, doctors, lawyers,
accountants), and a new generation o f highly sophisticated politicians with university degrees
and connections w ith the outside w orld as well as with the internal underworld.
These new types o f leaders seem to have replaced colonial style big-m en-cum -politicians— m en
like Parua K uri and M ek N ukuntz — w ho initially built their political careers through pre
em inence in moka exchanges during the 1960s and 1970s, but later denounced moka in favour o f
cooperative business ventures.
O lder style politicians like K uri and N ukuntz owed their success partly to the colonial
adm inistration policies o f banning warfare and licensing ceremonial exchange. Parua Kuri
epitom ises aspiring leaders o f the 1950s w hose initial pow er was derived from the colonial
adm inistration through their association w ith haps. Parua him self made the perfect transition
from boshoiin the 1950s to local governm ent councillor in the 1960s to m em ber o f assembly and
national parliamentarian in the 1970s. Parua K uri has played a dom inant role in D ei Local
G overnm ent Council. H e has been a vice president since its inception in 1962 and president
since 1966 (cf. A.J. Strathem 1976:268). Parua K uri first got elected to the H ouse o f Assembly in
1972 (A.J. Strathem 1976) and held the D ei O pen seat for three consecutive parliamentary terms
(1972-1987).2 A son o f a pre-em inent big-m an, Kuri o f the Tepuka Keitipi dan, Parua built his
renow n through selective use o f colonial and traditional networks and resources. As noted by
A.J. Strathem (1984:149), Parua still gives die im pression o f being the m ost im portant decision
m aker in D ei Local G overnm ent Council, since retaining his ordinary councillorship after being
elected as MP. But Parua Kuri’s dom inant role in D ei politics has been consistently challenged
by younger rivals from w ithin his own tribe as well as from other tribes in D e l His m ost ardent
rival is a young university graduate, Matrus Mel, w ho comes from the same tribe as Parua, but
leads a faction opposed to Parua’s faction in D ei politics and business (see Chapters 3-4). The
Parua faction has also been opposed by a form er deputy prem ier o f W estern Highlands
Province, William Pik, w ho comes from a tribe which has a special alliance with Parua’s tribe.
B oth M el and Pik, w ho were in a patron-client relationship with M elchior Pep as patron, played
significant roles in Parua’s election loss to Pep during the 1987 national election, as well as in

2.

For some eariy accounts o f Parua’s political career, see A J. Strathem (1970:562-564; 1976; 1984:149-152);
see also H.K. and P. Colebatch, M. Reay, and A.J. Strathem (1971:253-260) for a discussion o f Parua’s first
attem pt at state politics during die 1968 elections. I provide a more detailed account o f Parua’s dominant
role in the D ei field o f political com petition in the relevant parts o f the diesis. See, for example, his role in
the creation o f coalition-style alliances (Chester Three), business development associations {Chapter Lour),
inter-group conflicts and electoral manoeuvring {Chapters 5-8).

Background to Hagen Leadership and Politics

50

Parua’s son, Reuben’s election losses in 1992 and 1997 elections (see Chapters 3-4; and Chapters 7

8). In this way the personal history o f a few m en indicates m ajor changes in Hagen society over
several decades.
By contrast, the new-style politicians o f the 1990s owe their success to a num ber o f factors such
as education, unequal access to wealth through international and criminal connections, and
pillage o f state resources. These rashol politicians have consolidated their positions through
selective use o f patronage, largesse, intim idation, and terror. Some o f them owe their continued
existence in state politics to support from criminal gangs rather than by the legitimising process
o f a free and fair electoral system. A large part o f the contem porary PN G political culture is thus
based on nepotistic patronage, parochial loyalties, and what I call gutter-politics.3
This obviously raises difficult problem s and issues for P N G leaders and peoples in their attem pt
to construct a nadon-state from politically and cultural-linguistically fragmented societies. An
explanation for the com peting value systems in Papua N ew Guinea, especially the conflicting
allegiances o f individuals w ho are caught between parallel m oral realms, may be found in the
writings o f an anthropologist som e 26 years ago* h i com paring political systems Peter Lawrence
pointed out that in W estern society “the state rests on one concept: that o f the dtizen-isolate,
the person w ho, by acknowledging his obligations to the state, to which he surrenders his title to
use force in return for its protection, is automatically guaranteed rights and privileges equal to
those accorded all other persons similarly accepting the state’s authority” (1971:5; see also
Lawrence 1969:18-19). By contrast, as will becom e dear in the succeeding chapters o f this thesis,
m ost, if n o t all, Papua N ew Guineans have strong attachm ents with their primary kin-groups
and have yet to develop into dtizen-isolates. However, Lawrence may have been right in
suggesting that it is in the towns such as Port M oresby and Lae where the “individual is
beginning his m etam orphosis from kinsm en to dtizen-isolate” (1969:37), owing to factors such
as education and employment, acculturation, and interaction with people from other parts o f the
country. Q uestions o f loyalty and sliding levels o f identity will be addressed in the next chapter. I
now turn to the phases o f H agen history.

3.

Gutter-politics is a term used here to refer to the use o f criminal gang; by raskol politicians to solidify their
vote by intimidating and terrorising voters and rival politicians. These raskol politicians may have criminal
backgrounds o r strong connections with local raskol gang? and even with international criminal
organisations. For a detailed analysis o f the relations between politicians and raskolgmgs, see Harris (1988);
see also Dinnen (1996b) for an integrated approach to the analysis o f criminal gangs, high-level corruption,
and other problems as challenges o f order in a weak state. In Chapter Five; I present a discussion on the
role o f politicians as a vital link between warfare and the illicit trafficking o f firearms and drug?.
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PhaseI: Pre-1933 and 1933-1940
P rior to colonial rule there was a period characterised by endemic warfare in which despots and
fight-leaders w ere prom inent in inter-group relations o f enmity. This was die period just before
European contact in the 1933 and Australian Colonial Adm inistration-im posed pacification in
the 1940s. A lthough it is extremely difficult to reconstruct pre-colonial Hagen society, oral
accounts o f w arfare and the evidence o f population dispersal show that pre-colonial Hagen
warfare was m ore than a political game, that stakes were high, and winning and losing m eant
everything to the com batants and their groups (see Chapters 5-8 for parallels between warfare and
elections). H ow ever, as will becom e clearer in Chapter Five, Hagen warfare was never an
uncontrolled descent into H obbesian chaos, n o r an indication o f social disintegration,
retrogression, o r societal collapse. It still provides an im portant arena o f com petition and
cooperation for local groups and their leaders, and thus remains a highly coordinated political
affair, regulated by definite ‘rules o f tile game’ (c£ Bailey 1969), and is now systematically linked
to other spheres o f com petition, such as business and elections (see Chapters 3d).

Phase II: 1940s and 1950s
Between the 1940s and 1950s many groups were involved in converting relations o f enmity into
those o f exchange, and intermarriage between some groups even intensified. The Hagen area
was effectively padfied by the 1950s, owing laigely to the efforts o f local leaders w ho had grafted
themselves onto the colonial administration for personal interest Many o f them became bosbois
before the Second W orld W ar and after the w ar became iuhids and tukuls (appointed village
officials). In his study o f contem porary politics and political change in Chuave, Wayne Warry
was able to trace the developm ent o f institutions and organisations that have arisen since
European contact
By 1953 th e adm inistration h ad began replacing bosbois w ith M uds and UdMs w ho w ere
responsible to th e kiap a t C huave p atro l p o s t Som e bosbois becam e M uds b u t, a t least in
C huave, th e adm inistration com m only appointed younger m en w ho w ere b etter
T o k p isin speakers, o r w h o h ad served th e adm inistration as interpreters o r carriers o n
p atrols. T h e adm inistration first appointed M uds as trib al leaders and tultuls as d a n
leaders, b u t later ap pointed M uds fo r each clan, occasionally, m ade o n e param ount M ud
(ndlpus) fo r d ie trib e, and assigned tu M s to act as assistants to th e bdud w ithin th e clan.

These officials oversaw government roadwork, the building o f rest houses and aid
posts. They were also responsible for settling disputes and for enforcing government
regulations pertaining to the proper care and maintenance of villages (Warry 1987:72).
T he H agen situation was quite similar to Chuave, except there were no param ount bilud. The
first appointm ents in Hagen were o f headm en, known locally as bosbots, w ho were initially
selected by the kiap, but later the bosboiswere allowed to ‘mark’ im portant m en w ho were known
for their ‘strong talk’ (ik rondoki) to becom e bosboi (see A.M. Strathem 1972a:43-44). It seems that
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som e o f the earliest appointm ents were o f m en w ho were already leaders in indigenous spheres
o f com petition, while a few may have been fearless warriors.

Phase HI: 1960s and 1970s
H ie 1960s and 1970s period was one o f relative peace, except for one m ajor w ar between two
large H agen tribes, the Jika and Yamka, during the early 1970s. T he significance o f that w ar —
right next to M ount H agen tow n — was enorm ous: (a) because o f extensive media publicity in
both radio and new spapers; and (b) even m ore remarkably, it exposed the soft underbelly o f die
supposedly ‘hard’ colonial state. T he link between the crum bling o f the autocratic kiap system
and d ie resurgence o f warfare in the Highlands during this period was noted by A.J. Strathem:
In th e early 1970s it w as o ften stated th at o n e o f th e m ain reasons fo r th e outbreak o f
inter-group fights w as th e ero sio n o f th e system o f ‘hard-fisted’ adm inistration by
generalist p atro l officers, w h o originally h eld b o th police and m agisterial pow ers. T hese
m en w ere able to ac t as judge, gaoler, an d jury in m atters involving breaches o f N ative
R egulations, an d o n th eir patro ls could m ete o u t sw ift p unishm ent to offenders, and
p rev en t sm all disputes fro m escalating (1984:26).

This period was also characterised by an intensification o f ceremonial exchange and the
incorporation o f new econom ic resources as they became available through the adoption o f a
capitalist econom y, thereby emphasising the resiliency o f traditional institutions. But there were
im portant changes, too. The m ajor structural changes and associated social issues becom e m ore
clearly expressed w hen events o f the sixties are examined separately from those o f the seventies.

Phase IU (a): 1960s
The 1960s was a decade o f relative peace in Hagen. Local governm ent councils were established
during the early 1960s. H agen and Kui councils were set up in 1961 and 1962, respectively, but
later m erged in 1964 to form a joint Hagen Council, covering the areas immediately north and
east o f M ount Hagen; D ei Council was established in 1963; Mul Council, paired since 1968 with
D ei to form a single O pen electorate for the H ouse o f Assembly, began in 1964 (A J. Strathem
1970:549; A M . Strathem 1972a:ll). D ei was later removed from M ul because o f hostilities
betw een the Mul and D ei people, and since 1972 has remained a separate O pen electorate, with
its ow n representative to the N ational Parliament (AJ. Strathem 1976:269-270; 1984:143).4I*

4.

As described by A J. Strathem , “no t long before the 1968 elections, relations between Mul and Dei
councils were set in jeopardy by the killing o f a driver from Mul Council while he was travelling inride
D eT (1976269). Although a large compensation was made to relatives o f the M il driver, retaliatory action
was taken against fee pre-em inent Dei leader, Parua Kuri, Airing the opening ceremony o f the Mugjamp
police post in 1970. For further information on this m atter and its political dimensions, see H.K. and P.
Colebatch, M. Reay, and A J. Strathem 1971:253-254; see also A J. Strathem 1984:25; and Ketan 1996259).
I present a brief discussion o f Dei-Mul relations in ChapterSeven.
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Phaseni(b): 1970s
T he 1970s was also a decade o f increased state-related political activities. It was a decade o f stateim posed political integration, through the creation o f a separate O pen electorate in D ei in the
1972 elections, followed by national self-governm ent in 1973, political independence in 1975,
and the establishm ent o f the provincial governm ent system in 1977. The cumulative effects o f
these were a m arked increase in political awareness and the subsequent incorporation o f
com ponents o f the state and its events into Hagen arenas o f com petition and cooperation (see,
for example, discussion on the Hagen Megagck in the concluding chapter o f this thesis). Elective
office, for instance, was recognised as the ultimate source o f wealth and power. And, as becomes
evident in Chapters 3A , leaders responded by encouraging their groups to form into coalitionstyle alliances in order to com pete m ore effectively for state resources.
Such intensified com petition between groups which were ardent rivals, with recent remembered
histories o f warfare, alm ost inevitably led to a resurgence o f warfare in the 1970s, a trend which
continued into the 1980s and 1990s (see Chapters 3-6). The underlying causes o f turbulence in the
1970s have been summarised by Standish:
In the 1970s land pressures and fears of shortage arising from cash cropping and
population growth, a general loss of earlier optimism for an exciting new life in die
modem economy, combined with a growing sense of insecurity in die period o f mass
education, and also political decolonisation, have ad increased social tension in the
highlands. Despite the government’s best intentions, from 1972 to 1977 there was a
great deal of large-scale clan warfare in a significant return to die old ways (1978a: 19).
T he resurgence o f warfare in the Highlands and its undedying causes has in fact form ed the
focus o f an im portant debate in recent times (see, for example, Standish 1973 and 1992; K erpi
1976; A.J. Strathem 1977, 1992 and 1984; Meggitt 1977; G ordon and Meggitt 1985; Burton
1990; M uke 1994; and O ’H anlon 1995). I review this literature in Chapter Five. Standish, for
instance, goes on to say:
My own work indicates that the resurgence o f warfare was promoted by clan elders.
Politically, it not only promoted these men back into political prominence, but it also
reinforced the dan as a political unit to an extent probably for greater than that which
had existed in the early to mid 1960s (1978a:19).
In addition to intensified com petition and warfare, the decade saw the rise o f new types o f
leaders such as businessm en, church elders, educated elites, governm ent officials and politicians,
gome o f w hich are the ultimate products as well as perpetrators o f such com petition. All o f these
types o f leaders now exist side by side w ith, and sometimes in opposition to, traditional types o f
leaders such as big-m en, orators, fight-leaders and ritual experts.
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PhaseIV: 1980s and 1990s
T he 1980s and 1990s was a period o f intensified commercial activity in Hagen. The period saw
an expansion in agricultural activity through the establishm ent o f large locally-owned coffee
plantations, in addition to further acquisition o f expatriate-owned coffee plantations and the
conversion o f tea estates into coffee plantations. Local business developm ent corporations
established in the m id 1970s prospered through diversification and intensification o f their
activities during the 1980s. But, as evident in Chapters 3A , in the 1990s many o f these business
groups have been plagued with internal pow er struggles between leaders o f factions, thereby
resulting in the bankruptcy o f some companies.
Politically, this period was perhaps the m ost im portant in term s o f both integration and
disintegration. Elections, for instance, became increasingly violent as people realised that it was a
zero-sum , winner-takes-ali game (cf. Standish 1996:320); that there is no room for half
heartedness o r complacency in politics which m ust therefore be approached with the same
com m itm ent and passion that one takes to the battleground; and that the state can be milked in
order to feed the prim ordial community (cf. Ekeh 1975). Although the state is still not the mean

game, it is nonetheless an im portant prize in local com petition.5 The abolition o f the provincial
governm ent system in 1995 has somewhat increased the intensity o f com petition. The political
implications and local dim ensions o f the abolition o f provincial governm ents in Papua New
G uinea are discussed in ChapterSix.
Furtherm ore, the 1980s and 1990s brought a further resurgence o f group warfare. It was a
period o f turbulence and violence, which saw the resurfacing o f despotic leaders and fight
leaders, apart from politicians, businessmen and others. This is perhaps a trend which m ost
anthropologists and other observers least expected. Turbulence o f some sort may have been
expected as a consequence o f rapid social and political change but few expected the resurfacing
o f despotic fight-leaders. I take up the discussion on despotic fight-leaders and the rise o f a new
generation o f gunfighters, political strategists, and politicians in Chapters 3-8, but shall now turn
to an analysis o f the different types o f leaders.

5.

There is an apparent contradiction between elections as zero-sum, winner-takes-all game and the state as a
prize in local competition but n ot the main game. This can be resolved through the separation o f
individual interests from group interests. For individual leaders and their primary kin-groups, elections
represent m ajor investments —- or gambling o f massive resources
and is indeed a zero-sum, winnertakes-all game. Yet for the wider groups, who have a m inor stake (including group prestige), the state and
its events are valued as a prize, and whilst they do agree that such a prize is w orth fighting for, they also
realise that it is n o t the main game in local competition. See Chapter Nine for further exposition o f this
paradox.
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Types o f Leaders: Big-men, Despots and Others
My interpretation o f leadership types is slightly similar to Daryl Feil’s (1987) configuration: that
different conditions gave rise to different types o f leadership models. But there is an im portant
distinction betw een his interpretation and mine: he argued, for instance, that conditions
conducive to despotic leaders were superseded in societies where big-men and ceremonial
exchange w ere prevalent; while I argue that both types, am ong others, can exist side by side
w ithin the same period. Arguing from an evolutionary perspective, he proposes th a t
An evolutionary continuum of key features of social life can be demonstrated and is
based on significantly divergent paths o f economic and agricultural 'development' in the
prehistoric and historic past Types o f leaders may, therefore, vary accordingly, and this
variation can be linked to these same historical processes (Feil 1987:92).
H e w ent on to say that archetypal big-m en, those w ho manipulate wealth in exchange, occur
mainly in the w estern part o f the Highlands w here intensive production o f pigs has been long
established and where polities are linked in exchange transactions by men o f influence and high
standing in cerem onial institutions like the Enga tee and the Hagen moka. H e then claims that
despotism occurs in those societies o f the eastern part o f the Highlands where production and
exchange o f valuables are n o t intensive pursuits and where perm anent agriculture and settlement
are n o t as old as they are in the w estern part o f the Highlands (see Feil 1987:98-99). H e further
argues:
Despotism, like big-manship, is an historically specific form o f leadership in societies
where production for exchange remains nascent; is recent, and where, furthermore,
groups are rigidly bounded and defined, and individuals in them 'disconnected' horn
others in symmetrically replicated groups. Endemic warfare occurred in the eastern
Highlands and despotic leadership was a response to constant threat despots built up
followings and ensured security which was impossible by means other than domination,
intimidation and audacity (1987:99).
Contrastingly, followings built on the exchange o f valuables, he says, fell to big-men in the
w estern part o f the Highlands, com prising Hagen, Enga and M endi societies (ibid).I
I disagree w ith the evolutionary twist in Feil’s argument, and suggest that this is not an accurate
assessm ent o f the situation in the Highlands, as there is evidence o f despotic leaders in societies
such as H agen w here — on his m odel — they should not be found at all It is im portant to
realise that leadership is generalised: that a fight-leader can also be a leader in exchange
transactions, o r a skilled orator, or, nowadays, a businessman o r a politician, depending on a
given situation. In the Hagen w orld view, a successful leader is one w ho, like an axe blade (rui

anbel), can fit onto any handle: for productive w ork (like gardening); o r for destructive w ork (as
in battle), just as there are productive leaders and destructive ones in m odem societies.
Accordingly, leaders, as shown in Figure 2.1, take on whatever role required by their groups.
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D uring w arfare, for instance, groups look to strong leaders, often daring fighters, for leadership.
As Standish argued for Chim bu society:
When its very existence is in peril, in a state o f war or near-war, a society is dependent
upon its leaders for survival. The group pulls together, and tightens itself into a
coherent force. It needs the best leadership it can muster and must follow that
leadership or face extinction. This is not a situation which allows rivals the luxury of
competing for followers in a state of ‘anarchy’, but one where the group needs leaders
and will find the best available, to perform essential roles (1978a:19).
This use o f ‘anarchy* is obviously in reference to an earlier interpretation o f Chim bu politics
w hich concluded that tribal leadership changed in a generation from the absence o f any fixed
authority —

a state o f ‘anarchy* — to a system o f ‘satrapy*, where governm ent-appointed

officials were given the opportunity to dom inate, during the colonial period (Brown 1963).
W hen warfare is formally concluded either by m utual truce o r by way o f externally im posed
‘pacification*, as occurred during the 1940s, leaders turn their energies to other activities to
establish their influence and compete. T he archetypal big-m en, for instance, becom e m ore
dom inant w hen relations o f enmity are converted into those o f wealth exchanges. Furtherm ore,
w hen groups redirected their attention to new arenas o f com petition and cooperation such as
the com petitive purchase o f m otor vehicles and coffee buying during die 1970s coffee boom , it
was the m ission-educated small businessm en such as G oim ba K ot (see Chap.3-4) and Ru Kundil
(see A J. Strathem 1994) w ho became prom inent Nowadays it is the university-educated
politicians and millionaire businessm en like Michael Mel, Paul Pora and Paias W ingti w ho are
prom inent, w hich reflects the very high contem porary Hagen cultural value placed on education,
business, and elective office (see Chapters 6-8).

Colonial Impact on Hagen society
European colonialism from the mid 1930s, symbolised by the autocratic ‘kiapdom* com prising
Australian patrol officers and their bunch o f ‘native* assistants (including die despotic village

bosboisy later replaced by hducds and tu/tuis), came as a rude shock to many Hageners, like many
others throughout the country. A lthough die Germ ans and British, and later die Australians, did
n o t actually control the large areas they claimed rights over, their influence often spread beyond
die small urban centres from which the colonial territories o f New G uinea and Papua were
administered.
T he people o f H agen, as in other parts o f the Highlands, interacted with the colonial
aHministTatfon for three baric reasons: (1) they were fearful o f the white m en s superior
firepow er, as it was often dem onstrated through the shooting o f pigs in front o f huge gatherings;
(2) they w ere in awe o f the mystique o f the white ‘persons-of-wealdi* (m l tvamh), as they were
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generally associated w ith the spirit w odd because o f their skin colour and their seemingly endless
w ealth, w hose source could n o t be explained in Hagen term s; and (3) w hen the fear o f firepower
was conquered and the mystique w ore thin, interaction continued because o f self-interest, taking
advantage o f an opportunity for personal gain, a strategy which continues to the present O thers
have made similar observations (see, for example, Brown 1972:66-67; Finney 1973:Chap.2; A.J.
Strathem

1984:Chap.2; 1993b:42; G ordon and Meggitt 1985:163; Standish 1992:33-34;

O ’H anlon 1993:21-22).6
T he interpretation o f the whitem en as Sky People from the spirit w odd was a com m on initial
reaction, but, as noted by G ordon and Meggitt for Enga, “we would be mistaken to conclude
from this that Enga were wholly overawed by the presence o f these Sky People” (1985:163).
R ather, it was “pragmatism, nurtured in a milieu o f widespread suspicion and backed up by a
quick understanding o f the fire pow er o f .303 rifles and a desire for useful objects ranging from
steel axes to steel bridges, that led to the comparative ease o f the first pacification in Enga” (ibid).
Indeed, the fear o f spirits and guns is no longer there, but w hat is still pursued today is the “self
interest part o f the equation” (A.J. Strathem 1993b:42).

The flooding o f the local economy w ith shell valuables
T he H agen people — initially those from Jika, Yamka, Elti, M okei and other tribes around the
present M ount Hagen tow nship — first made contact with Europeans during the much
celebrated Leahy-Taylor patrol o f April, 1933.7 Soon after this alien intrusion, the local economy
was flooded w ith shell valuables. Between 1933 and 1945, hundreds o f thousands o f peadshells,
bailer, nassa and cowries were flown in from the coast by private entrepreneurs (principally the
Leahy brothers w ho were working on an alluvial gold deposit at Kuta), missionaries (Ft William
Ross at the Wilya Catholic Station and G eorg Vicedom and H ebert Strauss at Ogelbeng
Lutheran Station), and also by the Australian colonial administration. Connolly and A nderson
(1987:250) estimated that the Leahys alone in 1936 were flying in about five hundred kina shells
6.

For a general discussion on die reactions o f PN G Highlanders to European contact, see Simpson’s (1954) and Connolly
and Anderson’s (1987) accounts o f the much celebrated Leahy-Taylor patrol; See also Leahy (1994) for a personal
account o fh ts adventures; and Souter (1963) for a general account o f patrols in Papua New Guinea and Irian Jaya.

7.

It is evident from a particularly well-researched narrative account — based on interviews with the Leahy
family as well as first-hand accounts o f Highlanders w ho actually m et district officer James Taylor, the gpld
prospector Michael Leahy and his brother Dan, the surveyor Ken Spinks, and m ore than ninety carriers,
armed police and Leahy's armed W arns from M orobe (some o f them accompanied by their Bena Bena
wives) — that the Roklaka, Yamka, Elti, Penambi, and Mokei (possibly in this order) were some o f the
first Hageners to see people o f European origin (see Connolly and Anderson 1987). Yamka Maepkang
Afiti o f Kelua, w ho is said to have “travelled several miles to the east to attend a funeral” (almost certainly
at Gumanch among the Roklaka) on 16 April 1933, claimed to have heard news o f the aliens from a
Roklaka man w ho announced: “The sun always rises! The river always flows in its banks! And the rocks
have always been there! But the makers o f all these things are coming up now. Perhaps they are spirits,
perhaps they will eat us all, but I am bringing them ” (quoted in Connolly and Anderson 1987:99-100; as
recited to them by Yamka Maepkang Min).
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a m onth to m eet their food and labour bills. Although no one knows for sure the exact num ber
o f shells flown into H agen and the Highlands during this early colonial period, it is generally
accepted that betw een 1933 and 1942 at least five and possibly ten million shells o f all types were
im ported by die European com m unity into die Highlands region to pay for food and labour
(see H ughes 1978:315; Connolly and A nderson 1987:250; Feil 1987:118).
D espite the inevitable devaluation, in the first ten years o f foreign occupation, there seems to
have been n o upper lim it to the dem and for m ore shells, a situation which was thoroughly
exploited by the intruders. It is, for instance, evident in Connolly and A nderson (1987) that apart
from settling their food and labour bills with shells, some Europeans — notably the Leahy
brothers — and many coastal carriers and guards used shells also to pay for sexual favours from
local w om en, thereby introducing prostitution, som ething which never existed in pre-colonial
H ag ai society.8 Q uoting from Michael Leahy’s diary, Connolly and A nderson noted that there
w ere marriages and casual sexual encounters in the early years o f European occupation:
As Leahy noticed, the normal bridewealth for a marriage was five peadsheQs and a
tomahawk. But a knife and a few smaller shells would pay for a short visit to the pilpiL
This was a specific response to the arrival of the strangers. Sex on a casual basis was
very much frowned upon in Hagen society, and sex for payment was absolutely
unheard of. To the women involved it would have been a strange and possibly
humiliaring experience, perhaps tempered by the satisfaction o f knowing they were
bringing wealth to their dans. Men say today die women were not feared to participate,
but, gjven their position in society, young girls would have found die pressure very hard
to resist In their desire to get tome o f die new wealth it seems husbands, uncles and
brothers had taken to prostituting their women (1987:142).
A t first the presence and econom ic activities o f these seemingly incredibly wealthy foreigners
had a ‘democratising’ effect on political com petition, whereby the road to wealth and pow er
w hich had previously been m onopolised by big-men was now open to anyone who could
obtain shells (see A J. Strathem 1966a). O btaining shells was easy: many m ore m en could get
enough to obtain a second wife, o r to repay debts simply by exchange o f garden products, o r by
w orking for Europeans and earning them as wages, in addition to prostituting their wives, sisters
and daughters. In other w ords, since die 1930s the system became m ote egalitarian — for m en
at least— providing access to wealth to individuals w ho may have otherwise been squeezed out
by the m inority w ho controlled the traditional networks through which shells and other
resources flowed.
Before die arrival o f die European, die shells which were circulated in moka networks came
through extended traditional trade routes via die Southern Highlands. As valued scarce
8

Connolly and A n d erso n , how ever, did n o t m en tio n th a t at least one pioneer missionary in Hagpn was also
involved in the exchange o f shells for sexual favours, which proved his fertility. I t is widely believed that a now deceased
prr^rrwfVMifr whrtp r a t h o f c prfest was the biological father o f at least one child. His daughter and grandchildren Eve h i a
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resources, the shells are said to have been controlled by those w ho held onto the ‘ropes’ o f

moka. F or instance, in 1964, the Tepuka O klem bo big-man and councillor Rokla listed for
A ndrew Strathem som e 23 m en w ho were the only ones in the Tepuka and Kawelka tribes to
have peadshells in their possession ‘about the tim e the European arrived’: and it is likely that his
account actually relates to a tim e shortly after the arrival o f the Leahys and Taylor (A.J. Strathem
1971:108). This account, as A.J. Strathem (¿bid) says, agrees with that o f Vicedom and Tischner
(1943-8, VoL2), w ho argued that before European contact big-m en m onopolised shell moka
payments in Hagen.

Inflation o f the m oka
T he flooding o f the H agen econom y had far-reaching implications on indigenous political
institutions and leadership systems. A n immediate consequence o f the massive circulation o f
shell valuables, as noted by an early observer, was th a t
The native of the Hagen area became the millionaire. He could go to the fringe o f the
area and buy wives with the shells he was gradually hoarding. Where a chief would
formerly be a great man with three wives, now he could buy 8 or 10. Young men who
formerly had no standing could now raise their status by working for the white man,
receiving payment in shells (Ross; quoted in Gidow 1947:72-3; cited in Feil 1987:119).
Citing A.J. Strathem (1966a) and his own w ork, Feil goes on to say that “peadshells were
devalued and the moka system which [had] provided wealthy, powerful leaders and furthered
exploitative class-like relations, underw ent a profound ‘democratic’ change once again”
(1987:119).9 B oth Standish (1978a) and later Feil (1982) argued that it was this drastically altered
situation w hich anthropologists first encountered and described as the milieu o f big-m en, a time
w hen plentiful peadshells increased the num ber o f players in competitive exchanges, and when
warfare was officially banned. But, as argued by Feil (1987:119-20), it was a situation which had
been transform ed many times in the p ast
In the end, it was inevitable that inflation set in and the shell economy was completely destroyed.
By the late 1960s shells had definitely lost their economic value among groups around M ount
H agen, w here once highly valued items such as gold-lipped shells were considered as being
good only for adornm ent and display purposes. Some observers have, for instance, commented
on the rather conspicuous absence o f kina shells during moka prestations during the 1970s:
Large-scale moka involving kina shells were still going on in the early sixties, but then
they quickly lost their prestige value. In 1965 the anthropologist Andrew Strathem
watched men from the Tepuka dans, who lived in an outlying district of Mount Hagen,
give mote than eleven hundred kina shells in moka to exchange partners from the

9

For com parable discussions and an elaboration o f this point, see A.J. Strathem (1971); and Standish (1978a and
1992).

Background to Hagen Leadership and Politics

60

Kawelka people. In 1974, those shells were ‘forgotten’ when the Kawelka came to
reciprocate. They had gone out of fashion and lost their value. Pigs, money and motor
cars were the featured items. Cash was the thing and what it could buy (Connolly and
Anderson 1987:281; no specific references given).
D espite the destruction o f the shell econom y by the Europeans, Hageners m oved onto new
arenas o f political com petition, often experim enting with new ideas and econom ic resources, but
social scientists seem to have been sucked into a black-hole o f academia called the ‘big-man’
m odel. This particular m odel has been so thoroughly applied, even in instances where it does
n o t fit, that it is now accepted even by m em bers o f the societies which have traditionally formed
the subject o f scholarly inquiry. T hat PN G Highlanders and many other Papua New Guineans
com m only refer to leaders as bikman in Tokpisin (English: ‘big-man’) is ample evidence o f how
deeply entrenched the big-m an concept is in discussion o f PN G societies. I now turn to the
‘big-m an’ m odel in order to assess its applicability in Hagen.

The Big-man Model
As a typological concept, the term ‘big-m an’ was first made popular by Marshall Sahlins (1963).
A t a tim e w hen social Darwinism was still very m uch the trend o f thought, Sahlins sought to
establish an evolutionary point in his com parison o f self-made leadership in Melanesia to that o f
inherited Polynesian chieftainship. A ccording to Sahlins, Melanesia represented a m ore
rudim entary type o f leadership structure w hen com pared with the m ore advanced chieftainship
system in Polynesia (1966:160-163),10 W hile the contrast between big-m en, especially the self
m ade bourgeois, and chiefs, the so-called titled and well-bred ones, remains an im portant
insight, critics were quick to point out the gross generalisations involved in lumping all
M elanesian leaders into one category o f achieved leadership and Polynesian ones into another
ascribed leadership categpry. Many Melanesian leadership systems, as aptly pointed out by Feil
(1987:93), have ascriptive elements and some Polynesian systems achieved ones; it is their
relative emphasis that varies. For example, in the PN G Highlands where “the big-man m odel
still reigns suprem e, despite many problem s n o t yet confronted” (Feil 1987:93), statistical data
Marshall Sahlins’s comparison o f “developed Polynesian and underdeveloped Melanesian polities” was
based on differences in scale, political structure, historical performance, and quality o f leadership
(1966:161-163). H e claimed that (1) “Melanesian polities” were smaller, numbering “seventy to three
hundred persons” in Melanesia in general, and, in the Highlands, “up to a thousand, occasionally a few
thousand people”, compared with Polynesian chiefdoms which “might claim ten thousand, even tens o f
thousands” (p.161); (2) that Melanesian “tribal plan is one o f politically unintegrated segments”, by
contrast with integrated, hierarchical structures in Polynesian (p.162); (3) that “only the Hawaiians,
Tahitians, Tongans and, to a lesser extent, the Fijians successfully defended themselves” against
“European cultural pressure in the late eighteenth and the nineteenth centuries, by evolving countervailing,
native-controlled states” (p.163); and (4) that “the Melanesian big-man seems ... thoroughly bourgeois, so
reminiscent o f the free enterprising rigged individual o f our own heritage”, compared with the Polynesian
titled and well-bred chief (p.164). All o f these broad, rather simplistic and alm ost superficial comparisons
are inappropriate, as there is considerable internal variation within both Melanesia and Polynesia, just as
there are broad similarities between these two cultural areas.
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provided by Strathem (1971:209) on H agen leadership show that, despite the absence o f a
form al rule o f succession, 27 out o f 36 m ajor big-m en had fathers w ho also were big-men. My
data collected 30 years later conform s to this pattern (see discussion on Hereditary* Leadership in
die next section). Similar cases were reported by Reay (1959) for the Kuma o f South W ahgi and
Lowman-Vayda (1971:339) for the M aring o f the Jim i and Simbai valleys. For the Kuma the
ideal is that the eldest son should succeed his father as the leader o f the sub-subclan (Reay 1959).
A recent paper by Reay reinforces this point:
Every ‘small group’ had a leader its members recognised as ‘first man* (yi kwnnd).
Ideally, and often in feet, he was descended in a direct line of eldest (kwma) sons from
the elder ( kumrtd) of the two brothers who founded the ‘small group’ (1984:36).
Likewise, am ong the M aring the position o f big-m an, which goes with special “knowledge o f
rituals concerned w ith fighting” (Rappaport 1984:29), passes from father to son. The contrast
betw een Melanesian leadership systems and those o f Polynesia, as previously m entioned, is
therefore less real than apparent (Standish 1978a; Douglas 1979, Chowning 1979; Iindstrom
1981,1984; Allen 1984; cf. Feil 1987:93).
As noted by one Highlands observer, for m uch o f the 1970s the m ost influential m odel o f
leadership was the essentially m eritocratic one developed by Andrew Strathem to describe the
Hagen system (O’H anlon 1989:35). Michael O ’H anlon, w ho him self conducted fieldwork
during 1979-81 and 1986 am ong the K om blo o f N orth W ahgi (immediate eastern neighbours o f
A.J. Strathem ’s N orthern Melpa), notes:
The typical Hagen leader, ‘big-man’, was both a compelling speaker and a wealthy
polygynist, particularly talented at investing the pigs reared by his wives in the ramifying
moka system of ceremonial exchange. From a male perspective, the system was
mfritrvTatir in that, though a big-man might give his sons a flying start in their careers
by providing them early on with a wife or two, such a start was neither necessary nor
sufficient to attain big-man status (1989:35-36).
A ccording to A.J. Strathem (1971:187), there is a proliferation o f terms describing attributes and
actions o f big-m en am ong the Hagen, and the m ost general term , which one hears m ost often, is

mta nyim (also spelt mini)* T hat is the term which A.J. Strathem translates as ‘big-man’. It should,
how ever, be noted that the w ord ‘big-m an’ is not an exact translation o f the Melpa term nma

mum*, b u t the big-m an concept approximates to all that mum entails. I have translated the term
wua mum as leaders, which is consistent with the way Hageners themselves equate the wua nmm
concept w ith all types o f leadership. Thus, orators may be referred to as ik nga wua nmm (leader
in speech-m aking); senior public servants and politicians as gapman nga wua ntdrn (leader in
governm ent), and outstanding businessm en as bisnis nga wua mum (leader in business). These are
w hat H ageners call ‘different types o f m ini (mim elepa-elepa moromen), which clearly implies that
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the econom ic big-m en w ho are generally associated with the moka ceremonial exchange system
can — and m u st— be distinguished from other types o f leaders.
N onetheless, A.J. Strathem ’s statem ent that both ‘rich man’ and ‘chief are inappropriate as
translations for tvm num is m ost probably an accurate assessment at least o f his own
observations. H e rightly argued that it is n o t the fact o f wealth but its deploym ent which is
im portant and that the big-m an occupies no definite office o f headship over specific num bers o f
subjects (A. J. Strathem 1971:187). Hagen big-m en are essentially econom ic entrepreneurs
continuously engaged in m astering support and marshalling resources for ceremonial exchange.
O ther term s used by Hageners when referring to leaders, mostly big-men, emphasise wealth,
oratorical skills, and generosity. It is w orth quoting A.J. Strathem here in full:
The Hagen terms for big-men employ concepts o f size and physical well-being as well
as referring directly to the financial status and power to speak and propose plans which
big-men are supposed to have. It is notable also that the greatest spread of terms occurs
at the top and bottom of the social hierarchy, and that rubbish-men, who are at the
bottom, are often described by symbols which make them the opposites of major bigmen, who are at the top. Thus, the major big-men have strong heads, while those of
rubbish-men are so ft they are like strong forest trees while rubbish-men are like
humble, weak ones; they know how to speak whereas rubbish-men do not And bigmen in general ‘make grease’ — which carries connotations of both health and wealth
— whereas rubbish-men are dry, like ash (1971:187-188).
Simply, this can be interpreted in the following manner. Owing to the competitive nature o f
society and big-m en being such fierce com petitors, Hageners perceive big-men in association
w ith success. Rubbish-m en are regarded as weaklings because o f their lack o f ability to succeed.
A big-m an’s success, retrospectively, comes with wealth, knowledge and ability. In the words o f
Roy R appaport, “these are primarily the fruits o f the same abilities — intelligence, vigpur,
forcefulness — that make a man a frequent decision-maker” (1984:29). Although he was writing
on the M ating w ho are perhaps culturally and linguistically much closer to the W ahgi and
Chim bu than o f Hagen peoples, Rappapords assertion that “big-men are ... intelligent m en o f
forceful personality” {ibid) is quite an accurate summation o f the situation in Hagen. These
abilities appear to m ark the difference between big-men and those o f other categories.
How ever, w hat A.J. Strathem does n o t m ention is the fact that Hageners have two im portant
term inological categories o f big-men: one called ik nm (lit: ‘speech man5) and die other mel m a
(‘m aterial wealth m an5). In their view, both the orator and the wealthy man are im portant, their
positions often complementary. Hageners maintain that in times o f need one comes up with the
necessary goods while the other has the pow er o f speech with which to highlight the value o f
those goods during prestations. It is the deploym ent o f goods that makes them both big-men.
W hile the tw o kinds o f big-m en represent distinct categories, it is also possible that a successful
big-m an can play both roles to perfection, depending on the nature o f the occasion. If, for
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example, the occasion calls for bridewealth paym ent, the immediate kinsmen o f the husband will
com e up w ith the pigs and money while a renow ned orator, not necessarily from within the
subdan, will make a speech on their behalf, during the prestation.
Traditional leadership, according to A.J. Strathem ’s m odel, was largely defined in term s o f
cerem onial exchange. W arfare, as an arena for com petition and cooperation, was largely ignored.
Fight-leaders are virtually non-existent in his reports o f 1960s fieldwork. The present study
should help rectify this situation by providing som e fresh insights into the different contexts o f
leadership, both in fighting and non-fighting capacities (see ChapterFive).
Unlike in other societies such as Bena Bena, where the main emphasis is on fighting skills
(Langness 1971:309), and M ating, w here the position o f big-man goes with possession o f rituals
concerned w ith fighting (Rappaport 1984:29), in both Enga and Hagen bold warriors are
adm ired but are rarely big-men. In H agen, for instance, A. J. Strathem (1971:75) noted that
fighting ability alone could n o t give a man claim to being a nma nyitn (‘big-m an’). Financial and
oratorical ability were also required (¿hid). In this respect the Hagen are similar to the Chimbu,
w here the daring fighter is admired and is im portant in time o f w ar but does not always attain a
following (Brown 1967:46-47; 1972:43-44). Instead, the Chimbu, like the Hagen and Enga, place
m ost emphasis on entrepreneurial skills. Managerial capacity involving coordination and
foresight for planning agricultural activities and accumulation for large distributions, abilities to
represent the group forcefully (which involve possession o f a good oratory style), the stance o f a
bold w arrior, and a certain aesthetic flair required in displays and ceremony are all essential
characteristics for a big-m an (Rubel and Rosman 1978:165-166). From this, it is clear that being
a bold w arrior, although an im portant characteristic o f Chimbu leadership, does not necessarily
guarantees one o f big-m an status.
Y et, in tim es o f instability and endemic warfare, we find the emergence o f certain m en o f
violence w ho maintain pow er w ith force and threat o f violence. These warrior-type leaders,
dubbed by anthropologists as despots (see Salisbury 1964; see also Read 1959; Brown 1963; A.J.
Strathem 1966; W atson 1971), were violent men w ho were o f real value to their groups in times
o f warfare. D espots were reported in Eastern Highlands and Simbu provinces. O ne
anthropologist (Salisbury 1964) even suggested that although the indigenous ideology in
H ighlands societies was one o f egalitarian com petition for leadership, before European contact
leadership was in practice characterised by the serial despotism o f powerful big-m en, which
effectively prevented other aspiring big-men from reaching the top (quoted in A. J. Strathem
1971:224). This view, although at the tim e rejected by others (such as A. J. Strathem 1971), has
recently been revived by Feil (1987). Theoretically, once warfare is removed die value o f violent
m en correspondingly drops (A. J. Strathem 1971:224). It will be interesting to see if this
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occurred during and after pacification. I take up the question o f despotism as a form o f
leadership in Chapter Five: H ere I refer to re-examination o f A.J. Strathem’s big-man model by
Standish and others.
H ie m eritocratic m odel o f leadership developed by A.J. Strathem does not sufficiently account
for variability in contem porary leadership types, nor does it account for those hereditary and
despotic aspects o f leadership emphasised by eady accounts o f Hagen society by Vicedom and
others (see Standish 1978a). Although A J. Strathem him self had rejected Vicedom’s account o f
class stratification as highly rigid, Standish (1978a) and later Feil (1982) suggested that A.J.
Strathem and others w ho conducted fieldwork during the 1960s had failed fully to appreciate the
democratising effects o f colonial rule. Part o f Standish’s and Feil’s argument was summed up by
O ’Hanlon:
By imposing peace, the Australians had removed leaders’ power over refugees; by
imposing massive quantities of shells, they had undermined their power over trade and
exchange networks. The big-men observed by Strathem and others were substantially
colonial creations (1989:36).
Standish and Feil believe that the hereditary and despotic character o f leaders was down-played
by A.J. Strathem and others. Standish has been particularly influential in the reconsideration o f
the big-man model. Citing Chimbu informants’ statements that in pre-colonial (and colonial)
times there was an ideology o f inheritance within leading families, and pointing out that such
statements are quite consistent with early accounts o f missionary-anthropologists Bergmann in
Kamanegu (Chimbu) and Vicedom in Hagen, and more recent studies by Reay among the
Kuma (South Wahgj) and A.J. Strathem him self among the Melpa (Hagen), Standish pointed
out the major weakness o f the big-man model:
The central core of the ‘Big-man5 theory is the open nature of the competition for
leadership, which is achieved on merit rather than ascription. In the highlands,
manifestations of operative hereditary principles have been identified in several areas,
and practical demonstration shown not only of the mechanics of advantage for
members of certain lineages, but also several instances of succession. ‘Hereditary
advantage’ is perhaps a better term for the findings presented. If there is no requirement
for a strict rule of primogeniture before we use the term ‘hereditary’, then adequate
evidence has been presented to aigue that hereditary elements are strong in the
emergence of leaders, as well as meritocratic factors (1978a:32-33).
My data suggests that there is a combination o f both personal ability and hereditary advantage
involved in leadership status. In fact, trie pervasive principle o f succession in Hagen provides
sufficient grounds for reconsidering approaches to the study o f leadership in Papua New
Guinea. O thers have reached similar conclusions (see, for example, Criowning 1977; Douglas
1979; and May 1997). I now turn to discuss the empirical data on hereditary leadership in Hagen,
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but will return to a reconsideration o f the big-man m odel in die concluding section o f this
chapter.

‘Hereditary* Leadership
Evidence presented in this study shows that whilst leadership status is pardy competitively
achieved through individual ability, hereditary iqualifications>, as indicated below, are also strong
factors in leadership status. Table 2.1 contains data on 319 leaders in 1994-5 in eight Hagen tribes
com prising 31 dans: Tepuka (8) Kawelka (4); Minembi (7); Kombukla (8); Welyi (1); Remdi (1);
Kumungaka (1); and Gulke (1). Although the first three were covered in A.J. Strathem’s
compilation o f statistical data in 1964-5 on 97 big-men in 14 clans, specific comparisons
involving three or m ore generations o f leaders are not possible because he did not indude actual
names o f the big-men represented in his analysis. The names o f the leaders and clans
represented in my data are given in Appendix III. His data, as mentioned earlier, shows that 27
out o f 36 major big-men were the sons o f big-men, while 31 out o f 61 m inor big-men had
fathers w ho were also big-men — a total figure o f 58 out o f 97 men w ho succeeded their fathers
as big-men (see A.J. Strathem 1971:209). This data, when compared with similar data collected
thirty years later (Table 2. /, below), should tell us whether or not there has been any change in
patterns o f ‘succession' o r hereditary advantage.

Table 2.1: Hereditary advantage in Leadership Patterns
Other type
o fleader

Father
was a big
man

Father was
another type
<fleader

Father was
not a leader

Father's
status
not
known

92

3

75

—

18

2

56

52

4

46

1

9

—

Kombukla

63

56

7

61

—

1

1

Minembi

58

56

2

52

—

2

4

Welyi

12

12

—

11

—

1

—

Remdi (Dei)

15

15

—

12

—

—

3

Kumungaka

11

11

—

9

—

2

—

Gulke

9

8

1

8

—

1

—

Totals

319

302

17

274

34

10

Groups

Bag-men
Total
Number of
headers

Tepuka

95

Kawelka

1

There are two im portant issues involved here: (1) the rule o f succession; (2) hereditary
advantages. O n the first point I agree with A.J. Strathem (1971:210) that there is no rule o f
succession in Hagen. O n the second issue, sons o f leaders have real advantages over others in
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com peting for leadership status. It is also fair to say that since there is now inheritable wealth, in
addition to advantages o f education, and access to offices and roles in the state, there is a strong
tendency tow ards inheritance in both ideology and practice which may n o t have been there
before (c£ Brow n 1987). How ever, it is perhaps w orth m entioning here that the data presented
in Table 2.2 should be treated with som e caution because it is only a statistical frequency (based
on higjüy subjective judgements o f w ho is a leader and w hose father is/w as a leader) which
tends to confirm a greater likelihood o f leaders being sons o f leaders. But n o t all sons o f leaders
are leaders, o f course.
D espite the absence o f any rule o f succession, data presented here shows that 275 out o f 319 —
o r 86 per c en t— o f current leaders had fathers w ho were also leaders. O n the basis o f his 1964
5 data, A.J. Strathem suggested that m ajor big-men had a 3:1 chance o f being the sons o f bigm en, and for m inor big-m en the chances were alm ost even, 1:1 (1971:210). I have not made the
distinction between m ajor and m inor big-m en, n o r have I sought out leaders as big-men. Rather,
I sought inform ation on leaders' in general {ol Uda man in Tokpisin, o r wua nuim in Melpa), but,
for com parative purposes, leaders with oratotical abilities and those pre-em inent in ceremonial
exchange were tagged as ‘big-men'.
It should be noted, however, that many o f the leaders m entioned here as ‘big-m en' are (or were)
also local governm ent councillors, national parliamentarians, provincial assembly-men, village
court magistrates, peace officers, church pastors, circuit councillors, businessm en, orators, fight
leaders, and so forth — in other w ords, these are different types o f leaders. As Hageners say,
they are ‘m en with nam es' (nm mbi pi)9whose renow n extends beyond local boundaries, and
w ho are therefore influential in decision-making processes. My data suggests that current leaders
have a 8:1 chance o f being the sons o f leaders. Figure 2.2 shows comparable data on ‘succession',
betw een 1964-5 and 1994-95.
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Figure 2.2: Pattern of 'succession in leadership status, 1965-1995

1964-5

1994-5
PERIOD (YEARS)

Source.

Based on data complied by A.J. Strathem in 1964-5 (1971) and similar data which I compiled in 1994-5.

This represents a marked increase in sons succeeding fathers as leaders since A.J. Strathern
conducted his statistical analysis on leadership in 1964-5. Despite the absence o f any systematic
study on the reasons for this improvement in chances o f sons o f leaders becoming leaders
themselves, there is the virtual certainty o f sons being encouraged — and with decided
advantage in socioeconomic privileges such as education, inherited wealth and the right
connections — to succeed as leaders. Moreover, the Hagen ideology o f ‘the son shall replace the
father as a leader’ is vigorously pursued by aspiring leaders. In fact, “major big-men certainly do
place value on the idea that at least one o f their sons should take their place” (A.J. Strathem
1971:212). In the Dei Council area, for instance, there is strong evidence o f succession being
advocated and practised by leaders. Furthermore, the Tepuka Keitipi big-man and former Dei
MP, Parua Kuri, whose father was a pre-eminent big-man, and his son, Reuben Parua, only
recently ousted as Dei MP, are clearly a case in point The Highlands leader, Iambakey Okuk,
who claimed to be the son o f a leader, although his biological father was not known to the
colonisers as a leader, represents a clear case o f the advocacy o f succession (Standish 1992:101).
In Hagen, all leaders (and others too) hope that first their wives will give them sons and, second,
that at least one o f their sons will become a leader o f some sort. Accordingly, leaders tend to
become polygynists and often encourage their sons to do likewise, thereby ensuring that at least
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one wife will produce a son to ‘take the father’s place’ (tepam nga kokl He moklombd). Whilst it is
generally true that all men value the idea o f a son ‘taking their place’ (iepam nga kokl He moklombd),
leaders in particular do tend to encourage their sons to replace them. Thus, if a renowned
orator’s son shows signs o f oratorical abilities, people will say ‘the orator’s son will take his place’

(tepam ik-wua nga kangem kokl He moklombd), or, more generally, a leader’s son exhibiting some
leadership qualities will be thought o f as ‘taking his father5s place’ (tepam rum nuim e nga kangem

kokl ile moklombd). The frequency o f polygyny among leaders, despite the hostility towards this
practice by Christian churches, is shown in Table 2.2.
T a b le 2.2: L ead ersh ip an d Polygyny
Groups

Total
N um ber
Leaders

Polygynist men
of

Wives who are
in

polygynous

Monogamist
men

U nknom i

Total number
o fwives

marriages

Tepuka

95

52 (55%)

117(73%)

41 (43%)

2

160

Kawelka

56

30 (54%)

79 (75%)

26 (46%)

—

105

Kombukla

63

27 (43%)

79 (69%)

35 (56%)

1

115

Minembi

58

27 (47%)

71 (70%)

29 (50%)

2

102

Welyi

12

7 (58%)

21 (81%)

5 (42%)

—

26

Remdi (Dei)

15

9 (60%)

23 (79%)

6 (40%)

—

29

Kumungaka

11

4 (36%)

8 (53%)

7 (64%)

—

15

Gulke

9

5 (56%)

13 (76%)

4 (44%)

—

17

Totals

319

161 (50%)

411 (72%)

153 (48%)

5 (2%)

569

H alf the 319 leaders are in polygynous marriages, accounting for 411 out o f 569 wives (72 per
cent), at an average ratio o f 2.6 wives per polygynist The relatively low range o f 36-60 per cent
o f polygynist leaders suggests that polygyny is neither the prerogative o f leaders, nor a
prerequisite for the achievement o f leadership status. In fact, it is perfectly normal for aspiring
leaders to become successful managers o f their personal networks without the complications o f
extra privileges and obligations that goes with polygynous marriages. Yet it is customarily
fashionable in Hagen society, as in other parts o f the Highlands, for leaders to have more than
one wife. As some would say: Em pasin bilong ol Haibns bikman (‘It is the way o f the Highlands
big-men7).
Correspondingly, all eight groups covered in this survey recorded significantly high percentages
o f wives in polygynous marriages, with a range o f 53-81 per cent. A large majority o f Hagen
leaders, as indicated in Appendix 111, have an average o f 2-3 wives, but a few may have as many as
10 wives. The most outstanding leader in the Dei Council area, Parua Kuri, for example, has
only four wives, although his father had ten wives. By contrast, Hagen businessman and Pangu
Party president, Pati Wamp, who may be nationally known but has far less influence than Parua
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in the Dei Council political field, has seven wives.11 The percentages o f leaders and wives in
polygynous marriages are shown in Figtire 2.3.

Figure 2.3: Percentage of Leaders and wives in polygynous
marriages
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There are many reasons why traditional Hagen leaders and ordinary men married more than one
wife. The m ost commonly given reasons were: (1) to build up a cheap supply o f labour; (2) to
extend moka networks; (3) to create and strengthen alliances between groups; (4) to raise sons
who may replace them; (5) to build up numbers in their groups; and (6) as a status symbol.
In contemporary Hagen society, politicians and businessmen practice polygyny for neady the
same reasons: (1) to extend personal networks for votes; (2) to create and strengthen political
alliances; (3) to raise sons; (4) to build up numbers for their groups; and (5) as a status symbol.
Although most politicians and businessmen do not use their wives as cheap labour, some o f
their wives are income earners in the capitalist economy, which is important because elections,
as evident in this study, can be expensive exercises, costing massive amounts o f cash and other
economic resources (see Chapter She, see also Chapter high!).*

There are significant differences between Pati Wamp and Parua Kuri, for example, in age, wealth, sphere
o f influence. Parua is older and perhaps less wealthy than Wamp, and his sphere o f influence is D ei while
Wamp operates at the national level. But what 1 cannot demonstrate here is whether or not material
factors override physical attractiveness in the decisions that young w om en and their relatives make w hen
choosing married m en as prospective husbands over single men. Despite his age and lack o f formal
education, Parua is certainly a more striking figure and better looking than Wamp, but do w om en interpret
such characteristics as physical attractiveness? Unfortunately I am not qualified to com m ent on that but it
is fair to say that political and econom ic factors are important considerations in decisions to do with
marriage in Hagen society.
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Significantly, w hat is com m on to both traditional and m odem polygynists is in the infringem ent
o f their wives* constitutional right to vote freely. D espite considerable acculturation and the
influence o f Christian m issions, Hagen is still a male-dominated society. Accordingly, Hagen
m en have considerable influence over their wives in voting during elections. Because o f the ever
present threat o f retribution from supporters o f losing candidates, coupled with kinship and
econom ic obligations, families stand to gain o r lose as a unit so it is not surprising that women
follow their husbands in their choice o f candidates. In respect o f ‘recalcitrant* wom en —
regardless o f w hether they are highly educated, ‘liberated*, or whatever the case m ight be — a
blow over the ear w ith a pointed knuckle is usually a sufficient physical rem inder that good
H agen wives should always vote the same way as their husbands.12
A m ajor difference between traditional leaders and m odem leaders is that a big-man often had
the consent o f his first wife w ho provides the pigs w ith which to acquire a second wife in order
to assist her in pig rearing which is a laborious task. By contrast, first wives o f m odem politicians
often bitterly oppose the idea o f a second wife and do put up nasty fights, thereby, in their view,
protecting their rights to occupy the front seat o f the ministerial vehicle, o r to occupy the official
residence. Many aspiring leaders, including some highly educated ones, m any m ore than one
wife because they see the acquisition o f a collection o f wives as an im portant status symbol,
w ithout o f course realising that there are serious obligations that go with such a practice. The
first wife may be highly educated, whereas later wives are usually village women. In urban areas
w here housing is a m ajor problem , and also rising costs o f school fees and consum er items,
polygyny has caused real econom ic hardship for many families, even for wealthy businessmen
and politicians. A n increase in domestic violence, for instance, has been attributed to the
problem s caused by polygyny. Surveys by the PN G Law Reform Commission identified
polygamy as a m ajor cause o f divorce in the Highlands region, and as a factor in domestic
violence (see T oft and Bonnell 1985; see also Ranck and T oft 1986). Violence against w om en,
despite the official tendency to pay less than adequate attention, is a real and pressing problem in
Papua N ew Guinea, an im portant subject which unfortunately cannot be taken up here because
o f the analytical focus o f this study.

Conclusion
There were several im portant issues raised in this chapter. First, there are different phases o f
H agen history, characterised by alternating periods o f peace and warfare, with two particular

When caught up in the excitement o f elections, such behaviour can easily go unnoticed by even the
keenest observer. W ithout attracting attention to themselves, Hagen men can be quite effective in
reinforcing their policies through both subtle and crude, yet discreet, means. See Chapter S ix for a detailed
discussion on voter coercion and retributive actions taken agiinst defectors, and the wider implications o f
such behaviour.
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types o f ‘traditional’ leaders, despotic fight-leaders and big-men, being prom inent in inter-group
relations o f negative and positive reciprocity, respectively.
Second, the political situation observed by anthropologists in the 1950s and 1960s was an almost
artificially created situation, drastically altered by the im pact o f colonialism. By banning warfare,
which in pre-colonial times gave prom inence to despotic fight-leaders, the colonial state
significantly altered the political status quo by (a) elevating big-men through the licensing o f
cerem onial exchange; and (b) opening the doors o f opportunity by introducing cash, cash-crops,
education, Christian missions, plantations, local governm ent councils and elections. All o f these
provided aspiring leaders w ith new paths to prestige, power and influence.
Third, these new opportunities directly resulted in the proliferation o f many different types o f
leaders. I f in the past there were only a few powerful types, such as big-men, fight-leaders and
ritual experts; now there is a multitude o f leaders, including councillors, village court magistrates,
parliamentarians, businessmen, bureaucrats, professionals, academics, church elders, and
criminal raskolgang leaders including politicians with criminal backgrounds and connections), in
addition to orators, big-men and fight-leaders.
Fourth, in view o f the considerable variation in contem porary leadership types and the wide
range o f arenas o f com petition in which they operate, it is fair to say that the big-man m odel
does n o t adequately account for Hagen leadership. Furtherm ore, the importance o f fathers o f
leaders as a factor in leadership patterns — evidence o f succession being advocated and
practised — is hard to reconcile with a model that is primarily based on the open nature o f
com petition for leadership. There is no conclusive evidence to support the argument that there
was equal opportunity for everyone to enter arenas o f competition for leadership status. Quite
contrarily, sons o f leaders seem to have unfair advantages in both pre-colonial and
contem porary contexts.
Admittedly, the situation is further complicated by emerging social stratification caused by
disparities in wealth and power, unequal access to wealth and education, and the inheritance o f
wealth. As recently pointed out by Ron May, “simplistic versions o f the big-man model thus
require substantial qualification to take account of, first, the effective continuum in (and
com m on mix of) leadership patterns, from hereditarial o r ascriptive to competitively achieved;
secondly, the range o f leadership styles, from the ruthlessly despotic to leader-as-steward, and,
thirdly, the existence o f varying degrees o f social stratification” (1997:5). H e further notes:
This qualification having been made, however, it is probably still true that, compared to
other largely ‘tribal5 societies, including those of neighbouring Polynesia, traditional
leadership in Papua New Guinea can be generally characterised as largely dependent on
personal qualities (and as a corollary only partly susceptible to inheritance), and
substantially constrained by competition, by specialisation of leadership roles, by the
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prevalence o f communal modes o f decision making, and by communal demands on
leaders and resentment of leaders who attempt to raise themselves too far above other
members o f society (May 1997:5; my emphasis).
Indeed, it is possible that, with the above qualification, the big-man model can be applied to
Hagen and other Highlands societies, but only to a particular leadership type: the traditional bigm en, those w ho gain prestige through ceremonial exchange, and orators who are influential
decision makers in peace negotiations, dispute settlements, and compensation payments. In
other w ords, the big-man m odel, whilst applicable to traditional big-man type leadership, is
inappropriate to describe the full spectrum o f contemporary Hagen leadership. Given their
shared history o f colonialism and its legacies, the same argument can be applicable to other
societies in the Highlands and elsewhere in Papua New Guinea and Melanesia.
Finally, in view o f recent comments by A.J. Strathem (1987) in discounting claims o f early
evidence o f stratification in Hagen, the debate on leadership is certainly far from over.
Hopefully, future research in this area should take into account o f (a) the wide range o f
leadership types, their modes o f operation, and respective arenas o f competition; (b) the
dichotomies o f internal and external forces that shape leadership patterns; and (3) social
stratification. In the next chapter I deal with an equally im portant debate, that concerning social
structure, which began in the 1950s and 1960s, before moving on to Hagen case studies on
business, warfare, and elections (all o f which are discussed here as arenas o f competition and
cooperation) in subsequent chapters o f the thesis, which are contemporary examples o f Hagen
leadership and o f Hagen groups in action.

Chapter

3

H AG EN GROUPINGS, OLD A N D NEW: TRIBES, CLANS, FACTIONS,
ALLIANCES A N D COALITIONS
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Introduction
According to their ideal-type model, the people who belong to the cultural-linguistic area around
M ount Hagen live in territory-holding named groups called reklaep (line’, or Vow5), which are
poly-segmentary in nature. In practice they largely conform to this model, despite considerable
variations, as in the size o f the groups. The Hagen reklaeps vary significantly in size, ranging from
below 200 to neatly 20,000 persons, and function. Members o f such groups often refer to
themselves as o f ‘one stock’ (mbo tenta), usually share a common origin-myth and observe a
particular taboo substance. The segments o r sub-units are constantly engaged in competition
(mduding warfare) with each other, but may occasionally cooperate in sponsoring large-scale
sociopolitical o r economic events. Inter- and intra -reklaep rivalries are m ost commonly expressed
within well established arenas o f competition and cooperation, such as warfare, compensation
payments, ceremonial exchange, business and elections.
The way in which Highlands people here organise themselves politically and the nature o f their
social and analytical constructs has formed a major focus o f academic debate in recent times.
Researchers from a W estern cultural and educational background, for instance, have been forced
to deal w ith sociopolitical systems quite unlike their own. In attempting to analyse these complex
systems, researchers (mostly social anthropologists and political scientists, but others too) have
had to rely on conceptual frameworks and terminology derived from other similarly ‘simple’,
‘non-industrialised’, o r ‘stateless’ societies, notably from the European colonies in Africa. Thus,
for example, ‘trading’ between groups and individuals became ‘exchange’, armed conflict
between groups became ‘tribal warfare’, and pre-eminence in ceremonial exchange equated with
a ‘political leadership’ type called big-m an’. Furthermore, the social groupings, from the highest
and m ost inclusive level to the lowest, were labelled ‘tribe’, ‘clan’, ‘sub-clan’ and ‘lineage’.
This somewhat carefree and bulk borrowing — rather than adopting o r developing conceptual
‘tools’ based on local concepts — has directly resulted in a sad situation where foreign words
and concepts are now almost permanently established in the literature as well as in daily
conversations (among Hageners too, especially educated ones). While I find concepts such as
‘reciprocity’ (give and take), ‘warfare’ and ‘ceremonial exchange’ useful analytical tools in
discussing Hagen political competition, some o f the established anthropological terms for the
various forms o f social groupings in the literature may need some reconsideration.
This chapter begins with a discussion o f the major problems encountered by early
ethnographers in attem pting to apply anthropological concepts derived from mainly African
studies to Papua New Guinea Highlands social structures. It is essentially a brief but critical
scrutiny o f the literature on Highlands social structures, with a view to demonstrating how and
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why Highlands social organisation may be different (or similar) to other societies in PN G and
elsewhere in the w orld. It involves an examination o f the main levels o f social and political
otganisation in H agen, beginning with the high-level named groups, tribes and clans, and
discussing alliance systems, such as coalitions, factions and confederacy-type alliances.
The chapter then moves to a description o f the m ajor alliances between these dan and tribal
groups which have becom e the major actors in contem porary Hagen competition, w hether in
warfare, business o r elections. The m ajor coalition-style alliances are analysed in the context o f
political com petition between groups and their leaders. Also explored here is the prodaim ed
relationship between traditional military alliance systems, the business development associations
that were form ed in the mid-1970s, and contem porary political networks vis-a-vis the constant
shifting allegiances o f non-aligned voter blocs in elections. This is mainly to determine the
presence o r absence o f any significant linkages between them , that is, to identify any common
bonding ‘threads’ which may run through these organisations.
The final part o f this chapter looks at the D ei O pen electorate as a fidd o f political competition,
emphasising the diverging sub-fields (provincial constituendes) and the problems encountered
by the various pow er blocs and their leaders in attempting to maintain cohesion. In particular,
the discussion concentrates on the military alliances operating within this political field in order
to find explanations for the developm ent o f rifts within them — and their political implications
for corporate activities in other arenas o f competition such as elections.
The chapter concludes by identifying a num ber o f salient features o f Hagen political
organisation, and suggests that groups, factions and coalitions are ultimately created to serve
specific functions and goals. M oreover, it is argued that leaders play an im portant role in the
construction and maintenance o f these groups, a significant point which I think has been down
played by those in search o f descent models in the Highlands region. A further argument is that
Highlands observers failed, also, to recognise the Hagen notion o f the ham e-m ust-not-godow ri, which is a significant factor in the composition, recruitment, solidarity, and continuity o f
local groups. Such processes, once having been identified, are then built into the overall theme
o f the study, that o f com peting legitimacies (and competition for the allegiances o f individuals)
in state-sodety relations.

The Hagen Social Structure
O ne o f the first and perhaps m ost impressive things that W esterners may have leam t about
people in Hagen (and many other parts o f the Highlands) is the way in which members o f a
local population may identify with, and oiganise themselves into, a high-level named group, in
relation to other ymfyir groups. Indeed, for many anthropologists, w ho must have been
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impressed by elaborate hierarchy o r set o f structures, these groups resembled ‘segmentary
lineage structures' o f some African societies. Individuals, for instance, belong to an elaborate set
o f progressively m ore inclusive named groups, such as ‘tribes’ which have a segmentary structure
(A.J. Strathem 1971:Chap.2; 1972:18; Burton 1989:256; Medan and Rumsey 1991:Chap.3; Muke
1994:Chap.6; Ketan 1996:243). Despite some difficulties encountered in eady attempts to
categorise the various units according to size and functional criterion, these group levels, from
the largest to the smallest, are: coalition-style alliances, tribe-pair, tribe, tribe section, dan, clan section, sub

dan, sub-sub-clan, and lineage (cf. A.J. Strathem 1971; 1972).1 In an eadier paper, A.J. Strathem
(1966a356) identified eight main levels o f group segmentation: tribe, major section o f tribe,
m inor section o f tribe, clan, clan-section, sub-clan, sub-sub-clan, and lineage. These terms, he
says, are usually sufficient to deal with all levels found in a particular group (ibid). A revised and
m ore detailed version was published in his book, The Rope ofMoka, in which he identified ten
levels: great-tribe, tribe-pair, tribe, major section o f tribe, clan-pairs, clan, clan sections, sub-clan,
sub-sub-clans, and lineage (A.J. Strathem 1971:19-27).
Although Hagen social organisation is supposedly based on ‘tribes’ (see Burton 1989a), I have
included coalition-style alliances and tribe-pair as levels above the tribal level because o f their
relevance to the discussion on political organisation. Hageners have no direct translations for
these terms although there is definite organisation (and cleavage) along these lines. However, as
indicated by A.J. Strathem (1972), they do have words for other levels: the tribe is referred to as

reklaep tenta (‘one line3); dan as tepam tenta (‘one father*); sub-dan as manga rapa tenta (‘one men’s
house5); and the lineage as tepam-kangemal (‘father and his sons’).

Reklaep tenta (wan lain in Pidgin) is a term that can also be used when referring to other group
levels, including major section (e.g, Jika Maipngel line5) and clan (e.g. Jika Milakamb line5). But
this is m ore a m atter o f expression rather than an actual social construct, which means that the
term reklaep, when applied to ‘tribe’ is more consistent with the way Hageners think o f
themselves (as a line’ in dance, war, elections, etc.). O ther idioms applicable to the whole range
o f group levels are: mbo tenta (‘one stock’ or ‘one kind3); mbi tenta (‘one name3). Andrew Strathem
has previously published a more comprehensive discussion on Melpa idioms and group

As argued by Merlán and Rumsey (1991), any attempt to “distinguish analytically among various levels of
the segmentary hierarchy and to establish a standardised set o f terms for units at each [level]” may meet
with less than satisfactory results. A major problem is the fact that there is considerable difference in size
(and function). In Nebilyer, for instance, “the maximally inclusive named units (‘tribes) differ greatly in
size: from under 100 to over 7000 people, with a corresponding variation in the number o f named sub
units” (Merlán and Rumsey 1991:38). Likewise, Hagen groups, as indicated earlier, differ significantly, from
under 200 to nearly 20,000 persons. One may distinguish levels according to functional criteria, but here
too one encounters problems, which are discussed later in this chapter (see subsection on the Differences in
Si%e and Function in this chapter, see also Merlán and Rumsey 1991:Chap3 for comparable discussion of
Nebilyer tribes).
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structure so it is not w orth going over the same ground here.2 Suffice it to say that the idioms
Strathem recorded for my group, the Kawelka, have not changed much in thirty years, but the
structures certainly have, as evident in Figure 3.2. The changes in structures, as will be aigued,
correlates with population growth, which is also a factor in the formation (and shifting nature) o f
Hagen alliance systems.
Anthropological concepts such as <tribe,, ‘dan’, and ‘lineage’, whilst initially borrowed from
elsewhere and applied by early ethnographers as useful analytical tools, are now deeply
entrenched in the literature — however flawed or imprecise they may be in some cases. When
dealing with societies like Hagen it is im portant to note that such terms only roughly
approximate to existing social structures and must therefore be used rather cautiously.
Accordingly, I have used local terms where appropriate, but reverted to anthropologically
established terminology in instances where I feel there is clearly a need for greater edification for
the vast majority o f readers who are not familiar with Hagen idioms. If, by using such concepts,
one appears to be keeping in line with the anthropological tradition I have criticised earlier, then
I am doing so rather reluctantly and only as, I believe, originally intended — as useful analytical
tools.
T he H agen reklaep
The Hagen reklaep is the same as the Nebilyer talapi (Medan and Rumsey 1991:Chap.3). I have
no doubt that reklaep and talapi have the same meaning and are slight variations in
pronunciations o f the same concept Medan and Rumsey (1991:36) have literally described talapi
as line’, ‘row*, or ‘column’. All o f these are applicable to reklaep, which, like talapi, “is a broad
generic term”, as “nowadays it is used for provincial, national, and even geo-political identities in
so far as these are known”: ol lain Jika (‘the Jika line’); lain bilong Simbu (line o f Simbu5); even
Australia lain (‘Australian line*).
The established anthropological usage for this term, as indicated above, in both Hagen and
Nebilyer is ‘tribe’. Suggestive as this image o f ‘line’ {lain in Tok Pisin) might be for descent
theorists, M edan and Rumsey have warned that:
...in Ku Warn [Nebilyer] discourse the point of contact between the more and less
literal senses of talapi is not — as they might assume — in some notion of a line of
descent by which each member of a group is linked to its apical ancestor. What is locally
relevant is not a vertical, genealogical line, but a horizontal, tactical one: the line of men
who form a single flank on the battlefield and dance as a single row at ceremonial
exchange events (1991:36).

2

See A J. Strathem (1972:Chap.l); See also Medan and Rumsey (1991:Chap.3) for comparable discussion o f
the talapi [‘line’] structure in the neighbouring Nebilyer valley.
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The local teems for social groupings in three closely related cultural and linguistic areas in the
Western Highlands Province are given in Tigure 5.1. Listed below are local terms which roughly
approximate to the anthropological concepts. The stacked structure o f the diagram reflects the
conceptual relationship between the various categories: Hagen and Nebilyer being very similar in
cultural-linguistic terms (albeit with minor differences in pronunciation), while Hagen, being in
an interstitial position, shares some attributes o f both Wahgi and Nebilyer. All three culturallinguistic areas, however, have similar social groupings, which are functionally and analytically
equated with the anthropological concepts o f tribe, clan and sub-clan. However, it is important
to note that these are less than precise translations, even though they have now been accepted
into the canon o f the anthropological literature.

Sources.

Based on A J. Strathem (1972); Merlan and Rumsey (1991); and Muke (1994).

All these groupings are described in the lingua franca, Tokpisin, as lain (line). Indeed, as it will be
made clear in the next section (see discussion on The Tribe) and in subsequent chapters, line’ is a
solid entity to which members owe their first loyalty, especially in critical situations when one is
forced to choose between his own group and another (including the state). Yet, and somewhat
paradoxically, Tine’ often fails to direct members to support each other in group events, thus
echoing O ’Hanlon’s (1989:54-56) point that there may be ‘shadow communities’, with divided
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loyalties, and even traitors within the ideally solidary group.3 As evident in the case studies on
warfare and elections, not all members o f a Tine’ will participate in warfare, nor will they all
support a hom e candidate in an election. But will they go over to the other side? That depends
on w ho o r w hat constitutes the other side. A nd also on the type o f competition and on
undedying historical relations between the participants. In Hagen warfare, for instance, one or
m ore segments may choose not to fight alongside other segments o f a reklaep mainly because o f
cross-cutting kinship ties, but will rarely assist the opposing side. There is even evidence o f
segments (mostly at the dan level) having teamed up with the other side to fight against their
fellow tribesmen. T hat happens in very rare instances, especially when a dan (or section) may be
structurally part o f one tribe but dosely associated with a dan (or section) from another tribe
(and both tribes would be rivals in major warfare, dections and business). During 1986-1990, the
M inembi K im bo clan, for example, allied themselves with the Kawelka and fought against an
alliance o f M inembi clans because there was m ore ‘warmth* (mukl-tnukl eteni) in their association
with the Kawelka Kundm bo dan (with whom they are currently paired) than the M inembi tribe
(among w hom they are structurally part, but against whom they have also fought in pre-colonial
warfare). See Chapter Five for a detailed analysis o f military alliances; see also Chapters 6-8 for
shifting allegiances o f non-aligned voter blocs in elections, which generally follows military
alliances.
O f course, there is an element o f degree o f size involved here: smaller groups tend to be more
united than large ones, yet the ‘name-must-not-gp-down* principle is im portant to all Hagen
groups. In other words, being a m ember o f a reklaep has its privileges and obligations — and one
may o f course vote, fight and die as a Jika, Mokei, or Yamka — but it is im portant to recognise
that ‘line* membership does not necessarily dictate automatic partidpation in such group
activities.
Is th e H agen reklaep based on descent?
The reklaep, as argued below, is not based on descent Hagen is an area where people have
trem endous difficulty tracing descent for whatever its w orth (which may pragmatically be o f little
value in the overall scheme o f things). Except for a few older leaders (usually orators) who can
trace their genealogy beyond the fourth generation, m ost people’s knowledge can be as shallow
3.

O ’Hanlon (1989:54) says that ‘Svithin any clan there are likely to be sets o f individuals who identify
themselves as the ‘cuttings’ of, and indebted to, each o f the other major groups with which that clan has
intermarried”. As a member o f a ‘shadow community’ within his dan, “a man may experience divided
loyalties when his clan is at odds with that o f his blood”’ {ibid). Such a situation would be true for Hagen,
as it is for N orth WahgL For example, the sons o f women from the Jika Mikkamb clan in Remdi Jikamho
dan may refuse to fight if these two dans ever declared war on each other. Traitors, which O ’Hanlon
discussed in the context o f betrayal (1989:Chap.3), are another matter. I discuss these matters in terms o f
contradictions: between group and individual interests; loyalty and betrayal; ideology and practice (see
concluding section o f this chapter).
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as three o r four generations at the m o st It is also an area where people tend to place much
weight on the numerical strength o f a group. These are the major reasons why descent is stricdy
n o t a charter for recruitm ent As a result, not all members o f a reklaep can claim common
descent
W hen reviewing the relevant literature on Hagen group structures, it might be useful to posit
two basic questions: (1) is descent relevant to group recruitment; and (2) is descent a primary
principle governing group identity? In his study o f descent and group structure among the
Melpa, A.J. Strathem (1972) made an im portant distinction between principles o f group
recruitm ent and those o f group identity. Based on fieldwork conducted in the 1960s (between
1964 and 1968) in mostly Hagen Central and Dei Council areas o f Hagen district, A.J. Strathem
(1972) asserted that ‘descent* was irrelevant to the former, but operative in the latter. Medan and
Rumsey, w ho jointly conducted seventeen m onths o f fieldwork (between June 1981 and
N ovem ber 1983) in nearby Nebilyer Valley, tend to agree with A.J. Strathem on the first point
but beg to differ on the latter. Based on their observation o f Nebilyer groups, Medan and
Rumsey claimed that “neither die talapi (line*), nor the Iku tapa (men’s house), nor any other
social unit in the Nebilyer entails descent as a structural basis”. They further w ent on to say:
., .the sharing of a common apical ancestor is not even imputed as a notional principle
of ‘group identity’ among people who share a common segmentary identity (are of ‘one
line5), at least not at the level of ‘tribe’ (i.e., named segmentary identity of the most
inclusive order). Rather, where common ancestry is explicitly posited by origin myths,
these almost always involve pairs of ancestors who are related as brothers... Though we
assume such pairs of brothers would have had a common father, he is not named or
even mentioned in most such stories. From this and other evidence, we conclude that
the image of relatedness which they project is not one of ‘common descend, or even
filiation to a common stock, but brotherhood per se (1991:37; italics in original).
A part from this particular discrepancy, Medan and Rumsey (1991) were otherwise virtually in
agreement with A.J. Strathem (and also with Marilyn Strathem) on many other points. So why
the discrepancy? Is it because o f structural differences between Hagen and Nebilyer? O r is it
because they differ in cultural, linguistic, o r any other aspect o f society? O r is it because there are
sig n ifica n t

differences between the observers rather than the people who form the focus o f their

observations? The last question is a general one which may be applicable here as it would in
other parts o f the Highlands, PN G , and elsewhere in the wodd. And, I might add, it is probably
best left unanswered. However, in relation to the second and third questions, I see no real
difference between Nebilyer and Hagen. A t least on the basis o f social structure and culturallinguistic evidence, I suggest that Hagen does not differ significantly from Nebilyer. Except for
m inor linguistic differences, as evident in different ways o f expressing the same concepts (for
example: reklaep and talapi for line’; mangp rapa and Iku tapa for men’s house), Hagen and
Nebilyer are very similar in almost all aspects o f society.
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Can the discrepancy be explained in terms o f differences in research methods? Again, I see no
real difference here. M edan and Rumsey’s research methodology, for instance, was generally no
different to A.J. Strathem ’s. Both studies, for example, relied on the traditionally tried and tested
technique o f ‘participant observation’ and ‘selective interviews’. As well, both do not seem to
differ significantly in their utilisation o f anthropological concepts: Medan and Rumsey, like A.J.
Strathem (and Marilyn Strathem), identified the m ost inclusive social unit in the ‘segmentary
order as the ‘tribe’.
However, it is w orth m entioning here that their works were greatly influenced by differences in
theoretical emphasis, reflecting the times in which the studies were conducted. Andrew and
Marilyn Strathem , for instance, conducted fieldwork during a period when descent theory
dominated social anthropology. Some o f their eadiest and m ost detailed studies were focused
primarily on group structure and its relation to patterns o f residence, marriage, ceremonial
exchange, political leadership, dispute settlement, warfare, and so forth (see, for example, A.J.
Strathem 1971, 1972; and A.M. Strathem 1972a, 1972b). Their work epitomised the general
PN G Highlands ethnography that emerged during this period. Medan and Rumsey, however,
seem to have benefited quite significantly from the Strathems’ contribution to exchange theory
(A.J. Strathem 1971; 1979a and A.M. Strathem 1972b, 1988). While the central focus o f Medan
and Rumsey’s study was on the form and content o f Highlands oratory, their study was largely
influenced by exchange theory, which in their words, “has provided a valuable corrective to
segmentary lineage theory” (1991:3). Segmentary lineage theory, according to Medan and
Rumsey, “included the presupposition that what holds together’ the segmentary system — the
principle by which social groups are defined — is ‘descend, i.e., common connection through
m ore o r less extended series o f parent-child (read: father-son) links to common ancestors”
(1991:3). They claimed that “no such principle was evident here [in Nebilyer]” (¡bid).I
I shall return to the question o f descent theory vis-a-vis exchange theory in a short while, but
meanwhile here is my contribution to the debate on descent as a principle governing group
recruitm ent and group identity. I will argue, on the basis o f case studies (on warfare, elections,
business, etc.), that some o f the explanations put forward are inadequate, just as the principles
considered as gpvem ing group recruitment and identity are inherently deficient The way in
which the different arenas o f competition and cooperation — ranging from the more traditional
forms such as warfare and ceremonial exchange to m odem ones like elections and business
developm ent associations — have merged in recent times suggest that there are (at least now) far
m ore significant factors other than those put forward by anthropologists (e.g. ‘descend,
‘exchange’, etc.) involved in the ‘construction’ and ‘maintenance’ o f groups. And the fact that
such groups are constantly competing against each other as well as with the PN G state for the
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allegiance o f individuals is o f direct relevance to this study (see the final section o f this chapter
for further elaboration o f this theme).
Like A.J. Strathem (1972) and Medan and Rumsey (1991), I found no evidence suggesting that
descent is the key organising principle o f Hagen society, nor do I accept that die principle o f
agnation, o r patrilineal descent (through father’s line), sufficiently accounts for group
membership. Confusions and misunderstandings are almost inevitable in areas like Hagen where
people may say things in a particular way, but actually do things in a different sort o f manner.
For instance, it is n o t unusual for people o f the same ‘tribe’ to describe themselves as o f ‘one
stock’ (mho tenía), w ithout necessarily implying that they originated from the same ‘stock’ or
ancestor. Similady, people o f a particular ‘clan’ may speak o f themselves as o f ‘one father, one
blood’, and therefore cannot marry within because o f the common bloodlines; yet we find that
not all o f them can claim common descent Perhaps the best example comes horn the m ost
minimal unit, tepam kangemal (‘father and his sons’), where cleady one would expect to find a
father and his sons and their families. N ot quite so! It is more often (than not) the case that there
are non-agnates in all levels, including the m ost minimal u n it
D escent, therefore, is not die sole criteria for group membership, especially in recruitment (see
sections on The Tribe and The Clan). In relation to A.J. Strathem’s point on descent as a principle
governing group identity, I suggest that descent, or the idea o f having a common origin, comes
into play as an ideology o f group solidarity. As evident in the case studies on warfare and
elections, it is an ideology utilised by individuals, especially leaders, to drum up support for
activities in which they stand to benefit personally. Furthermore, I suggest that descent is not die
only factor in group solidarity. Following Muke (1994), I would argue that ‘patrilineal descend as
a factor in group solidarity can be matched by a factor called ‘matrilineal ascend. Taking a crucial
step further from Muke and especially M edan and Rumsey (on their endorsement o f the
exchange theory), I would argue, also, that there are far more im portant pragmatic factors in the
‘construction’ and ‘maintenance’ o f social units than those put forward by A.J. and A.M.
Strathem on Hagen, M edan and Rumsey on Nebilyer, and Muke on South W ahgi groups. I shall
return to this point later, but now turn to Muke’s Ka structure.
John Muke, w ho describes him self as a ‘native anthropologisd, conducted fieldwork in the late
1980s among his own Kuma people o f South Wahgi. From the standpoint o f an ‘insided, Muke
presented an interesting m odel o f the Ka (tribe/clan) structure (1994:Chap.6). By utilising the
analogy between the growth o f a plant (sweet potato) and the social reproduction process, Muke
asserted that groups developed in the same way as a plant does and their structures were
therefore named accordingly, thus the comparable terms: Ka (tribe/clan) for base; Kip (main
section) for shoots; Kamrn (sub-clan) for vines.
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The term Ka (as in KaweLka, Kondiyksr, o r Yam kd) is a commonly recurring suffix to group
names in both W ahgi and Hagen, which Muke (1994:177) believes is an archaic w ord for sweet
potato.4 Likewise, Hagen group segment names often end with mbo, which means ‘stock*, or
‘shoot o f som ething planted* (A.J. Strathem 1972:42). In attempting to explain the origin o f this
phenom enon, Muke (1994:178), after A.J. Strathem (1972), says that this ideology relates to
planting o f maternal substances and states that the name o f the female ancestress is taken and
the suffix mbo added to it to form a new segment in a tribe. In deed, Hageners do speak o f the
female substances, which include kopong (‘grease*) and mema (blood), as transplants taken from
the m other’s group (for which a certain form o f gift exchange has been instituted for the
purpose o f honouring such obligations). However, my data on Hagen groups suggest that the
suffix mbo is far m ore commonly attached to the name o f the group into which the female
ancestress (or usually a num ber o f diem) was bom , rather than her personal name.5 A num ber o f
examples can be identified in Figure 3.2; at its m ost minimal, or sub-sub-dan, level can be found:
Dakap-m bo (after Dakapkae), Kiklpukla-mbo (after Kiklpukla); Elti-mbo (after Elti), Minembim bo (after Minembi), Romalke-mbo (after Welyi Romalke), Tipuk-mbo (after Tepuka) and
Penambi-mbo (after Penambe). O ne only needs to consult the segmentary structures given in

Appendix I to see that this is the case throughout Hagen society.
Nonetheless, as far as the W ahgi and Hagen Ka structure goes, a sister’s children are also
described as ‘cuttings’ o r ‘shoots’ taken from the father’s group and being transplanted when
they shift residence back to their m other’s agnatic group. H ere, Muke’s discussion o f the
checker-board-type sweet potato gardens (angha doog) direcdy corresponds to the Hagen idea o f
m en being organised according to pana ru (‘garden ditch’, or ‘division*). A.J. Strathem expressed
this point very clearly:
There is the image of the whole clan as a ‘garden division’ (pana ru) and the idea that
persons who change membership ‘plant* themselves, or are planted by big-men
sponsors in a new ‘garden division’. The emphasis here is on the territorial nature of the
land-holding and on a symbolisation of residence which states that joining a group

4.

His suggestion that the sweet potato (ipomea batatas) being the plant which may have served as the
botanical m etaphor for the Ka structure was made on the assertion: “It is quite possible that the word
Angka, used in South Wahgi to describe mature sweet potato tubers, can be separated, just like proper
genealogical names can be separated from the suffix idioms o f the groups” (Muke 1994:177). In noting the
similarities in the word for sweet potato in neighbouring languages, such as: Kda (in Chimbu), Oka (in
Melpa), A ngkri (in East Kambia), Kep (in N orth Wahgi), and [Ngai (in Temboka)], he says that the
m etaphor could be an archaic word for the base or matures o f the sweet potato crop, which is associated
with the checker board (doog) agricultural practices (ibid). But the kaukau, as pointed out by Bill Standish,
came only came a few centuries ago. O ther crops have stock, roots, stems, etc, so it is possible that the
names predate kaukau. (personal communication, August 1997).

5.

The Nebilyer, as pointed out by Alan Rumsey, use the suffix m b (woman) in stead o f mbo, which once
again highlights the prom inent role o f women in the ‘creation’ o f new segments within groups (personal
communication, August 1997).
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implies making ‘roots’ with it, as a plant roots itself in a garden (1972:222; cited in Muke
1994:183).
A.J. Strathem further noted that “this idiom becomes fused at certain points with the Melpa
concept o f kinship, since the lexeme pukl can mean both a physical root and a kinship link.
H ence sisters sons have a particularly strong ‘root’ with their m others’ dan groups” (1972:222;
see also A.J. Strathem 1971:35). While A.J. Strathem’s emphasis was largely on the individual’s
connections to the land, Muke associates the botanical mode o f kinship expressions with a
‘matrilineal ascent5system:
Generally the expression ‘men within a square’ (yi googmi) implies a segmentary group
division, an historical process which is based on the notion of balance, static and
gradual changes. The composition of groups at each structural level is thought of as
squares in a field system, just like die checker board field systems in sweet potato
gardens (Muke 1994:183).
Muke’s Ka m odel is far m ore detailed than w hat is given here and m oreover he suggested the
antiquity o f the structure at 300 years (about the same time as the introduction o f the sweet
potato). Unfortunately it is not possible to work out the kinship system that preceded the Ka
structure, but we can at least benefit from this particularly refreshing approach to analysing
Highlands social structures from a different perspective. In particular, Muke made two im portant
points w hich should be kept as pointers to future studies on this subject matter:
•

The com position o f groups at each structural level (tribe, clan, sub-clan etc.) can be
thought o f as squares in a field system, just like the checker-board-type field systems
in sweet potato gardens. Accordingly, high-level named groups in Wahgi, such as
Dambnge, Kuma and N ene, may have historically operated as squares but are now
seen as ancient field systems. As population increased over time these origin groups
divided into Ka squares. Each Ka unit operated as a square unit in relation to other

Ka squares and once the population within each o f the units reached beyond the
carrying capacity o f the size o f a square, the expanding groups divided into Kup unit
The same principle applies to other levels, such as the Kup and Kanem segments (see
Muke 1994:183).
•

Since the Ka, Kip and Kanem are field systems superimposed upon one another, one
can peel each layer and define them as independent functioning units; Ka being the
m ost ancient structure and Kanem the recent functioning one. Therefore an interval
o f time can be determined for each o f the structural levels: approximately 100 years,
which suggests that the Ka structure may be 300 years old (see Muke 1994:198,199).

Although there is a difference in emphasis between their interpretations, I see A.J. Strathem’s
discussion on the Hagen idea o f ‘planting’ a person in a new group as quite complementary to
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Muke’s Ka structure. A n im portant idea emerging from both W ahgi and Hagen kin categories, as
aptly stated by Muke (1994:183), is the emphasis on the planting substance which, in another
way, refers to the reproductive capacities o f women. This leads us to the point where a sister’s
offspring, particularly sons, become significant factors in group solidarity. A sister’s sons, as
pointed out by A.J. Strathem (1972), have particularly strong roots with the m other’s clan (see
discussion on the clan in the next section). lik e those o f agnatic descent, a sister’s sons will have
no trouble in marshalling support for group events such as warfare or ceremonial exchange. In
fact, many are known to have gone on to establish themselves as leaders in their m others’ natal
groups. likew ise, members o f a group founded by a group o f clan sisters often stand together as
a solid unit in group events. The principles o f ‘patrilineal descent’ and inatrilineal ascent’ are
therefore both o f direct relevance to group solidarity.
However, as will be dem onstrated by the numerous cases studies discussed in subsequent
chapters, there are many other factors — pragmatically even more significant than the principles
o f ‘descent’, ‘ascent’, o r ‘exchange’ — which determine the composition o f a group. It can be
argued that neither the principle o f descent, nor exchange, nor ‘ascent’, nor population size can
adequately account for both group recruitment and group identity. My argument is simply based
on the two m ost fundamental characteristics o f groups: first and forem ost is the fact that all
groups are ultimately created to serve certain functions and in some instances to achieve specific
goals; and secondly, all groups are shifting in nature, in a constant state o f flux and wane, as old
members are lost (via death, marriage and outward migration) and replaced by new ones (via
births, marriage and inward migration). This raises serious questions about the value o f debate
on descent theory vis-a-vis exchange theory, an im portant point to which I shall return later (see

Conclusion in this chapter).
M oving away from the Hagen-Nebilyer-W ahgi area o f the W estern Highlands, I now turn to the
m ore general discussion on PN G Highlands literature, with a view to establishing some working
definitions for social groups found in Hagen.
Som e gen eral com m ents on an ancient paradox
Difficulties in the use and definition o f group structures have warranted much attention.
Fundamentally, the m ost prolonged debate in all o f the anthropological literature is whether the
Highlands social structure is exclusively based on (1) a patrilineal descent system or (2) a descent
dogma based on a cognatic system. Under the latter an individual can claim dual membership
(through both the father and the m other), whilst under the former one can in theory claim group
m embership only through the father’s line. The controversy over the nature o f PN G Highlands
group structure encountered various twists and turns, but ethnographers have made gallant
attem pts in salvaging some logical explanation from this paradox (see Barnes 1962; 1967;
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Langness 1964; Sahlins 1965; Meggttt 1965; Scheffler 1966; 1973; de Lepervanch 1967-68; A.J.
Strathem 1969b; 1972). As previously noted by others, Bames (1962), for instance, “questioned
the use o f African models in the New Guinea Highlands, pointing out that in many respects the
Chim bu and their cultural relatives [such as Wahgi, Hagen and Enga] were different from the
Tiv, N uer, Tallensi, and other Africans: genealogical reckoning was shallow, non-agnates were
easily incorporated into groups, segmentary processes and the ways o f conceptualising them
seem different” (Keesing 1975:58; see also Langness 1966 [1964]:131; A.J. Strathem 1969b:37;
Feil 1987:128). Bames w ent on to generalise that:
•. • although som e H ighland societies are appropriately classified as agnatic, the area as a
w hole appears to b e characterised by cum ulative patrifiliation rather than by agnatic
d esc en t ... B ut in m ost, though n ° t in all, H ighland societies the dogm a o f descent is
absent o r is held only weakly; th e principle o f recruitm ent to a m an’s father’s group
operates, b u t only concurrently w ith o th er principles, and is sanctioned n o t by an appeal
to the n o tio n o f descent as such b u t by reference to the obligations o f kinsfolk,
differentiated according to relationship and encom passed w ithin a span o f only tw o o r
three generations (1966[1962]: 120-21).

Cumulative patrifiliation means that a man would normally become a member o f his father’s
group, but if due to circumstances he affiliated with his m other’s o r paternal grandmother’s
group, his children’s rights in that group would be secure. For they, though not related by
patrilineal descent, were related by patrifiliation to the group he had attached himself to (see
Keesing 1975:58-59). Although Barnes’s (1962) generalisation was statistically supported by
empirical evidence (see, for example, A.J. Strathem 1972:104-105; 218-219), other writers
pointed out that factors such as matrifiliation, co-residence, and participation in exchanges and
warfare or in cult rituals can all be im portant also in determining affiliations (see Brown 1962;
Langness 1964; de Lepervanche 1967-8; A.J. Strathem 1969b, 1972 and 1979a; Scheffler 1985;
O ’H anlon and Franklin 1986; Feil 1987; O ’Hanlon 1989; Medan and Rumsey 1991; Muke
1994).
A fter Barnes’s (1962) insightful article and especially in light o f more recent work on exchange
theory as a “corrective to segmentary lineage theory” (see Medan and Rumsey 1991; see also A.J.
Strathem 1979a; and A.M. Strathem 1988), one may wonder whether the above debate was ever
relevant at all? Segmentary lineage theory, needless to say, was always going to be inadequate
when it comes to understanding PN G Highlands social structures. Despite its eady popularity
am ong certain academic circles during the 1950s and 1960s, segmentary lineage theory was
fundamentally flawed in its application because anthropologists either ignored or refused to
recognise some basic facts about PN G Highlands social structures.
As noted earlier, it was based primarily on the principle o f descent, and it was thought (quite
incorrectly) that descent was the key organising principle that held a group together. As a
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m em ber o f not one but several progressively m ore inclusive named groups, it came as no real
surprise to me when I read M edan and Rumsey’s report o f the absence or irrelevance o f descent
as a principle by which social groups are defined in Nebilyer. Their suggestion that exchange
theory, unlike segmentary lineage theory, can be used to explain Highlands social structure is a
useful one, though I do n o t agree that it sufficiently accounts for group composition. While it is
true that groups, factions, and coalitions are created for, and as a consequence of, exchange
transactions, it is equally true that such groups are ‘constructed* and maintained for specific
purposes (see the concluding section in this chapter).
It should be noted that many o f the problem s encountered by eady Highlands ethnographers
were o f their own making. The application o f W estern anthropological concepts onto Highlands
group structures, o r trying to explain Highlands societies using African models, was a common
mistake made by many eady ethnographers. However, to continue the inquiry along this fine
would be pointless. Suffice to say, w hat appears to outsiders as bewildering makes perfect sense
to Highlanders and one need only to ask the people themselves how and why some things are
done in a particular way. Hageners, for example, agree that some o f the members o f their
lineages are wua-nt-mei (‘bom o f the man5) while others are amb-nt-mei (horn o f the woman*, Le.,
the sister), w ithout implying that the latter are formally ‘second-class members* (A.J. Strathem
1966a:357; 1971:35).6 This cleady indicates that group membership in Hagen is not restricted to
agnatic descent (father-to-son), even though the lineage (tepam kangemal, ‘father and his sons3) is
described that way. In practice, a sister’s sons as well as others, including war refugees, can gain
membership in a group w ithout necessarily tracing descent to an apical ancestor. (Examples o f
sons o f the sister having gone back to her father’s group are given in Chapter Eight). However,
m ost members o f a group, especially at the levels below the tribe, can claim common descent to
a putative male ancestor.
W hen dealing with questions o f agnatic descent, or the ability to trace one’s fine through the
father to a founding male ancestor, o r genealogical structures in general, it is im portant to realise
that (1) such questions are o f far less pragmatic value to a Hagener than it might appear to an
Elsewhere A J. Strathem notes that “man and woman in this contrasted pair are not husband and wife but
brother and sister, and the idiom relates to the feet that, although a sister normally moves into
patrivirilocal residence at marriage, if she subsequently returns to her own natal group and brings her
children with her, they can become amb-nt-mei members o f the group. If her sons stay at her natal place
and become amb-nt-mei members their children in turn become ma-nt-mei, ‘man-bearing members, fust as
are those who are putatively descended from a longer genealogical string o f male group members”
(1972:18-19). W hether this has always been the practice in Hagen society or is a consequence o f recent
events such as the impact o f colonialism is however hard to tell. The Kawelka, who form the basis o f A J.
Strathem’s analysis, were dispersed through warfare (see Appendix IV ). An explanation for the high
number o f non-agnates indicated in Chapter Eight (see also A J. Strathem (1972) may be found in the
history o f warfare and population dispersal. W hether or not the Kawelka are an unusual case can be
determined through comparative studies o f group membership, for example, by comparing historically
relatively weak groups with relatively strong groups, but this I cannot demonstrate here.
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observer; and (2) a claim o f common descent must not be confused with the ability to actually
trace one’s lines to either male or female founders o f a group. My experience with Hageners is
that there is a sliding scale o f memory o r amnesia when it comes to tracing lines. That is, the
lower the level, the m ore the people who can claim common ancestry, but less than half will
have difficulty tracing their lines. For instance, in a sub-clan, o r manga rapa (man’s house), just
over fifty per cent o f all males may claim to have descended from one putative ancestor (usually
named), but only about five per cent or even less will be able to trace an unbroken line with any
degree o f success. In the Kawelka M embo clan (c.2,000 pop.), for example, only one old man,
U1 Korom be (Kaimbkul), could manage to deliver a comprehensive account o f clan history
(including genealogy) while two others could only manage to recall their own sub-sub-clan
histories.7

The Tribe
In spite o f all the difficulties, the language ofdescent used in ethnography o f today when describing
social units is still littered with words such as lineage, clan, tribe, and phratry (see Feil 198734; see
also Barnes 1962; A.J. Strathem 1969b; 1971; Scheffler 1985), While accepting that there is
considerable difficulty in putting these terms to use, some working definitions will suffice here.
A tribe can be defined as a politically o r socially coherent and autonomous group occupying
land or claiming a particular territory (R A I1951; Burton 1988; Muke 1994). In fact, it is true in
some areas that the tribe is the m ost cohesive and autonomous political group. While this is
usually the case in areas where there are many small tribes, with average populations o f fewer
than 500 persons, those with larger populations are typically less cohesive and more fragmentedI

I had the benefit o f four older informants among the Kawelka. Three were big-men while the fourth was
a man o f exceptional knowledge o f Hagen culture. My big-men informants here were once regarded as the
three m ost im portant Kawelka Kumapei (‘those who live at Kuma’, or the Upper Wahgj) leaders —
Goimba Onombe, Ken Ripa and Toa Pani — who are generally accepted as the mae tepam (‘father o f
land*) or maepukl tvm (1and-root-man’, or ‘owner o f land*) o f the Kawelka territories at Kuk in the Upper
Wahgi Valley. All are now over seventy years and have quite considerable influence in land ‘ownership’
among the Kawelka. Goimba, whose father Onombe and grandfather Kund Mend (together with other *
Kawelka) were brutally evicted from Kuk during pre-colonial warfare, took advantage o f the presence o f
the Australian Colonial Administration by reclaiming his forefathers’ land in the 1960s (see Górecki 1982
for a more detailed discussion o f the reoccupation o f Kuk). That was done through the use o f historical
information (and genealogies) and Goimba in particular has a very good knowledge o f Kawelka history,
yet neither Goimba, nor Ken, nor Toa could trace their own genealogies beyond the third generation. It
was partly complicated by the fact that both Ken and Toa, are non-agnates, originally o f Klamakae
Kopimbo and Tepuka Kengeke clans, respectively, but have gone on to establish themselves as influential
leaders among the Kawelka. My fourth and non-big-man informant U1 Korobe, on the other hand, is an
exceptionally culturally-oriented person. N ot only can he, now known by his Christian name Kaimbkul,
gjve a full account o f clan genealogy, but he is also gifted in the construction and use o f traditional
artefacts, as demonstrated to ANU researchers (see Swadling 1981:39, picture o f Kaimbkul and another
Kawelka man, Korowa o f the Kurupmbo clan, with 300-400 year old wooden spades found at the Kuk
archaeological site).
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— in which case, the level o f cohesiveness in corporate activities is often found to be m ost
effective at the clan and sub-dan levels.
Segm entary structure o f th e trib e
Tribes, as indicated in Figure 3.2, have a segmentary structure and may, depending on size, be
subdivided into several levels o f sections, dans and sub-clans (A.J. Strathem 1972; Burton 1988;
1989). Following M edan and Rumsey, my use o f 'segm entar/ is in the simple sense: that within
a single reklaep o r tribe, '‘distinctions are made among multiple, homologous, named sub
groupings, each o f which is divided in the same way, etc” (1991:36). Hagen groups, for instance,
are functionally and ideologically divided into subgroups (as in the case o f ideology governing
group solidarity), which are further divided into sub-subgroups and so forth. Accordingly, the

rekhep (tribe) is the m ost indusive level within the 'segm entar/ structure. W ithin the reklaep may
be found sections, often a pair o f them (in instances where they have been founded by brothers)
which are cleady named and distinctions are made between them. There is no direct translation
for ‘sections’ in the M dpa language, but the m ost commonly used concept is raid (a pair o f
them), a term which is applicable to all levels o f pairing.
In each o f the sections are the various named 'dans’ which, as we shall see in the next section
and in successive chapters, are m ajor units in political competition. As indicated above, 'd an ’ is a
term which best equates with the Hagen ideology o f tepam tenía nga fo f one father3), or having
origjinated from a single putative ancestor to whom m ost — but not all — members can claim
descent8 As a result, certain taboos are observed, including the rule o f exogamy (where one
m ust n o t marry from within the clan); the virtual absence o f major warfare between these
subdivisions (clans); and because o f the absence o f warfare, moka exchanges are generally
conducted between clans rather than within themselves. W ithin the clan are the men’s houses

(manga rupá) which tend to be territorially localised (see M edan and Rumsey 1991:41-44 for
comparable discussion on land tenure in Nebilyer).

8

A J. Strathem’s compilation o f data on 258 adult or near-adult Kawelka men in 1964 shows that 95 or 37
per cent were non-agnates (1966a:357; 1972:104). I give some examples in ChapterEight
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F igure 3.2: A typical H ag en segm entary structure: th a t o f th e K aw elka

Roklambo

Dakapmbo
Roklambo
Kumbambo
Kundmbo
Kiklpuklambo
•- Kumapei
Eltimbo

Minembimbo
Klambo
Oyambo

KAWELKA

L- Akelembo
Mandembo

r Rokmbo

Romalkembo
Tipukmbo

Kurupmbo
Katmbo

Penambimbo
Kalmbo ingk

Puntmbo
Roklambo
- Oyambo
Oyambo ingk
Membo
_ Elpuklmbo
Keiyambo
_ Keiyambo ingk

TRIBE

MAJOR SEC TIO N

CLAN (EXOGAMOUS)

SUB-CLAN

SUB-SUB-CLAN

Source: Based on A J. Strathem (1972:35); Ketan (1996:246); and inform ation supplied by Ben K onts,
Kawelka M embo Oyambo sub-clan.
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The manga rapa, which roughly approximates to ‘sub-clan’, is generally the m ost im portant and
frequently operative social unit in Hagen society. While levels such as section, clan, sub-clan,
sub-sub-clan and so forth come within the overarching umbrella o f the tribe, this in no way
suggests that each level is functionally or otherwise subordinate to the next m ost inclusive level.
In other words, the tribe m ust not be viewed as a corporate management structure, where each
franchise or division can be directed to meet certain demands, nor can it be compared with that
o f an interest group. W hy not? Because there is no overarching authority; it is not a power
structure. It is basically a ‘functional’ structure, which simply means that different functions are
perform ed at the various levels, depending on the size o f the rekhep. Cooperation in major
arenas o f com petition such as warfare, ceremonial exchange and elections is mainly on a
voluntary basis, although this is clearly complicated by factors such as loyalty, group pride (that
is, ‘the name m ust not go down3) and, above all, self-interest
It is also necessary to distinguish the reklaep structure from the African-derived notion o f
‘segmentary lineage system’. As noted by Merlan and Rumsey:
This African-derived notion of ‘segmentary lineage system’ involves concepts of
‘descend and ‘apical ancestor7 which are analytically distinct from the notion of
‘segmentary’ per se, either in our general sense or in the sense we distinguished as
segmentaryi. It is important to keep these features separate if we want to develop useful
ways of comparing, not only the range of societies found in Africa but societies as
different as those of Africa and Highland Papua New Guinea (1991:36).9
Furtherm ore, they argued that “notions o f descent and apical ancestor are o f little or no
relevance in the Nebilyer area” (Medan and Rumsey 1991:36). Likewise, in Hagen the notions o f
descent and apical ancestor are o f limited consequence, even though the principle o f descent can
occasionally be used by prom inent individuals to justify their efforts in mobilising resources and
groups for sponsoring large-scale events such as warfare and elections.
D ifferences in size a n d fun ction ofH agen tribes
The tribe is probably the m ost im portant political and military unit in Hagen society. It is an
alliance o f clans which may o r may not claim common descent, and membership is ideally by *
agnatic descent (through the father’s line). Its members may live in territory-holding dans and

Following Durkheim (1964), Merlán and Rumsey (1991:35) considered “the concept ‘segmental’ or
‘segmentary’ to be far more general and widely applicable than ‘segmentary lineage’” which portrays an
image o f a “hierarchically ramified tree-like organism”. In the more general sense the term ‘segm entar/, as
originally suggested by Durkheim (1964), is used when referring to “social differentiation by the
multiplication o f (or division into) like parts” (Merian and Rumsey 1991:35). In the more restricted sense,
which Merian and Rumsey called segmentary^\úc\ “the term refers to internally ramified structures, where
two or more segments at one level comprise a single segment at a higher level, etc.” However, they did
quite cleariy state that their “usage o f the term does not presuppose such ramification, although m ost o f
the social identities which we call segmentary do in fact exhibit if’ (¿bid).
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access to land for coffee plots, food-crops, and homesteads are based on both usufructuary
rights and through inheritance. Hageners speak o f ‘tribe’ as som ething to be reckoned with in
terms o f warfare, ceremonial exchange, commercial enterprise and m odem politics. In the event
o f war, tribesm en may have to defend their territory together o r face decimation. A part from this
military function, a tribe may stage a tnoka or a singsing as a single u n it It can also sponsor
candidates to contest elections as well as prom oting business enterprise. While it is true that
these functions are currently being perform ed at this level in smaller tribes, they have been
transferred down to the section or clan level in bigger tribes. Jika as a tribe, for example, is so
laige and fragmented that in 1986 gun warfare broke out within its Maipngel section in which
the Komb-Akelemb dan-pair were subsequently routed by an alliance o f Komapi, O prom b,
Milakamb and Muklmana dans.10 As well, candidates have been sponsored by the respective
clans against each other in 1987,1992 and 1997 national dections. That Paias W ingti, who was
then the incum bent MP for Hagen O pen and Prime Minister o f PN G , had opted for the
W estern Highlands Provincial seat rather than accepting Paul Pora’s challenge in Hagen O pen
during the 1987 dection was partly because o f his fear o f losing to Pora, but perhaps more
importantly because he was unable to obtain assurances o f support from within his Jika tribe.
In Hagen, the biggest tribes, in order o f numerical strength on the basis o f 1997 population
estimates, are: the Jika and Mokei o f the Hagen Central area, with nearly 20,000 and 15,000
persons, respectively; the Kumdi o f the Mul Council area, with a population o f about 10,700; the
Minembi o f the D ei Council area, numbering around 7,000; and the Kuli o f the Anglimp-South
W ahgi area, with over 5,000 persons. The Dei Council area is characterised by relatively smaller
but m ore numerous tribes than the Hagen Central area which has thirteen tribes, induding the
three large ones, Jika, Mokei and Yamka.11

Jika has three major sections: Andapunts, Mukaka and Maipngel (which is easily the largest) with an
estimated 1997 population o f more than 10,000 persons. Maipngel has two minor sections:
Andakelkam, which is made up o f the Komh-Aklemb clan-pair and the Tokpa-based Roklamb; and
Rukumb, which is made up o f five clans (Parklemb, Oprom b, Komapi, Muklmana and Milakamb).
Although the war was mainly fought along this minor sectional line, the two Tokpa-based clans, Roklamb
and Parklemb did not participate because “they physically live in between the Mukaka clans at Togoba
{Tokpa] — and speak their language — while the other Maipngel dans are located in the Ogelbeng-Hagen
Tech area in the centre o f the (Hagen Open] electorate, some ten kilometres away. At any rate, the
Roklamb-Parklemb are now more interested in the political scene around Togoba (Tokpa], with its
national dimensions, than in the more distant and parochial struggle going on near Hagen” (Burton
1989a:263-64). In spite o f this conflict, Maipngel is unusual in the sense that it has remained as an
exogamous unit at the sectional level while others are usually exogamous at the clan level. Only once was
this rule broken: in the early 1980s when a woman from the Komb clan married a Milakamb leader, the
late Brass Wak, a candidate for the Hagen Open seat in 1987 and son o f the pre-eminent Jika big-man,
Wak. See Burton (1989a) for segmentary structures o f Hagen Central tribes and the issues and
circumstances surrounding Brass Wak’s death.
There is a discrepancy between the figures given here and those given in a recent paper by Burton and
Keher (1997). According to their population estimates, the “Jika, who number some 12,000”, may be
broken down into three exogamous sections”, and die other two large tribes, “the Mokei, with about
11,000 people, and the Yamka, with about 3,500, are demographically im portant [m Hagen politics]”
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Some o f these large tribes have been successful in warfare and occupy huge continuous
territories across m inor linguistic boundaries. For example, some clans within the largest Hagen
tribe, Jika, speak Melpa while others, including Paias Wingti’s Mukaka clan, are Temboka
speakers. As indicated in Table 3. /, the smallest tribes, which have been decimated in warfare, are
closely associated with, or almost incorporated into, larger ones from which they sought and
were given refuge.
T ab le 3.1: G roups associated w ith, or incorporated into, larger ones

J ik a

M o kei

K um di

Rem di

K entpi

Kungunka

Epilkae

Kungunka

Klalka

Kumungaka

Palka

Elti

Kenapka

Milaka

Gulke

Milaka

Jika Kom b-Akelem b

Fund

Kiklpukla

Punti

Ndilika

Prandike

Teiya

Jika in the past gave refuge to many groups, including Elti-Penambi and Kungunka-Palka, but
only sections o f Milaka and Teiya were fully incorporated into its Milakamb clan.12 Some
Kungunka-Palka clans are almost incorporated into Milakamb as well (cf. A.J. Strathem
1971:230; Appendix 1.2; and Burton 1989a).
More recent instances o f ‘incorporation’ are: (a) the Jika Komb-Akelemb pair into Mokei
Andakelkam section; (b) a large group o f Poiyaka-Aiyaka tribesmen into Kawelka at Kuk; (c)
Tipaka tribesmen into Tepuka in Dei; and (d) some Enga and Simbu migrants into Remdi at
Muglamp. However, only the Komb-Akelemb ‘incorporation" into Mokei was a direct
consequence o f warfare, while the others have been largely motivated by economic and
(1997:156). It is however not clear from their discussion whether these figures were taken from the 1990
population census, or from more recent estimates. In any case, their figures appear much too conservative,
suggesting underestimation on their part. My estimates o f 20,000 Jika, 15,000 Mokei and 5-6,000 Yamka in
1997 would be more accurate, considering that there was widespread underenumeration in Western
Highlands during the 1990 census, in addition to the fact that many members o f these tribes work and live
outside the province.
According to an account given to me by an older Milakamb informant, Makinda o f Bomri village, the
Milaka and Teiya are linked to Milakamb through an historical alliance. The Milakamb are in fact said to
have been originally part o f the Nebilyer-based Milaka. Some members o f the Teiya, also a Nebilyer group,
came with the Milaka to settle in Milakamb territories near the Hagen township. Descendants o f Teiya
migrants w ho have gone on to establish leadership status among the Jika Milakamb are Glen Komonga
(businessman and national president o f the People’s Progress Party) and Kuimbakul Piandi (Deputy
Commissioner o f Correctional Institutional Sendees). Other prominent Milakamb leaders (though not o f
Teiya origin) are Malcolm Culligan (former Secretary for Western Highlands), Bob Nenta (former
Commissioner o f Police), Ogla Makindi (former President o f Gutnius Lutheran Church, Enga, and
current District Coordinator, Baiyer River area), to name but a few o f many outstanding Milakamb leaders.
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dem ographic factors (see Chapter Five). T he term incorporation, if strictly applied, suggests that
som e sort o f merging has taken place. In this case, all four cases given here may be m ore
accurately described as being closely associated rather than incorporated because none o f them
seem to have relinquished their original structural identities. O f course, this may happen over
tim e, perhaps in future generations, but individuals at the present time have assumed refugee
status and will live and die as Kom b-Akelem b, Poiyaka-Aiyaka, Tipaka, o r Rngart o r Simbu.
U pon death, it is likely that in m ost cases, their bodies will be returned to their agnatic groups,
and should they die fighting alongside their hosts, reparation payments will be made by the host
group to relatives o f the deceased.
Some smaller tribes, although dispersed through warfare, have remained autonom ous, while
others have regrouped in recent times. Although the rem nants o f some groups, such as the EltiPenam bi pair o f tribes and the Kawelka, have regrouped and consolidated their num bers since
coloniaUy-imposed pacification in die 1940s, many others, including K opi, Punti, and
Kungunka-Palka remain split groups. Smaller groups such as Klalka, Kiklpukla and Ndilika have
alm ost lost their autonom y as tribal units. Table 3.2 shows the smaller groups which have been
dispersed through warfare and as a consequence have dual residency, usually beside larger and
m ore pow erful groups from which they sought refuge; in cases where bigger groups have dual
residency is usually a result o f conquest (for example, the Jika are said to have acquired m ost o f
their land around the Ogelbeng plains and those in the upper W ahgi valley through military
conquest).13

Jika appears to have been far m ore successful than other groups in warfare. Some o f their present
territories which were acquired through conquest are: Ainya, Kehia, Kimimnga, Kala, Krukramp, Kuamp,
and Kenta. The Kimka (also known as Ainya Kimka) originally lived at Ainya, west o f Ogelbeng, currently
occupied by the Jika KomapL The original residents o f Kala were the Anglimp-South Wahgi group,
Menjpi (sometimes called Kala Menjpi), together with their historical pair partner, the Kemi (also known
as Kala Kemi who are now paired with Kukilka).
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T ab le 3.2: D ual R esidency. G roups w ith m ore th a n one territo ry

Local Group

Territories

District/ Census Division

GeographicalLocation

Elti-Penambi

Baisu, Kenta
Kelua, Kumunga
Kuta
Kilinga

Hagen
Hagen
Hagen
Nebilyer

Upper Wahgi Valley
Ogelbeng Plains
Kubor Range
Nebilyer Valley

Kukilka

Moitemp
Bakl
Kuklinga, 'Tepkla
Tiriya,
Tiki
Welya, Kum
Kailge

D ei
Hagen
Hagen
Nebilyer
D ei
Hagen
Nebilyer

Gumants Valley
Upper Wahgi
Ogelbeng Plains
Tokpa Plains
Baiyer Valley
Upper Wahgi
Nebilyer Vallley

Wump
Kailge
Ambukla, Nunga,
Kulkaramp
Baisu, Raemp
Mbukl
Kuk-lVlbakla
Kuningramp

Anglimp
Nebilyer

South Wahgi
Nebilyer Valley

D ei
D ei
Hagen

Muka Valley
Jimi Valley
Upper Wahgi

D ei
Hagen
Baiyer

Sepik-Wahgi Divide
Upper Wahgi
Baiyer Valley

Welyi

Kotna, Kentkena
Kenamb-Keiya
Kul

D ei
D ei
Baiyer

Klamakae

Angkukl
Ruin a
Kindeng-Muneng

D ei
D ei
Anglimp

Muka Valley
Jimi Valley
Baiyer Valley
Baiyer Valley
Jimi Valley
South Wahgi

Kiklpukla

Kul
Muglamp

Roklaka

Gumanch
Penda

Mokei

Keltiga, Ripamul
Baisu
Raemp
Rouna

Baiyer
Dei
D ei
D ei
Hagen
Hagen
D ei
Baiyer

Jika

Ketiga
Ogelbeng
Kenta

Jika Komb-Akelemb

Pulkimb
Ruti-Rapung

Poiyaka-Aiyaka
Punti

Kopi

N okpa
Tepuka

Kawelka

Note:

Baiyer Valley
Gumanch Valley
Gumanch Valley
N orth Wahgi
Klgomet Plains
Upper Wahgi
Gumanch Valley
Baiyer Valley
Tokpa Plains
Ogelbeng Plains
Upper Wahgi
Ogelbeng Plains
N orth Wahgi

Tokpa
Baisu

Hagen
Hagen
Hagen
Hagen
D ei
Nebilyer
Hagen

Mala
Tiki
Mapkla

D ei
D ei
Mul

N orth Wahgi
Baiyer Valley
Baiyer Valley

Nebilyer Valley
Upper Wahgi

During a recent war against the Jika Maipngel section in the 1980s, the Kukilka were brutally evicted from
their Kuklinga and Tepkla territories and have since joined their fellow tribesmen at Bakl and Moitemp.
This happened soon after the Jika Komb-Akelemb pair were routed from their Puklimb territory. Some
K om b clansmen have m oved to their Ruti-Rapung settlements in D ei — where they are closely associated
with the Nelka tribe — while m ost have taken up residence with the Mokei Andakelkam section.
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Originally dispersed through warfare, m ost o f the groups indicated in Table 3.2 had sought and
were accepted as refugees, while a few are closely associated through special alliances. Elti and its
pair-partner Penam bi were initially given refuge by Jika, after routed by sections o f the M okei,
but later joined a friendly M okei section and som e Elti relatives were incorporated into the
M okei N am bka clan. A fter a m ajor w ar in the early 1920s, the Elti-Penam bi pair were driven
from the N ebilyer Valley up to the Ogelbeng Plain by a powerful coalition o f Mokei, (<K um 5)
K opi and som e other neighbouring groups (see A.J. Strathem 1971:66-67; Connolly and
A nderson 1987:109). A ccording to accounts given by some Mokei inform ants, the form er
W estern H ighlands M P Raphael D oa’s clan was directly descended from Elti refugees. D oa o f
course w ent on to becom e n o t only an im portant leader o f the M okei N am bka clan but the
entire M okei tribe and virtually the w hole o f H agen, which reinforces the point that non-agnates
and their descendants can rise to leadership status.

The Clan
O pinion on the usage and definition (functional or however defined) o f the clan is divided but
m ost anthropologists agree that the d an is strictly the largest exogamous unit in any given
structural hierarchy (Lowman-Vayda 1971:322; Brown 1971:212; M eggitt 1971:196; A.J.
Strathem 1972:18; Rubel and Rosman 1978:187; B urton 1988:1.5). Exogamy is the rule which
requires that individuals m ust seek a marriage partner outside the group. It is a cleady nam ed and
historically autonom ous group, which means that members cannot marry from within the clan
because o f a com m on acknowledgment o f dose blood relationship (Burton 1987). W hile this
narrow definition fits some Highlands societies, it may n o t be a useful one for others. It is
therefore necessary to consider m uch broader approaches. G ting Vicedom and Tischner (1943
8:2:9-10) and A.J. Strathem (1971:33), Rubel and Rosman noted that for the Hagen:
A clan is usually occupies a single territory and fights as a unit to defend that territory.
Ideally, there should be no lethal fighting within the clan. The clan is the exogamous
unit Men o f a clan organise m ka exchanges as a group. There is a clan cemetery that is
the location for sacrifices made to clan ancestral spirits. Clansman are obliged to take
blood revenge and must contribute to compensation paid to allies for men lost in
warfare on their behalf The clan operates as a unit at cult performances, and dances as a
unit at festivals. Clans stand towards one another as major or perpetual enemies or as
minor enemies who can become allies. The clan will also have a major ceremonial
ground. In terms o f descent dogma, the dan is spoken o f as tepam tenta (founded by a
single father) and this dogma is referred to as the basis for rules of exogamy, and
cooperation in warfare and ceremonial exchange (1978:187).14

For further discussion on these m atters, see A J. Strathem (1966a:357; 1972:18); and A M . Strathem
(1972a.*ll-12); see also Brown (1972:35-37); O ’Hanlon (1989:26-27); Medan and Rumsey (1991:Chap.3);
and Muke (1994:Chap.6) for comparable discussion on Chimbu, N orth Wahgi, Nebilyer and South Wahgi
groups, respectively.
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W hile the clan still perform s some o f these functions, it no longer makes sacrifices to d a n
ancestors at cemeteries. Instead, it may now have a church adjacent to the cerem onial ground to
w orship die Christian G od. In addition to its military function, the clan also operates as a single
unit in elections and business enterprise.
M ajor characteristics o f the clan, according to Vivelo (1978) are: (1) based on unilineal descent
(one-line descent; tracing o f descent through one parent and that parent’s same-sexed
progenitors, Le., all males o r all females); (2) from this can be form ed local o r residence groups
(of people living together); (3) may be a corporate group, Le., they may control some valued
com m odity (such as land); (4) may be exogamous (cannot marry from w ithin the group); (5)
often have group taboos (a proscription, a ‘don’t7, which, usually, carries with it supernatural
sanctions); and 6) contain m em bers o f both sexes originally but, following the rule o f exogamy,
one sex m ust leave the group upon marriage (Vivelo 1978:162-3; see also Keesing 1975:31).
Using these general characteristics as a check-list, an examination o f H agen social structure
shows that none o f these fit perfecdy but, w ith some m odifications, the first four points and the
last one may be applicable. In this way, one may conclude that in Hagen the clan is a land
holding local group o f which the core members are related by ‘patrilineal descent7, tracing
bloodlines to a com m on male ancestor, which means that one cannot marry from within the
group. D escent, however, is n o t the only criterion o f m em bership because marriage into the
group also provides m em bers, while marriage out o f the group results in loss o f active
m em bership (see Vivelo 1978:163).
A m ajor problem w ith this definition is its disregard for exceptions to rules gpvem ing this type
o f organisation. H ageners, for instance, describe the clan (and levels below the sub-dan) as o f

tepam tenta, mema tenta (‘one father; one blood7) but that does n o t mean patrilineal descent is the
sole charter for recruitm ent, n o r can all its members claim com m on descent. Females bom into
the d an , upon marriage gain m em bership to a husband’s group, but never entirely relinquish that
o f their ow n, and are addressed by using the name o f their descent group as a prefix to their
personal names. Clansmen rely on their married sisters for assistance in staging laige events,
such as cerem onial exchange, and often encourage them to shift residence, together w ith their
husbands and children, back to their place o f birth. A sister’s sons, in particular, ate usually
encouraged to return to his maternal kin and sponsored by their uncles to do so. This and other
factors show how flexible Highlands groups are when it comes to defining their social
structures.
This flexibility and continuous evolution can be seen all around. Some groups are clearly nam ed
and historically autonom ous. The Tungei o f South W ahgi are a gpod example (Burton 1988).
B ut others have developed into large exogamous tribal sections, such as Jika MaipngeL A tribal
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section in the making is the Kawelka example shown earlier in Figure 3.2. The three Kawelka
clans

K undm bo, M andem bo and M embo — can be m ore accurately described as tribal

sections rather than clans because the Kawelka themselves do n o t have a name for this level
today. Currently the m ost com m only used names are M embo Keiyambo, M em bo Oyam bo,
K rupm bo, K lam bo and K undm bo. This cleady indicates that K rupm bo and Klam bo, previously
sub-clans, have now alm ost assumed dan status while Keiyambo and Oyam bo, form er sub-sub
clans, have evolved into sub-clans and possibly clans. This leaves K undm bo which remains as a
clan.
T he change in structures thus correlates with population growth. The Kawelka, which had a
population o f about 860 persons in 1964 (A.J. Strathem 197232), has experienced considerable
population grow th over the last 33 years. It had a 1990 population o f some 4,100 persons,
induding som e Tepuka, Poiyaka and Aiyaka migrants at K uk (see Table 3.3; see also Table 3.4).
T he other reason for structural changes lies with exchange relations, a factor which is related to
population grow th. Sub-groups are created and separately nam ed by leaders in order to receive
larger shares during distribution o f wealth items from com pensation payments, ceremonial
exchange, bridewealth, and pork from festivities. Similady, rival leaders may also influence sub
divisions to be divided into further sub-sub-divisions by deliberately presenting them with
separate initiatory gifts in order to receive large am ounts o f wealth items in moka. The form er
D ei M P, Parua K uri, a pre-em inent big-man and exceptionally skilful moka strategists, devised
and utilised such a strategy am ong his m other’s people, the Kawelka. Kawelka leaders often
express fears o f unnecessary fragmentation brought about in this manner. Such fears are
reflected in a statem ent made by the Kawelka M embo big-man, K ont, w ho says that “We are all
one small group here but Parua has divided us into tiny little groups because he wanted to eat
from as many o f us as possible” (personal com m unication, January 1995).I
I have thus far discussed the m ajor levels o f traditional social organisation in Hagen, noting that
w ithin the tribe are im portant subdivisions, such as clans and sub-clans, which all exhibit
considerable variation in size and function. H ow these groups w ork together in contem porary
Hagen politics is the focus o f the next section. D ifferent types o f alliances, both old and new —
w hich we may call ‘traditional’ and ‘neo-traditional’ — are analysed in the context o f the m ajor
arenas o f com petition and cooperation (particularly warfare, business and elections) within a
particular field o f political com petition (Dei C ouncil/O pen electorate).

Coalitions and Factions
A bove the tribal level is a loosely organised level which I have previously described as ‘phratry’,
m eaning an alliance o f tribes which do n o t necessarily claim com m on descent but may have
corporate property and functions (Ketan 1996:248). I am aware o f the discrepancies between

*
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this and other m ore ‘orthodox* definitions (see, for example, Brown 1972:35; Keesing 1975:150),
w hich em phasise com m on origin-myths as a basic criteria for distinguishing ‘phratry* from other
level o f groups, including tribes. Thus, a m ore accurate term for these Hagen groupings would
be coalition-style alliances to describe coalitions, based on military alliances, form ed in the early
1970s to achieve specific goals. U ndoubtedly there are many ways o f defining coalitions, but the
one which best sums up the H agen situation was given by Jerem y Boissevain:
The coalitions which people form in their drive to attain their goals are temporary
alliances. Although their internal structure and organisation vary enormously, all
coalitions am built by individuals who are dependent, in different ways, cm each other.
Because the very existence o f a coalition depends not only upon the specific anH varied
goals and resources o f individuals who compose it, but also on the relations between
them, they are unstable. In time, goals alter, resources shift and relations between people
change. Moreover, the ad hoc nature o f coalitions makes them ideally suited instruments
to exploit new resources in changing situations. Coalitions may thus reflect changing
circumstances, they may bring about change, and, by their very nature, are constantly
subject to change. They may disappear as certain goals are achieved, or they may evolve
into social forms of a different structural order, such as more permanent associations,
often transforming their social and cultural environment in the process (Boissevain
1974:170).
G eneralisations are visually way o ff the mark, but this one is spot on.15 As evident in the business
developm ent associations o f the 1970s (discussed in Chapter Four), the coalition-style alliances o f
D ei are explicitly gpal-oriented, highly personalised in key areas o f operation, and their stability
has been threatened by disruptive pow er struggles between leaders o f different factions within
them . A lthough som e o f their goals have been achieved, relations between the various factions
(headed by prom inent individuals) have n o t been warm. Rifts do occur, predictably along
structural lines, yet the coalitions — somewhat strengthened by recent bouts o f warfare in the
eighties — seem far from disappearing. Rather, they have hardened into sem i-perm anent
associations. A nd while they have been a driving force in transform ing their social, cultural and
natural landscape, their internal structures seem to have changed largely because o f shifts in
corporate goals, personal interests, and com m on perceptions o f econom ic disparity between the
leaders and their people.
As illustrated in Figure 3.3, there are three m ajor coalition-style alliances operating in Dei.
Significantly, they all have m ajor business investm ents (see Chapter Four). These are: (1) the

Pipilka, an alliance o f mainly Remdi, Kimka and Roklaka tribes, which has an estimated
population o f around 5,000 and controls the giant Gum anch Plantation and M ount H agen Paris:
M otel, am ong other businesses; (2) the Welyi-Kuta, an alliance o f mainly Welyi and the
K om bukla-M inem bi pair o f tribes, which has an estimated population o f around 14,000 and

For a m ote detailed discussion o f coalitions, in committing resources and how this affects power relations,
see Boissevain (1974:Chap.7); and A J. Strathem (1984) on coalitions in the Dei Council area.
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business interests in coffee plantations; and (3) the Raem bka, an alliance o f mainly Tepuka,
Kawelka, N elka and several other small tribes, w ith an estimated population o f 18,000 and has
business interests in coffee plantations and plantation m anagement agencies.
T he population data, by core groups, is given below (see Table 33 ), though the 1990 Census
figures should be treated with som e caution as it is evident that there was widespread
underenum eration in W estern Highlands Province. Some o f these groups, for example, appear
to have grow n by over 100 per cent in 11 years, which clearly needs explanation. Two Raembka
groups, the Kawelka and K entpi tribes, appear to have experienced extraordinary population
grow th o f 156 and 153 per cent, respectively, while a third, die Welyi o f die W elyi-Kuta alliance,
appear to have doubled its population size in eleven years. There is likely over-enum eration
involved here. Firsdy, it is possible that Kawelka may have been enum erated twice, both at
M bukl and K uk, in addition to a large population o f migrants at Kuk, num bering 500 or m ore
persons, which were counted at the K uk census p o in t Secondly, the large increase in the K entpi
population may have been caused by the inclusion in the 1990 census o f several small tribes
(including Prandike, Gulke, Punti, and perhaps Mungapke) w ho may have been counted
separately in 1979. It is also likely that migrants at Kinjibi and N unga plantations were included
in K entpi. Thirdly, the 110 per cent increase in Welyi population is believed to have been caused
by large m igrant populations at Penga, Mamgoig and K otna plantations.
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T ab le 3.3: C oalition-style alliances: C ore g roups by p o p u latio n d a ta

Groups

1979a

1990b

Difference (%)

Adjusted 1997c

RAEMBKA

8,111

14,502

78% increase

18,500

Tepuka

2,575

3,351

30% increase

5,000

Kawelka

1,631

4,168 d

156% increase

4,500 d

Kumungaka

514

374 e

28% decrease

1,000

Kentpi

2,040 f

5,158 f

153% increase

5,000 f

Nelka

770

1,116

45% increase

1,500

Kkmakae

581

335 e

42% decrease

1,500

2,369

1,523 e

36% decrease

4,700

Remdi

988

587 e

41% decrease

2,000 g

Kimka

600

936

56% increase

1,200

Roklaka

781

Not counted

N /A

1,500

7,334

10,657

45% increase

14,500

Kombukla

2,262

2,939

30% increase

4,000

Minembi

3,596

4,609

28% increase

7,000

Welyi

1,476

3,109

110% increase

3,500

PIPILKA

WELYI-KUTA

Sources andnotes:
x

Provincial Data System, National Statistical Office (1982);

b.
c.

1990 National Population Census (NSO 1993; 1994);
Estimates by author;

d.
e.
£
g.

Including som e Tepuka, Poiyaka-Aiyaka (ex-Nebilyer) and Enga migrants at KuL;
Likely underenumeration in 1990 Census;
Including Prandike, Gulke, Punti, and possibly Mungapke.
Including Kiklpukla and Ndilika.
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The elparaka or m ajor warfare disjunction, as indicated in Figure 3.3, is the m ajor line o f fissure,
w hich m eans that the different tribes and clans, except for a particular case (that o f the Mmembi
K im bo clan), have litde choice as to which alliance they can join. Individuals and factions,
however, enjoy considerable freedom in shifting allegiances from one candidate to another in
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elections, yet such freedom o f selection cannot be exercised in warfare. Military alliances tend to
be m ore stable than election alliances, though the latter is clearly based on the former. An
im portant rule in warfare is that reparation payments may be made to m inor enemies, thereby
converting relations o f enmity into exchange o f wealth items (and eventually into alliance), but
one does n o t and cannot com pensate m ajor enemies for w ar deaths. Thus m inor enemies in one
conflict can be allied against a com m on m ajor enemy, whilst m ajor enemies maintained relations
o f enmity (see Chester Five; see also A.J. Strathem 1971:Chap.4; 1972:Chap.4). W hereas in
elections, some individuals are know n to have supported candidates sponsored by m ajor
enemies, in w arfare, the rules are virtually set: that is, once your group considers itself as a m ajor
enemy o f another (or vice versa), there is n o t m uch you can do about i t Yet, there are some
inspiring stories about cross-cutting kinship ties and individual courage in initiating peace
settlem ents between w arring groups (one such narrative which appears in Chapter Five is that o f
tw o PN G D efence Force soldiers’ role in negotiating peace between die Remdi and Minembi in
1989).
A llia n ces in a ction
The m ajor coalition-style alliances o f D ei, as noted earlier, were form ed by prom inent
individuals in the early 1970s to achieve specific goals. Their com position is schematised in

Figures 3.4-6. They were initially set up as business developm ent associations, w hose m embership
was founded on w hat A J. Strathem described as “neo-txaditional coalition-style ties between
existing large groups” (1984:87). The ties are mainly o f a military nature and their somewhat
vague historical roots suggest that they may well be fairly recent formations. W hat is not vague is
their role in contem porary politics, in addition to business and warfare.
T he Tepuka-Kawelka pair form the core o f the Raembka alliance, which is in com petition with
W elyi-Kuta in mainly warfare, business and elections. The Tepuka-Kawelka pair have fought
against the Kombukla-M inembi pair in m ajor warfare since pre-colonial times (see Chapter Five).
Parua K uri, the first D ei M P since the creation o f the D ei electorate in 1972, came from within
the Tepuka-Kawelka pair. K uri held the seat for three consecutive five year terms, from 1972 to
1987. M elchior Pep, the man w ho replaced K uri during the 1987 elections, is from the
Kom bukla-M inem bi pair, which form s the core o f the W elyi-Kuta alliance. Pep held the seat
betw een 1987 and 1992, but chose to resign after charges o f m isconduct were laid against him
under the PN G Leadership Code. By resigning, he ceased to be a leader* under the Code. H e
was thus able to stand in 1992, because he had n o t actually been found guilty o f breaking the
Code. B ut on his re-election, the charges were revived and he was found guilty, thereby
precipitating a by-election. In 1993 Kuri’s son, Reuben Parua, succeeded Pep.
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T he situation since 1993, how ever, has changed. Although Reuben Parua w on the 1993 D ei
O pen By-Election as a Raembka candidate, in 1997 he was forced to seek re-election as a
Tepuka candidate, because the Kawelka had sponsored their own candidate (William Pik).
Furtherm ore, the agreem ent he had with form er K entpi candidate, Philip Bobby, now no longer
stood, as the K entpi, too, sponsored their own candidate (Paul Koi) in 1997. Similarly, M elchior
Pep, w ho consolidated his position as a W elyi-Kuta strongm an during his term as a minister in
the national governm ent, was forced to contest the 1997 election as a Kombukla candidate
because the Nam bka clan o f the M tnembi had their own candidate (Maj. Pun Kaip). An update
o f the political situation in D ei O pen electorate in the 1997 election is given in Chapter Seven.
Unlike the Tepuka-Kawelka pair, none o f the core members o f the Pipilka alliance are
traditional enemies o f those in the W elyi-Kuta alliance. The m ajor warfare disjunction indicated
in Figure 3 3 is therefore a ‘modem* one, taken from the context o f m ore recent cases o f warfare
between the three principal partners o f the Pipilka alliance and the Kombukla-M inembi pair (see

Case 1 in Chapter Five), The Remdi Jikam bo clan and the Kimka-Roklaka tribe-pair form the core
o f Pipilka, w hich com bines with a faction o f Raembka against the Welyi-Kuta alliance in warfare,
but com petes against both Raembka and W elyi-Kuta in business and elections.
The Pipilka alliance, created in c.1973, appears to have been far m ore successful than the other
two in business but has virtually failed to replicate such success in elections. Their principal
candidate, K oi Ranpi, has unsuccessfully contested every election since 1977 (see Chapter Seven).
Before Ranpi, and during pre-Pipilka times, a prom inent Roklaka leader, Pirn K oldpi,
unsuccessfully contested the M ul-Dei O pen during the 1968 elections and the D ei O pen in
1972. In 1968 K oldpi scored only 456 votes — compared with eventual winner, Mek Nuginte
(3,029) and the runner-up, Parua K uri (2,315) — and was therefore eliminated after the first
count, under the preferential voting system (see H .K and P. Colebatch, M. Reay and A.J.
Strathem 1971 i274; Table 15). In 1972 D ei was separated from Mul, thereby creating two new
electorates.16 Pirn K oldpi was am ong seven candidates who contested the D ei O pen seat H e
came third, with 1,422 first preference votes, compared with the winner, Parua K uri (2,131) and

A brief history o f the Dei O pen is given in A.J. Strathem (1976). In 1964, as A.J. Strathem notes, the
people o f Dei Council “had voted within the Minj Electorate and had helped Kaibelt Diria to win his first
electoral contest” (1976:265). For die next election in 1968 Dei was paired with the neighbouring Mul
Council to form an electorate separate from both the Hagen and Wahgj areas {ibid, see also H .K and P.
Colebatch, etdY T iX ). A J. Strathem writes that “owing to a series o f confrontations between groups and
individual leaders in Mul and Dei, in which the two main rivals for the position o f House o f Assembly
M ember in 1968 [Mek Nugintz and Parua Kuri] were closely involved, the Dei Council President [Parua
Kuri] asked that Dei and Mul be made separate electorates for 1972; and, because o f the evident bad
relations between the two councils, this request was granted by the visiting Electoral Boundaries
Distribution Committee” (1976:265; for Mul-Dei relations, see also A.J. Strathem 1984-24-25; 1992£36237; Ketan 1996:259).
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the runner-up, G apa W ai o f the M inem bi tribe, w ho polled 1,819 votes (see A J. Strathem
1976:283; Table2).
M ek N ugintz’s election victory in 1968, with a score o f 5,675 votes, over Parua K urt, w ho polled
3,108 votes, after the fifth and final count (ibid), cannot be described as an election success story
for the Pipilka alliance because (1) M ek is a m em ber o f the Mul Coundl-based ‘U pper Remdi’
section o f the tribe w hich is not part o f the Pipilka alliance; and (2) his victory came before the
form ation o f the Pipilka coalition, which was a genuinely new aggregation o f groups.
B ut how do w e explain P un Ruing’s victory in D ei O pen during the recent national elections in
June 1997? Ruing’s success, despite a strong challenge from within Pipilka via the candidacy o f a
Rem di candidate, Willie W undaki, came about as a result o f unique circumstances and personal
ability.17 As will be argued, there are several im portant factors which contributed to Ruing’s win,
but none o f which point towards Pipilka as a base-vote. The rift within Pipilka and other
underlying factors (including pow er struggles between faction leaders) are discussed in Chapter

Four, while the reasons why Puri Ruing’s personal trium ph was n o t a Pipilka-wide corporate
victory are argued in Chapter Seven.
T he Pipilka alliance, in particular, came about as a result o f the plantation acquisition scheme.
T he historical relationship between its two main factions is n o t quite clear, as indicated by the
difficulties encountered by inform ants w hen trying to make historical connections between
them . O ne faction is made up o f D ei Council-based groups, such as the Remdi Jikam bo clan
and the Kimka-Roklaka tribe-pair, while the other is com posed o f the Nebilyer, Hagen and
Anglimp residents, the K opi-N okpa tribe-pair. A part from cooperation between the two
factions in business activities, they act separately in other spheres o f com petition such as warfare
and elections because their members are divided by electoral and local governm ent council
boundaries and, in some ways, they can be described units divided by electoral geography. The
Remdi-Kimka-Roklaka faction operates w ithin the Dei O pen Electorate, while the K opi-N okpa
pair o f tribes are split across both the electoral and council border between Hagen and Anglimp.
Thus, the apparent lack o f cooperation in warfare and elections can be attributed to diverging
fields o f political com petition w ithin which these groups and their leaders interact The N okpa
group and its leaders, notably Michael Mel and his elder brother Peter Wama, operate mainly
w ithin Anglim p-South W ahgi, but its pair partner, K opi, belongs to the Hagen O pen electorate.
T he K opi are in a very similar position to the Remdi who are split across the Dei-M ul electoral

As pointed out to me by his adviser, Richard M el— an accountant who himself was unsuccessful in 1997
in attem pting to oust fellow Kumdi tribesman Robert Nagle in Mul-Baiyer Open — all o f Puri’s rivals in
general, and William Pik and Pun Kaip in particular, played im portant roles in Puri Ruing’s win (personal
communication, O ctober 1997).

H igen Groupings: Tribes, Clans, Factions, Alliances and Coalitions

106

bolder. O ne h alf o fK o p i, also know n as ‘K um K opi’ live and operate in central H agen and are
paired w ith N okpa, while the other half, also know n as TCopon Kopi* reside in D ei and are
currently in close association w ith the Kawelka K undm bo and M inembi K im bo dans, with
w hom they share som e tem tories around Tiki in the Baiyer valley. Special alliances such as
pairing and do se associations are described in the next section (see discussion on The Dei Council

Field ofPolitical Competition), but I should m ention here that electorate, local governm ent council,
o r other similarly arbitrarily created administrative boundaries that ignore either ethnic, cultural
o r linguistic variations have caused considerable problem s for some groups and their leaders.
A lthough M ichael M el appeared n o t to have been im peded by such difficulties in 1987 w hen he
w on the Anglim p-South W ahgi O pen seat, his unsuccessful bid for re-election in 1992 and
subsequent switch to H agen O pen in 1997 indicate that a divided popular-base is indeed an
im pedim ent to success in dections.18 A fter losing the Anglimp-South W ahgi O pen seat to
William Ekip (a P ort M oresby-based businessm an and Tsekieng tribesman) in 1992, Michael
Mel switched to H agen O pen in 1997, but was beaten to third place by the incum bent and Mel’s
form er N ational Party colleague, Paul Pora, w ho polled 10,038 votes (28.98%), com pared with
M el (6,571) and the runner-up, K ing Kela (also know n as Stanley N ui), w ho polled 8,143 votes
(see Kaiulo 1997a:103).
Like Pipilka, the Raembka alliance’s vague historical roots suggest that this could well be a recent
form ation. In feet, m ost Raembka inform ants that I have spoken to had great difficulty tracing
historical links, militarily o r otherw ise, between die various m em ber groups. W hile some groups
can be linked historically through military alliances, especially in the context o f tribe-pairing and
lim ited coalitions o f three o r four small tribes, there is no historical evidence o f a confederacytype alliance having been in existence during pre-colonial times. The Raembka alliance, like its
rivals Pipilka and W elyi-Kuta, became popular only in the mid-1970s and early 1980s. As a
m atter o f rhetoric, it is now fashionable in public oratory for Raembka leaders to give the
im pression that theirs is a united and pow erful alliance. As pointed out to me by an emerging
Raembka leader, M atrus (Dokta) Mel, in January 1995:
The Raembka coalition, with a membership of some seventeen tribes, is easily die
biggest group in die Dei Council area. It is named after a strong jungle vine called
raembka kan which grows in the Jimi valley. Raembka leaders often claim that direre is
‘an extended group’ — just like the raembka vine — stretching far and wide, drawing
membership from Wariki Kuiyake, near Tiki in the Baiyer valley, to Old Temb Keri,
near Kirml in the upper North Wahgi. Orators frequently refer to this long vine of
groups’, when appealing for group solidarity during national elections fas well as at

The same can be said o f warfare: diverging political fields o f competition can be an impediment to both
elections and warfare. The recent war efforts o f the Pipilka and at least one faction o f Raembka were
ham pered by geographical and political boundaries, an im portant point to which I shall return in Chapter
Five.
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other large-scale events such as tmka exchanges, compensation payments, and peace
settlements] when el-ik ( fight talk3) speeches are delivered [tn which extravagant rlajms
are deliberately made to belittle rival groups and their leaders].
H e further explained that Raembka is metaphorically thought o f as having either a head and a
tail/bottom (using anthropom orphic image), o r as having a sh o o t/to p and roots/base (m plant
m etaphor). T he R a e m b k a /^ (head) o r mm (shoot, top), according to Mel, is made up o f six
high-level nam ed groups, while the Raembka por (tail, bottom ) o r pukl (roots, base) has eleven,
altogether a total o f seventeen groups (with a com bined estimated 1997 population o f som e
30,000 persons).19 A n im portant point to make here is that laige coalitions are good for military
and electoral support, yet they can be very bad for business, as they are far too difficult to keep
together. It is, how ever, n o t unusual for politicians to embrace as many groups as possible.
T hus, the discrepancy between these figures given by M atrus Mel and those presented earlier in

Table 3.3 can be explained in term s o f personal interest o f inform ants, changes over

and

perhaps varies w ith the inform ants degree o f knowledge o f local politics.20 It is im portant to
recognise that leaders generally and politicians in particular tend to associate with as many
groups as possible, mainly through contem porary personal netw orks, but such netw orks can
also be built on historical relations between groups. Leaders are n o t only responsible for the
creation and m aintenance o f such groups but also adding new m em bers in attem pting to extend
their personal networks. O ne consequence o f extensive networking, as argued later in this thesis,
is the creation o f confederacy-type alliances, often cutting across electoral boundaries (see

Chapter Five and Chapter Nine). As well, w hat is physically evident is a recent increase in the
num ber o f groups aligned with Raembka, including groups which are structurally part o f those
in opposing alliances (e.g. M inembi K im bo clan) and num erous others that were previously
19 .

Matrus Mel, in feet, gave actual names o f the groups which make up the ‘head’ and ‘tail3 o f Raembka.
Raembkapeng (head), he says, is made up Tepuka, Kawelka, Mapkli, Palke, Klamakae and Kimbo. The first
five are tribes, while the last, Kimbo, is a clan, which is structurally part o f the Minembi tribe, but closely
associated with the Kawelka Kundmbo dan and the ‘Kopon’ Kopi tribe. The Raembka por (tail), he
added, is made up o f Kentpi, Nelka, Gulke, Dapi, Prandike, Opei, Krange, Kumungaka, Purke, Mungapka,
and Oklomoni. All o f these are tribes except Krange, which is commonly referred to as structurally part o f
Kentpi. While the core groups remain constant, there is slight variation in the num ber o f groups which
make up Raembka, depending on different informants. Groups such as Kimbo, Purke, Mungapka,
Oklomoni, Mapkli, Palke, Opei, Gulke, and Punti have only recently been induded in Raembka mainly for
political reasons. Waklupka, through their dose association with the Roklaka ‘Nu-por-pei’, are now
considered as part o f the Pipilka, although they were previously included in Raembka (personal
communication, January 1995).

20.

While discussing Raembka it was easy to tell, from the unmistakable glow in his eyes, that Matrus, a
UPNG commerce-economics graduate, is proud o f his tribal roots and apparently enjoys talking about
local politics. Particularly impressive is his knowledge o f the Raembka alliance, within which he has
considerable influence. Matrus Mel is m ost probably the only village councillor in the province with a
university degree, and there is no question about his loyalty towards his Kelmbo dan (which he represents
in Dei Local G overnm ent Council), or about his strong tribal roots with the Tepuka, o r about his role as a
pow er-broker within Raembka and Dei politics. Nonetheless, and rather ironically, he has also been
implicated in the processes that have destabilised group solidarity (as evident in Chapter Four on
cooperative business ventures and in ChapterSeven on national dections).
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non-aligned (e,g. M ungapka, Gulke, Punti). By increasing m em bership in the various levels o f
organisation, leaders like M atrus Mel thus becom e ‘engineers5 in the ‘construction5 and
m aintenance o f political blocs, a key point to w hich I shall return later in the concluding section
o f this chapter.
It is, in a way, fair to say that Raembka clearly lacks cohesion, has never fought together in
warfare21, and is highly fragmented because o f enduring and at times disruptive pow er struggles
betw een leaders o f factions and m inor coalitions. M atrus Mel, for m stanre, leads a faction that is
opposed to the one led by Parua K uri and prom inent D ei businessm an, G oim ba K o t T heir
struggle for pow er in D ei, as it will be made clear in Chapter Four; has resulted in bankrupting at
least tw o once-prosperous business groups and arguably losing at least three national elections
w hich Raembka could otherwise may have won.
Problem s o f disruptive pow er struggles, however, are n o t restricted to Raembka, as both Pipilka
and W elyi-Kuta have faced similar problem s o f their own. An overview o f the connection
betw een w arfare, elections, and businesses is presented in the next section (see Dei CouncilField of

Political Competition), and the various spheres o f political com petition are being analysed m ore
specifically (by way o f case studies) in subsequent chapters (see Chapters 4-8), so it will suffice
here to schematically present the various factions and the key players involved (see Figure 3.4-6).
Bear in m ind that the num ber o f key players in each o f the factions given, however, is not

exhaustive, as there are many outstanding leaders w ho have n o t been m entioned here (see
Appendix III for a m ore com prehensive list o f D ei groups and their leaders). N ote also that not all
o f the individuals m entioned as key players within the different coalitions, factions, and sub
factions can be described as ‘big-m en5. They are, in fact, different types o f leaders, endow ed with
varied skills and knowledge. Some o f them , for example, are successful businessm en but
generally poor orators, others are politicians (including a few with despotic tendencies), and a
few are gifted orators (but lack knowledge o f m odem business and politics).
Furtherm ore, the size o f their highly personalised following within factions is in fact much
sm aller — at an average o f perhaps only fifty o r even fewer, core supporters — than the
population figures given in the following diagrams. T o use Boissevain5s (1974) m odel o f

In pre-colonial warfare, some Raembka groups fought against each m ember o f the Welyi-Kuta alliance,
but n o t in a concerted effort on a single front, nor in a single battle. When informants speak o f alliance
warfare, one m ust take into account o f the fact that in these m atters regarding warfare, Hageners tend to
exaggerate. The nearest thing to alliance warfare between the Raembka and Welyi-Kuta was said to have
occurred sometime during the 1930s, when the Welyi group was almost decimated by the combined
forces o f the Tepuka-Kawelka pair and their, Kopi, Kimbo and Klamakae allies (see Ketan 1996:264).
O ther m embers o f the Raembka, however, ware no t involved and the Kombukla-Minembi pair were said
to have assisted Welyi in a mainly non-fighting opacity.
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personal netw orks, these core supporters form a leader’s 'intimate’ and ‘effective’ 2ones,
com prising friends and relatives in the form er and the latter being made up o f a circle o f persons
w ho are im portant to him in a m ore pragmatic sense for econom ic and political purposes. Some
o f these people, as Boissevain says, are strategic persons w ho may be useful to a leader because
o f their ow n netw orks, through which he can gain access to friends o f his friends (1974:47-8). It
is thus possible to depend on a small circle o f relatives and friends to extend one’s networks,
mainly by a systematic selection o f wives from a num ber o f strategic groups, careful cultivation
o f exchange ties and by keeping relations warm through the investm ent o f material and
em otional resources (see Chapter Six for a m ore detailed discussion o f personal networking as a
political strategy). In this way, the various factions within Raembka, Pipilka and Welyi-Kuta can
be seen as personal networks. In Raembka, for example, m en such Parua Kuril, Goim ba K ot and
M atrus Mel are at the centre o f their personal networks through which they attem pt to influence
activities around them . Factions such as T epuka (I)’, T epuka IP, ‘Kawelka’ and ‘Kentpi-Nelka,
etc.’ can therefore be viewed as personal networks o f these men inasmuch as their realm o f
influence spreads unevenly throughout these groups. This interpretation is valid for both Pipilka
and Welyi-Kuta.

F ig u re 3.4: R aem b k a factions an d key players

N ote:

All population figures are from the 1990 National Population Census (For a more detailed population data
on Dei tribes and the reliability o f National Statistical Office (NSO) data from the 1990 Census, see
A ppendix IT, see also Table 3A and explanatory notes).
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F ig u re 3.5: P ip ilk a factions an d key players

PIPIL K A

K O PI
The K opi are
split across the
H agen-D ei
electoral border.
T hose in Hagen,
also known as
Kum Kopi, are
paired
with
Nokpa,
while
those in D ei are
closely
associated with a
Raembka
faction. There is
a small faction,
led by Andrew
Konts, which is
opposed to that
led by Michael
Mel.

Note:

N O K PA
T he N okpa are
also split across
an
electoral
border between
Nebilyer
and
Anglimp.
The
N okpa leaders,
Michael Mel and
his
elder
brother,
Peter
Warna, are the
key players in
the
KopiN okpa faction.

R EM D I
Remdi is yet another
group that is split
across an electoral
border, between Mul
and D ei. But those in
Mul are not part o f
the Pipilka; only those
in D ei are. And the
key
players
are
Puklma Kopi and
Henry Tiki, w h o are
business
rivals,
Councillor Koi Ranpi
and Willie Wundaki,
both
unsuccessful
candidates in national
elections.

ROKLAKA
The Roklaka are
traditionally
paired with the
Kimka and are
currently in a
military alliance
with Remdi and
KimkaTheir
key players are
the current D ei
MP, Puri R uing
his mentor, Pirn
Koldopi,
and
Councillor D o t
Roltmga.

KIMKA
The Kimka are
in
close
association with
Remdi
(with
w hom
they
share territory)
and their pairpartner,
Roklaka. Their
key players are
M ount Hagen
lawyer
and
businessman,
Simon Nurum,
and Councillor
Kumi Krai.

Population data for Remdi, Kimka and Roklaka tribes are given in Table 3.3 (see also Table 3.4), while
figures for Kopi-Nokpa pair o f tribes were n ot readily available to m e at the time o f writing. O w ing to
multiple residency — in Nebilyer, Hagen and Angjimp districts — it was difficult to determine the Census
Division in w hich file K opi-Nokpa pair were enumerated during the 1990 census. However, an estimated
com bined population o f 2,500 persons for the Kopi-Nokpa in 1997 would not b e unreasonable.
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3*6: W elyi-K uta factio n s an d key p layers

T he registered business groups, which bear the same names, are discussed in the next chapter.
But it should be noted here that the faction leaders m entioned above played dom inant roles in
the creation o f these businesses, which they now control. Individuals such as Parua K uri and
G oim ba K ot (in Raembka), M ichael Mel (in Pipilka), M elchior Pep, Pati W amp and Sapom Kipa
(in W elyi-Kuta) launched their business and political careers by manipulating these networks.
T he next generation o f leaders such as M atrus Mel (m Raembka), Simon N urum and H enry Tiki
(in Pipilka), and Pun K aip and Wikai M embi (in Welyi-Kuta) are attem pting to do the same,
thereby resulting in rifts within the coalitions, a significant point to which I shall return in the
next chapter, after first briefly discussing the military dimension o f political allegiances in the D ei
Council political field.
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T he D ei Council Field o f Political Com petition
T he D ei Council field o f com petition covers the entire national parliam ent electorate o f D ei
O pen, w hich had a population o f som e 41,842 resident citizens in 1990 (NSO 1993:5). In the
D ei Council area, as in other parts o f H agen, there are clearly established alliance netw orks,
through w hich military assistance is sought and given in warfare, and nowadays arrangem ents for
support in elections and business developm ent corporations are organised along these same
broad lines. This political field and the constituent alliances are schematised in Figure 3.7\ There
are at least 28 tribes o r teklaep operating w ithin the D ei Council field o f political com petition,
constantly com peting but sometimes cooperating w ith each other to form large blocs in arenas
such as business, elections and warfare. Table 3.4 contains population data for 25 D ei tribes. The
variation in size o f groups is again emphasised here by the population data, a m ajor contributing
factor in the degree o f cohesion w ithin groups. As evident in the case studies on warfare and
elections (Chap.5-8), laige groups tend to split quite predictably along structural lines whilst
smaller ones form into alliances in order to m atch bigger rivals.
Some o f these groups have organised themselves into large coalition-style alliances such as those
m entioned in the previous section (Pipilka, Raembka and Welyi-Kuta). W ithin these loosely
organised coalitions are the core groups, w hose m em bership is based on traditional military
alliances, and which are currently in close association. In this section, I discuss these
predom inantly military blocs and the way they organise themselves in relation to other similar
groups, thus em phasising the political cleavages w ithin them , and make some general remarks
about their proclaim ed allegiances — and opposition — towards each other and the larger
coalitions to which they belong.
H ow ever, it should be noted that my discussion is a simplified version o f w hat is otherwise a
very com plex situation. It is primarily based on inform ants’ perceptions o f contem porary
relations between the various groups. It is possible that such perceptions may have been largely
influenced by recent events rather than historical relations, although this means that w hat is
given here is a fairly accurate assessm ent o f contem porary D ei politics (see Chapter Five and

Chapter Seven for som e historical discussions). Furtherm ore, the field o f military cooperation
betw een the groups sketched below (see Figure 3.7) is taken from the context o f recent conflicts
(see Chapter Five) and therefore should n o t be viewed as a perm anent arrangem ent, as the
patterns o f alliance and enmity are bound to shift in future as the goals and interests o f the key
players change.
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fi /paraka (major warfare) disjunction

Traditional Pairing

In current military alliance

Likely to support a candidate
sponsored by an ally in 1997
>

May shift allegiance in 1997

In close association with each
other
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T ab le 3.4: T rib es o f D ei: p o p u latio n d a ta
No.

Tribe

1966'

1979*

19903

1997 est.

1

Minembi

2813'

4609

2

Tepuka

2419

3596
2575

7000
5000

3
4

Kombukla
Welyi

1542
1224

5
6
7

Kentpi
Remdi
Kawelka

1196
1196s

8
9

Roklaka
Kopi

10
11

Kimka

12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

Kumungaka
Nelka
Waklupka
Prandike
Gulke
Punti

860
744
711
388
368
364
348
252
with Kentpi
with Kentpi

DaP f
_________ with Kentpi
Mungapka
with Kentpi
Klamakae
241
Kiklpukla
130
Mapkle
with Tepuka
Palke
with Tepuka
Epilkae
Dakapkae
Ndilika
Total

N o t counted
N o t counted
68
16,464

2262
1476
2040*

3351
2939
I 3109
5158*
587*

988
1631

41687a

781

N o t counted

514
600
514

964
936
374*

770

1116
10158
with Kentpi
with Kentpi
with Kentpi
with Kentpi

N o t counted
with Kentpi
with Kentpi
with Kentpi
with Kentpi
with Kentpi
581
with Remdi
with Tepuka
with Tepuka
N o t counted
N o t counted
with Remdi
18,328

with Kentpi
335*
with Remdi
with Tepuka
with Tepuka
N o t counted
N o t counted
with Remdi
28,662

4000
3500
' 5000*
20006
4500^
1500
1500
1200
1000
1500 '
1000
with Kentpi
with Kentpi
with Kentpi
with Kentpi
with Kentpi
1500
with Remdi
with Tepuka
with Tepuka
N o t counted
N o t counted
with Remdi
40,200

Notes and Sources:
1.

Based on A.J. Strathem (1966b).

2.

Data from Western Highlands Provincial Data System (NSO 1982).

3.

Data from 1990 National Population Census (NSO 1993).

4.
5.

Including Prandike, Gulke, Dapi, Mungapka and Punti tribes.
Including the Mul-based ‘Upper Remdi’ section.

6.

Including the small Kiklpukla and Ndilika groups.

7.

Including som e Tepuka, Poiyaka-Aiyaka (ex-Nebilyer) and Enga migrants at Kuk.

8.

Including 401 Roklaka ‘N u Por pei’ w ho are sometimes paired with the Waklupka.

•

*
Suspected underenumeration during the 1990 Census. In the case o f <Ix>wer Remdi’, for example, it is
unlikely that the population had significantly decreased from 988 persons in 1979 to 587 in 1990. The opposite,
however, is believed to have occurred, hence my conservative estimate o f 2,000 persons in 1997. The same
would be true for both Kumungaka and Klamakae populations. In fact, underenumeration is suspected in all
groups, a point which was raised by N SO itself. Owing to operational difficulties involved in the 1990 census, it
was suggested that “more case o f omission and duplication is likely to have occurred during the 1990 Census
than during the 1980 Census”, and “in the case o f the Western Highlands Province, omission has almost
certainly been far more extensive than duplication” (NSO 1994:9). It should also be noted that “the entire
Rural Sector o f Western Highlands Province was enumerated using the Tine-up’ system o f enumeration. In the
absence o f P D S data, coverage must have suffered” (NSO 1994:10). The extent o f underenumeration,
however, is not known mainly because o f “unreliable results o f the Post Enumeration Survey which was carried
out in 1991”, thus, “comparison o f 1980 and 1990 data should be made with the utm ost caution” (NSO

•

Population figures for six small tribes have not been included here: (1) the small Rulna resident Mapkle-Palke
tribe-pair, which may have been enumerated together with the Tepuka Jikimbo-Wanyembo clan-pair, (2) the
Baiyer residents Epilkae-Dakapkae tnbe-pair, which had a combined population o f only 138 persons in 1966

1994:10).

Htgen Groupings: Tribes, Clans, Factions, Alliances and Coalitions

115

(A.J. Strathem 1966b); (3) the small Dapi tribe which has almost been incorporated into the Kentpi; and the
‘Kopon Mungapka tribe w ho reside in the Jimi valley. Also missing are the little-known Jimi Valley-based
Oklmoni and the Kimil-based Opei who operate mainly within the Dei political field but are administratively
part o f the N orth Wahgi electorate.
•

Rural Non-Village Census Units (such as plantations, small stations and schools) have not been included in the
local population data because many o f these contain predominantly migrant populations (originally from other
provinces). However, it is im portant to take note o f such populations, especially in instances where the migrant
populations are in a patron-client relationship with their hosts. In such situations, migrant populations often
vote with their hosts and may even support them in war, as in Remdi’s case with Simbu and Enga migrants at
Gumanch Plantation (see Case 1 in ChapterFivi).

A part from their military functions, these blocs also operate in other arenas o f com petition and
cooperation, notably elections. Some questions w orth considering here are; W hat is the
historical basis for traditional pairing? Are they in a current military alliance? Are they in close
association? Are they likely to support an election candidate sponsored by a military ally? A
further question w orth raising here would be w hether o r not there was a shift in allegiances o f
allied groups during the 1997 national elections. Some o f these questions will be considered in
the context o f recent warfare between a confederacy o f two such blocs in a ‘fight-partnership’
against a com m on enemy bloc (1986-1990), and subsequent reparation payments during 1990
1996 and the 1997 national election.

Figure 3.7 (above) is based on the traditional division between the Tepuka-Kawelka pair o f tribes
and the K om bukla-M nem bi. It was precisely along this m ajor rift that serious fighting broke out
at the end o f 1986 (see A J. Strathem 1993:236; see also Chapter Five). The D ei Council area is
divided into three provincial governm ent constituencies — Gumanch, Mala-Kinjibi and K otnaTiki. The later — o r m ore precisely, activities within it — form the central focus o f analysis in

Chapter Seven. The following are predom inantly military alliances which operate within (and out
of) these constituencies.
T he T epuka-K aw elka P a ir
T he Tepuka-Kawelka see themselves as traditional rivals o f the Kombukla-M inembi in warfare,
business and elections. Theirs is a traditional pairing, based on military alliance and exchange
relations, dating back to pre-colonial times (see Chapter Five and Chapter Seven; see also A.J.
Strathem 1971:64-6). In fact, it is evident in the Kawelka origin-myth that the alliance has its
roots in a marriage between a Kawelka ancestor and a Tepuka woman. As indicated by A.J.
Strathem (1972:40), it is a generalised alliance o f great im portance in warfare, current marriage
patterns, land use, and ceremonial exchange. This alliance was later extended into commercial
enterprise and elections in the 1970s and early 1980s, largely through the initiatives o f the form er
D ei M P, Parua Kuril, him self the son o f a woman bom into the m ost num erous Kawelka clan,
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M embo. The Tepuka-Kawelka, o r m ore precisely the Tepuka half o f the pair, have dom inated
D ei electoral politics since 1972 — either as mem bers o f parliam ent (MP) o r the provincial
assembly (MPA) — through Parua K uri, M P (1972-87) and his son, Reuben Parua (MP, 1993
1997), in D ei O pen electorate, and Kuma Rokla (MPA, 1980-1984) and K ar Kil (MPA, 1984
1994) in the K otna-Tiki constituency o f D ei (see Chapter Fight for m ore inform ation on these
leaders).
Recently, however, the alliance has been considerably underm ined by certain events and the
conflicting roles and ambitions o f some leaders. The strength o f the alliance between the Tepuka
and Kawelka tribes began to falter during the mid 1980s. A less than successful occasion in 1984
w hen Parua K uri’s clansmen repaid a ceremonial gift o f pigs and money (ntoka) to the Kawelka
heralded this decline, which was hastened by a tragic event in 1988 when a young M embo man
was killed in P ort M oresby by a fellow clansman o f the politician (see A J. Strathem 1993:50;
K etan 1996:256; see also Chapter Seven for further discussion on Parua Kuri’s moka, and Chapter

Fight for a m ore detailed discussion o f this incident and its political implications). O ne o f a new
breed o f fearless leaders in gun warfare, his death was considered a m ajor set-back to the
Kawelka w ar effort against the Minembi. As A.J. Strathem says, this untoward event split the
alliance, and even after a large com pensation payment o f hundreds o f pigs and K12,000 cash
had been m ade, relations were still shaky:
There was suspicion that the death was not an accident but might have been planned.
The Kawelka people at home in Mount Hagen had been involved for some years in
bitter fighting with long-established enemies within Dei, and there was a feeling that the
MP had not given them support but had rather attempted to gain favour with die more
numerous enemies as a part of electoral manoeuvring. (All this was unsubstantiated
rumour, but it affected people’s attitudes). Guns had been introduced in this war and
the enemies held the better weapons. It happened that the Membo youth killed in
Moresby was one o f a new generation o f fighters with guns and his removal was
regarded as giving an advantage to the Kawelka’s prime enemies. Previously, in 1987,
the politician had lost the parliamentary election to a rival from the opposing bloc
within Dei. Relationships that had held since the 1960s were now being shattered in all
directions (1993:50).
F or further discussion o f these m atters, see also Chapter Six on electoral m anoeuvring Chapter -

Seven for discussion on Tepuka-Kawelka relations in the context o f the 1992 and 1997 elections;
and Chapter Fight for discussion on the circumstances surrounding the death o f the M embo
youth in P ort Moresby. Parua Kuri’s election defeat in 1987, which was replicated by his son
Reuben Parua’s loss in 1992, are widely regarded as a direct consequence o f Kawelka’s
withdrawal o f su p p o rt This situation is further complicated by the political aspirations o f a
form er deputy prem ier o f W estern Highlands Province, William Pik, him self a Kawelka
K undm bo clansman. Pik and M elchior Pep have been, and possibly still are, friends (though
they both contested the D ei O pen seat in 1997). Although Pik assisted Pep to secure some
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Kawelka votes (mainly from Pik’s K undm bo clan) during both the 1987 and 1992 national
elections, he him self entered the race in 1997, perhaps believing that he had become strong
enough to defeat Pep and Parua (see Chapter Fight for a m ore detailed analysis o f Pik’s social
networks vis-a-vis Pfep and other key players in the D ei political field).
W hilst personal networks between the Tepuka and Kawelka have n o t been severed by these
events, corporate relations between the Tepuka and Kawelka appear, at best, shattered, if not
hostile. The traditional military alliance between the two group seems to have been temporarily
suspended, as the Kawelka are now in a military alliance with a group described here as the
T ik i A lliance, com prising K opi, Kim bo and Klamakae groups. Furtherm ore, they are n o t likely
to support each other in elections, as they both sponsored candidates in opposition to each
other during the 1997 election and are understandably bitter n o t necessarily over their defeat by
the Roklaka candidate, Pun R uing but towards each other for jeopardising their chances. Thus,
in post-polling violence, they both expressed their anger and frustration at each other rather than
at Puri Ruing’s supporters.
The K om bukla-M inem bi P a ir
The Kombukla-M inembi are a numerically powerful pairing based on traditional military
alliance. They com pete against the Tepuka-Kawelka pair in m ajor warfare, business enterprise
and national elections. Although potentially a very powerful political force, neither M inembi nor
K om bukla leaders have been able to mobilise support for a combined effort in either warfare or
elections. There is no doubt that if the pair o f tribes had fought wars o r contested elections in a
concerted m anner, they would have w on quite easily. But they have mostly assisted each other at
the level o f their constituent clans rather than as a unified grouping during warfare, and have
consistently endorsed candidates against each other in elections.
Part o f the problem is that Minembi, being a large tribe, is quite fragmented, with memories that
m ost o f its constituent clans fought each other in pre-colonial warfare. As well, the M inembi are
split across a provincial constituency boundary: one half o f M inembi belong to Gumanch
constituency while the other are part o f the Kotna-TikL The division does not even follow
structural lines. Instead, it is based on residential grounds. The M inembi clans w ho live within
the K otna-Tiki constituency are called Komonga Mandong Minembi (The M inembi w ho live down
there on the other side o f the m ountain5) whilst those in Gumanch call themselves Komonga

Rondong Minembi (The M inembi who live up here on this side o f the m ountain5).22 The mountain

Komonga Mandong Minembi comprises the Kimbo, Elyipi, some Papeke, Ruprupkae, Komonkae and
Engambo clans who live in and around Tiki, whilst Komorga Rondong Minembi is largely made up o f the
Nambkae, Ropke, Napakae and Mimfee clans who live in territories at Keraldung Moga, Kuta-Kori and
Kumbunga (compare with segmentary structure given in Appendix 1).
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is in reference to the M iti range which divides the Gum anch valley from the Muka and Baiyer
valleys.
This situation is further complicated by the fact that M inembi’s principal allies, the Kombukla
and Welyi tribes, are also split across the same boundary, w ith Kombukla operating in Gumanch
and Welyi in Kotna-TikL T he Welyi have traditionally supported the Kombukla in pre-colonial
warfare and later in elections against the Tepuka-Kawelka pair, but some o f them have recently
shifted allegiances towards Reuben Parua in 1993. However, a large section o f the Welyi remain
aligned with M elchior Pep and his K om bukla tribe, whilst a few (perhaps between 200-300) are
believed to have voted for Reuben Parua in 1997. Relations between M inembi and Welyi are less
certain. They may assist each other in warfare on an individual basis and largely in a non- fighting
capacity, but it seems very unlikely that they would support candidates sponsored by either side
in future elections. Even at the provincial level, they have opposed each other, as evident in

ChapterEight.

^

The traditional military alliance between the Kombukla and M inembi is still valid at least at the
d an level, which means that a particular K om bukla dan may assist a neighbouring M inembi clan
in warfare (and possibly elections), depending o f course on the degree o f warmth in the relations
between them and a factor described by Burton (1989a272) as ‘social propinquity’ (affinal and
exchange system ties becom e im portant when lain fails to guide warriors and voters in their
choice). Military cooperation at the tribal level, however, seems unlikely since they both have
recently fought wars independently o f each other (though some assistance was given on an
individual basis). Similarly, it seems unlikdy that they will support candidates sponsored by one
o r the other pair-partner. A tradition (since 1972) o f opposing each other in elections was
continued in 1997 when Kombukla and M inembi each sponsored candidates in opposition to
each other. It is widely believed that a large num ber o f M inembi and possibly som e Kombukla
voters shifted allegiance to the Roklaka candidate, Puri Ruing, thus enabling his relatively small
group to trium ph over numerically stronger rivals.

The T iki A lliance (Kopi-Kimbo-Klamakae)
T he alliance being described here as the ‘Tiki Alliance’ is a fairly recent form ation, based on their
com m on military alliance with the Kawelka in a recent war fought against the M inembi during
1986-1990 (see Chapter Five). They also share some territories at Tiki in the Baiyer Valley and
operate mainly in the Kotna-Tiki constituency o f Dei. The Tiki Alliance, together with the
Kawelka, were thus in a ‘fight-partnership’ with a similar bloc, described here as the ‘Gumanch
Alliance’ (see below), in their war effort against the Kombukla-M inembi bloc. The dans in the
Tiki Alliance, although currently in a military alliance with only the Kawelka half o f the TepukaKawelka pair, are likely to either individually (as individual men) o r collectively (as members o f
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each dan) support candidates sponsored by either the Tepuka o r the Kawelka. However, in
1997 it is believed that a large majority o f the Kimbo and Klamakae vote w ent to the Kawelka
candidate, William Pik, while some K opi voted for the Tepuka candidate, Reuben Parua. An
explanation for dais may be found in (1) Tepuka’s decision n o t to assist Kawelka and the Tiki
Alliance in the late 1980s war against the M inembi; and (2) the subsequent reparation payments
o f 300 pigs made by the Kawelka to the Tiki Alliance for men lost while assisting Kawelka
during the war (see ChapterFive, see also discussion in the concluding chapter o f the thesis). Only
dose K opi relatives within Reuben’s m other’s natal clan are believed to have remained loyal to
him.

The Gumanch A lliance (Kimka-Roklaka-Remdi)
W hat I have labelled the ‘Gumanch Alliance’ is in fact the core o f the Pipilka Coalition which
operates mainly w ithin the Gumanch Constituency o f D ei Council. It is a traditional alliance,
founded on historical military cooperation. The Kimka-Roklaka are paired and whilst historically
have been dosely associated with the Remdi (with whom they share some territories near the
M uglamp station), relations between them have not been particularly good in recent times.
D espite their cooperation in warfare and a large reparation payment o f 1,000 roasted pigs made
by the Remdi to their Kimka-Roklaka allies in 1994 for losses sustained in war, they compete
against each other in elections. The Kimka-Roklaka sponsored their own candidate to oppose
Remdi candidates in 1992 and 1997 elections as well as a by-election in 1993. The rdationship
between the Kimka-Roklaka and Remdi is quite complex, the details o f which are given in

ChapterSeven (see also ChapterNine).
The North-Eastern Confederacy (Kumungaka-Kentpi-Nelka-W aklupka-Prandike)
W hat is described here as the ‘N orth-Eastern Confederacy’ is a constellation o f relatively small
tribes in the Mala-Kinjibi Constituency o f D ei Council. It is not an alliance but a loose
association o f groups w ho sometimes cooperate with each other and at other times oppose each
other in arenas o f com petition such as elections. While they have cooperated in major warfare
against other similar confederates, they have also fought against each other in m inor warfare.
They are likely to support a candidate sponsored by Tepuka rather than Kawelka because o f
Tepuka’s historical military alliance with the Kentpi. But with Parua Kuri out o f the picture, it is
n o t clear w hether they would vote for Reuben Parua because o f their traditional ties with Kuri
and his group. In 1997, as in 1992, the Waklupka are believed to have pledged allegiance to the
Roklaka candidate, Puri Ruing, because o f their close association with the “N u Por Pei” section
o f the Roklaka w ho live with them at Penda. The Kumungaka-Kentpi pair o f tribes, with
Prandike w ho are dosely associated with K entpi, had a hom e candidate in 1997, while Nelka is
believed to have split between the Kombukla candidate, M elchior Pep, and the Tepuka
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candidate, Reuben Parua. The Nelka have since the 1970s been closely associated with Reuben
Parua s Tepuka K eitipi clan, both groups being core members o f the Raembka alliance. Yet in
recent years M elchior Pep has developed strong ties with a section o f the Nelka thro ugh
association w ith a form er W estern Highlands provincial assembly member, John Moka, who
him self contested the 1993 D ei O pen By-Election when Pep was ineligible. John Moka, 1ik<*
M atrus Mel and William Pik before 1997, is almost in a clientage relationship with M elchior Pep
as patron and therefore could not contest against Pep in 1997.

A Com parable Bloc in the Hagen Central Area: A Confederacy o f Kinjika-Yam ka, E ltiPenam bi and Kem i-Kukilka interests
By way o f com parison, the confederacy-type alliance system in Hagen Central area (also known
as Hagen O pen electorate), however, is slightly different As will be shown in Chapter Six, there
are a num ber o f party-aligned interest groups at work, each led by prom inent and powerful
individuals. M ost o f these are loosely organised coalitions, with vague historical roots, suggesting
that they are very recent formations serving the political aspirations o f certain individuals. The
power-base o f the M ount Hagen O pen MP since 1987, Paul Pora, is made up o f one such
coalition. His relatively small Kinjika-Yamka group, having realised that it cannot compete
effectively against either Jika o r Mokei groups, has made a pact with two other smaller tribepairs, the Elti-Penam bi and Kemi-Kukilka to share out political offices and leadership roles.
A ccording to Yamka inform ants23, under the agreement reached between leaders o f these
groups in the late 1980s, the Kinjika-Yamka pair, through Paul Pora, would hold onto the
Hagen O pen seat, the Elti-Penambi (through Kingal Kuikuri) would keep the Kwi Constituency
seat in the provincial assembly, and the Kemi-Kukilka (through Bishop Sanangke) would retain
the presidency o f the Lutheran Church (ELC-PNG, Hagen District).
In light o f recent developments — notably Kingal Kuikuri’s loss to Kinjika candidate, James
K ond, in January 1995 and the abolition o f all provincial governments in July 1995 — it is fair to
say that leaders o f this coalition may encounter some difficulties in keeping it together as a
cohesive unit. The Elti-Penam bi pair are m ost likely to perceive Kuikuri’s election defeat in 1995
as directly resulting from the Kinjika-Yamka pair’s failure in not keeping their end o f the bargain.
Future elections can be viewed as an ideal test for its leaders and Paul Pora in particular.
However, the 1997 election results confirmed a widely held view that Pora had done enough in
Hagen to retain his seat, despite a direct challenge from his form er National Party colleague and
Anglimp-South W ahgi MP (1987-1992), Michael Mel, w ho opted to contest the Hagen O pen

The information on the agreement between the Kinjika-Yamka, Elti-Penambi and Kemi-Kukilka coalition
was given to me in January 1995 by John Puk and members o f the Atenga family o f Tega village, M ount
Hagen.
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seat Pora had previously retained his seat during a ‘supplementary* election in August 1987 (held
some six weeks after die dose o f polling in the main national dection period, 13 June to 4 July),
despite a challenge from a PD M -endorsed Kinjika candidate, Terema Rumints (see Burton
1989a).

Conclusion
A m ajor aim o f this chapter has been to establish the various levels in which local groups
organise themselves for political purposes. The different types o f groups discussed here cover a
wide range o f possibilities — from the m ost minimal units such as families and lineages to
progressively m ore indusive levels such as clans, sub-dans, tribes and coalitions — all o f which
are in com petition with each other as well as with the PN G state for the allegiances o f individual
citizens. The corporate nature o f political com petition will become evident in the subsequent
chapters o f this thesis.
This final section o f the chapter has a dual purpose: firstly to summaries the main points o f the
chapter; and secondly to highlight some salient features o f social organisation in Hagen sodety
in order to situate the discussions in the succeeding chapters. I now turn to some im portant
points raised in this chapter.

Sliding Degree o f Identity and L oyalty
There are progressively m ore inclusive levels o f group membership, identity, and loyalty. In
many cases, an individual has little choice: on the one hand is the group into which a person is
bom to , whilst on the other hand, there is a wide range o f administrative groups. It is, for
example, nowadays not uncom m on for a person to think o f him self as first a m ember o f a
particular lineage o r sub-clan, clan, tribe, then as belonging to a particular census division,
constituency, electorate, and finally province, region and nation. It should be noted here that
there is a tendency towards a progressively declining level o f loyalty as one moves away from the
family, o r w hat Boissevian calls “Ego’s personal cell”, which is “usually composed o f his dosest
relatives and possibly a few o f his intimate friends” in whom “he invests a great deal o f his
material and em otional resources” (1974:47). This sliding level o f loyalty is reflected in a
statem ent made by a senior U PN G academic, Jo Mangi, which is w orth quoting here in full:
W hen I am in th e village I am know n as T um be, th e son o f M angi o f the K ondi
W im ans E n d u k K anem lineage and I identify m yself as such. In th e rm d-W ahgi area I
am a K ondika. In th e W estern H ighlands I am a Jiw aka (acronym s o f Jim i, W ahgi,
K am bia). In o th er p arts o f the H ighlands I am a W estern Highlander. In o th er p arts o f
d ie country I am a H ighlander. W hen I am overseas I am a Papua N ew G uinean. T his is
m y p erception o f m y identity and I proudly adhere to i t I f som eone w as to ask m e as to
w here m y loyally laid this is th e answ er they w ould g et and it is in th e o rd er presented
above (M angi 1992:124).
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Personally revealing as it m ight be, this is an im portant statem ent about individual identity and
loyalty in Papua New Guinea. As will be shown in the succeeding chapters, the PN G state, in
com parison with the kin-group, comes a poor second when it comes to individual allegiances,
thereby cleady emphasising the fundamental questions o f com peting legitimacies between state
and society; o f parallel m oral worlds, as expressed through the Hagen notion o f <us-versusth em ; and o f the familiar and, therefore reliable source o f physical and emotional security,
versus the alien and sometimes unpredictable entity known as the state.
Nevertheless, w hat is also evident in the Hagen case studies is that group membership does not
automatically translate into support for group events, either in the form o f military assistance in
warfare, o r by way o f votes in elections. It is often the case that there is greater internal cohesion
within smaller tribes/clans than there is in large ones. The sub-units o f smaller groups tend to
cooperate m ore frequently than those in large ones mainly for pragmatic reasons such as
survival But w hat is com m on to all Hagen groups is that they all value the ‘name-must-not-godow n’ principle. It is this particular principle which has kept Hagen tribes together, despite
m ajor rifts within them . It has also kept the remnants o f groups decimated by pre-colonial
warfare from losing their tribal identities completely through the process o f incorporation into
m ore powerful groups.

Factors determ ining group composition, solidarity and continuity
The hame-must-not-go-down* principle is a m ajor factor in the com position, recruitment,
solidarity and continuity o f Hagen groups, a significant point which I think has been neglected
by Highlands observers, particularly by those in search o f evidence to support the so-called
African models and also by proponents o f the exchange model. While the principles o f descent,
ascent, and exchange may be factors in group solidarity, they cannot adequately account for
variations in group structure and recruitm ent patterns in Hagen and elsewhere in the PN G
Highlands. But this Hagen notion o f the ‘name’ can help us to understand the reasons behind
the actions o f leaders in building up their numbers through the recruitm ent o f non-agnates, in
mobilising support for corporate activities such as business, elections and warfare.
The case studies on Hagen political com petition highlight the m ost fundamental characteristics
o f groups: that all groups are ultimately created to serve certain functions and in some instances
to achieve specific goals; and that all groups are shifting in nature, in a constant state o f flux and
wane, as old members are lost (via death, marriage and outward migration) and replaced by new
ones (via births, marriage and inward migration). In light o f this evidence, one may ask w hether
there was any great value in the debate on descent theory vis-a-vis exchange theory.
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Leaden as ‘engineers* in the ‘construction* and maintenance o f pow er blocs
A n im portant point w orth emphasising here is that it is the political elites (men such as Michael
Mel, Parua K uri and M elchior Pep), not the mass o f the population, that initially define the
political agenda. Such an argum ent is very similar to one made by Marina Ottaway, an observer
o f African politics, w ho recently remarked:
As m any studies have show n, in A frica th e em otional allegiance o f m o st people is n o t
directed originally to th e group th at politicians choose to define as th e nation, o r tribe.
T h e O ro m o L iberation F ro n t in E thiopia does n o t build o n a prim ordial sense o f
affinity am ong all O rom os. I t is leaders, n o t prim ordial attachm ent, th at define the
boundaries o f O rom ia. P opular sentim ent is usually created by th e political agenda o f
th e leaders, n o t vice versa, b u t once it is unleased, it becom es very real (O ttaw ay
1995:243).

The role o f leadership in the construction and maintenance o f local groups and coalitions have
also been noted by other African observers. Chazan, M ortimer, Ravenhill, and Rothchild, while
com m enting on the fluidity o f the ethnic group, its lack o f homogeneity and cohesiveness,
concluded that “it is less than accurate to characterise the ethnic groups on the African continent
as having a fixed, centuries-old, prim ordial consciousness” (1988:102). They further noted that:
A m ong such peoples as th e Sukum a in w hat is now Tanzania, th e Sara o f C had, die
Y oruba an d Igbo o f N igeria, th e K ikuyu and Luhya o f K enya, th e N goni and Plateau
T onga o f Zam bia, and th e K aram ojong o f U ganda, there w ere affinities based u p o n co
residence in a region and u p o n sim ilarities o f culture, traditions, and legal and econom ic
practices. H ow ever, an aw areness o f th e group as a distinct entity in relationship to
o th er cultural groups rem ains a relatively recent phenom enon. In fact, th e process o f
ethnic self-definition occurred in th e sh o rt tim e span th at it did because o f th e im pact
o f colonial interventions and the intense com petition over pow er, status, econom ic
resources, an d th e social services happening during th e late colonial and post-colonial
periods (1988:103).

There are im portant distinctions between the Hagen coalitions described in this study and those
African ethnic groups m entioned above. A major difference is in size: African ethnic groups
num ber tens o f thousands while Hagen groups have an average population o f only a few
thousand, w ith a range o f 200-20,000 persons. Yet, the prom inent role o f leaders in the creation
o f groups and the tendency to embrace as many groups as possible is a com m on trait in Hagen,
in Africa, and indeed in many other human societies throughout the w orld In fact, it is fair to
say that by increasing membership to the various levels o f social organisation, leaders such as
Michael Mel, Paul P ota and Paias W ingti become political ‘engineers’ in the ‘construction’ and
‘maintenance’ o f political blocs. Some salient features o f Hagen social organisation should
illustrate some o f the points raised here.
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Salient Features o f Hagen Social Organisation
N am ed groups as points o f reference
A salient feature o f Hagen society is that named groups are crucial for reference — the tribe
being the m ost inclusive category (see A.M. Strathem 1975). O thers have made similar
observations (see, for example, A.J. Strathem 1971; 1972; Burton 1988; O ’H anlon 1989; M edan
and Rumsey 1991; M angi 1992; Muke 1994). There are at least 85 tribes in the Hagen culturallinguistic area (see Appendix IT ). Names o f individuals are often contextually prefixed with their
tribe o r dan names. In inter-tribal activities, for instance, tribal names may be used. Personal
names such as Raphael D oa (of the Mokei Nambka line), Parua Kuri (of the Tepuka Keitipi line)
and Paias Wingri (of the Jika Mukaka line) thus become Mokei D oa, Tepuka K uri and Jika
W ingti. Likewise, in intra-tribal activities, clan names are appropriate: Nambka D oa, Keitipi
Parua and Mukaka Paias, which indicate a sliding degree o f identity and loyalty.24

Tribe-pairs
A second feature o f Hagen society is that m o st— but not all— Hagen tribes are paired, which,
as noted by Burton (1989a:256), direcdy corresponds to the way the natural world is structured,
with almost all plant and animal species being named in pairs. Greater solidarity supposedly
exists between pair partners than between either o f them and other allies, and sometimes the
linkage between a pair o f tribes is supported by an origin myth associating the first ancestors o f
the two tribes (see A.J. Strathem 1971:19; A .M Strathem 1975:432). But in practice, this is not
always the case. For instance, when a group migrates to a new area, it is likely to lose its original
pairing and develop another with one o f its new neighbours, which means that the new pairing
may n o t be supported by a myth (see A.J. Strathem 1971:19). The functions o f pairing at this
level, as A.J. Strathem says, are also variable:
Some pairs are staunch allies, others have little to do with each other. Small tribes are
likely to have strong pairings, if only because these were important for survival in the
past (1971:19).
As m entioned above, size is an im portant factor in the degree o f cohesion o r fragmentation
within tribes and coalitions, and m oreover in the degree o f ‘warmth’ between tribe-pair partners.

See Merlan and Rumsey (1991:Chap.5) for linguistic structures o f segmentary politics in the Nebilyer area;
See also Mangi (1992:124) and Clark (1997:67) for a sliding degree o f identity and loyalty to clan, tribe and
state. I provide a discussion on the question o f loyalty (and conflicting roles o f leaders) in Chapter Vive.
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Preoccupation w ith ‘name’ and numbers
A third feature o f Hagen society is the perpetual preoccupation with ‘name’ and numbers o f a
group. It is expressed in a myriad o f cultural expressions — in the words o f folk songs, funeral
lam ents, el ik (fight-talk’) speeches, dance formations, moka exchanges, group warfare,
commercial enterprise and elections — some o f which form the focus o f analysis in subsequent
chapters. Hageners place great value on group identity, and while they realise that men make a
group, they also know that a group makes a man. If, for instance, a girl m ust find a husband with
a neighbouring tribe, her immediate kinsmen and clan brothers often make it their business to
inquire about the potential groom. If the future husband’s tribe is o f considerable renown, or
has a nam e, then approval is granted. If, however, the group is o f no consequence, the girl’s
people will register their disapproval by referring to its members as ‘men w ithout name’ (wua mbi

naparom), o r men o f no renown.
The preoccupation with numbers is reflected in the statements that Hagen men make in
justification for practising polygyny. Men say that they marry m ore than one wife in order to
have sons and ultimately to build up numbers for their groups. Using a plant m etaphor,
Hageners associate the birth o f sons in particular with the sprouting o f a wild banana species,

mum, and the subsequent proliferation o f groups generally with the propagation o f a tropical
palm called dakla (pronounced dalgd) in Melpa language.25 A group that is experiencing
considerable growth in male population is often described metaphorically as sprouting shoots
like round and flourishing like dakla plants.26 The preoccupation with numbers, particularly o f
males, however, is n o t unique to Hagen. In Wahgi society, for instance, O ’H anlon (1989)
reported that “m en often express dismay at the birth o f daughters” and “make periodic demands
that non-agnates residing elsewhere should return hom e to their natal clans” (1989:32).
H agen tribes, accordingly, have grown bigger as a result o f population growth. This has led to
problem s associated with population pressure on agricultural land and marginally diminishing
returns on investments in land-based resources (including poor yield in coffee and food-crops
25.

These plants both thrive under humid tropical conditions and their proliferation rate is quite phenomenal:
a single shoot o f either plant can multiply and colonise large tracts o f land over a relatively short period o f
time. But the reasons why Hageners have selected these particular plants for comparison with their
groups, I think, lies not only in the concept o f rapid proliferation, but perhaps more so in the naturally
healthy and attractive manner in which shoots take off and proudly hold themselves up against the forces
o f weather: solid, robust, vibrant; and above all, united — almost like themselves, or perhaps more like
what they would like to be!

26.

Hagen courting songs provide an elegant channel through which concepts such as the roum-dakla effect
are expressed, but they can be equally poetic, yet eloquent and forceful, in the hands o f skilful orators. In
the words o f a particular courting song for instance, the prospective bride’s natal group is exhalted by her
suitor: ‘T o u r people, like the round and dakla plants, have become more numerous {round melpokpa, dakla
mel dakla neni), but I am only a small boy, with no one [behind me]. How can I deal with them [her
people]?”
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due to im poverished, overused land). Nevertheless, Hageners, especially leaders, in attem pting to
build their support base for elections and other purposes, continue to recruit people from other
parts o f the province and elsewhere in the Highlands. The Hagen case studies indicate that it is
the smaller groups w ho actively participate in the recruitm ent o f non-agnates. For example, the
Kawelka have sponsored a large num ber o f Poiyaka and Aiyaka migrants from Nebilyer to settle
at Kuk. likew ise, the Remdi have taken in a large num ber o f Enga and Simbu migrants, who, as
indicated in Chapter Five, have assisted the Remdi in warfare. This is quite consistent with
observations made by other observers (Reay 1971; O ’H anlon 1989). In N orth Wahgi, for
example, O ’H anlon (1989:32) noted that it was the smallest Komblo clan, Milyand, which m ost
sharply augmented its size during the early 1980s by providing land for several immigrant Simbu
families.

A lliance Systems: Some generalpoints
A general point w orth raising in any discussion on alliance systems and local group formation is
the shifting nature o f alliances. The alliances are n ot fixed, though may have historical roots. As a
direct consequence o f warfare and subsequent population movement, groups now allied to each
other were previously involved in totally different arrangements with others geographically and
historically removed from contem porary cases. According to historical accounts o f warfare given
by Hagen inform ants, m ost groups involved in current military alliances have often fought each
other in previous wars. Bearing in m ind that Hageners make an im portant distinction between
m ajor, perpetual o r traditional enemies {elparaka nmd) and m inor enemies {el namb nrna), groups
opposed in m inor warfare may combine in m ajor warfare (see A J. Strathem 1971:55-56;
1972:74-75; A.M. Strathem 1975:168). This is made possible through reparation payments,
following a general rule that one may compensate m inor enemies but not m ajor enemies for
m en killed in war (see Chapter Fiver, see also A.J. Strathem 1966b:Chap.3; 1971:Chap.4; 1981:12).
Similarly, groups opposed in provincial elections may combine in national elections and
mobilising support from m inor enemies is much easier than from major enemies.
Secondly, despite this historical process o f shifting alliances, the present alliances o f D ei are
relatively stable in the context o f the various arenas o f com petition and cooperation analysed in
this study. Their relative stability depends heavily on the historically military nature o f the
alliances. But here one should be careful in dealing with historical accounts o f military alliance
given by inform ants. As indicated by A.J. Strathem:
I t is possible th at th e fu rth er away in tim e th e period o f endem ic w arfare becom es, th e
m o te th e inform ants are likely to sim plify w arfare patterns, o r to m ake th em m ore rigid,
o r to attrib u te actions to w hole groups w hich in fact involved only certain individuals o f
th e g ro u p s... A fu rth er danger is th at inform ants m ay p roject back o n to th e past
features o f th eir cu rren t political situation so th at, w hile th eir ostensibly historical
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account is covertly valid for the present, it is invalid for the period which it overtly
purports to describe (1971:54-55).
This is an im portant point, which requires us to ask why they make such statements. Part o f the
answer, as indicated above, lies in individual motive and perception. A nother reason for this is
that in the absence o f reliable details o f past events, individuals are recasting history in the
context o f contemporary relations, which does not necessarily mean that they are consciously
manipulating information. Since each individual's perceptions are shaped by personal
experiences and by oral accounts handed down through the generations, it is quite possible that
the information they present is, in their view, accurate. In fact, there are only few older men,
usually big-men and fight-leaders, who have some knowledge o f pre-colonial warfare and
alliances, which means that for m ost people it is the present alliances that matter. The alliances
described in this study are thus relatively stable insomuch as allowing us to predict where the
rifts will occur and why some groups will cooperate in order to compete against others.
Finally, in matters regarding group affiliation and warfare vis-a-vis alliance systems, Hageners
tend to exaggerate, at times deliberately inflating figures regarding the number o f men, groups,
guns and so forth as part o f political strategy. In the Hagen world view, as would be the case
elsewhere in the country and in other parts o f the world, it is always better to give others —
including friends, enemies, potential rivals and supporters, o r what ever they may be — a clear
impression that your group can more than hold its own against any force, militarily or otherwise.
There are two sides to this strategy, which we may call constructive and obstructive. O n the one
hand, it is constructive in the sense that other non-aligned groups will find it attractive to
associate with in terms o f intermarriage, moka exchange, and cooperation in business and
elections. As for groups which belong to the same alliance as yours, the task o f securing
assurances o f support for elections and contracting allies in warfare becomes much easier if they
perceive strength and cohesion in your group. O n the other hand, it is obstructive by way o f
deterring potential enemy attacks. Exaggerating a group's strength is an effective way o f casting
doubts in the minds o f enemy strategists about their own group's strength, which can protect
the group from enemy aggression, or buy time in order to organise defences.
In this chapter I have described the major alliances in Dei, which, together with Chapter Two,
provide im portant background information for Chapters 4-8, which contain case studies on the
major arenas o f competition and cooperation in Hagen. As noted, some o f these alliances are
nowadays mobilised in business competition and politics in state-sponsored arenas. The roles o f
business groups will be discussed in the next chapter. Because the alliances described here are
also registered business organisations, the division between this and the next chapter is therefore
an artificial one forced on me to make it easier for the reader.

Chapter 4

BUSIN ESS DEVELO PM ENT ASSOCIATIONS
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Introduction
The history o f capitalistic enterprise in this country is comparatively sh o rt Yet, it is quite
complex and its political, economic and social implications are not yet fully understood. This
study provides some useful insights into how people in a particular area o f Papua New Guinea
have devised strategies to accommodate state-sponsored programmes o f commercialisation. In
the PN G Highlands, for instance, it has been said that people here were more ready for
capitalism than their coastal counterparts (see Finney 1973). Although I do not subscribe to this
theory, there is some truth in the notion that Highlanders are spirited competitors. O ne only
needs to see the activities around us today to appreciate the fact that these enterprising people
have taken over a substantial part o f the country^ economy. The coffee industry, for instance, is
dominated by W estern and Eastern Highlanders. Even the service industry in Port Moresby,
including PMV buses, taxis, automobile service and fuel stations, real estate, and retail outlets are
predominantly Highlands businesses. The roots o f this spirited enterprise lie in their
sociocultural, demographic and environmental background (see Finney 1973). A glimpse o f that
spirit will be revealed in this chapter.
T he second and third chapters focused on leadership and social structure, highlighting some o f
the m ajor debates in the literature, to establish analytical parameters for later case studies. This
and the next four chapters deal with major arenas o f competition and cooperation in which
groups described in the previous chapter and their leaders operate. This chapter examines the
m ajor business groups in the D ei field o f political competition, and attempts to account for the
relative successes (or lack o f it) in terms o f historical and current military and political alliances.
Also under scrutiny here are the new political actors — superseding big-men — who now
appear m ore prom inent than other types o f leaders. These new actors are the millionaire
businessmen, their henchmen (who are themselves aspiring businessmen or politicians), and
politicians at provincial and national levels. The chapter explores their links to local groups and
their com m on appeal to local identities, highlighting the largely personalised nature o f these
corporate business ventures and the problems that stem from this arrangement. It concludes
with a brief critique o f Amarshi, G ood and M ortimer (1979) and Donaldson and G ood (1981),
arguing that the pow er base o f wealthy capitalists in Hagen is the primordial community rather
than class.

Problems of Terminology
D espite numerous studies o f ‘business development associations*, there is little agreement
between observers on characteristics and definitions. W ithout getting involved in the debate on
the application o f terminology, it needs to be pointed out that ‘business development
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associations', interchangeably used as developm ent associations', equate to w hat R olf G em tsen
(1981) calls ‘dynamic com m unity groups'. O ther descriptions are ‘community developm ent
associations' (W alter 1981), o r ‘self-help m ovem ents' (May 1981), o r ‘self-help developm ent
m ovem ents' (May 1982:21). These groups, also described as “spontaneous local m ovem ents,
differing in their origins and specific objectives but sharing a broad concern with the
achievem ent o f econom ic, social and political developm ent through communal action”, were
collectively dubbed as ‘m icronationalist m ovem ents' (May 1982:1). The term ‘m icronationalism '
was introduced by May (1975) “to describe a varied collection o f m ovem ents which displayed a
com m on tendency, at least at an ideological o r psychological level, to disengage from the wider
econom ic and political systems im posed by colonial rule, seeking in a sense a com m on identity
and purpose, and through som e com bination o f traditional and m odem values and
organisational form s, an acceptable formula for their own developm ent” (May 1982:1).
A m ajor problem w ith such a concept, as May him self may have been aware, is in its application
— o r m isapplication — to embrace the vast differences between the various movements
described in M icronationalist M ovements in Papua New Guinea (May 1982), Inconsistencies
and discrepancies are n o t confined to terminology, in that May’s description o f Pipilka as “an
ethnic group, com prising a num ber o f clans which claim com m on ancestry” and num bering
“about six thousand” (1982:21), is at odds with Standish's claim that “Michael Mel’s people at
W urup near M ount Hagen joined w ith other traditional allies and formed a neo-tribe covering
many fragmented groups in the M edlpa language area, which they called the Piblika Association”
w ith “4,000 m em bers” (1982:387, 391). The Piplka, as described in the preceding chapter, is a
coalition-style alliance, w ith m em bership drawn from existing tribes in D ei, Anglimp, Hagen and
N ebilyer areas. N either the registered business group, Pipilka D evelopm ent Corporation, nor
the Pipilka coalition are descent groups, nor do the principal factions — the K opi-N okpa and
the Remdi-Kimka-Roklaka — claim com m on ancestry. The Pipilka, as indicated in Chapter 3,
com pete with two other coalition-style alliances, Raembka and Welyi-Kuta, and their principal
field o f com petition is D ei, n o t H agen, Anglimp, or Nebilyer.
The registered business groups, w hich bear the same names, were form ed by educated elites and
local leaders from within these groups to facilitate participation in the national governm ent's
plantation acquisition scheme that began in the mid 1970s (A.J. Strathem 1984; Ketan 1996).
The D ei Local G overnm ent Council was instrum ental in setting up these business groups.
Councilors were encouraged by the governm ent to mobilise resources to buy shares in
plantations. The national governm ent, eager to localise plantation economy, provided easy credit
to enterprising local groups to buy these properties. G roups with traditional landownership
rtflims over plantations were given preference, but where ownership was disputed, groups with
adjoining territories were invited to com pete against each other. O f the individuals w ho played a
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prom inent role in this scheme, none was m ore influential than a young, energetic, forceful Parua
K uri, w ho was a m em ber o f the H ouse o f Assembly and President o f the Local G overnm ent
Council during this time.
T he business groups have also facilitated the political and econom ic am bitions o f certain
individuals (Ketan 1996:249; com parable discussion in May 1981:75), a point that does n o t sit
too well w ith m ost m em bers o f such groups. D issension has crept in because o f the substantial
disparities in incom e and living standards between the leaders w ho control the businesses and
the m em bers o f groups w ho are the supposed shareholders. Those w ho control the collective
investm ents o f the associations have becom e extremely wealthy while those at the periphery
have w atched quietly in anger. All these groups have been plagued with problem s, such as
w idespread dissension am ong shareholders and disruptive pow er struggles between leaders o f
factions, w hich in one case resulted bankruptcy for the group. W hilst leaders, especially educated
elites and politicians, have been jostling for pow er, the mass have been marginalised by a
com bination o f their own ignorance, feelings o f apathy and disdain, and by the dishonourable
m otives and actions o f their leaders.

The Pipilka factions, rifts and disruptive power struggles
Pipilka is probably the m ost successful business developm ent association in Papua New Guinea.
Michael Mel and A ndrew Kei form ed it in the early 1970s to take advantage o f the new
opportunities created by the national governm ent’s plantation acquisition scheme (see A.J.
Strathem 1984:150). A m ong its first acquisitions were the W urup and Alimp South coffee
plantations in May 1975. An expatriate planter, William M anton, built the plantations in 1958.
W urup was established on land traditionally owned by the K opi-N okpa and Roni-Lati alliance,
while Alimp South in the Nebilyer valley was built on land traditionally ow ned by the Kulga and
Miliga groups. It took Michael Mel, then a student at the University o f Papua New Guinea, and
A ndrew Kei, a local magistrate, 18 m onths to negotiate the purchase o f the plantations, but in
the end it was decided that the respective landowners o f Alimp and W urup take over the estates.
As noted by Standish (1982:387), a com bination o f sometimes crude, soemtimes subtle pressure
on H ighlands expatriates, as well as Michael Mel’s direct access to the chief minister’s advisors
through university contacts, helped overcome ministerial o r bureaucratic blockages to the
governm ent’s acquisition o f these large coffee plantations.
The purchase o f W urup and Alimp South were described by a PN G Post-Courier reporter as
“the first tim e in the Highlands that a plantation has been bought back by the original owners o f
the land” (Stocker 1975:21). The governm ent, as financier, paid K367,000 while Pipilka, as the
purchaser, made a deposit o f K 11,000. A t the handover cerem ony in May 1975, which was
attended by three governm ent ministers (Thomas Kavali, Ebia Olewale and Peter Lus), the
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M inister for Lands, Thom as Kavali, gave die owner and builder o f W urup plantation, William
M anton, a cheque from the governm ent The Leader o f the O pposition, Tei Abel, hailed the sale
o f the plantation as an act o f free enterprise, the sort o f thing that should continue in this
country, while Justice Minister, Ebia Olewale, said the transaction was visible proof o f the Eight
Point Plan in action (see Stocker 1975:21; see also Standish 1982).
Initially Pipilka had some stunning success, largely made possible by the 1975-1977 coffee
boom . Bill Standish reported that 15 m onths o f extraordinarily high coffee prices enabled
Pipilka to fully repay the governm ent loan o f K212,000 by 31 December 1976 in addition to
acquiring the M ount Hagen Park M otel for K225,000 (with K65,000 cash down payment with
no need for governm ent developm ent bank assistance). A dividend o f 100% was paid to the
association’s 4,000 members (Standish 1982:391, footnote).
D espite the initial success, there were problems in the direction o f the association and its
registered company, the Pipilka Developm ent Corporation. At the time Michael Mel told Bill
Standish that Pipilka’s next step would be to buy urban real estate to utilise the group’s large cash
surplus.
H ow ever, in ter d a n tensions involving Pflblika m em bers em broiling th e W urup area had
developed in 1976 and could disrupt th e sm ooth operation o f the association’s
businesses. A ttem pts w ere being m ade to block th e group’s expansion into M ount
H agen tow n property ow nership and local jealousies seem to have been aroused by the
association’s w indfall success. By m id 1977 the W urup estates had been divided in to
separate units com prising different clan groups (1982:391, footnote).

Initial problem s arose because o f differences between Michael Mel’s K opi-Nopka group and
Andrew Kei’s Roni-Lati group. The W urup plantation, as noted by Standish (quoted above),
were split between these two groups. O ne observer, perhaps a little overwhelmed by the violent
m anner in which these groups sorted out their differences, conduded that Pipilka “after a
spectacular early success appears to be in the process o f disintegration” (May 1981:73). Far from
disintegrating, Pipilka consolidated through a common process called ‘shifting alliances’:
dislodging from one alliance to enter into another. In this case, the K opi-Nokpa group shifted
away from their alliance with the Roni-Lati to form a coalition-style alliance with the Dei
Council-based Pipilka alliance, which is a consortium o f Remdi, Kimka and Roklaka interests.
As well as the conflict with the Roni-Lati, the difficulties involved in securing real estate in
M ount Hagen forced the K opi-N okpa group to look elsewhere for expansion. An explanation
for Pipilka’s inability to enter into the M ount Hagen real estate business may be found in the
traditional animosity with which Hagen Central groups, Jika, Mokei and Yamka, deal with
groups from ‘peripheral’ areas. As traditional owners o f the land occupied by the township,
Hagen Central groups feel that they have a right to deade who gets to own or control part o f
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tiie town. As evident in Chapter 6, these ‘super-tribes’ o f the Hagen Central area have been highly
critical o f appointm ent o f people from other parts o f the province to key positions within the
province and, on several occasions, have forced senior government officers to vacate their
offices. These tribes control the real estate market in M ount Hagen. Groups from other parts o f
the province have found it extremely difficult to buy into this lucrative business. The KopiN okpa group, despite its prom inent role in Hagen politics1, does not have the numerical
strength to muscle its way into the M ount Hagen real estate business.
This is where the D ei Council-based Remdi-Kimka-Roklaka alliance comes into the equation.
The K opi-N okpa thus entered into a larger alliance with the Remdi, Kimka and Roklaka groups.
The combined forces o f Pipilka, led by Michael Mel and current company secretary Puklma
K opi (a Remdi Jikam bo clansman), w ent into competition with Welyi-Kuta. As indicated in

Chapter 5, the Pipilka ultimately acquired Gumanch coffee plantation, one o f the largest in the
southern hemisphere, but lost out on Kugmi, an adjoining portion o f ‘undeveloped’ land, to
prom inent Kombukla leaders, Pari W amp and M elchior Pep, who acquired the land on behalf o f
the Kombukla-M inembi pair. Although the Remdi-Kimka-Roklaka faction claims traditional
ownership over the land on which the Gumanch coffee plantation was established by an
expatriate planter in the 1950s, their principal rivals, the Kombukla-Minembi, have always
disputed this claim. This point was ultimately contested on the battlefield but not completely
settled (see Chapter 5).
Pioneer coffee entrepreneur Dick Hagon first developed Gumanch, 25 kilometres northeast o f
M ount Hagen. The 500-hectare coffee property stretches along and beyond the banks o f the
Gumanch River. The Pipilka Development Corporation, now with more than 5,000 local
shareholders, bought the plantation for K3 million from an exporting form, Coffee International
Pty Ltd, in Mrach 1985. Gumanch was taken over by Coffee International Pty Ltd when then
owners, die Collins (PNG) group w ent into receivership in Australia and were selling o ff their
PN G interests. Pipilka already had an interest in the property through its 18 per cent
shareholding in Coffee International (see Times of Papua New Guinea 1985:29; Pascoe 1985:11;
Sinclair 1995:433). The purchase, described by the media as the biggest payout by a wholly
national company for the country’s largest plantation, marked the fruition o f a ten-year dream
for Michael M el The Post-Courierjournalist N oel Pascoe reported that Gumanch was the original*

Despite its small size, the Kopi-Nokpa pair o f tribes play a dominant role in Hagen politics mainly
through the activities o f brothers, Peter Wama and Michael Mel — and now Fr Robert Lak (gpvemor)
and Thomas W ebster (recently appointed administrator o f Western Highlands). Wama, a former
administrator, Mel, a prom inent businessman and former MP, and Lak, current MP, are all members o f
the N okpa tribe while Webster, a former UPNG academic who recently completed his PhD studies at the
University o f Bristol in England, is a ‘Kum’ Kopi tribesman.
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target for Michael Mel when he helped start Pipilka in 1975. H e was still a final-year law student
at the University o f Papua New Guinea when Pipilka began operations (Pascoe 1985ibid). A t
the time o f the takeover it was reported that Pipilka’s managing director Michael Mel was
confident that Gumanch would start servicing its ten-year loan o f K2 million from the PN G
Banking Corporation from the end o f that year. M oreover, at K l,900 per tonne o f coffee,
Gum anch was expected to produce a total revenue o f K1.7 million by the end o f 1985 (Times of

Papua New Guinea 1985:29).
By 1985 Pipilka also owned the W urup and Ulya plantations, in addition to the Hagen Park
Motel. Gum anch was then managed by the National Plantation Management Agency (NPMA)
for a fee o f K13,000 a m onth (Times ofPapua New Guinea 1985:ibid). Michael Mel estimated that
Pipilka, as NPM A’s biggest client, were paying NPM A K300,000 to K400,000 in fees annually.
H e claimed that w hen Pipilka pulled out NPM A could not hold it together and it folded. Pipilka
formed a grower company with other NPM A clients, called Natgrow, which is now owned
100% by Pipilka (Michael Mel, June 1994; quoted in Sinclair 1995:432-433).
For the young elites, like Michael Mel and Puklma K opi, the acquisition o f W urup in 1975 and
Gumanch in 1985 was an im portant step towards establishing patronage systems that would
come to characterise interpersonal relations with clansmen later in life. They developed into
m ajor leaders later, but started their careers as brokers between the state and their groups. The
same pattern is being continued by the next generation o f leaders such as Henry Tiki and Simon
N urum in attem pting to challenge Michael Mel and Puklma K opi’s dominance over Pipilka.
Initially diere were two major factions within Pipilka, divided according to geographical and
political basis: the Hagen, Anglimp and Nebilyer resident, Kopi-Nokpa faction, led by Michael
Mel (Chairman); and die D ei Council-based Remdi-Kimka-Roklaka faction led by Puklma Kopi
(Secretary). Recendy, however, the Dei Council faction divided into (1) the Remdi Jikambo clan;
and (2) the Kimka-Roklaka pair o f tribes. The situation is further complicated by power struggles
within die Remdi faction. It is fair to say that there is power struggle at two levels: between
Remdi and Kimka-Roklaka (through the initiatives o f Kimka lawyer Simon N urum and
Councillor Kumi Krai); and within Remdi itself, between the faction led by Puklma K opi and a
faction led by an aspiring leader and coffee planter, Henry Tiki, and his lieutenant and adviser,
Pora Kui, an accountant with the South Pacific Bank in M ount Hagen.
The differences between the Remdi and the Kimka-Roklaka factions has been taken on to the
arena o f national elections, where the Kimka-Roklaka sponsored their own candidate, Puri
Ruing, to oppose Remdi candidates, Koi Ranpi in 1992 and 1993 by-election, and Willie
W undaki in 1997. W hilst the underlying reasons for the rift between the Remdi and KimkaRoklaka factions are detailed in the relevant parts o f the thesis (see, for example, Chapter 7), it
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should be pointed out here that Remdi political strategists gambled — and lost — by somewhat
arrogantly assuming that the Kimka-Roklaka would back their candidate, K oi Ranpi, in 1992,
despite outstanding reparation payments and alleged unpaid business dividends owed by the
Rem di and the Pipilka D evelopm ent Corporation.

The Raembka factions, rifts and disruptive power struggles
The Raembka D evelopm ent Association, like Pipilka and Welyi-Kuta, was formed in the early
1970s by then D ei M P Parua K urt and businessman G oim ba K ot w ho became its first nom inal
directors. By 1977 Raembka had acquired two coffee plantations, Nunga and Kinjibi
(pronounced K entpi), and a third, Tigi (pronounced Tiki), jointly with the Council.2 Both Kuri
and K ot are influential leaders within the Tepuka-Kawelka alliance and they come from the same
section o f the Tepuka tribe. Since none o f the plantations were located on land traditionally
ow ned by the Tepuka-Kawelka pair, one cannot help w ondering w hether K uri and K ot would
have bothered putting together a group as large and fragmented as Raembka had they been able
to rfairn traditional ownership at either the level o f the tribe-pair o r at lower levels such as the
tribe o r clan.
The N unga and Kinjibi plantations, located in the upper N orth Wahgi, were established in the
1950s by expatriate planters on land which was traditionally owned by the Nelka and K entpi
tribes, respectively. The traditional ownership o f the land which is now Tiki plantation in the
Baiyer valley was never fully resolved, as the contest for territory and group prestige was frozen
by coloniaHy-imposed pacification in the 1940s. This land was previously used as a major
battlefield during pre-colonial warfare between the Kawelka-Kopi-Kimbo-Klamakae alliance
versus an alliance o f mainly M inembi clans. Owing to this particularly ambiguous nature o f
historical ownership and equally vague claims by the neighbouring groups, the land was virtually
handed over to the expatriate planter, John Collins, by the colonial administration and later
acquired by the Council in 1975.
Raembka Investm ents was incorporated as a business group in 1985. Its business activities were
centred around Parua K uri and Goim ba K ot, both men having interests in coffee estates and
retail shops. Raembka had some early successes, particularly through the efforts o f K ot in
a tt^ ip tin g to expand and diversify into areas such as automobile fuel sales and service stations,
trade stores and supermarkets, plus coffee buying, processing and exporting. K ot built his
business on small retail shops, beginning with the acquisition o f a Lutheran M ission-owned
2.

The Tiki plantation was established in the mid-1950s by an enterprising Australian called John Collins.
According to A J. Strathem, ‘Jo h n Collins was o f a well-known business family in the Highlands and was
sister’s son o f Danny Leahy, one o f the early Australian explorers and formers in die area. John Collins’
highly productive plantation in Dei Council was taken over in 1975 by the Council itself after his death”
(explanatory footnote in A J. Strathem 1979.131).
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trade-store at K otna w hich he managed in the eady 1970s on behalf o f the K otna (Lutheran
Church) C ircuit By the mid-1980s the business, exclusively under Goimba’s control, had
developed from a small trade-store (no bigger than the size o f a street-com er ‘tuckerbox’ trailer)
into a significant com pany with investments in supermarkets, coffee estates and a fleet o f Toyota
pickups w hich were used mainly for roadside coffee buying.
In hindsight, it would seem that K ot probably took too much upon him self and at times juggling
both personal and public businesses, considering his direct involvement in at least three areas,
Raembka Investm ents, the D ei D evelopm ent Corporation and his own coffee estates at K otna
and M ount Ambra. K ot ultimately lost control o f both Raembka Investments and D ei
D evelopm ent C orporation to his rivals. H e lost the Chair o f the D ei D evelopm ent Corporation
in 1989 to a younger rival, Matrus Mel, w ho comes from the same tribe as K ot and K uri but
leads a faction w hich acts in opposition to them in business and politics.
D espite its early successes, Raembka Investments collapsed in 1987, after much dissension and
pow er struggles between the various factions. This was the year in which Parua Kuri lost the Dei
O pen seat to M elchior Pep. As indicated above, before 1987 its business interests in addition to
the three plantations m entioned above were: two supermarkets, one at Penga and the other in
M ount Hagen town; the K otna Coffee Plantation; and shares in various companies.3 Currently,
Raembka is a dorm ant company and, as indicated in JFigure 4. /, individuals have taken control o f
the business interests. The diagram represents the defacto, rather than dejure dismemberment o f
Raembka, as in m ost cases the business interests were taken over by physical force.
W hilst the N unga and Kinjibi plantations have been occupied by members o f the Nelka and
K entpi tribes, respectively, the future o f Tiki plantation is uncertain. As in pre-colonial times, the
Tiki area once again became a battleground during 1986-1990 between the M inembi and an
alliance o f Kawelka, K opi, Kimbo and Klamakae groups. Despite reports that a certain group,
led by a Dakapkae tribesman and Holy Trinity Teachers College lecturer, Teng W anenga, had
shown interest in taking control o f the plantation, others claim that Tiki has almost been
reclaimed by Muka Puklapukl, an exceptionally malevolent spirit, which is famous in the area
and was claimed to have been responsible for the death o f the plantation’s previous owner and
founder, John Collins.4

3.

The information on Raembka Investments was given to me by Matrus Mel, the leader o f a faction
opposed to the Kuri-Kot faction. A UPNG graduate with a combined major in Economics and
A ccounting Mel, after unsuccessfully contesting the Dei Open seat against Parua Kuri in 1982, became a
Local Governm ent Councillor in 1986 and subsequently in 1989 ousted Goim ba K ot as Chairman o f Dei
Development Corporation, a business arm o f the Council.

4.

According to local folktale, this particularly spiteful spirit Muka Puklapukl (named after a frog that lives in
the Muka River) has deceived many men, including John Collins. Its modus operand involves enticing men
to have sexual intercourse with it after transforming itself into a stunningly attractive maid. It kills men by
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F ig u re 4.1: T h e P ersonalised B usiness In te re sts o f R aem bka

The Raimburger Supermarket in M ount Hagen town was taken over by Matrus Mel, who
became owner-manager between March 1988 and December 1989. From January 1990, Matrus
took control o f the D ei Developm ent Corporation as its Chairman and left the retail shop to be
taken over by a Kuli-based Jika Milakamb businessman. We can safely assume that Raimburger
too has gone broke.
A fter the collapse o f Raembka and presumably Raimburger, our principal actors next turned
their attention to the D ei D evelopm ent Corporation. As in Raembka before its collapse in 1987,
here too individuals contested the right to control Council-owned businesses, mostly coffee
im pregnating them w ith contam inated eggs, hence the swelling o f the stom ach several days before death.
B efore Collins’s arrival, Tiki and the surrounding swamps w ere considered by local folk to be the hom e o f
m alignant spirits like Puklapukl and w ere therefore avoided. Puklapukl in particular was said to have been
angered by Collins’s clearing o f the area and sought revenge by way o f enticem ent and im pregnation w ith
a dreadful disease after sexual intercourse w ith Puklapukl in the guise o f a young girl. The statem ent that
the Tiki plantation h as alm ost been reclaimed by Muka Puklapukl’, however, can be inferred as an
im plication o f the plantation being in a run-down state, thus being reclaimed by the jungle and the swamp,
conditions w hich suit Puklapukl (and perhaps m osquitoes?). T he relationship betw een human settlem ents,
m alignant spirits, swam ps and malaria has been m entioned elsewhere (see Ketan 1996:242; see also
G órecki 1979; Muke 1994:56).
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estates. A bitter pow er struggle between factions saw M atrus Mel wrestle pow er from G oim ba
K o t in 1989. M el was chairman o f the C orporation between January 1990 and July 1992. The
com pany closed all its operations in July 1992. In a personal docum ent given to me by Matrus
M el in January 1995, he attributed the closure o f the com pany mainly to the national “econom ic
crises, coupled w ith the depressed price o f coffee”.
A fter w hat may be described as particularly unsuccessful attem pts in both business and politics
— having unsuccessfully contested the D ei O pen seat in 1982,1987,1992 and a by-election in
1993 — M atrus M el returned to his professional field o f accounting. Since May 1993, he has
been employed by the Small Business D evelopm ent C orporation’s Highlands Regional O ffice in
M ount Hagen and did n o t contest the 1997 elections. His form er rival, G oim ba K ot has now
perm anently m igrated to M ount A m bra where he resides w ith his wife’s Yamka group, K ot has
developed a num ber o f coffee blocks at A m bra and grows bananas on a relatively large-scale. In
January 1995 K ot made a large presentation o f pigs to the Yamka as payment for the land which
he occupies.
M eanwhile, R o t’s old business partner, Parua Kuri, has retired from national politics after some
20 years. K uri first contested the then com bined M ul-Dei O pen seat in 1968 and lost to Mek
N ugritz, but in the succeeding election he successfully contested the D ei O pen seat which he
held for three consecutive five year term s (1972-1987). K uri is still influential in D ei politics, at
times perform ing a significant role in the political career o f his son, Reuben Parua. K uri assumes
m any roles, as a father, confidant, adviser, for which he may be better qualified for than anyone
else in D e l H is organisational abilities and extensive personal netw ork would be o f huge value
to Reuben. The skilful manipulation o f such networks and K uri’s personal involvem ent in
m obilising support for Reuben during the 1993 D ei O pen by-election directly influenced a shift
in allegiances o f non-aligned voter blocks and ultimately resulted in a favourable outcom e for his
son. Significantly, his son lost the election in 1992 when Kuri’s involvem ent was minimal,
alm ost reluctant5

The Welyi-Kuta factions, rifts and power struggles
T he W elyi-Kuta developm ent association was formed around the same time as Pipilka and
Raembka. T he Welyi, being the traditional owners o f the land occupied by the Trem eam e
(Penga) coffee plantation, were invited to contribute money towards the purchasing o f shares in
the plantation.6 Their first acquisition was the Penga plantation in the late 1970s, followed by the
5.

See Chapter 7even for a m ore detailed account o f this election and Kuri’s involvement as a major
contributing factor in Reuben’s change o f fortune in 1993.

6.

The Tremeame coffee plantation, at Penga, in Dei Council was built by an entrepreneur and pilot called
Bob Gibbes, who earlier had run Gibbes-Sepik Airways and subsequently ran hotels in the Highlands
before retiring to Australia (see explanatory footnote in A.J. Strathem 1979:131).
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creation o f others, including Mamgogl, in the 1980s. Similarly, a section o f the Kombukla tribe,
as traditional landowners o f the Bitam coffee plantation, near Muka Kengnapana, were invited
to pool their resources towards buying plantation shares and acquired Bitam. Together, the
Welyi and Kombukla required a managing company, hence the formation o f the business group
called Welyi-Kuta. The Welyi-Kuta group then w ent into competition with Pipilka for the right
to gain control o f Gumanch coffee plantation, but was unsuccessful here. It was however
successful in beating Pipilka for Moitemp plantation. After the acquisition o f the Moitemp
plantation, near the Kugmi creek — also known in Tok Pisin as deti-ivai% derived from the
English dirty o r muddy water — by Pati W amp, the Kombukla-Minembi tribe-pair broke away
from the Welyi-Kuta business group.
The com petition between Pipilka and the Kombukla-Minembi pair was especially intense, both
parties claiming traditional ownership over Gumanch and Moitemp plantations. Their
differences were ultimately sorted out on the battlefield: first by the Kimka-Roklaka pair against
the Kombukla during 1980-1982; and later by the Remdi-KimkarRoklaka alliance against the
Kombukla-M inembi pair during 1984-1989. In both wars, the Minembi suffered heavy losses,
including nearly 20 deaths, whilst Kombukla managed to escape w ithout substantial loss. This
fact has not been lost on the Minembi, particularly the large group o f educated Minembi leaders.
They resent the fact that Kombukla commands leadership status in both business and national
politics while Minembi sacrificed warriors in defending Kombukla-Minembi honour and
territory. If this resentm ent spreads among Minembi communities and clans, it could develop
into a Minembi-for-Minembi group to compete against the Kombukla and their principal
leaders, Pati Wamp and Melchior Pep. In fact, there are signs that such a group may have already
emerged, as indicated by electoral challenges made by the Minembi Nambka clan in 1992,
through the candidacy ofW ikai Membi, and again in 1997, through Maj, Pun Kaip’s candidacy.
Meanwhile at Kotna, the Welyi had consolidated their business investments, through the
appointm ent o f Sapom Kipa, a high school headmaster, as managing director o f the Welyi-Kuta
business group. Under his direction, the Wely-Kuta incorporated a coffee exporting company in
1989 in an attem pt to diversify its business. Further development in this area appears to have .
been hampered by dissension and internal power struggles.
The Welyi-Kuta business group, like Raembka in 1987 (and Dei Development Corporation in
1989), has been the focus o f power struggles between faction leaders, Sapom Kipa and Jimmy
Wara. The faction led by Jimmy Wara was critical o f Sapom Kipa's management and wrestled
pow er from Kipa in 1996. A fter ousting Kipa from die company's senior management, Jimmy
W ara, according to one inform ant, paid K30,000 in dividends to Sapom’s clan in O ctober 1996,
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ostensibly to show shareholders that he was a better manager than his predecessor. Such
payments may well be motivated by a desire to gain support in upcoming elections.7

Discussion
The business developm ent associations were founded on relatively weak historical alliance
networks, but the core m em ber groups have since strengthened their linkages through current
military and political alliances. D espite bitter power struggles between faction leaders, the various
companies owned by the Pipilka Developm ent Corporation and the Welyi-Kuta Business
G roup have remained robust, whereas dom inant individuals have grabbed Raembka assets.
For the core groups, with a recent history o f warfare, business enterprise and elections presented
new and exciting arenas o f com petition in which outstanding scores could be settled. Initially,
personal interest was sacrificed in favour o f group prestige; a classic case o f group sentiments
overriding individual goals. Amidst the excitement generated by the competitive manner in
which the coalition-style alliances were registered as commercial businesses, coupled with the
rapid acquisition o f large plantations, there is little chance that anyone would have foreseen a
future in which only a few educated and dom inant individuals would become increasingly
wealthy and powerful at the expanse o f their tribesmen. In the heady days o f the late 1970s and
eady 1980s — a period characterised by intensive commercial activity and the competitive
purchasing o f m otor vehicles as a direct result o f the coffee boom — the group ‘name’ mattered
m o st
Dissension crept in only after the money disappeared, when inequalities between leaders and
ordinary people became m ore marked, as reflected by status symbols such as Range Rovers and
private education for children o f the wealthy compared with fellow tribesmen who travel by
PM V and send their children to sub-standard, poorly equipped bush schools; when it dawned
on fellow tribesmen that, apart from group pride and prestige, they had no personal stake in
these businesses and were therefore unable to influence the direction o f these companies; and
w hen it became obvious that some o f these companies were suffering from mismanagement and
were thus unable to pay dividends because they were broke.
The information on Sapom Kipa’s removal from the senior management o f Welyi-Kuta and subsequently
Jimmy Wara’s ascendancy was given to me by Ben Konts, a close relative o f Wara, who claims to have
been present when the cash sum o f K30,000 was handed over to the Sapom-led faction. Although there
has been some suggestion that Jimmy Wara supported his cross-cousin, Reuben Parua, rather than his
own brother, Roman Rombokl Wara, during the 1993 Dei Open By-Election, it is not clear whether or
not he was in this instance attempting to secure assurances o f support from his tribesman for his cousin
for 1997. This type o f electoral manoeuvring is not uncommon in Hagen. For instance, a family who
received a cash sum o f K3,000 from Reuben Parua to revitalise the Kul Coffee Plantation in the Baiyer
Valley told me in November 1997 that they had to vote for him during the 1997 national elections, despite
considerable pressure from their own group who had a home candidate. The man who received the grant
was Parua’s second cousin.
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In Australia, Europe, N orth America and elsewhere in the industrialised w orld, these leaders
would have been prosecuted and possibly jailed for bankrupting public companies. Either
through pillage or negligence, factional leaders o f many o f these corporations have not
registered profits, claiming that they are still repaying bank loans, while shareholders have not
received any dividends since these companies began operations m ore than 20 years ago. The
m ajor reason shareholders have n ot revolted against their leaders is because (a) o f the influential
roles these leaders played in setting up these businesses; and (b) the substantial contribution
towards the purchase o f the plantations from the state in the form o f developm ent grants which
were brokered by some o f these factional leaders. M oreover, leaders such as Michael Mel and
Puklma K opi are protected by the Hagen concept o f pukl wua (‘root man5), which means that
they are the ‘owners5o r custodians o f these businesses and, by implication, w hether they make a
profit o r not is their businesses, not everyone else5s.
In any case, the cleverest leaders are usually those w ho effectively utulise the specialist skills o f
traditional big-men and orators to maintain peace and warmth in their relationship with member
groups. In exchange for special favours and gifts o f mainly cash and beer, skilful orators can
easily downplay the economic disparities, whilst emphasising the worthy efforts and enormous
achievements o f the business leaders in lifting up the name o f the group. Special favours may
include the sponsorship o f big-men to travel to Port Moresby or the northern Queensland city
o f Cairns for a week o f fun and mischief. A commonly used strategy involves the appointm ent
o f nom inal company directors, representing various segments o f a group, who receive a small
fee for protecting the interests o f the business leaders. These so-called directors have no direct
influence over the operation o f their companies. But a guaranteed regular income, occasional
gifts o f beer, and the prestige that goes with such a title may be sufficient inducem ent to secure
their support. It is however im portant to note that m ost big-men are vein, self-centred and
sometimes indomitable creatures, but definitely not fools. Always seeking new opportunities for
mavimiring their wealth and influence, big-men will accommodate the interests o f businessmen
and politicians for as long as they feel that such a relationship enhances their own reputation.
Prestige is the driving force behind the activities o f such men.
Is this really capitalism? Leaders are still mobilising group sentiment (in elections, business and
warfare), even if they act as dom inant individual capitalists. This is a major weakness (or gap) in
the w ork o f Amarshi, G ood, and M ortimer (1979) and D onaldson and G ood (1981). The
Hagen case studies presented here suggest that Marxist models o f economic relations and social
class systems are inadequate when it comes to analysing business development associations and
the behaviour o f millionaire businessmen. The com m on assumption that a small class o f owners
o f capital w ho control the means o f production would dominate the majority o f people who
have nothing but their labour to sell is hard to justify in light o f the evidence presented here.
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N eatly all Papua New Guineans ate landowners and do not need to sell their labour in order to
make a living.
D espite the presence o f wealthy capitalists w ho may associate with other people o f similar
socioeconom ic brackets, all o f them are tribesm en and depend on their primary kin-groups for
security, em otional well-being and votes; and their political power-base is still the prim ordial
community, n o t class.
A final point is that there is m ore cooperation in warfare than in elections o r in business, which
means that the military alliances are m ore stable than political and economic alliances. Military
alliances generally follow moka networks and are therefore dominated by traditional leaders such
as big-men. Political and econom ic alliances, though founded on military alliances, are m ore
com m only dom inated by politicians and businessmen. Conflicts, however, arise when m odem
and traditional leaders com pete for dominance. In the next chapter I discuss a particular type o f
conflict, group warfare, which was organised along these same coalition-style alliance lines
described here and in the previous chapter.

Chapter

5

TH E DYNAMICS OF HAGEN WARFARE
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Introduction
This chapter deals w ith warfare as an im portant arena o f political com petition and cooperation,
previously linked to cerem onial exchange through reparation payments, and nowadays to statesponsored arenas such as elections and business. Elections, as will becom e evident in the
following chapters, are generally organised along the lines o f military alliances discussed here and
in the previous chapters. But, as indicated in the previous chapter, there is m ore reliable
cooperation in warfare than in other arenas o f com petition and cooperation. Evidence
presented in this chapter will show that dans o f the same tribe may oppose each other in
business, elections, and even in m inor warfare, but are highly likely to cooperate in m ajor
warfare against traditional o r perpetual enemies. The high degree o f cohesion in warfare can be
viewed as a basic survival strategy — with a political dimension. C ooperation between the
constituent clans o f a tribe was especially vital in pre-colonial times because annihilation was an
ever present danger. By no means o f lesser significance, was the group ‘name’ factor, a
significant them e which runs throughout this thesis.
Previous studies on PN G Highlands warfare have been approached from various perspectives:
functionalist and cultural ecological (Vayda 1967; R appaport 1984[1968]); and dem ographic —
involving focus on pressure on land and social and social relations (Meggitt 1977); other writers
have stressed social and ritual aspects o f warfare (Muke 1994); and shifting alliances (A.J.
Strathem 1966b; 1971; 1977; 1992). The wide range o f social-structural, ecological, political and
psychological theories applied to Melanesian warfare has been critically reviewed by K nauft
(1990; see also Muke 1994 and O ’H anlon 1995). The value and validity o f the various
explanations o f M elanesian warfare and the historical influences that shaped anthropological
perspectives have been assessed by K nauft (1990). By providing insights into the dynamics o f
H agen warfare, my study attem pts to correct some fallacious assum ptions inherent in W estern
theoretical perspectives on PN G Highlands warfare, and m oreover argues that Hageners engage
in warfare to ensure that their respective group ‘names m ust not go dow n’.
Furtherm ore, this study provides explanations for the persistence o f warfare in the H ighlands o f
Papua N ew G uinea, w ith a special emphasis on cultural and societal ‘strength’ and institutional
‘weakness’ in state structures. In a recent paper on social disorder, A.J. Strathem (1993b)
discusses state-society interaction and com peting legitimacies. Although my overall aim in this
thesis is similar to Strathem ’s — to m ap com peting legitimacies — the main purpose o f the
present chapter is to provide a m ore detailed and refined discussion o f contem porary H agen
warfare than hitherto available. Accordingly, I present a micro-analysis o f warfare, stressing the
dynamics o f political com petition between groups, factions and coalitions and, m ore specifically,
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on the role o f leaders in w arfare, particularly in the context o f W estern influence in term s o f new
ideas and beliefs such as Christianity and technological innovations such as guns.
T he chapter is organised into four parts. The first contains a brief background discussion on
H agen w arfare, w ith a particular em phasis on im portant distinctions made by Hageners w hen
discussing warfare. T he second part contains tw o case studies o f Hagen warfare during the late
1980s, w ith a view to dem onstrating the corporate nature o f warfare, the difficulties involved in
organising m odem w arfare, and the conspicuous lack o f state intervention. The third part o f the
chapter looks at the im pact o f technological innovations, especially the devastating effects o f gun
warfare and its econom ic dim ensions. T he final part o f the chapter looks at the contexts o f
leadership in warfare. In particular, it examines change and continuity in leadership roles in the
context o f gun warfare and w ider social change. A m odel o f H agen warfare is used to explain
som e o f die com plex processes involved. The m odel encapsulates a general pattern o f escalation
in disputes and conflict m anagem ent T he chapter concludes by arguing that H agen warfare,
despite com m on belief, does n o t represent societal collapse o r disintegration. R ather, it can be
fruitfully viewed as a way o f asserting authority and restoring order w ithin a weak state.

The Hagen Concept o f Warfare
It m ust be stated at the outset that the term ‘tribal warfare’ can be misleading w hen loosely used,
especially as in m edia reports. It is misleading because warfare does n o t involve tribes alone but
other levels o f group as w ell F or example, warfare can be a clan m atter in som e instances1,
while, in others, it can be at a level higher than the tribe, such as tribe-pairs, coalitions, o r other
form s o f alliance. Tribal warfare, then, involves physical violence between groups. Since
definitions, contexts and patterns o f Hagen warfare have been adequately treated by others (see
A.J. Strathem 1966b:Chap.3; Muke 1994), I shall only briefly deal w ith them , in order to allow
for fuller discussion o f the role o f alliance networks as a basis for com petition and the role o f
leaders in w arfare, the effects o f guns in Hagen warfare, and the political (including electoral)
dim ensions o f that warfare.
W ithout duplicating the w ork o f others, like Rappoport (1984[1968]) and Meggitt (1977), it is,
nevertheless, necessary to m ention the m ajor contributing factors behind group warfare. There
are many reasons why groups engage in warfare, but it is im portant to point out that in m ost
cases groups resort to arm ed conflict either because peaceful avenues o f resolving conflicts have
\

The Jika Maipngel intra-section warfare o f 1986-87 is a good example. D uring this war MaipngePs two
subsections, Rukumb and Andakelkam, fought each other and, consequently, Rukumb, comprising
Komapei, O prom b, Milakamb and Muklmana dans, routed the Komb-Akdemb dan-pair, who have since
taken up residence with a Mokei section. The adoption o f guns, as a technological innovation in Hagen
warfare, was first noted in this war.
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been totally exhausted, o r because circum stances dictate such action. T he latter occurs when
existing relations betw een the antagonists have deteriorated to such an extent that peaceful
avenues o f settling disputes will be deliberately ignored and w ar will n o t only be considered
inevitable b u t ideal and noble — very m uch to do w ith questions o f honour, group ‘name’ o r
renow n, pride and dignity.
Resolving conflicts through violence becom es a m ore realistic option w hen a person o r group
considers an insult caused by som e w rongdoing— such as hom icide, assault o r th e ft— to be so
grave that even the offer o f wealth items as com pensation paym ent in generous am ounts would
n o t make adequate incentive for appeasem ent The reason for this may be found in the Hagen
concept w hich I have identified earlier as mbi mam nepanha (‘the nam e m ust n ot go down'). The
other is the Hagen concept called popokl (‘anger7), which influences the choice to be made. The
offer o f com pensation may be accepted if a person’s popokl is n o t so intense; o r conversely,
revenge will be chosen if the popoklis very intense. A.J. Strathem (1981) makes this point clearly
in discussing
...H ageners’ ways o f describing th eir feelings after a killing o r d eath fo r w hich
responsibility is im puted: they are angry (popokl), and they w an t to take revenge, to
retaliate. N o t to d o so is to behave like w om en rath er th an m en. Only th e sight o f
w ealth, they say, can so o th e th eir feelings and m ake th em am enable to peaceful
settlem ent (1981:7).

W hat Strathem does n o t m ention is that Hageners also say that only revenge o r pay-back killing
can settle outstanding debts in reciprocal killing. It is often the case that people have long
collective m emories regarding killings, and w hen a son fails to avenge his father’s death, the
grandson takes over the responsibility, and so on until outstanding debts in reciprocal killings, in
the clan o r family view, are balanced.
In spite o f Christian m ission influence, the pay-back mentality (good-for-good and bad-for-bad)
still prevails. The key is people’s perceptions regarding positive and negative reciprocity and their
notions o f a balanced system. Functionalists (for example, Rappaport 1984 [1968]; and Meggitt
1977), however, argue otherw ise, but my empirical data, such as Case 2 (Kawelka-Minembi W ar,
described below) suggest that sometimes groups fight for alm ost purely psychological reasons
(see, for example, Standish 1973; K nauft 1990), in which case, o f course, functional reasons are
secondary considerations.
H agen warfare typically involves armed conflict between groups with strong military traditions
stretching back to pre-colonial times. The rules governing w ar preparation, battle sequences, and
indem nity paym ent are clearly defined. M oreover, w ar alliances follow a pattern quite similar to
those involving cerem onial exchange networks. Any serious scholarly inquiry into warfare m ust
cover all its dim ensions. It cannot be analysed adequately w ithout a historical perspective o f
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social relations betw een local groups. O therw ise a great injustice will be done to the subject at
hand. M ost reasons for fighting m entioned in the media, for instance, are n o t m ajor contributing
factors, b u t are, in fact, trigger mechanisms. For example, the particular cases o f warfare
described in the next section o f this chapter were both triggered by alcohol-related incidents, yet
there were underlying factors which prevented the eventual antagonists from seeking peaceful
avenues o f conflict resolution — hence, alcohol was blamed for both wars. G roups fight for
various reasons, w hich are quite com plex and multifaceted, but inform ants tend to agree that
groups fight mainly over land, suspected and actual killings (including m otor vehicle accidents),
assault causing serious injury, rape, theft o f property (especially pigs), arson, non-paym ent o f
com pensation, and (nowadays) over election results (see Iam o and K etan 1992:102-103; see also
Standish 1992 for com parable discussion in Simbu).
It is w orth m entioning here that any serious attem pt to understand the complexities o f warfare
m ust allow for the distinctions made by the participants themselves. H ageners, as pointed out by
A.J. Strathem (1966b;49), make three basic distinctions in their own accounts o f warfare: (1)
betw een the ‘ro o t m an o f war’ and the ‘a ll/ (glpukl wua and kui wud); (2) between m ajor o r
traditional enemies and m inor enemies (elparaha wua and el uninga wud)\ and (3) between clans
w hich are paired and those w hich are n o t I shall explore these dichotom ies o f Hagen warfare
rather briefly here, b ut later provide a discussion on how key warfare relationships are
m aintained (see section on Reparation Paymentfater in this chapter).
The Hagen term , el pukl wua (lit: ‘fight root m an7), is used w hen referring to the principal
instigators o f war, as opposed to kui wua (lit: ‘dead m an7; o r those w ho died while supporting the
‘fight ro o t m an7). In H agen there is a clear distinction between the pukl wua, as ‘owners7 o f the
w ar and the kui wua> w ho, as allies, m ust be com pensated for assistance rendered and losses
sustained. This idea o f identifying a person or group as the ‘ow ner7o f a dispute, w rongdoing o r
fighting, which is expressed by the term pukl (‘root7; ‘base’) (A.J. Strathem 1981:12), n o t only
facilitates com pensation payments b ut also serves other functions such as retribution. The
principal com batants in Case /, the Rem di Jikam bo and the M inembi Nam bka clans, for
example, were the elpukl wua>w hilst the Kimka-Roklaka tribe-pair were the kui wua to the Remdi
(and eluninga wua, m inor enemies, to the Minembi).
T he second dichotom y o f Hagen warfare distinguishes m ajor o r traditional enemies from m inor
enemies. The w ords, elparaka wua (tit: ‘fight-bird o f paradise plum es-m an7) translate as ‘the man
w ho fights you wearing his feather head-dress7 (often made o f bird o f paradise plumes), which
means in his full w ar apparel (see A.J. Strathem 1966b:49). It is a term used w hen referring to
m ajor o r traditional enemies w ho maintain hostile relations in both times o f peace and war, A
timp o f peace, in other w ords, is a truce period, mutually reached for various reasons (for
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example, w hen both sides have had enough o f fighting, o r w hen both sides are threatened by
famine ow ing to neglect o f food-crop gardens). By contrast, el uninga wua (also called el namb wua)
simply m eans there is a lesser degree o f enmity and centrality in the conflict It can be used w hen
referring to those assisting a m ajor enemy in war; your m ajor enemy’s allies are the el uninga wua.
In Case 2, die K opi (as well as M inembi K im bo and Klamakae) were seen by the M inembi as el

uninga wua because o f their supporting role to die Kawelka. As pointed out by A.J. Strathem , “in
H agen the rule was that one paid com pensation to m inor enemies, with w hom there was regular
interm arriage and exchange. W ith m ajor enemies matters were m uch m ore uncertain” (1981:12).
T he fact that one paid com pensation to m inor enemies m eant that previously hostile relations
could be converted into exchange netw orks and sometimes into alliance systems. In this way,
groups w hich had in som e instances fought against each other as m inor enemies were in other
instances allied against a m ajor enemy. H ie phenom enon o f group relations alternating between
alliance and enmity is quite consistent w ith an observed pattern o f shifting alliances (see A.J.
Strathem 1966b.*Chap.3; 1971:Chap.4; see also Kawelka example in Case T).
A third dichotom y deals w ith the difference between clans which are paired and those which are
n o t T he difference lies in their approach to negotiating each other’s assistance in war. Paired
clans, strengthened by intense intermarriage and frequent moha exchanges, are ideally automatic
allies in w arfare, unlike non-paired clans which may n o t be automatic allies. They may share
territory, have usufructuary tights in com m only held gardening land, and in the past they may
have given refuge to each other. It is evident from A.J. Strathem ’s examination o f dan pairs
w ithin the Tepuka tribe that paired clans: (1) do speak o f themselves as interm arrying closely; (2)
do share territory and have given refuge to each other; and that (3) their military situation is such
that (a) whilst there may be stick fights between them , which are conflicts o f a lesser order o f
seriousness, they are automatic allies o f each other w hen one is involved with an outside enemy;
and (b) w hilst there may be some unpleasantness between them over kui wua payments, they are
never arrayed on opposite sides in a fight; (4) ideally there is no poisoning between them (and
A.J.S. found no cases w here accusations o f such were made); (5) they are linked by the marker
w ord ntkl (‘pair’), suffixed to their names spoken together, and (6) internal com pensations
betw een such groups are continued in the form o f moka (see A.J. Strathem 1966b:Chap.3;
1971:Chap.4).
W hile this is a fair assessm ent o f the situation in the D ei Council area, which is characterised by
num erous and relatively small tribes, the situation in other parts o f Hagen may be slightly
different T he military situation in the Hagen Central area, for instance, significantly differs from
that o f D e l H agen Central area, as indicated in Chapter Three, is hom e to the ‘super-tribes’ o f Jika,
M okei and Yamka: all o f which are quite pow erful in term s o f numerical strength as well as
political influence (often backed up by superior firepower). This means that, on the one hand,
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groups below the d a n level can hold their ow n and m atch others at both the clan and tribal
levels in w arfare, while on the other hand, they may n o t becom e autom atic allies w hen one
m em ber o f a clan-pair is involved in a fight O w ing to factors o f size, strength and C h ristia n
m ission influence, som e paired clans in H agen Central are n o t automatic allies. F or example,
during the Jika M aipngel-Kukilka w ar, fought in the late 1980s, a section o f the Jika O prom b
clan allegedly gave safe passage to fleeing Kukilka tribesm en instead o f assisting their Jika
K om api d an-pair partners in attacking them .
Christian church m em bership may have been a factor here. A com m on response from both Jika
and other H agen inform ants, w hen asked why this was allowed to happen, was that the Kukilka
w ere protected by G od. Attacking them would have evoked the wrath o f G o d Their escape
from die Jika K om api troops after leaving their Tipukla and Kukulinga territories, w est o f
O gdbeng, was directly likened to that o f the Israelites o f the Old Testament w ho, under M oses’s
leadership, fled from slavery in Egypt and made a dramatic escape from the pursuing Egyptian
army by crossing the Red Sea, after “the LO RD drove the sea back with a strong east wind
[which] blew all night and turned the sea into dry land, [hence] die w ater was divided, and the
Israelites w ent through die sea on dry ground, with walls o f w ater on both sides” (Exodus 14:21
22). It is said that before the Kukilka left for Kelua and Bag}, they gathered at their Tipukla
C hurch for prayers and collected an offering o f cash which they deliberately left behind,
know ing full well that their enemies would steal it and therefore be punished by G od2.
Incidentally, the head o f the Lutheran Church, Bishop Sanengke, is a Kukilka tribesm an, and he
has strong ties w ith the O prom b clan through church work. The O prom b live in and around
the O gdbeng (also called Uklpeng) Lutheran m ission station, which was founded in the early
1930s by the G erm an missionary, G eorg Vicedom. In this context, it is d ear that the O prom b
dan-section’s decision n o t to attack the Kukilka is quite understandable: how could they possibly
justify attar-king fellow Lutherans and Christian brothers with w hom they have shared fellowship
for m ore than fifty years?
H ow ever, w hat is n o t so d e ar is the relevance o f group size and strength in decisions to do with
military alliance. K om api can hold its ow n against any similar size group, as it did against the
Kukilka tribe. A nd so would O prom b in a similar situation. K om api and O prom b are in an
unusual situation in the sense that they b d o n g to a single large tribe section, Maipngel, w hose
Hang act independently in m ost events, have endorsed candidates against one another in national
elections, experienced internal fighting in 1986-87, yet still remain an exogamous u n it A nother

Indeed, many Hagen inform ants, including som e Komapi leaders, have pointed out to me that foe
Komapi have consistently been embroiled in conflict after conflict and will continue to do so simply
because they com m itted foe ultimate crime by attacking foe house o f G od.
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reason why the dan-pair ‘rule* regarding warfare was ‘broken’ here lies in the Hagen concept
described earlier as popokl (‘anger1). An offence such as assault evokes popoklwhich makes people
w ant to take revenge, unless com pensation is offered. It is even m ore pronounced in m urders,
w here popokl drives people to seek revenge (although in som e cases com pensation may prevent
this). In the Kukilka case, it was the Jika K om api’s popokl over an alleged poisoning o f a young
K om api m an by a Kukilka m an’s wife which gave the K om api a valid reason to fight The
O prom b, how ever, had no popokl with the Kukilka and so did not join their paired d an in
attacking them . It is this notion o f Hagen reasoning, taking into account the nature o f previous
relations and the severity o f an offence, which determ ines the outcom e o f disputes.
Beyond that lies the analytical realm where structural explanations have been offered by
anthropologists and other observers. T he resurgence o f warfare in the 1970s, after colonial
adm inistration im posed pacification in the 1940s, has been largely attributed to dem ographic
pressure (see Meggitt 1971,1977). For example, in the case o f the Central Enga, Meggitt (1977)
argued that Enga population build-up has m eant the inevitable return to warfare, as alternative
m eans o f coping w ith the problem o f land shortage have been exhausted. F or H agen, however,
this argum ent does n o t hold because o f factors dealing with recruitm ent for warfare, business
enterprise and election campaigns. In spite o f a high population density, which approaches 300
persons per square kilometre in some areas, leaders actively recruit new m em bers, com prising
mainly Sim bu and Enga immigrants, for both political and econom ic purposes. Such migrants
receive access to garden land, but are dependent on their hosts and patrons. M igrants have at
times played vital roles in warfare. In the Remdi-M inembi war, for instance, both Simbu and
Enga m igrants residing with the Remdi in and around G um anch coffee plantation fought
against the M inem bi (see Case 1). Such support can also be extended to election campaigns (see

Chapter Si£) and to business activities in terms o f labour. Thus, the demographic argument
cannot be extended to Hagen because land acquired through violent eviction is seldom occupied
by the victors for fear o f both enemy attack and enemy spirits seeking revenge. B oth the Jika
M aipngel and the Kawelka-M inembi cases reinforce this p o in t A fter the Komb-Akelemb danpair were routed during the 1986-87 Maipngel w ar the Milakamb clan and its allies — Kom api,
O prom b and M uklmana — deliberately avoided the vacant Puklgjmp settlem ent Similarly,
neither the Kawelka, nor its allies— K opi, K im bo and Klamakae — showed interest in claiming
the form er M inem bi territory in Tiki for resettlem ent In both instances, die m ost attractive
option appeared to be business developm ent (of mainly coffee plantations) on these properties.
Labour, how ever, will remain a m ajor problem because traditional sources o f plantation labour
recruitm ent such as the Southern Highlands and Enga currently offer m ore attractive m onetary
rewards as a direct consequence o f m ining and petroleum exploitation in those areas. This is
further com plicated by the fact that H ageners, for reasons to do w ith status, do n o t like w orking
for other H ageners, and recruitm ent from w ithin the tribe for expanded plantation holding? is
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lim ited by reasons m entioned previously (fear o f attack). R ecruitm ent o f group ‘m em bers’ from
o ther provinces as well as encouraging m igrant settlem ents in W estern Highlands, therefore,
rem ains a viable option, w hich is mutually beneficial to the provinces concerned because it eases
dem ographic pressure in som e areas (Enga and Simbu) and increases m anpow er in others
(W estern Highlands) w here plantation labour is scarce. Recruits from other parts o f the province
and the H ighlands region, as indicated in Chapter Three; are sponsored by leaders as part o f
political strategies, and while their continued ‘m em bership’ to H agen tribes and clans is
constantly renewed through participation in corporate activities such as warfare and elections,
they never fully relinquish their m em bership to natal groups in their hom e provinces. This
statem ent is also applicable to descendants o f migrants. I shall now turn to the case studies on
H agen w arfare in order to assess the corporate nature o f warfare.

Case 1: The Remdi-Minembi War (1984-1989)
T he Rem di-M inembi conflict lasted nearly five years. A lthough the groups were n o t traditionally
m ajor enem ies, relations between them had deteriorated to such an extent that armed conflict
was inevitable. As indicated in die second and third chapters o f this thesis, the plantation
acquisition schem e, which began in the late 1970s and early 1980s, played a vital role in this
conflict T o facilitate participation in the governm ent's plantation acquisition scheme, Remdi and
other Pipilka groups (Kimka, Roklaka, and the Nebilyer, Hagen Central and Anglimp residents,
K opi-N okpa tribe-pair) in 1975 form ed into a developm ent association called Pipilka
D evelopm ent Corporation. Pipilka w ent into com petition w ith a similar group called WelyiK uta, com prising mainly the Kombukla-M tnem bi tribe-pair and their allies in Welyi tribe (see
A J. Strathem 1984; see also K etan 1996). Pipilka ultimately gained the giant Gum anch Coffee
plantation3, but lost out on Kugmi, an adjoining portion o f land, to prom inent Kom bulda
leaders Pati W amp and M elchior Pep, w ho acquired the land on behalf o f the KombuklaM inembi. Pipilka’s Kimka-Roklaka tribe-pair, w ho share a com m on territorial boundary with
K om bukla, disputed the P N G Land Board decision and consequently w ar eventuated. W hile
Kimka-Roklaka and K om bukla w ere the principal com batants, both M inembi and Remdi
inform ants agree that their groups provided assistance to their respective allies. A fter alm ost a
year o f fighting, using mainly traditional w eapons such as bows and arrows, a period o f m utual
truce prevailed in the early 1980s.
Although the Rem di and M inem bi groups were n o t principal com batants during the KimkaRoklaka versus K om bukla war, their relationship had deteriorated to such an extent that

The plantation, according to one Remdi inform ant, was formally taken over by the locals in 1985 with a
2.7 million kina bank loan, which was folly repaid in 1993. Such complexities o f m odem commerce are not
folly grasped by Hageners and consequently resulted in a dispute over non-paym ent o f dividends (see
Chapters 3A \ see also ChapterSetm).
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peaceful avenues o f resolving conflicts w ere ignored w hen a m inor incident involving a
disagreem ent over a snooker game developed into full-scale warfare. The Remdi-M inembi w ar
was triggered o ff by an incident at a village tavern ow ned and managed by a Rem di tribesm an, a
senior governm ent employee in M ount Hagen. Following a disagreem ent over a snooker table, a
now prom inent M inem bi leader, then a governm ent employee in M ount H agen, was alleged to
have ‘confiscated’ the snooker balls, w hich angered the Remdi caretaker o f the premises. A
tussle ensued and during the confusion, som eone damaged the caretaker’s

testicles.

C om pensation was dem anded, w hich the M inembi claimed was to excessive, and Remdi
declared w ar on M inembi.
D uring the initial encounters warriors on both sides used traditional w eapons — bows and
arrow s, shields and spears —- and the battle sequences followed shield form ation and
m anoeuvres w hich characterise traditional H agen warfare (see discussion below on The Adoption

of the Gun as a Technological Innovation in Hagen Warfare; see also Muke 1994 and Burton 1990 for
com parison). T he turning point o f this w ar was marked by a particular incident now vividly
rem em bered by w arriors on either side and was simply referred to by one M inembi inform ant as
* e ‘T en g a incident”. W hile engaged in a batde at the Tenga creek, with opposing troops on
either side o f the w ater, a shotgun w ent o ff “accidentally” on the M inembi side4. Although noone was hurt and no further shots were fired, which suggests that it may in fact have been an
accident, the Rem di were quite convinced that the gun shot was m eant to kill som eone but the
cartridge failed to find its target
In hindsight, I am convinced that the shot was neither an accident no r m eant to kill som eone,
but was an expression o f strength, o r a flexing o f military muscle. If this is correct, then, Remdi
read it well by responding w ith guns. The fact that it did n o t take both sides long to com e up
w ith several guns for battle a few days later suggests that this was a w ar w hich had deeper (much
deeper) roots and both sides were well-prepared for i t It is believed that some gun-m en had
served their apprenticeship in other conflicts prior to this war, w hilst a few had technical
knowledge o f guns through participation in criminal gang activities (chiefly robbing and
terrorising coffee buyers and expatriate plantation owners a n d /o r managers). M ost others had to
learn, w hich they did very quickly. By the second week, open battlefield tactics were abandoned,
for reasons discussed later in this chapter, and gun-m en form ed gangs to attack and counter
attack using raiding and am bush tactics.

Principal Combatants and Allies

The inform ation on the ‘T enga incident” was given to m e by M r Bu Phill o f the Minembi Napakae clan,
which, together with its dan-pair partner, Nambka, were the ‘fight root man’, or ‘owners’ o f this war.
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The principal combatants, elpukl mta (‘fight root man5) or ^owners’ o f the fight were the Remdi
Jikambo and Minembi Nambka clans. The Remdi Jikambo were assisted by a number o f groups:
some in fighting capacity, such as major allies; and others, especially the minor allies in non
fighting, yet materially supportive roles. Likewise, the Minembi Nambka were assisted by a
number o f groups. A full list o f allies on both sides is given below (see Table 5. /).
T ab le 5.1: A lliance System s: R em di-M inem bi W ar (1984-1989)

Major allies of the Remdi Minor allies of the Major allies of the Minor allies of the
Jikambo clan
RemdiJikambo clan
Minembi Nambka
Minembi Nambka
Remdi Elpuklmbo

Nengka

Minembi

Kombukla

Ropkembo
Remdi Penambembo

Jika Maipngel

Minimbi Papeke

Kumdi

Remdi Ropmbo

Yamka

Minimbi Kutmbo

Jika Andapunts

Minimibi

Welyi

Remdi Kundumbo

Engambo
Remdi Ukunimbo

Minimbi Napakae

Kimka

Minimbi Mimkae

Roklaka
Kiklpukla
Enga Migrants
Simbu Migrants
Source:

Based on information supplied by Remdi informants: Ivan Tau, Maip Kei, Puklma Kopi and jerry Yar
Rombina o f Muglamp, and Minembi informants: Bu Phill, Moga village, and Peter Watinga, Keraldung
village, Mount Hagen.

Remdi Jikambo fought according to its structural divisions: Pilembo, Roklomb and KulemboPaklembo subclan-pairs. Remdi as a tribe is split across both a Local Government Council and
an Open Electorate border. One half comprising predominantly Jikambo and some
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Penam bem bo live in D ei Council (also D ei O pen electorate) and are also know n as “Lower
Remdi”, while the other h alf com prising the rest o f the Remdi clans live in Mul Council (which
is part o f the Mul-Baiyer O pen electorate) and are also known as “U pper Remdi”. In this
particular w ar, U pper Rem di clans, like the Kimka-Roklaka tribe-pair and Kiklpukla, actively
participated as m ajor allies. The Engan and Simbu m igrants, w ho live w ith the Remdi Jikam bo
d a n and are employed by the G um anch Coffee Plantation (which is ow ned mostly by the
Jikam bo), also participated in fighting as m ajor allies.
Rem di Jikam bo’s m inor allies — Nengka, Jika Maipngel5 and som e sections o f the Yamka —
assisted in a largely non-fighting capacity. They provided the links through which resources,
induding guns and cartridges, were channelled towards the Remdi w ar effo rt As is customary
in H agen, one o r two warriors from these groups may have acted independently and strictly on
an individual basis to take up arms and fought on the Remdi side. Such m en are called el kentep

mta (‘steal fight m an’) and w hen one o f them is killed, the responsibility lies w ith the ‘ow ner’ o f
the fight, n o t the killer, which means that his group will not normally take upon themselves to
avenge his death. The ‘ow ner’ o f the fight will pay com pensation, in the same way as allies are
com pensated for their support and losses sustained. This rule o f placing responsibility on the
‘ow ner’ o f the fight acts as a constraint for full-scale confederation-type alliance warfare.
T he Rem di also had an active fighting partnership, el kompani (‘fight company’, o r ‘joint ventureship5) w ith the Kawelka (who were involved w ith the M inembi Andakelkam section), and by
extension o f its allies, were also in partnership with the K opi, K im bo and Klamakae (Kawelka’s
allies) w ho were involved with the N guni and M inembi Andakelkam section with w hom they
share a com m on border.
T.ik<* their Remdi Jikam bo opponents, M inembi Nam bka also coopted the assistance o f fellow

M inem bi dans: Ropkem bo, Napakae, Mimkae, Papeke, K utm bo and Engambo. They also had a
m ajor ally in the Kom bukla but here the support was n o t given in a concerted effort, rather it
was m ostly on an individual basis, thus we may call Kom bukla a m inor ally.

Remdi, through its Jikambo clan, has strong connections with the Maipngel section o f the Jika, which is
Hagen’s biggest tribe. Both Remdi and Jika Maipngel had fought in separate wars, at different times,
against another Jika section, Andapunts. That explains why Maipngel supported Remdi while Andapunts
threw its weight behind Minembi.
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F ig u re 5.1: S tructural O rg an isatio n o f M inem bi
K aw elka F ig h t P artn ersh ip (El Kompani).

F orces

ag ain st
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th e

R em di-

Andaoukam

Elyipi
MINEMBI
Komonkae
Ruprupkae

Andakelkam

TRIBE

Source:

MAJOR SECTION

Fought
against die
Kawelka and
dieir
allies,
Kopi, Kimbo
and
Klamakae.

the Remdi

CLAN (EXOGAMOUS)

Based on information supplied by Ivan Tau, Jerry Yar Rombina, Maip Kei, Puklma Kopi and Pen
‘Seholda’ Kei o f Remdi Jikambo dan; Yap Goimba and Komori Ongky o f Kawelka Elpuklmbo sub
subclan; and Bu Phill and Peter Watinga o f Minembi Napakae and Nambka dans, respectively.
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F ig u re 5.2: T h e H a g en El Kompani (‘F ig h t P artn ersh ip ’) System .

Uppex-Rerndi

M ul

El-Paraka D isjunction

N engka

H agen
C entral

jik aM aipngel

El-Paraka D isjunction

Key:

Assisted in fighting on an individual basis
Assisted in a mainly non-fighting capacity
Currently in confederated-style alliance, providing links through
which firearms and sensitive information are passed from one
conflict to another.

The el paraka disjunction indicates either historically established
major enemy lines or that these groups have recently fought each
other in major warfare.
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Notes:

.

1

.

2

3.

Based on inform ation supplied by Ivan Tau, Jerry Yar Robina, Puklma Kopi and Pen ‘Seholda’ Kei o f
Remdi Jikambo dan; Yap Goimba, Goim ba Onom be and Komorui Onky o f Kawelka Elpuklmbo sub
subclan, and Bu Phil and Peter Watinga o f Minembi Napakae and Nambka dans, respectively. Ivan and
Kopi in particular were responsible for my education on el kompam systems and how inform ation and
resources (including guns) are channelled through alliance networks. Kopi was particularly patient in
explaining political strategies, such as the conversion o f previously hostile relations into one o f moka
relations, especially when engaging war with a major enemy. A t the inception o f the Remdi-Minembi
conflict in 1984, for instance, Kopi led a group o f Remdi Jikambo leaders into presenting a sum o f K500
as moka gifts to their m inor enemies, the Jika Kilampi clan (of the Jika Andapunts section), thus converting
previously hostile relations into one o f friendship. This effectively prevented the Andapunts, as a group,
from supporting Minembi (although it is widely beilieved that some members o f the Andapunts section
assisted Minembi on an individual basis, mainly in a non-fighting capadty).
Although the Kopi-Nokpa are Hagen Central residents, they are part o f the Dei Council-based Pipilka
alliance, mainly through business activities.
The Ngum are n o t part o f the Welyi-Kuta alliance but are listed here because o f their role in the KawelkaMinembi war, as an active fighting partner o f the Minembi,

M inem bi had an active fighting partnership with the Baiyer resident, N guni, w ho were in alliance
w ith the M inem bi Andakelkam against the Kawelka-Kopi-Kimbo-Klamakae alliance.
M inembi’s m inor allies were: Kumdi, Jika A ndapunts and Welyi. Both K um di and Jika
A ndapunts had scores to settle and may have joined in on individual basis, but Welyi mostly
acted as a non-fighting partner by allowing M inembi to use its territories to set up road-blocks
against Rem di and Kawelka. B oth Kum di and Kombukla have historical ties with the Minembi.
T he K om bukla are currently paired with the M inembi and have previously fought together in
m ajor

wars against other groups such as the Tepuka-Kawelka pair. The Jika A ndapunts-

M inem bi association, however, is a m ore recent form ation, founded on com m on military
grounds — they both had an enemy in Remdi. T he Jika Andapunts section, com prising mainly
Kilampi, Jilim b, Kundka and Pangaka dans, fought the Remdi in a bow and arrow fight during
the 1980s.
It is significant to note here that the Remdi-Jika Andapunts conflict was quickly resolved as a
direct consequence o f some sm art thinking on the part o f Remdi military strategists. As the
Rem di-M inembi w ar intensified, Remdi strategists offered a gift in cash (K500) as a token o f
peace and goodwill to the Jika Kilampi elan o f die A ndapunts section, thereby effectively
preventing Kilampi from mobilising significant fighting blocks as well as preventing M inembi
from contracting the A ndapunts as a m ajor ally6. Following this, moka relations were created,
6

There is no doubt that Remdi leaders would have taken this opportunity to remind Kilampi leaders that
this particular war was a Dei Council m atter and Hagen Central groups should keep out o f it
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which culminated in presentation o f 15 pigs to Remdi by the Kilampi in early 1995.? Remdi used
the pigs in their miapeng compensation to their Kimka-Roklaka allies in January 1995.
The Remdi and Minembi maintained hostile relations for nearly six years, from the inception o f
war in 1984 until it was concluded in 1989. During this period, nearly forty warriors were killed,
almost all in raids and ambushes as battlefields were abandoned (for reasons discussed later in
this section), large human populations were displaced (many have yet to reclaim previous
settlements, especially those around the Tenga battle-grounds), and no accurate figure can be
placed on damage to property which is believed to be in tens o f thousands o f kina.
Unlike previous inter-group conflicts in which the state played an active role in at least
attempting to prevent them from escalating, this particular war was typical o f conflicts in the
eighties where there was virtually no state intervention. In the 1970s, for instance, police mobile
squads, assisted by helicopters, were sent into ‘tribal fighting zones’ to apprehend warriors and
restore order, but in the 1980s there were so many fights, at least 22 separate cases in Western
Highlands (see Appendix DTI; see also Iamo and Ketan 1992:104), that police were unable to
cope with the situation.
T ab le 5.2: W ar D eath s: R em di-M inem bi W ar (1984-1989)

Remdi <&Allies

No. ofDeath

Minembi

No. ofDeath

Lower Remdi
Upper Remdi
Roklaka
Kimka
Kiklpukla
Enga migrants
Simbu migrants
Total

6
2
3
3
1
1
1
17

Papeke
Nambka
Engambo
Ropkae
Napakae
Rapake
Mimkae

3
6
3
3
1
1
1
18

Source:

Based on information supplied by Ivan Tau, Muglamp, and Peter Watinga, Keraldung village, Mount
Hagen.

The Remdi-Minembi war, like numerous others, ended in 1989 not because o f state intervention
but mainly because the combatants themselves felt that they had had enough o f fighting. That
The information on the conversion o f enmity into moka relations between the Remdi Jikambo and the
Jika Kilampi was given to m e by prominent M ount Hagen businessman and Remdi big-man, Puklma
Kopi, w h o him self played a significant role here and now enjoys warm relations with the Kilampi. Kopi
told m e that this was a com m on ploy put to use successfully by imaginative leaders in the past, but current
leaders are som etim es slow to realise the importance o f making friendly gestures towards minor enemies
w hen confronted with the prospect o f full-scale war against major or traditional enemies (Puklma 1994:
personal communication).
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there w ere nearly equal num ber o f deaths on both sides (see Table 5.2) suggests that debts in
reciprocal killings were settled. A church-sponsored peace settlem ent was endorsed by leaders
on both sides and the w ar was ended in 1989.
H ow ever, the process towards accepting the eventual peace settlem ent was initiated well before
the m issions stepped in. Prom inent individuals, mostly businessmen and senior governm ent
employees, related by cross-cutting kin-networks, m et on a regular basis in P ort Moresby. O ne
o f th e M inem bi leaders w ho was principally held responsible for the pub incident, which initially
triggered the war, has strong personal connections with im portant Remdi Jikam bo leaders
through marriage. Also, his Nam bka clan has marriage and moka ties with the Jikam bo clan. In
this regard, the w ar was viewed by many people as an unfortunate, if n o t shameful, event which
threatened to destroy these special ties. In fact, when an attem pt was made on his life at M ount
A m bra, w hilst travelling to M ount Hagen tow n for work, many Jikam bo leaders realised that
they would have caused the death o f the husband o f their sister and father o f her young
children. A fter the attem pt he transferred to P ort M oresby, w here he was allowed to attend
those m eetings between Remdi and M inembi leaders. The key individuals here were two PN G
D efence Force employees, both commissioned officers: one with the rank o f Captain, a
N am bka clansman w ho recently resigned with the rank o f a M ajor in 1996 to contest the 1997
national elections; and the other a Jikam bo clansman w ho is currently a Captain in the army. The
officers w ere linked by both w ork and cross-cutting kinship ties. O n this basis, they were able to
attract prom inent individuals from both Remdi and M inembi to attend inform al weekend
gatherings at their army barracks residential premises. The gatherings were in the form o f
barbeques and mumus and were mostly family events, but would invariably coincide with the visit
o f one o r m ore leaders from home. The fact that these meetings were conducted inside military
establishm ents w ith visible security precautions such as entry check-points m eant that visitors,
despite their backgrounds, felt quite com fortable 8.1 personally know both officers quite well and
was invited to several o f those gatherings in which the conversation, despite the absence o f any
set-agenda, always revolved around the war: dealing with questions such as why they fought, and
how to stop i t It was clear to me that these two officers, for different reasons, were rebuilding I

I certainly had confidence in both their intentions and in the security offered by the military establishment;
although in one instance I may have been saved by the Nambka army captain from possible harm. I was
in his house one evening when some o f his clansmen w ho were visiting from Hagen inquired about me
and he told them to leave me alone. Whilst my own group, the Kawelka, were never directly involved with
the Nambka, they were nonetheless enemies by virtue o f the ‘fight partnership’ system, which made me
an enemy by extension. The danger was m ore real than apparent because I later learnt to my horror that
some Kawelka had assisted the Remdi in at least one battle against the Nambka and they were m ore
fearful than I, even in 1992, long before the war was over. O n this occasion, I was doing some research
for the PN G Electoral Commission and visited Minembi territory for the first time in over ten years.
Although I was accompanied by the same PN G D F officer, my tribesmen (about five men) whom I took
with me were so petrified that they almost w et themselves. It was their first time, too, in ova- a decade
since they last entered Minembi territory and came face to face with the enemy.
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bridges betw een themselves and their groups, the Jikam bo and N am bka, both elpukl rma, o r
ow ners o f the war. W ithout doubt, the heavy burden o f responsibility for losses sustained by
respective allies was a factor in their calculation, but they were also w orried about re-establishing
ties. Indeed, an im portant point frequently raised in these meetings and later taken up by leaders
in Hagen was that although gun warfare had caused far too m uch damage and cut o ff relatives
on b oth sides, efforts towards restoring ties should be made so that people could “see each
other’s free” again, especially those o f daughters and sisters and their children (and they in turn
w ould see their fathers, brothers and uncles). I now turn to the second case on warfare, before
making som e general statem ents about Hagen warfare.

Case 2: T h e K awelka-M inem bi War (1986-1990)
T he Kawelka and M inembi are traditionally m ajor enemies. Kawelka sections have either
individually o r collectively fought against M inembi clans in pre-colonial times. The 1986-1990
conflict was triggered o ff by an incident involving a Kawelka K undm bo man w ho died inside
M inem bi Elyipi territory under dubious circumstances. A lthough apparently intoxicated with
alcohol at the tim e o f his death, and the cause o f death was never established, Kawelka
suspected foul play and dem anded com pensation. Denying responsibility, M inembi refused to
pay w hat they considered was a hefty com pensation claim, and Kawelka, obviously angered by
this treatm ent, declared w ar on the Elyipi clan. In the ensuing war, involving nearly five years o f
brutal deaths and massive destruction o f property, a section o f M inembi was routed, but not
w ithout substantial loss o f life and property to Kawelka and its allies. Compared w ith previous
w ars, inform ants claimed that the loss o f life and property in this particular w ar was unusually
high, som ething which has been directly attributed to the adoption o f w estern technological
innovations in the form o f guns and m otor vehicles used mainly for the m ovem ent o f troops
and equipm ent
T he elpukl wua (‘fight root m an5), o r ‘owners’ o f the fight, were the Kawelka K undm bo and
M inem bi Elyipi clans. T he K undm bo were supported by other Kawelka dans, chiefly M embo
and, to a lesser extent, M andembo. They also coopted the services o f K opi, K im bo and
Klamakae. All o f these groups fought as m ajor allies o f K undm bo.
The historical military situation is that M em bo and M andembo have paired against the
K undm bo-K im bo pair in m inor warfare but com bined against M inembi in m ajor warfare during
pre-colonial times. T he K im bo are structurally part o f the M inembi but have in the past fought
against other M inem bi dans and are currently in close association with both K undm bo and
K opi, w ith w hom they are paired together and linked idiomatically as K opi-K im bo rakl ( a
‘pairi), in the same way that dan-pairs are described. T he Klamakae have in the past fought
against the M em bo in m inor warfare but are now closely associated through intermarriage and

The Dynamics o fHagen Warfare

161

moka exchanges. All o f these groups, including K im bo (which is a m ore recent inclusion), are
part o f a larger but rather loosely organised group called Raembka (see Chapter Three, see also A.J.
Strathem 1984; K etan 1996).
Some assistance was received from the Raembka confederacy, but not in a concerted effo rt
A nd, those w ho came forward to provide assistance did so on individual basis and m ostly in a
non-fighting capacity, because m ost Raembka groups remained neutral in principle. However,
Kawelka had a solid fighting partnership with the Remdi, Kimka and Roklaka tribes w ho were
engaged in active w arfare w ith a section o f the M inembi during the same period (see Case 1 in
this chapter).
lik e K undm bo, the M inembi Elyipi clan was assisted by other M inembi clans, mainly Papeke,
Engam bo, K om onka and Ruprupkae. They were also supported by die Nguni tribe. The
historical military situation is that the Papeke-Elyipi are paired, having descended from a pair o f
brothers, Romnggukl and W aep, and w hilst the two have not fought between themselves, there
w ere causes o f enmity between them which prevented them from being close allies during the
sequences o f warfare within living memory (A.J. Strathem 1966b:60-61). The Elyipi are currently
in close association w ith the Tepuka Kengeke, with which they have intense intermarriage and
frequent moka exchanges. A n explanation for this may be found in that in pre-colonial warfare
the Elyipi were attacked by the N um ereng section o f the Engam bo d an and driven out from
their old territory at Krapana w here the Engam bo now are. The Elyipi, as a result were scattered
and later reform ed in a new territory granted them by the Tepuka Kengeke, hence the ElyipiKengeke alliance which subsequendy developed across the supposed el paruka disjunction
betw een Tepuka and M inembi (A.J. Strathem 1966b:60). The Kom onka-Ruprupkae pair have
fought against the Kawelka M embo with the small Klamakae tribe hdping them as their
neighbours (A.J. Strathem 1966b:63). The M inembi-Nguni association appears to be a m ore
recent form ation, founded largely on com m on military grounds.
B oth the K om bukla and Welyi were m inor allies o f the M inembi and assisted in a largely non
fighting capacity. In addition to supplying resources towards the M inembi w ar effort, these
tribes also allowed M inem bi to set up road-blocks within their territories, which resulted in at
least tw o Kawelka deaths. Road-blocks were a key tactic, considering the fact that Kawelka
w arriors residing at K uk had to travel all the way to Mbukl and into the Baiyer Valley to fight
A long the way, they had to som ehow pass Kom bukla and Welyi territories w ithout encountering
road-blocks. T he journeys were always made at night, leaving Kuk after 10.00 p.m. and reaching
K otna before dawn. H alf the journey would be covered by vehicles in less than two hours but
after Penga it became difficult for vehicles because o f road-blocks at the Kuiya bridge and other
similarly strategic locations w ithin Welyi territory. A com m on route taken was to follow the
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H ighlands Highway dow n to K indeng and across to K ondapena, or alternatively to cross over
the suspension bridge near Rukmump and into Roklaka~Waklupka territory, and from there
follow the old highway back to Penga and try to sneak past Welyi territory in the early hours o f
the m orning. O nce past K otna, they were into Tepuka territory (although they were often wary
o f possible danger in Kengeke territory because o f the Elyipi-Kengeke alliance). The M ount
A m bra-K otna road, although it is m ore direct and takes considerably less time to reach Penga,
was deliberately avoided because m ore than two-thirds o f the distance is within Kom bukla
territory. T he K om bukla were viewed by the Kawelka as an active ally o f the M inembi w hilst the
Welyi were considered as, at the m ost, sympathetic towards die Minembi.
O verall, it was an extremely difficult war, especially for the Kawelka, in the sense that these long
journeys, coupled w ith shortage o f food supply and cartridges, put enorm ous pressure on the
warriors w hose task was to drive out the M inembi from Tiki while at the same time protecting
their ow n territories, m ost o f which lie in difficult terrain on the Jimi-W ahgi-Baiyer divide.
Initially, many people from within the Raembka alliance provided food and cash but as the war
progressed further it became especially difficult to maintain such support. As a result, many
w arriors w ho returned to K uk showed signs o f malnutrition, having suffered from lack o f food
and fatigue. Many o f them were reluctant to go back to M bukl, often openly expressing anger at
other m em bers o f the community, blam ing them for lack o f support A few even dem anded that
fellow clansmen and their families contribute towards trips taken to P ort M oresby, ostensibly to
purchase m ore pow erful guns and cartridges. T hose w ho did make it to P ort M oresby often
boasted o f alm ost single-handedly driving out the enemy and dem anded that P ort Moresbybased clansmen supply food and beer for themselves (so that they could regain weight and
strength) and cash for guns and cartridges. A t first the P ort M oresby-based clansmen felt
obligated towards these w arriors, w hom they considered as protectors o f their territorial rights
back hom e, and tolerated their excesses and outrageous dem ands, but as tim e w ent on, they
came to realise that som e o f these ‘great w arriors’ were selfishly exploiting the kinship system for
personal gain9. Although a few o f the visitors were in fact warriors with genuine intentions, the
others were ‘businessm en’ looking to make a quick profit from re-selling communally purchased
cartridges (see discussion on Economics of Gun Warfare). O nce this im portant source o f resources
was cut o ff as a direct consequence o f hum an greed it became extremely difficult to maintain the

It is significant to note that the exploitation o f the kinship system for personal gain follows a common
trend in which urbanites feel that their rural counterparts make far too many demands on them without
reciprocal action. The system is supposed to be mutually beneficial in the sense that clansmen who come
on visits to urban centres like P ort M oresby are given shelter, food and cash by their urban-dwelling
kinsmen and when the urbanites return hom e for visits they are supposed to be taken care o f by their
rural kinsmen. However, this does no t seem to be the case any more. It has become a largely one-way
process, where many urbanites have complained o f clansmen w ho have foiled to reciprocate and,
m oreover, are resentful o f people w ho n ot only foil to reciprocate but also expect and often ask for cash
when they visit home.
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w ar effort back hom e and it was only a m atter o f tim e before other options, too, became
exhausted, thus bringing the w ar to conclusion in 1990.
As previously m entioned in the Remdi-M inembi case, here too was a notable absence o f state
involvem ent A part from instances w here state agencies’ involvem ent was specifically requested
by the com batants, the state generally failed to take control o f the situation in an authoritative
m anner, even w here opportunity presented itself. The state’s incapacity was emphasised by its
apparent failures in at least tw o accessions when police action was requested.
T he first occurred in January 1987 w hen the Kawelka and their allies invited the then Provincial
Police Com m ander, R obert K oras, and his deputy, Jeffeny K era, to attend a wrn paka funeral
cerem ony at M bukl It was a public ceremony attended by several hundred people, including
leaders from neutral groups, w ho came especially to see if the police would take some kind o f
action against those responsible for the killing o f a Kawelka K undm bo m an (which triggered the
war). W hilst both K oras and K era were personally in favour o f a peaceful settlem ent and
prom ised that som e sort o f action w ould be taken, they were unable to back their words because
o f lack o f resources and eventually the rugged nature o f the terrain and M inembi’s unwillingness
to hand over the alleged killer conspired against the officers.
T he second incident occurred in July 1989 w hen a C hurch-sponsored trace was violated by the
M inem bi through the killing o f a Kawelka K undm bo man, K upakl Prior to and possibly
because o f the higher priority o f the W estern Highlands Provincial G overnm ent elections in
June 1988, leaders from both sides agreed to a peace proposal jointly subm itted by the Lutheran
and Catholic churches (in consultation with the Provincial Peace and G ood O rder Committee).
T he trace cerem ony was witnessed by representatives from m issions, the Provincial
G overnm ent and m em bers o f the Police D epartm ent W hilst the details o f the agreement were
n o t available, it was, nonetheless, evident from the speeches made at Kupakl’s funeral ceremony
th at representatives from both Kawelka and M inembi had signed the agreem ent pledging that
they w ould take responsibility for any violation o f the trace. Precisely w hat course o f action
w ould be taken in the instance o f trace violation, it seems, was n o t stated in the agreement,
because that proved to be a point o f contention in the debates that followed. Since the final
peace settlem ent, w hich signals the conclusion o f war, was never held, the M inembi, w ho
obviously felt that the debts in reciprocal killings had not been balanced, set up the road-block at
K enim ba (inside K om bukla territory) in which the K undm bo man was killed (see Election Case II:

1995 Western Highlands Provincial Election!). Consequently, the Kawelka invited provincial
governm ent officials and the Provincial Police Com m ander to attend the funeral ceremony at
Knk-Rimgamiiridi village in an attem pt to press hom e the point that M inembi had violated a
state-sanctioned truce.
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T he significance o f die truce agreement, o r lack o f it, was questioned by many speakers who
w anted to know w hat course o f action the state was going to take. This point was clearly
expressed by die Jika Kilampi councillor, David Maip, who said:
This agreement that you [state representatives] made them [Kawdka and Minembi
leaders] sign, what kind of agreement is it? Does it empower you to take [punitive]
action against those who have violated it? If it does, then you should send the police in
to take appropriate action [raid villages, apprehend the killers, and take the leaders into
custody]. When you made that agreement, what kind of power did you have? You
should now use that power against the violators [Minembi] (Ketan 1989b).
Although the then Acting Provincial Secretary, Oseah John10,* and the Provincial Police
Commander, Samson Mapi, were quite sympathetic and promised to look into the m atter, it was
obvious that their investigations were ham pered by lack o f resources. In the end no action was
taken and the groups returned to take up where they left off. Hostile relations were maintained
until 1990 w hen a peace settlement was finally reached Between 1986 and 1990, a total o f about
forty w am ors were killed, twenty from Kawelka and its allies and about the same num ber from
M inembi11. M ost o f these deaths resulted from raids and ambushes. Batdefields, as mentioned
earlier, were abandoned soon after guns were introduced into this war during the eady part o f
1987. The reasons for the change o f tactics, from batdefields to raids and ambushes, are
discussed later in this chapter (see The Adoption of the Gun as a Technological Innovation in Hagen

Warfare). T he unusually high num ber o f deaths on both sides has been attributed to the change
in tactics and the use o f guns. A laige majority o f deaths on the Kawelka side, for example,
resulted from cartridge wounds and nearly all, except Kupakl and a young M embo man, were
victims o f enemy raids and ambushes.

Oseah John, a devout Christian with exceptionally high work ethics, often w ent beyond the call o f duty to
assist in restoring order in conflict situations throughout Western Highlands, but without the support o f
local public servants and the police force, his efforts almost inevitably foiled to bear much success.
The num ber o f women and children killed during this war is unknown. Considering that the war had been
fought outside o f the batdefields, casualties o f war, especially in raids, did include non-combatants, which
means that the total num ber o f deaths on both sides is much higher than the figures given here.
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T ab le 5.3: W ar D eath s: K aw elka-M inem bi W ar (1986-1990)

Kawelka & Allies

No. ofDeaths

Kawelka Membo
Kawelka Kundm bo
Others
K opon Kopi
Minembi Kimbo
Klamakae
Kurupmbo-Klambo
Total

5
5
1
4
3
2
0
'2 0

Minembi

No. ofDeaths

all clans
Nguni

c.20
c.5

c.25

Source:

Based on information supplied by Yap Goim ba and Komori Ongky, Kuk-Mbakla Village, Mount Hagen.

Noie:

Informants maintain that the Kawelka Kurupmbo-Klambo clan-pair did n ot lose any men because only a
handful took part in the war. M em bo and Kundmbo were the major participants. A Kumdi Oynamb
man, listed above as ‘other’, married into the M embo clan and residing at Kuk, was killed while fighting on
the Kawelka side.

I have excluded actual names o f individuals elsewhere but, here, owing to its relevance to the
discussion on compensation, the names o f war dead are listed.
T ab le 5.4: A breakdow n o f K aw elka an d allies d eath s, by group (clan an d tribe).

Kawelka Membo

Kawelka Kundmbo Kopi

Minembi Kimbo

Klamakae

Pengk Kakl
Kumi Karl
Ketipa Raklpa

Palim Kuri
Kel Raem
John Pangk
Umdi Romba

Mok
Pot
Koim Mok
Wanga’s bro

Tu
Kuri
Ketipa

Ken Kewa
Kerow Kupri

4

3

2

W ump Pengk^
Ruk Tiki
Nopa^
6

Kupakl^
5

Source:

Based on information supplied by Yap Goim ba and Komori Ongky, Kuk-Mbakla Village, Mount Hagen.

1.

Originally o f the Kumdi Oynamb clan but residing with his Kawelka M em bo wife inside Kawelka territory
at the time o f his death. H e fought as a Kawelka against Minembi and may have faced fellow Kumdi
tribesmen at som e stage o f the war. His clan received mostly pigs as compensation from the Kawelka.

2.

All o f these, except Kupakl and Wump, were warriors killed in action or 'line o f duty'. Kupakl was killed in
an enemy road-block whilst travelling from Kuk to Mbukl on the Kotna-Tiki road, whilst Wump (who
lost his father, Pengk, in an enemy raid only weeks earlier) was killed in an enemy road-block on the
Hagen-Baiyer-Tiki road.
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The Adoption o f the Gun as a Technological Innovation in Hagen Warfare
A n overwhelm ing m ajority o f deaths on both sides resulted not from pitched batdes, as we
w ould expect from normal Hagen warfare, w here opposing troops are arranged in prepared
positions on pre-arranged set battlefields, but from pre-dawn raids and ambushes. W hat made
this an unusual w ar was the role played by politicians and the way in which new resources, or
W estern technological innovations, dramatically altered the pattern o f warfare, specifically in
term s o f com bat strategies and their effect on both com batants and non-com batants. As will
becom e d ear in the next chapter, politicians and their henchm en, as part o f electoral
m anoeuvring, are som e o f the m ajor suppliers o f guns and cartridges used in warfare (see Chapter

Six; see also A J. Strathem 1993). They are also known to have supplied vehicles used in raids
and the general m ovem ent o f troops, as well as giving financial and other aid to victims o f war.
T he use o f guns in particular has added an extremely dangerous dim ension to Hagen warfare,
resulting in m ore fatalities because o f a general shift in emphasis from one largely based on
display and adornm ent to that o f ambush and slaughter. T he adoption o f guns in warfare has
m eant that batdes fought with bow and arrows on designated fields, watched by neutral
spectators, is now a thing o f the p ast W hilst pre-gun batdes were serious confrontations and
should n o t be com pared to football m atches, it is im portant to realise that firstly warriors in w ar
dress were on display, both as a group exhibiting tribal m ight as well as individual fighting
prow ess, and secondly, the chances o f dying from arrow wounds were quite m inim al In fact,
m any have survived from injuries inflicted by arrows. And, furtherm ore, as noted by Muke, “in
traditional [pre-gun, o r bow and arrow] fights, only a few men were killed in a single encounter
and in som e instances, the w ar lasted for several m onths o r even years w ithout w ar deaths”
(1994:112). Hagen battle scenes are characterised by weaving and dodging com batants so it is
alm ost im possible to target the heart o f som eone in perpetual m otion, even by com petent
marksmen.
H ow ever, it is also im portant to m ention that combatants can die from such battles. According
to accounts o f warfare given to me by Hagen inform ants, deaths on a battlefield occur w hen one
group is forced by the other to withdraw. If the weaker group withdraws in a structured m anner,
w here die front-line shield-men and their archers’ withdrawal is covered by the flank archers,
deaths can be avoided, and they can regroup to fight again o r call it o ff till another day. If,
how ever, they receive no such cover and flee, deaths cannot be avoided because they will be
easy targets fo r enemy archers and spearm en (who are also shield carriers). In such situations, the
seriously injured can be left behind w ith no protection. H ere shield-men are very im portant
because they can save their stricken comrades from being hacked to death. By planting a shield
firmly on the ground in front o f the stricken m an and at the same time holding o ff the pursuing
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enemy w ith an axe o r spear can buy precious m inutes in which the w ounded can be rescued by
fellow kinsmen. B ut if no such rescue team o r backup is forthcom ing, the shield-man m ust
abandon the rescue attem pt and try to save himself, o r he, too, will be hacked to death. It is
because o f this possibility that brothers, fathers and sons, and cousins fight side by side in battle.
It is said that only an immediate relative, o r in special cases, a good friend, will com e back to
rescue you w hen you’re facing die axe. Even if one is already dead from an arrow o r spear
w ound, relatives will still try and save the body from being hacked12. This is because a mutilated
o r disfigured body has a particularly demoralising effect on warriors. Younger and inexperienced
w arriors, therefore, are never allowed near a hacked body. Likewise, immediate relatives,
especially w om en and children o f the deceased, will be prevented from seeing the body, in the
hope that it will n o t add to their anguish and he will be remembered as he was before the battle.
O n the other hand, m en w ho have used an axe to kill in battle are described as those V ithout
spirits/souls* (min pi-napetim), or with 'dead blood’ in their veins (mema kurum). It is a highly
specialised task, handled by a very few and only by those w ho have the stomach for the job, o r
the killer instinct It is said that they have perm anent bloodshot eyes, from having seen too
m uch blood, and generally avoid pork because a butchered pig reminds them o f exposed human
flesh. Their axes are jealously guarded and wom en and children are forbidden from touching
them for fear o f retaliation from the spirits o f the victims. Such m en are generally despotic in
nature and are both feared and admired by other mem bers o f their groups13. W hile the pow er
relations between warriors such as those m entioned above and other members o f society are
discussed in the section on the Context ofheaders in Warfare, here I turn to the history o f guns and
the effects o f gun warfare.
G uns were first introduced into Hagen warfare in 1986 during intra-sectional fighting within the
Jika in H agen Central, but soon spread to other areas in inter-group conflicts, such as D ei
(Remdi-M inembi; Kawelka-Minembi); Nebilyer (Kuklga-Uklga); and South W ahgi (KonumbkaKondika). G uns are passed from one conflict to another through social networks, just the same
way in which dance costum es and head-dress do in times o f moka and other festivities. Both
guns and dance costum es, especially the kei wal head-dress (which are largely made o f Raggiana
and King ofSaxony sprays), are valued scarce resources. Ownership o f the kei wal, for example, is
limited to enterprising individuals w ho loan them out to members o f a group staging a dance.
A fter the dance, pigs will be killed and choice pork bits and, in many instances, cash will be
presented to ow ners o f the kei wal Similarly, owners o f guns will be rewarded w ith pigs and

«

Reciprocal hacking exists where fighting is especially brutal and only between m ajor enemies. In less brutal
encounters, the bodies o f warriors killed with arrows or spears are left behind on the battlefield for neutral
groups to collect and return to respective groups for funeral ceremonies.

13.

G eorg F. Vicedom mentioned such a man called FCo o f the Yamka tribe (1983[1943-48], Vol.l:78-82).
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cash, o r votes in som e instances, for guns used in warfare. Initially, w hen guns were in short
supply, ow ners regularly loaned them out for cash payments. The same guns used in warfare
w ere also used in arm ed robberies, thus making it difficult for law enforcem ent agencies to
apprehend criminals because o f their value as w arriors to their groups. In a few cases, ow ners o f
pow erful guns w ere allegedly hired as mercenaries to fight in other people's wars. In the W ahgi
‘border war*, for instance, I was told by South W ahgi inform ants that mercenaries fought for
w om en in addition to cash and other econom ic resources. In the K ondika-K onum bka war,
M uke (1994) m entioned the involvem ent o f mercenaries from Hagen. A nd, during the RemdiM inem bi war, it was reported that a D aru man fought on the M inembi side while some Engans
and Simbus fought on the Remdi side. The hiring o f warriors, o r mercenary killers, does not
seem to be a new phenom ena, as it is evident from G eorg V icedom 's description o f a man
called K o o f the Yamka tribe w ho claimed that:
W hen th e K u th jK ulij fought* th eir b ro th ers said to m e: K ill K etla [Kelij P ora, this rich
m an, fo r us. Y ou are th e m an w ho kills people. W e d o n o t ask m ore o f you. O nly kill
this o n e fo r us. I joined up w ith tw o m en o f th e K erne. W e w en t and killed th e m an.
T h e K etla [K elij, how ever, cam e and asked [for] com pensation. I paid th em a string o f
cow rie shells an d m y Jam ka (Yamka] added som ething else. T h e K uth (KuliJ, how ever,
killed pigs [and] gave us th e m eat and p aid also w ith valuables. T his I to o k and
d istrib u ted am ongst m y people. I k ep t only o n e cow rie string and som e m eat fo r m yself
(V iced o m an d T ischner 1983 [1943-48], V oLl.81).

T he life history o f Yamka K o suggests that he was o f a despotic nature and was both feared and
adm ired by the people. I take up his story latter in this chapter (see Context of Leadership in

Warfare).
Presently every clan has its own collection o f guns, which means that any group in conflict with
another o f comparable size can hold its own in war. But the battles, such as the one described
earlier, are no longer possible. Battles have been replaced by raids and ambushes.
Traditional battle form ation, involving shield-men in the front-line with archers fighting out o f
the wings and returning for cover behind the shield form ation, was no longer possible because
shield-men could n o t defend against guns w hich can easily penetrate the w ooden shields. In
both the Rem di-M inembi and Kawelka-M inembi wars the principal battlefields o f Tenga and
G olke, respectively, were abandoned after the first shots were fired. Some tried corrugated
roofing m etal sheets for shields b ut these, too, proved ineffective against guns. In South Wahgi,
John M uke, w ho observed the K onum bka-K ondika w ar in which guns were introduced in
Septem ber 1989, reported that:
...shield carriers are sitting ducks d u rin g g u n w arfare: th e K ondika lo st seven m en in
tw o set piece m oves w ith in a single w eek. T h ree w ere sh o t in o n e set piece m ove and
fo u r w ere sh o t in an o th er form al co m b a t A ll o f th em w ere shield earners (M uke
1994:254).

The Dynamics ofHagen Warfare

169

T he devastating im pact o f guns on shields and m en resulted in the transition from battlefields to
raids and am bushes. A typical raid would involve five to ten young warriors sneaking into enemy
territory, under the cover o f darkness during the early hours o f die morning» and killing anyone
found before returning hom e. In the Kawelka-M inembi case, for instance, I was told that young
w am ors from Kawelka and its K opi-K im bo allied groups would travel from Tiki, cross over the
M iti K u m ountains, through M inembi territories, and follow the ridge into Remdi territories at
Muglamp. Similarly, M inem bi and N guni warriors would sneak into Kawelka, K opi and K im bo
territories in their search-and-destroy m issions, and in one particular instance, killed three
Kawelka at their M ope territories. A similar pattern o f warfare was observed in South Wahgi,
during the K onum bka-K ondika war, where Muke (1994) reported that:
After the loss of seven men within a single week die Kondika abandoned the idea of
carrying wooden shields. A similar shock-wave was generated throughout the
Konumbka fighting forces. The ‘fight husbands’ and the bone shield men’ felt reluctant
to go in the front-line. From mid December 1989 to January 1990, the Kondika used
ambush tactics instead. The traditional battlefields were abandoned and some of the
Kondika young warriors formed gangs and made a number of raids into Konumbka
territory around Minj town from strategically convenient places. The war was now in
the hands o f the young men and they conducted a kind of war without any rules at all
(Muke 1994:255).
M uke’s point on rules o f warfare is a significant one because in these seek-and-destroy missions
young m en are know n to have been involved in indiscriminate killing — o f both com batants
and non-com batants, including wom en and children — which is n ot a feature o f traditional
H agen warfare. In a particular raid, for instance, I was told that a woman was killed and a couple
o f young boys, both under ten years, were almost killed, but were saved by an older m em ber o f
the raiding party. H e pleaded w ith the younger members o f his team not to kill the boys and was
allowed to bring them back with him 14. This is perhaps the only instance in which a traditional
rule on prohibition against the killing o f wom en and children was observed, mainly because o f
die presence o f an older m an w ho still believed in the rules o f warfare. Otherw ise, both the
Rem di-M inembi and Kawelka-M inembi wars indicate characteristics o f unrestricted warfare,
such as those o f traditional Eastern Highlands warfare (see Feil 1987: Chap.4). Following
Langness (1972), D .K . Feil makes a useful distinction between types o f warfare in the Highlands:
die practice o f unrestricted warfare in eastern highlands and restricted warfare in western
highlands societies. U nrestricted warfare, according to Feil (1987:68), “is waged in the total
absence o f ‘rules’ and n o t invariably linked to specific incidents o r motives. It is general,
pervasive and perpetual warfare between groups m ore corporate than those that wage restricted
warfare.” H e further suggested that “this ‘absence o f rules’ involves, am ong other things, a less

O ne o f die boys was given to a man as a replacement for his own son w ho was killed by the enemy, while
the other was raised by the man w ho saved their lives. They lived amongst the enemy for die duration o f
the war and were only recently returned after negotiations initiated by the Lutheran Church (ELC-PNG).
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com plex and interlocking set o f constraints on individual choice determ ining participation in a
given w ar, such that m ore united and corporate fighting units can wage war” (ibid). For
ethnographical accounts o f unrestricted warfare in Eastern Highlands societies, see J. W atson
(1983) on Tairora; see also Langness (1964) on Bena Bena; Read (1955) on Gahuku-Gama; and
R obbins (1982) on Auyana. For accounts o f restricted warfare in the W estern Highlands, see
Brandewie (1981) on the K um di o f W estern Melpa; see also Reay (1959) and especially Muke
(1994) on the K um a o f South Wahgi; and A.J. Strathem (1971) on the N orthern Melpa.
In gun w arfare, it is m ostly young men w ith knowledge o f guns w ho organise raids and set

14)

am bushes for counter-raids. The ‘traditional’ big-men w ho played a general’s role in pre-gun
warfare have little o r no say at all in these m atters, which indicates that guns have also affected
the balance o f pow er, a significant point to which I shall return to later. But, here, I discuss the
econom ics o f gun warfare.

The Economics o f Gun Warfare
Some o f the costs o f warfare, such as loss o f hum an lives and destruction o f property, are m ore
obvious than others as a result o f mass-media coverage and people can m ore easily relate to
them because o f physical o r tangible evidence. O ther costs, by contrast, are n o t so obvious
principally because o f problem s in quantifying and sometimes it is difficult to put a price on
things like psychological effects o f warfare. However, by establishing the cost o f guns and
cartridges used in warfare during specified periods in relation to m ajor source o f incom e, it is
possible to get som e im pression o f the economics o f gun warfare.
In 1987, w hen guns were introduced into a num ber o f conflicts in H agen, a colleague and I were
told that an average clan o f 100-200 fighting m en out o f a total population o f 2,000-5,000
persons would have 20-50 guns (both factory-made and home-made). A particular dan, which
has an exceptionally laige num ber o f its members in the disciplined forces (military and police)
as well as other key positions in governm ent (both politicians and public servants) as well as the
private sector, was claimed to have m ore than 50 guns, including a num ber o f high-powered
semi-automatic weapons. Many others w ith smaller populations were said to have fewer than ten
guns each. W e were also told that during heavy fighting periods, o f up to a week o r m ore in
certain cases, a gun-m an can fire as many as twenty cartridges in a single day. Since cartridges are
scarce and costly, at a retail price o f K2.50 per cartridge and at a black-market price o f K5.00 per
cartridge, we estim ated that one gun-m an could fire an average o f twenty cartridges in one week.
If, how ever, in the unlikely event that he did fire up to 20 cartridges per day for seven days o r
m ore, he would m ost likely end up firing blank shots, getting him self killed, or bankrupting his
group. I shall return to this point later but first a w ord on the num ber o f guns.
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As it is customary for Hageners to deliberately inflate figures as part o f war propaganda, we
reached a conclusion that a more accurate figure would be ten guns per clan. That would have
been a more likely figure in 1987. But soon after that, many clans sent out representatives, with
thousands o f kina, to purchase guns mainly from criminal gangs in Port Moresby and Lae. Some
buyers came as far as Australia and, according to Hagen informants, several returned to Hagen
(via Torres Strait) with guns. A more likely figure, thus, would be 50 guns per clan (c.5,000
persons). A t K250 black-market price, 50 single-shot guns work out to K12,500 per clan. Highpowered self-loading rifles and semi-automatic weapons would, o f course, cost a lot more than
that.
Despite restrictions on cartridge sales in 1986 and 1987, cartridges were easily available from
Chinese shops at Boroko, National Capital District, for K2.50 per shot-gun cartridge, and could
be transported to M ount Hagen without much trouble at all. At more than K5.00 per cartridge
on the black-market, businessmen and others saw this as an opportunity and freighted in
thousands o f kina worth o f cartridges. One particular 'businessman*, a Kawelka Membo
clansman, who profited from the Kawelka-Minembi war by selling cartridges to his own
clansmen at a high price, was caught at Jacksons Airport in 1989 and jailed, but later escaped
from police custody while being transported to the Boroko District Court house.
Based on an estimate o f 50 guns per clan and cartridges at K5.00 black-market price, held
constant, and the number o f shots and the number o f days, treated as variables, the cost o f
cartridges, in PN G Kina, can be worked out in the following manner (see Table 5.5).
T ab le 5.5: T h e co st o f cartrid g es

Variables
1 day
1 week (7 days)
1 month (30 days)
1 year (365 days)

1 shot

5 shots

10 shots

20 shots

250
1,750
7,500
91,250

1,250
8,750
37,500
456,250

2,500

5,000
35,000
150,000
1,825,000

75,000
912,000

A single shot per day is tactically impossible because the initial confrontations before the
abandonment o f battlefields most certainly would have required more than one shot fired from
each gun. Even in raids gun-men would rarely be restricted to a single cartridge each.
Conversely, each gun-man could fire 20 shots in a single battle, but a raid would not require that
many shots, except in the instance o f being ambushed while out on a raid. In such a scenario —
where each gun-man fired 20 rounds — a single day's fighting would cost K5,000, and K35,000
if the trend continued for a week, while one month's cost would be K 150,000. If the intensity
was continued for a year, it would cost a staggering 1.8 million kina, but that is practically
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im possible, even if guns were rotated am ongst any com bination o f men. However, 10-20 shots
fired by each gun-m an, each day for a m onth o r m ore, is possible but would still cost between
K75,000 and K 150,000, w hich is a lot o f m oney and alm ost impossible to raise during a war. If
cartridges for just a single m onth cost that m uch money, imagine how much it would cost in five
years, in addition to food, transport, and the cost to property. A part from the cost o f property
damaged by the war, the w ar effort alone would have cost at least one million kina each year.
H ow was the m oney raised?
A t first regular collections were made, but once the coffee trees, due to years o f neglect, stopped
beating cherries, people w ere forced into alternative crops. Food crops are an alternative to
coffee but m arketing was a problem . People travelling to and returning from markets can be
easy targets for enemy patrols. Eventually, many people resorted to the cultivation and sale o f
m arijuana crops. Large gardens o f the drug were cultivated, usually under coffee trees o r
am ongst other crops such as bananas, and the product was flown into P ort M oresby where it
was sold to m ostly expatriate dealers but also to middlemen (mostly educated nationals with
overseas connections). Highlands-grown marijuana is reputed to be o f a distinctively high quality
and is in great dem and on overseas black-markets.15 Compared with coffee, marijuana fetches
good money (according to one police source, between K300 to K500 per kilogram )16 but
because o f harsh penalties, many people were scared and it is mostly young m en w ho were —
and still are — actually involved in the trade. W hilst individual cultivators claimed that income
derived from die sale o f the drug is solely for the war effort and are therefore protected from the
police, some young m en (like our cartridges-smuggling ‘businessman’ m entioned earlier) were
greedy and often kept the money for themselves, telling their clansmen that they were unable to
sell the product in P ort Moresby. In this regard, marijuana as a source o f income for the war
effort was not very reliable.
In contrast, a m ore reliable source o f incom e was provided by clansmen residing in P ort
M oresby and other parts o f the country. Boxes o f cartridges were regularly sent hom e and, in
som e instances, guns and cash were also sen t Among the W ahgi a similar pattern was
continued: in one case, a clansman living overseas at the time told me that he had sent half o f his
15.

According to Bruce Hams, formerly o f the Departm ent o f Finance and Planning, PN G H ollands-grow n
marijuana, called New Guinea Gold, is in great demand on the streets o f Los Angeles (Public Lecture on
raovka/gangs at Bomana CIS Officers’ Mess in September 1990).

16.

However, as pointed out to me by Sinclair D innen, it is extremely difficult to generalise about the price o f
marijuana. It is mainly dependent on a num ber o f factors, including geographical location, social relations,
type o f m arket (such as local vis-a-vis international), and seasonal availability o f cash (for example, during
coffee seasons and elections). The big trade in marijuana, Dinnen says, is between the Highlands growers
and expatriate buyers in the northern parts o f Australia, but the Americans have intercepted some o f the
trade via Hawaii. The flow o f marijuana from PN G to Australia basically follows the same route in which
guns and bullets travel in the opposite direction, via the Torres Strait (personal communication, August
1996).
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annual salary tow ards the w ar e ffo rt But the m ajor contributors here were politicians and
aspiring politicians — a m ore detailed examination o f their role is attem pted in the next chapter
(see also section on Contexts ofLeadership in Warfare in this chapter).
A n im portant point w orth m entioning here is in the role played by PN G national middlemen in
b oth shot-gun cartridges and marijuana businesses. The marijuana cultivator, just as the gun
m an, is an ordinary villager w ith no knowledge o f the international firearms and drugs trade, nor
does his personal netw ork extend to overseas connections. It is precisely those with overseas
connections that profit m ost from guns and drugs. W hilst my data on the middleman is
inconclusive, I can only speculate that those w ho reap considerable profits are some o f the
country’s m ost wealthy and pow erful individuals who are well-connected to take advantage o f
such opportunities. People like our friend the village cartridge ‘businessman’ makes peanuts
com pared w ith w hat our elite make through illegal sale o f firearms and drugs. I now turn to the
role o f leaders in warfare and discuss the implications o f gun warfare on Hagen leadership.

Context of Leadership in Warfare
There are a num ber o f leadership roles in Hagen warfare, just as in other aspects o f society, but a
m ajor difference lies in the emphasis by observers. A.J. Strathem (1966b:362-365) m entioned
two aspects o f leadership in warfare: (1) the leader’s own ability in fighting; and (2) his
judgem ent on w hen to make war and peace. J.D . Muke (1994:Chap.3) presents a cycle o f W ahgi
warfare com prising five stages, ranging from w ar preparations to peace settlem ent and festivities,
in w hich any one o f the stages would require leadership roles (although Muke was n o t quite
explicit here). I have presented a similar cycle elsewhere (Ketan 1989a). I explore some o f these
aspects o f leadership in the context o f gun warfare and extend the discussion to leadership roles
in rituals on w ar deaths. A m ajor aim here is to assess the level o f change a n d /o r continuity in
aspects o f leadership in Hagen warfare. It basically follows the m odel o f Hagen warfare I have
sketched below:
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F ig u re 5.3: A G eneral M odel o f H a g en W arfare

Source: Based on Ketan (1989a) and Muke (1994).

P h ase I: D isp u te
This is the first phase o f a cycle in which human behaviour is governed by definite rules, and
leadership roles are clearly marked by culture. Disputes in general arise from both perceptions o f
insult and actual assault on person. Acts o f violence resulting in loss o f blood, limb or organ, are
serious matters which can be resolved through compensation or reciprocal acts o f violence.
Homicide, either by design or accident, is an ultimate act o f violence which can be reciprocated
by way o f pay-back killing or alternatively resolved peacefully through compensation payment.
Disputes may also arise from theft and damage o f property, sexual offences such as rape and
adultery, and use o f someone else’s land without prior permission. In all o f these the use o f
wealth items o f pigs and cash play an important part in determining the final outcome o f
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disputes in the sense that in principle they ‘replace’ stolen o r damaged property, blood spilt, and
life taken. Com pensation for property is called kumop, which Marilyn Strathem (1972) calls
restitution17, for assault resulting in injury is called memapentetemen (‘putting back blood5), and for
hom icide is called nnta metemen (‘carrying or bearing a m an5)18. However, as pointed out by A.J.
Strathem (1981:8), it may happen, o f course, that people choose revenge rather than
com pensation. This is particularly true in homicide cases involving groups which presently
m aintain hostile relations o r have a recent history o f warfare. A.J. Strathem stated that “revenge
is likely to be chosen only between m ajor political enemies w ho also have other scores to pay
off. T hat is, a group dim ension is involved, and groups have a history o f disputes which may
include a num ber o f loose ends waiting to be sorted out” (1981:8). The decision to choose
revenge, o r n o t to, is weighted by factors o f social propinquity (the offender’s relative position
w ithin the victim’s personal social network), the nature o f group relations (alliance o r enmity),
and severity o f offence19.
I f fighting betw een brothers o r lineage members (‘father-and-sons5), for instance, resulted in
severe injuries, it would n o t lead to arm ed conflict because it is within the family, and other
m em bers will try to prevent such fights from escalating rather than taking sides. W hen asked
why revenge is n o t an option a com m on reply from inform ants is that these are family fights,
w hich side shall we fight on? Homicide resulting from lineage fights are very rare and are treated
as a m ajor disaster.20 If, however, fighting between members o f two different tribes resulted in
serious injuries o r hom icide, armed conflict was m ore likely than if the antagonists belonged to
the same tribe. Armed conflict was even less likely if the antagonists were members o f the same
d an o r subclan. The do ser the relationship the less likely the chance o f armed conflict B dow

17.

Property compensation payments, according to A M . Strathem, fell into two main categories: (1)
restitution, where amounts equivalent to the value o f the stolen item, damage to property or previous
debt; were returned; and (2) reconciliation payments, which were paid when the injury had no cost in
material terms but where a breach o f norm s had to be recognised o r relations brought back to some
equilibrium (1972a;25).

18.

The phrase, a m metemen, as noted by A J. Strathem (1981:7), tells us that die wealth stands in direct
replacement o f the man who has been lost, and can be used to obtain a new group member, for example,
by payments for a new bride who will bear children for the kin group which has received the
compensation.

19.

In his discussion o f hostile relations between the Maring groups (neighbours o f the Hagen), R A
R appaport reached a similar conclusion. “A violent episode between single or a few members o f a pair o f
groups did no t in all cases lead to inter-group armed conflict W hether or not it did seems to have been
mainly dependent upon (1) the results o f the violence; and (2) the previous relations o f the two groups”
(1984:110).

2°.

Paul Sillitoe makes a similar observation among the Wola o f Mendi. During fights between relatives,
witnesses would intervene and part them for fear o f serious injury. It is unlikely that other men will join
in the fight, and if a dispute does escalate into a fight between the disputants’ relatives, they will tty n ot to
injure seriously o r kill one another because to do so would be an unthinkable and tragic thing (Sillitoe
1981:72).
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th e clan level arm ed conflict is n o t allowed — and com pensation is encouraged as a way o f
resolving disputes.
H ow ever, there are instances w here less-than-fatal o r m inor injuries which have led to armed
conflict betw een dans o f the same tribe. In the early 1980s fighting within the Kum di tribe o f
M ul Council was triggered by w hat seemed to be a m inor incident, during a ceremonial dance,
involving young boys shooting at each other w ith coffee beans projected from bam boo blow
pipes. O ne o f the projectiles missed its intended target and found its mark am ongst the dancers.
A male dancer sustained an eye injury and the alleged culprit was attacked by the victim’s
kinsm en. T he boy’s kinsm en retaliated and w hat seemed to be a m inor intident led to armed
conflict, now know n as the Kum di kopi mong el (‘Kumdi coffee bean fight7). Although the
circum stances surrounding this conflict are less understood, it is, nonetheless, clear to me that
one o f the antagonists, the K um di Oynamb dan, shares with other Kumdi clans less than warm
relations. It has, for example, a history o f warfare in which individuals have gone against tribal
policy and fought for groups which are opposed to those in alliance with Kumdi21.
H aving sketched the likely scenarios, I now turn to the question o f leadership role in disputes.
W ho decides w hether o r n o t to choose revenge? H ow do individuals reach a decision on the
outcom e o f a decision? It is mostly big-men with knowledge o f past relations and current
connections, through moha and marriage ties, with big-men o f other groups w ho influence
decisions regarding revenge o r com pensation. Big-men are forceful public speakers and can
easily persuade others to take up arms o r to ask for com pensation. But the decision to seek
revenge usually takes m ore than sheer pow er o f a big-man’s words. A nd a decision to take up
arms does n o t instantaneously result from a single incident It is, in fact, based on a num ber o f
events o r offences, to which a big-man makes reference in his elik (‘fight talk7) speeches. It is his
ability to sum up a situation, in this case, one o f a deteriorating relations between his own and
the offending group, that makes a big-man a powerful instigator o f w ar (or o f peace). In cases
w here previous transgressions have n o t been adequately addressed through com pensation, and

moka and marriage ties between the two groups are minimal o r virtually non-existent, m ost
people w ould agree that revenge should be sought for a killing. A big-man would weigh up the
situation carefully and if he stands to lose nothing personally and the tribe can hold its own in
term s o f strength in num bers and nowadays firepower, or is able to draw support from its allies,
he th en proceeds to advocate armed confrontation. Since the relations between the groups, due
to recurring negative reciprocity (reciprocal theft, assault, rape and such), has reached a point
beyond w hich it can no longer be salvaged, a big-man’s suggestion to seek revenge through *
a>
*

see, for example, Kawelka-Minembi War in which a Kumdi Oynamb clansman was killed while fighting
on the Kawelka side. In a system o f fight partnerships {el kompam), Minembi received assistance on an
individual basis from Kumdi, just as Kawelka did from Remdi, so a Oynamb man fighting against
Minembi was certainly n o t in line with corporate or tribal interests.
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arm ed com bat is merely restating a view that is already collectively held. O nce a decision is
consensually reached, after each spokesm an o f the different sub-groups has had his say on the
m atter at hand, the segmentary units will be told to prepare for war.
O f course, it may be the case that they had already prepared for w ar and were waiting for
som ething to trigger it off, in which case, this latest incident will be the perfect opportunity to
engage war. Traditional w ar preparation is similar to that o f the South W ahgi (see Muke 1994). It
involved wealth reduction ceremonies in which outstanding debts were repaid to potential allies,
pig? were sacrificed to ancestors, weapons were produced, and orators released war statements at
public gatherings (see Muke 1994:Chap.3). In each o f these exercises big-men were prom inent:
as m ajor sponsors o f the ceremonies and as m ajor donors in prestations; as ritual leaders in
sacrifices to ancestors (asking spirits o f victims to assist in avenging their deaths); as supervisors
and advisers in the production o f weapons and keeping mental tally o f shields; and as orators in
releasing o f w ar statem ents at public gatherings.
T he influence o f Christian m issions, which began operations in the eady 1930s, and the recent
introduction o f guns have, somewhat altered this situation. Pig sacrifices to ancestors, for
example, were stopped by the Lutheran Church. The introduction o f guns in particular has
lim ited the role o f die big-m en in w ar preparation quite considerably. Elaborate ceremonies such
as those m entioned by Muke (1994) are no longer necessary because those who possess such
pow erful w eapons believe they can do the job w ithout the assistance o f the ancestors. A bigm an’s role is, thus, limited to releasing w ar statements. Furtherm ore, gun-men often play a
dom inant role in decisions regarding warfare, arguing that it is they, not the big-men, who will
do the fighting. Also, die supervision o f weapon production (home-made guns) and purchase o f
factory-made guns and cartridges is now handled by younger men with knowledge o f guns. In
my view, it is only a m atter o f time before they, too, will decide w hen to and when not to go to
w ar, thus effectively reducing the pow er o f big-men in war preparations.

Phase II: Compensation or Escalation?
If we were to stricdy follow a cycle o f warfare, phase II would involve escalation o f a conflict.
B ut it is im portant to recognise that com pensation may positively short-circuit the process back
to peaceful relations, thereby restoring some sort o f equilibrium. Since the various types o f
com pensation payments are discussed separately in another section (see Compensation Payments), I
shall only briefly present a general outline here in order to allow for a fuller treatm ent o f
escalation as a sub-phase o f warfare.
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2.1: Compensation
Com pensation is a pow erful m eans through which disputes are resolved. The anger, expressed
through the concept, popokb can only be appeased by wealth items o f pigs and cash offered as
com pensation (see A.J. Strathem 1981; see also A M . Strathem 1972b). By paying com pensation
the pukl M ia’s (‘ro o t m an5) group accepts responsibility for the offence (theft, assault, o r killing)
and attem pts to prevent retaliation. Big-men on either side would speak for the groups: those
representing the aggrieved party would demand com pensation and speakers representing the

pukl M ia’s group w ould try to shift the blame away from the group, th e pukl nmds family, and try
to blam e it on immaturity o r a particular nature o f the offender such as nomanpi-napetim (lias no
sense o f reasoning5), ndoimb ri-neri ('inadequate mental capacity5), rakra fwild5), or raskol ('rascal
gangster5). This does n o t mean that they are denying responsibility, nor is it intended to infer
insignificance o f the m atter at hand. Instead, it is a way o f telling the aggrieved party that group
relations are far m ore im portant than the cowardly acts o f some individuals and efforts will be
made to restore som e equilibrium. A t the same time, the speakers on the pukl m ta’s side will try
to persuade the pukl M ia’s family to com e up with a reasonable size com pensation payment, one
that w ould n o t only 'fit the crime5but also take care o f the popokl factor, thus rem oving the need
for retaliation. It may follow Marilyn Strathem ’s scheme: "where restitution was demanded
reconciliation items m ight be added to the original am ount Thus after the theft o f a pig, the
th ief w ould return a similar pig (kumop, restitution) and then add a further article 'to shake hands 5

(ki tiUmbil) with the owner55 (1972a:25). It is this reconciliation aspect o f com pensation which
may rem ove the popokl factor and lead to restoration o f relations. This best sums up disputes
involving theft and damage to property, sexual offences, assault and other such relatively m inor
offences. But severe injuries and homicide com pensation are certainly m ore serious matters in
w hich the behaviour o f big-m en and their approach to settling disputes differs markedly from
that involving m inor disputes. In such cases big-men from neutral groups would be invited to
act as arbitrators. T heir task was to negotiate a settlement that would satisfy both parties in the
case o f injury com pensation and especially the victim group in homicide cases. Some aspects o f
H agen dispute settlem ent procedures are similar to those o f the Wahgj. John Muke5s description
o f South W ahgi conflict solving procedures can easily be applied to Hagen:
The victim group and the offender5s group assembled at their own central activity place
and invited a third party group to act as arbitrators. This group consulted the principal
protagonists and then carried back and forth the confrontational debates between the
two groups. Depending on the proximity between the disputants, such negotiations
lasted a day or for several days (Muke 1994:99).
H e goes on to note that “if the peace m ediators were successful, a compromise was reached and
som e form o f damages payments were exchanged 55(ibid). It needs to be added here that big-men
from neutral groups acting as arbitrators were quite forceful in directing the owners o f a dispute
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involving hom icide com pensation. They would generally set the target (as near as possible but
n o t necessarily as high 38 the one dem anded by the victim group) and w orked away at the
offending party until the required am ount in wealth items was raised. Elsewhere I explore the
strategies involved in the raising o f hom icide com pensation (see Compensation Paymenty), but here
I should m ention that the use o f third-party arbitrators in resolving such disputes has w orked
well in the past and the m odem state, having the foresight to recognise its value, has validated
their role by creating local peace and good order committees. These committees, com prising
prom inent individuals (such as local governm ent councillors, village court magistrates, as well as
big-men) representing the various local groups (tribes and clans), arbitrate in m ajor disputes
betw een high-level groups (mostly at above the subclan level). All the members are m en and are
typically skilful orators. They are paid a basic allowance o f K25 per m onth and act mainly upon
request and are usually rewarded with a small potion o f the com pensation. T heir role in society
is nonetheless an im portant one which is recognised by both state and society, and the
m em bers, therefore, are held in high regard in their Local G overnm ent Council areas. T heir
renow n, o f course, goes beyond local governm ent council boundaries but their pow er and
influence is lim ited to groups w ithin their respective council areas.
T he D ei Council Peace and G ood O rder Com m ittee, for example, has eight members (see Table

5,5) and handles m ostly hom icide and serious injury cases. A ccording to committee m em ber and
Roklaka councillor, D o t Roltinga, and Mugjamp Village C ourt Chairman, Pirn K oldpi, the
com m ittee’s pow er to enforce com pensation claims falls within a ceiling figure o f K6,000 and 40
pigs for hom icide cases, including fatal m otor vehicle accidents. D ot Roltinga, w ho has been a
local governm ent councillor for over twenty-three years, pointed out that this ceiling price is
m uch lower than the current rate o f over K10,000 and at least 50 pigs, which makes their job
m ore difficult, and exposes its apparent lack o f power.
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T a b le 5.6: T h e D ei C ouncil P eace an d G ood O rd er C om m ittee

Committee
Member
D o t Roltinga
Kumi Krai
Nuggints
RinS
Romba
Pini
Kingal
Unknown
Source:

Tribe
Roklaka
Kimka
Waembe
, Nelka
Unknown
Mapkli
Unknown
Unknown

Position

Type ofLeader

Approximate
Ape

Councillor
Councillor
Councillor
Councillor
Unknown
Unknown
Unknown
Unknown

Big-man
Big-man
Big-man
Big-man
Big-man
Big-man
Big-man
Unknown

50+
50+
50+
50+
50+
50+
50+
Unknown

D o t Roltinga and Pim Koldpi, Gumanch Village, M ount Hagen.

Both Roltinga and Koldpi claimed that the lack o f resources as a limiting factor in their work.
This was supported by Jika Komapi councillor, Tepra, who said that the state itself has “no
strength” (rondokl ti mod) and must therefore recognise the Lutheran Church (ELC-PNG) and
other churches, together with the Peace and G ood O rder Committees, as leading peace-makers,
by allocating more resources such as vehicles and funds to continue their good work. Tepra
blamed politicians for lack o f action in conflict areas and his own Hagen MP, Paul Pora, for not
responding to conflicts in the Hagen Central area. Meanwhile, D o t Roltinga blamed politicians
as being responsible for contributing towards inter-group conflicts by supplying guns as well as
paying compensation, both o f which can enhance their status in society.
2.2. Escalation
Escalation, depending on the type o f relations maintained, may take two basic forms. Where
hostile relations are maintained, one offence will be reciprocated with another, in a fashion that
can be described as mutually destructive negative reciprocity. For example, if one man was
assaulted, his kinsmen would not hesitate to retaliate by assaulting either the assailant or a
member o f his kin-group, or if this is not possible, they would grab an d /o r kill pigs, or even
rape women in serious injury and homicide cases. However, in the event o f seemingly normal
relations — neither friendly nor hostile — a single offence may not require direct retaliation and
in fact the offended group may setde for compensation, but all such incidents will not be
forgotten. They will be kept as unsettled scores, together with outstanding war deaths during
previous fights in their history. In the meantime, big-men will begin to release war statements
during public ceremonies. Also certain incidents involving big-men, such as peculiar behaviour,
will be interpreted by other big-men as signalling war messages. Prior to the Kawelka-Minembi
War, for example, a certain Minembi big-man’s behaviour during a Kawelka Kundmbo pig
killing ceremony at Golke was interpreted as intending to kill someone. This man, according to

The Dynamics ofHagen Warfare

181

K undm bo inform ants, paraded around the cerem onial ground with a w om an's net-bag (n>almet)
containing som e unripe bananas, stones and som e other fruits and nuts. A t a funeral speech,
after a K undm bo m an was killed by the M inembi in a road-block in 1989, the K undm bo bigm an, Rai, made reference to this by saying that:
This man, a big-man, did a strange thing by carrying those objects around in a public
place. There were many people from different groups who came for the feast saw this
strange behaviour and were baffled by it Some said: "This man is going to kill
someone, but who is he going to kill?" I thought he was hungry for pork so I asked my
brothers to add some to my own and gave it to him. But did he want pork? No, he
wanted something else. Instead, he took and ate polled} my man [referring to Kundmbo
Palim]. That is how he waged war against me. I did not want to fight- He started it all
(based on Melpa transcripts o f tape recordings made by Andrew Strathem in July 1989).
As happened here, relations, whilst appearing to be quite norm al may hide tensions which at any
tim e can flare up in full-scale war. Revenge for the death o f Palim, w ho died under dubious
circumstances inside M inembi Elyipi territory (lamo and K etan 1992:103), appears to have been
chosen instead o f com pensation (see Case 2).
Escalation also involves the contracting o f allies as well as reaching tem porary truce and
establishing moka ties with m inor enemies. This is where the persuasive skills o f orators (ik ivud)
and the entrepreneurial skills o f wealth transactors — both qualities that successful big-men
possess — are required Big-men will call upon their allies to repay debts for assistance
previously given to them during their fights. A t the same time, they will make sure that the fight
is only on a single front and discourage m inor enemies from attacking by making small
prestations o f gifts to them . In the Rem di-M bem bi W ar, for example, Remdi leaders, led by
Rem di Jikam bo big-man and M ount Hagen businessman, Puklma K opi, gave a gift o f K500 to
the Jika Kilampi, thus converting a previously hostile relations into one o f exchange netw ork
(see Case /).
W hen making peace with m inor enemies, no m atter how tem porary it m ight be, w hilst at the
same tim e initiating w ar w ith a m ajor enemy, big-men will alm ost apologetically (but never
explicitly) point out to their form er enemies that fighting should never have occurred between
them (and perhaps never should again), arguing that the positive aspects o f their relations, such
as moka exchanges and intermarriage, far outweigh those o f negative reciprocity. A m ajor aim
here is to explicitly state the current nature o f their relations between the ex-m inor enemies
w hilst em phasising the point that current enmities are strictly between the m ajor enemies. Thus,
in this way, the battle lines are clearly drawn at the outset so that third-parties (except for m ajor
allies o f principal com batants) are discouraged from entering into the conflict In Hagen, alliance
systems are clearly established (although shifting in nature) and, therefore, act as a preventive
m echanism in negptiations between m inor enemies, w here one o r both parties are also m ajor
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allies o f tiie principal com batants. In other w ords, one principal com batant will n o t initiate
exchange relations w ith a m ajor ally o f its principal o p p o n en t It may happen som e tim e in the
future but n o t at the tim e w hen the m ajor com batants are preparing for war. In the same way,
alliance systems may act as a m ajor constraining factor in all-out warfare between confederacytype conglom erates w ith m em bers w ho are parts o f m ore than one alliance network. It is bigm en w ith knowledge o f such networks w ho can successfully exploit them to their own and their
group’s advantage. B ut even for the m ost successful o f big-m en there are constraints such as
individual cross-cutting kinship ties, marriage and moka exchanges, and nowadays business and
w ork ties. These can prevent the big-m en from contracting individuals from allied groups to
assist in fighting, in the same way that it is difficult to prevent one o r two individuals from m inor
enem y groups from supporting the principal oppo n en t T he point to rem em ber here is that a
group may pledge allegiance one way, o r declare neutrality in a particular conflict, yet individuals,
for reasons m entioned above, may n o t necessarily act accordingly. Significantly, this trend is
continued in other spheres o f com petition and cooperation (see, for example, elections in

Chapters 6-8).
Phase III: War
This corresponds to John Muke’s “actual engagement” phase (1994:107), o r com bat, in which
battle sequences were fought between the combatants. Since I have already m entioned
traditional battle form ations, albeit briefly, and they are described m ore extensively by Muke
(1994), I deal w ith only leadership aspects o f com bat here.

3.1. Fight-Leaders and Despots
T he first aspect is the leader’s own ability in fighting (A.J. Strathem 1966b:362). Strathem goes
on to note that “fighting ability is always listed as one o f the ideal capacities o f big-men
(although they were m atched in this by fighters w ho were not big-men)” (ibid). D raw ing from
early accounts o f warfare (Vicedom and Tischner 1943-8, V o ll and 2; A J. Strathem 1966b),
one gets the im pression that excellence in moka, not fighting skills, was required in achieving and
m aintaining big-m an status. This is probably an accurate assessment in so far as the big-man
m odel goes, w ith strong emphasis on pre-em inence in moka exchanges, but does that mean that
there were no other types o f leaders? If big-m en, as Vicedom and Tischner (1943-8, VoL2) and
A.J. Strathem (1966b) say, did “incite their clansmen to war, in order to hum ble neighbouring
rlans and prevent them from holding successful moka occasions”, yet “im portant big-m en m ight
keep away from fighting” (see A.J. Strathem 1966b:363), it makes one w onder just w ho m ight
have led Hangmen to war. If som eone did lead them to war, then shall we call such persons
fight-leaders? V icedom would have said no: he claimed that “there were no real fight-leaders,
although an orator m ight m arshal the m en initially for a pitched battle” (voL2:147; cited in A.J.
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Strathem 1966b:363), and Strathem him self offers litde in the way o f either rebutting o r
supporting V icedom , apart from this general com m ent on big-men:
O n the whole, then, it seems that personal prowess in warfare was neither a necessary
nor a sufficient criterion for becoming a big-man. Yet it enters as a component in the
ideal picture of the big-man, in his guise as the triumphant victor over other clans and
rival big-men (1966b:363).
There are tw o points w orth raising here. Firstly, it is possible that V icedom in particular and also
Strathem (perhaps to a lesser extent) down-played the role o f leaders in battle. Secondly, the
pow er and influence o f ‘fight-leaders’ (those w ho led others in battle) appears to be lesser sixty
years ago than it is today. I f the situation had changed over tim e, then it m ust have been very
dramatic because my own observations o f warfare over the last ten years indicate that there are
in fact fight-leaders. These are m en w ho formulate strategies, organise battle form ation and led
others in attack and defence. Some are skilful fighters themselves, excelling in several aspects o f
fighting such as shield form ation, archery, o r counter-attack. O thers are fearless m en w ho
organise raids and ambushes. A few are violent m en w ho terrorise others in times o f both war
and peace. These m en are especially despotic in nature and feared by enemies but are valued by
their ow n groups for their licensed violence in warfare. I have heard stories o f such m en but
personally know o f only one. H e is o f the Kawelka M embo clan, aged between 35 and 40, his
nicknam e, M bakiaAmP !, is well-known am ongst many groups in the w hole o f the D ei Council
area and som e parts o f the Hagen Central area. A m ong the Kawelka his prowess in fighting is
m atched by none and he was a m ajor driving force behind the brutal eviction o f a M inembi
section from their Tiki territories in the Baiyer Valley. H e is said to have fought a num ber o f
battles alm ost single-handedly and in one instance fought on despite a spear lodged into his
thigh. W ith the sharp end o f the spear firmly buried into the ground and the other end sticking
out o f his thigh, he was pinned to the ground, but as the enemy closed in for the kill, he used the
back o f his palm and karate-chopped the spear at both points o f entry and exit, thus freeing
him self to face the enemy. Spurred on by his courageous act, his clansmen engaged the enemy in
a pitched battle and finally chased the enemy off. Mbakla Ami is one o f the few ‘older’ fighters
w ho have made the transition from bow and arrow fights to gun warfare. H e is now skilled in
both w eapons and, during the Kawelka-M inembi W ar, led num erous raids into M inembi
territory. H e is well respected by w arriors and all o f them feel com fortable being led by him in
raids.

M bakla A m (lit ‘Mbakla a rm /, or ‘a one-man army from Mbakla1). Mbakla (as in Mbakla Imp manga,
‘origri place9) is h e Kawelka sacred site near Mbukl on the Sepik-Wahgi Divide, and one o f the villages at
Kuk has been christained Kuk-Mbakla. It is a term that is also used as a prefix when formally referring to
the group or an individual m ember o f the Kawelka, thus Mbakla Kawelka or Mbakla Ami. Incidentally,
Ami is also the name o f an im portant ancestor but I see no direct linkage here — the w ord derives from
the English, (and Pidgin) army.
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A m i is also a leader in other aspects o f society. H e is a renow ned orator, possesses skills in
com pensation negotiation, is prom inent in clan and subclan m atters regarding bridewealth
paym ent and has been involved in som e m inor moka exchanges. A nd, he is referred to as a rwa

nuim (big-man), precisely the same w ord used w hen referring to those w ho are pre-em inent in
moka exchanges. Am i is admired for all these <positive>aspects o f his character and is considered
an hero by many o f his tribesm en. Yet he is feared by many people from both within his own
tribe and outside. There are two cases which illustrate this p o in t
T he first involved the renow ned social anthropologist, Andrew Strathem , in late 1994. D uring a
b rief visit from Pittsburgh, USA, Andrew killed a pig for his old friends at K uk to settle som e
outstanding m atters. T he m eeting w ent well and as he was com ing out o f a friend’s settlem ent he
encountered a road-block. A young man o f the Kawelka K urupm bo d an , apparently unhappy
w ith A ndrew over som e land m atter, had felled a gum tree across the road. As the young m an
(who was in fact the nephew o f the Kawelka big-m an, Ru, a dose friend o f Andrew) was about
to confront Andrew, Mbakla Ami appeared w ith a chain-saw and deared the road. There was no
objection to his intervention and the m atter was dropped w ithout further problem s.
T he second involved a young councillor from a Hagen Central group. In 1992 three young m en
from the Kawelka Klam bo clan were involved in a fight with the councillor’s brother, in which
the Hagen Central m an sustained a broken arm. A fter the fight the councillor took it upon
him self to hand out punishm ent H e first assaulted one o f the assailants, then followed another
into M ount H agen tow n and after having spotted him sitting inside a vehide confronted him.
H e tried dragging him out o f the front-seat, threatening to cripple h im Ami w ho had been
sitting next to him got out o f die vehide and challenged him: ‘Y o u prom ise to cripple him but
first tell m e how many m en have you personally killed?” It was Ami’s way o f telling the
councillor that ‘do n o t start w hat you cannot finish’, o r ‘do n o t get involve in m atters which you
cannot handle’. T he councillor, in spite o f his reputation as a tough character him self, did n o t
pursue the m atter, at least n o t along this line o f strategy, and the conflict was later resolved
peacefully through an exchange o f com pensation.
These tw o cases, w hilst illustrating fear, also suggest the use o f fearless reputation as a tool in the
prevention o f disputes from further escalation. This makes m en like Am i becom e unlikely
peace-makers, despite their use o f heavy-handed tactics. All o f these may be good for the
com m unity in term s o f m aintaining some form o f order, b ut there are bad o r disruptive aspects
to the behaviour o f such m en as well.
Am i in particular is know n to have taken goods from local markets w ithout paying, dem anded
w om en from the K undm bo elpuklwua (although this is norm al in elpukl wtuhkui wua relations)
and was prom pdy given one (for which he has yet to pay bridewealth), and in the past stolen
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pigs and attempted rape on at least one woman, and defaulted one moka. This behaviour is
consistent with that o f similar men in the p ast In Georg Vicedom’s account o f Yamka K o, we
leam that K o began his life-time career as a tough character early in his youth. H e claimed to
have ‘never listened to talk’, stole pigs, struck-down men with sticks and wounded them, raped
women, broke into houses and stole valuables, killed a number o f men and women, and people
generally fled at the sight o f him. H e described himself as ‘shameless’ and ‘non-hearing', a
‘napitla’ [one w ho would not mend his bad ways, nor take advise regarding such behaviour]. His
own people were said to have been proud o f him and often praised him but many feared him
(1943-8, VoLl:80). Further, he goes on to claim that:
I killed Kutli {Kuli] Kiti. His relations came and asked for compensation, so I gave
them shells. I killed a Ndika (JikaJ, the Kuntaka [Kundtka] Ketla [Ketikla], during a
fight; also the Kutli [Kuli] Ropokla. From the Mokae [Mokei] I killed the Kom onka
Koram a and from the Namboka JMokei Nambka] a young man on the dancing ground.
During a fight I killed the Ndika [Jika] Nditing and the Mokae Koepaka (Mokei
Koipka], as well as the Koka Medimbo [Mokei Melirnb]. W hen I killed Mokae [Mokei]
Oklambo, I left his body on the dancing ground (VoLl:81).

Such outrageous claims, if made today, would get someone killed. In fact, the real and ever
present fear o f pay-back killing would prevent most men from making such bold claims.
Moreover, considering the size o f Yamka which is rather small compared with Jika or Mokei
(see Table 5.6), it is incredible that Yamka was not routed as a result o f this man’s actions.
T a b le 5.7: H a g en C entral’s ‘su p er-trib es’, by p o pulation.

Year/Period

Jika

Mokei

Yamka

1960s

6,749a

6,199b

2,281

1980 residents counts ^

8,943

7,809

3,653c

1987 e st pops.2

10,508

9,241

4,642

Sources'.

A.J. Strathem (l% 6b:19); Burton (1989:257).

a:

Including groups given refuge: Kungunaka (755), Penam bi (678), Elti (445) and Palka (314).

b:

Including som e Epilkae (153) w ho are sem i-incorporated,

c:

W ith Kinjika

1:

T h ese figures are for people deem ed to be ‘residents’, which suggests that the total figures (including
non-residents) w ould be m uch higher.

2:

O n the basis o f population growth at 2.0 per cent a year.
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G eorg V icedom w ho m ust have been shocked by this m an’s self-account tried to place K o’s
behaviour in the context o f tribal strength and the m an has a certain kind o f hero from w hom
people around him could draw strength from. H is com m ents are given below:
When reading this life history, one shudders and could think that the man has
exaggerated. But this is not the case by any means. There are a few men o f this kind in
every tribe. They are always celebrated as heroes by their relations, for it is this kind of
man who makes a tribe strong, protects his clan, and enriches it by his actions. When
one gets the impression that Ko tells o f his deeds with a certain satisfaction, one has to
keep in mind that the Mbowamb [Hageners] do not detest such men but have a certain
fear o f them and even magical shyness. If other men are not like this it is only because
they have not such strength The Mbowamb’s [Hageners] attitude towards criminals is
different from ours (Westerners]. Crime is only what harms the clan, everything else is
welcome (Voll:82).
It is clear from the M bakla Ami and Yamka K o cases that such m en have a place in society, their
pow er and influence derived from reputations and in war they led by example. Hagen society, in
contrast w ith W estern society, has no regimented military structure and ranking in which orders
are followed strictly to the letter. But that does n o t necessarily mean the absence o f leadership in
warfare. There were — and still are — fight-leaders who may n o t be big-men (and why should
they be?) b u t are still leaders.

3.2. Initiators of War and Peace
It has been suggested in the literature that big-m en often play a m ajor role in initiating w ar as
well as in peace-making (see Vicedom and Tischner 1943-8, VoL2; see also A.J. Strathem 1966b;
1971). Big-men have been depicted as calculative individuals w ho influence others to fight so
that they may personally benefit at the expense o f rival big-men (see Vicedom and Tischner
1943-8, Vol.2; de Lepervanche 1968:176; Sillitoe 1978:252, cited from Muke 1994).23 There may
be som e truth in this in the sense that the accounts o f warfare given by Hagen inform ants often
indicate that particular wars were started o r ended by certain individuals w ho are usually bigm en, o r nowadays, politicians and educated elites. Testing this, however, is difficult because
firstly, it is alm ost im possible to docum ent cases in which big-m en did win o r lose from wars
initiated by them o r by their rivals; and secondly, no big-man o r politician would adm it to either
starting, o r profiting from , a particular war, w ithout serious repercussions. It is mainly for these
reasons that there is no substantial evidence.

23.

In a subsequent paper, Sillitoe (1981), however, states that “in the acephalous society o f Wola, rival bigmen do n o t lead factions nor do they try to extend political control over one another through war (which
is the argument put foward in Sillitoe 1978). The Wola think that war is a bad, but sadly an unavoidable,
part o f life, and big-men stand to gain nothing from it. The only time they stand out above average is
following the end o f a war when men make reparation payments to relatives o f dead allies. This is because
o f their superior ability in handling wealth in ceremonial exchanges, upon which their and positions as bigmen depend” (Sillitoe 1981:75).
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N evertheless, in recent tim es, politicians have been blam ed for encouraging others to fight, as
part o f electoral m anoeuvring, o r as part o f punitive action against supporters o f rival candidates.
Again, there is no conclusive evidence, apart from rum ours and allegations. The closest I came
to docum enting the involvem ent o f big-m en and politicians as initiators o f w ar (and peace) was
in 1992. A fter the 1992 N ational Parliam ent elections, w ar broke out between the Welyi and
K entpi tribes o f D ei Council over election results (see Chapter Seven, see also K etan 1996:263-4).
A prom inent big-m an and form er provincial governm ent m em ber outlined a strategy to me,
w hich he argued w ould win the support o f both Welyi and K entpi voters for the Tepuka
candidate, R euben Parua. H e argued quite convincingly that it was in Tepuka’s interest to
encourage the antagonists to fight for a while and then step in w ith gifts o f pigs and cash to
settle the dispute, thus putting them into positions o f obligation towards Tepuka as the peace
maker. As it transpired, the conflict was resolved and the K entpi candidate, Philip Bobby, was
persuaded to step aside in favour o f his fellow Raembka candidate, Parua, and som e Welyi
voters shifted allegiance to Parua during the 1993 D ei O pen By-Election. W hilst this case
suggests that there is a possibility o f big-m en and politicians exploiting conflict situations for
personal and group interests, the evidence, is still insufficient to make any firm statements about
the role o f leaders in initiating w ar as a strategy designed to achieve personal goals.
Contrarily, die data on leadership role in peace-making is quite sufficient A.J. Strathem (1966b;
1971) has already reported on big-m en as peace-makers. I extend the discussion to cover the
role o f politicians and other leaders such as church leaders, businessm en and educated elites (see
discussion on Peace Settlement, see also the discussion on die role played by leaders in ending the
Rem di-M inembi W ar in 1989).

Phase IV: War Deaths
In traditional Hagen warfare, there was a definite leadership role here. A fter Muke (1994), I
break the discussion into two sub-phases, reflecting the two opposing sides to w ar death
ceremonies: the victim’s funeral ceremony; and the killer’s victory ceremony.

4A:Funeral Ceremony (V ictim 'sgroup)
There were two parts to this ceremony. The first involved funeral rites and this is where the
ritual leader com es in. I f a w arrior was killed instandy on a batdefield it is believed that the
victim’s min ('spirit’, o r 'shadow image’) escapes suddenly and stays w here the incident occurred
(Muke 1994:112). T he objective o f the victim’s group, as pointed out by Muke, 'Is to form an
enclosure at the scene o f the death and invite the shadow image to com e with them back to the
proper burial place” {ibid). A ritual expert {man mai), armed with a bam boo tube and a piece o f
clothing taken from the victim, w ould roast pork-fat over a fire, w hilst at the same time sum m on
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the min by calling the nam e o f the victim, often explaining to the victim’s min that he is in foreign
territory and therefore m ust com e hom e with them . T he min, supposedly operating on the basis
o f smell (of som ething familiar such as clothing) w ould be lured into the bam boo tube by the
axoma o f the burning fa t It responds by chirping like a quail as it approaches the ritual expert
w ho m ust catch and trap it inside the bam boo tube by closing it with leaves o r a piece o f d o th
once he and his clansm en are convinced that it had entered the tube. I f successfully captured it
will be taken back to the tribal burial grounds where it will be released soon after die corpse is
buried. O n the other hand, if unsuccessful, the victim’s min is said to be unhappy with somebody
w hich calls for public confession in order to eliminate clansmen w ho may have w ronged the
victim so that only those considered to be on good terms and preferably his best friends may
participate in the rituals. T he ritual expert, if it is believed that he is n o t doing a good job, may be
substituted w ith another. A nd, the ritual will be repeatedly perform ed until die min is captured
and delivered to the clan cemetery. T he ritual min calling also extends to deaths resulting from
m otor vehicle o r other similar accidents in w hich the victim dies instandy.
T he influence o f m issions, however, has m eant that such rituals are becom ing very rare and face
die real possibility o f being phased out w ith church rituals. There are very few ritual experts
around; many have died out, while others have now been baptised, which prevents them from
practising. This has forced people to go outside their tribal groups to hire ritual experts. For
example, in 1988, w hen a Kawelka man was killed in P ort M oresby, a Koiari ritual expert was
hired to sum m on the min so that it would be taken back to Hagen w ith the body. Although my
tribesm en w ere convinced that the min had been captured, I was n o t so convinced. There are
tw o ways o f testing the procedure. Firsdy, it is claimed that you can hear the min chirping away
like an excited quail, both from inside the tube after it is captured and from outside as it
responds to the ritual expert’s calL Secondly, it is said that there is a big difference in the weight
o f the bam boo tube before and after it is captured I heard no such chirping noises, no r felt any
difference in w eight W hen I pointed out this to the ritual expert, he responded that he was n o t
too sure. W hen I asked why then did he claim to have captured the min, his response was simple
and quite logical: “it is w hat your tribesm en believe that is im portant, w hether o r not the spirit is
in the bam boo is n o t im portant” I saw no reason to w ithhold paym ent so I advised my
tribesm en to pay him for his specialist services.
T he second part o f a traditional funeral ceremony involves the wuapaka (rip-lifting man’), o r the
public display o f the corpse, o r alternatively his clothing such as front-apron (hai), bark-belt (kak)
and 3fc-tanget o r cordyline leaves (keiya pukia). This would occur at a ceremonial ground (moka

pend) in w hich m ourning women and close male relatives o f the victim would assemble around
the corpse (or his clothes) suspended on a platform o r cross-bar and would rise to join grieving
neighbours as they m arched into the grounds in clan and subclan groups. Each group would
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sing a funeral song considered appropriate for the occasion, whilst the victim’s group would sing
tw o o r m ore newly com posed funeral songs together with old ones. A fter circling around the
grounds for som e tim e and once all the neighbouring groups (both allies and neutral groups)
have joined in, everyone will be told to assemble for el ik (‘fight talk*) speeches. This is where
big-m en and nowadays politicians come in. A n exceptionally high level o f oratorical skills is
required here in order to persuade allies to continue with the w ar effort and urge warriors to
avenge the death.
T he nmapaka cerem onies for im portant leaders were similar to those o f w ar deaths, except for a
m ajor difference in being that the objective o f the orators here is to emphasis the group’s loss
rather than to marshal support for revenge.
T he Christian m issions, however, have banned this ceremony, so now it is reserved for
im portant leaders w ho have n o t yet been baptised. Even those w ho have died whilst being
prepared for baptism have been denied a traditional funeral ceremony. This has led to some
tension betw een those w ho have been converted to Christianity and a small but powerful
m inority (including m ost politicians) w ho still d ing to some aspects o f the past, especially in
m atters o f personal interest (such as funeral ceremonies in which their participation can gain
them political support, “polygyny, which secures for a big-man wives as a labour force and
affines as exchange partners” [A.J. Strathem 1969a:44] and potential voters in elections, and
other aspects o f traditional society which contribute towards the overall success o f individuals
and groups). T he tension between Christians and ‘traditionalists’ over funeral ceremonies was
highlighted by a South W ahgi case in early 1987. I was part o f a U PN G research team which
visited the W estern Highlands in January 1987. We flew to G oroka by plane and from there
travelled by road to Minj where we had an invitation from U PN G academic and K ondika
Jo Mangi, to overnight at his house. Mangi and a colleague, Linus Digin’rina, had
arrived in Minj two weeks earlier. There were four o f us in the second team, com prising two
expatriates and tw o nationals, and as we arrived at the rendezvous point (Minj High School),
neither the U PN G pair, n o r Mangi’s brother, Andrew (the school’s headmaster) were present
As we started walking towards a small K ondika ham let on the hills behind die Minj tow nship, a
m essenger told us that Mangi was n o t able to m eet us because o f a family tragedy but he
(messenger) w ould lead us to Mangi’s hom e. The others, being outsiders (the other national was
from the coast), may n o t have noticed but the first thing that struck me upon arrival at the
K ondika ham let was the conspicuous absence o f m ourning. I found that disturbingly unusual
because people throughout the Highlands always cry when som eone dies. A n explanation for
this was given to us later. The deceased, w ho was Mangi’s paternal uncle, was studying for
baptism w hen he died, w hich, according to the Catholic church, made him a Christian and
therefore required a non-traditional funeral. This ‘non-traditional’ or Christian funeral consisted
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o f prayers, a serm on and singing o f Christian songs accom panied by guitar music. T he denial o f
a full traditional funeral cerem ony to the deceased angered his relatives, especially Mangi and his
younger brother, w ho considered this as an infringem ent o f individual rights as well as a
violation o f traditional custom . T he dispute resulted in Mangi pulling a stunt on his clansmen,
w hich eventually cost him a pig. The details o f this incident are given in Appendix XI.

4 2 : V ictory Ceremony (K iller’s group)
This particular cerem ony also involved ritual leadership, especially in the purification rites
perform ed immediately after the killing. Muke’s description o f South W ahgi purification rites are
applicable to Hagen:
Meanwhile, the killer’s group showed their jubilant mood and humiliated the opponents
by singing abusive war songs, chants and dancing... After their victory ceremony in the
battlefield, they also returned to their sacred site to perform a series o f rituals known as
‘they killed the person and are eating them’ [which, in Hagen is symbolised by the eating
o f pig Ever]. The main objective was to purify the killer from the minmaan [die Hagen
min\ o f the deceased enemy from haunting him and to honour the gods for assistance.
A huge pig was killed during this ceremony. The Ever and heart o f the pig was removed
and cooked on a specially prepared platform. The fresh meat was steamed and was
given to the warrior who struck the first blow. The rest was oven cooked [and]
distributed among the crowd, but portions of the meat were not given the test of the
population. After the ceremony they displayed their shields to an audience and then
waited fort the victim’s group to conduct all the funeral rituals and then stage the next
battle known as the ‘paint wax’ (Muke 1994:113).
T he H agen purification rites are similar to those o f the W ahgi as described by Muke. The victory
celebration is called guide roromen (roughly equates with jubilation), which involves taunting the
victim 's group with w ords, song? and actions. N o definite leadership role is required here and
the participants are mostly younger warriors. It is in the next part o f the ceremony which
requires ritual leadership. T he symboEc ‘eating o f the man’ through the consum ption o f pig Ever
is called wua mk hcnmh halg noromen (‘killing m an and eating his Ever5) are activities w hich are
supervised by a ritual expert, o r alternatively by clan leaders with knowledge o f ritual procedures.
Nowadays, victory celebrations, as a direct result o f gun warfare, are no longer possible because
successful raiding parties cannot express their jubilation nor taunt the enemy w ithout drawing
unnecessary attention to themselves and face the real possibiHty o f being killed. Furtherm ore,
m ission influence has m eant that m ost m en cannot participate in these ‘pagan’ ceremonies.

Phase V: Peace Ceremony
This is the cerem ony w hich formally m arks the end o f a single bout o f warfare and the
beginning o f peaceful relations. As pointed out by Muke (1994:113), it is difficult to define the
duration o f wars betw een groups. H e goes on to note that:
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....in some cases (like ‘the brother’ groups) there exists a permanent hostility that lasts
for several hundred years. In other cases (as the wars against the ‘brother-in-law’
groups) wars were fought for a short duration: each brief bout o f war was brought to an
end, followed by a period o f mss> and back again. In both cases, however, it was
intervention o f a third party group that brought a formal war to an end (Muke
1994:113).
T he South W ahgi groups’ m aintenance o f perm anent hostility between ’the brother’ groups can
be com pared to m ajor o r traditional enemy relations in Hagen where one com pensates m inor
enemies b ut n o t m ajor enemies and the relationship between m ajor enemies is characterised by
m utual distrust, fear and accusations o f poisoning.
W ithout com pensation (which would otherwise terminate hostilities and convert relations o f
enmity into exchange partnership), hostilities are never truly terminated. A nd the virtual absence
o f interm arriage and moka ties means that friendly relations are never achieved. In this regard,
Muke’s characterisation o f the South W ahgi ‘brother’ group warfare as “perm anent hostility that
lasts for several hundred years” (1994:113) may hold for Hagen.
likew ise, the W ahgi ‘brother-in-law’ groups can be com pared w ith the Hagen m inor enemies
w ho share intermarriage and moka ties and whilst having fought one another in m inor warfare,
have also com bined against a m ajor enemy.
In both cases, a single bout o f warfare may last several years, as indicated by the Remdi-M inembi
and Kawelka-M inembi cases, which ended when the com batants got tired o f fighting.24 This
w ould invariably coincide with diminishing food supplies and difficulties in maintaining the
support o f allies. M oreover, it seems that wars were always brought to an end as a result o f third
party intervention (see Muke 1994:113; see also A.J. Strathem 1966b:364-5). Indeed, third party
groups and im portant leaders played a significant role in initiating peace. But it was a
com bination o f factors, in addition to third party intervention, that brought a w ar to an end.
Firstly, it is the com batants w ho themselves m ust decide that they have settled outstanding debts
in reciprocal killings (as seems to have occurred in the Remdi-M inembi and Kawelka-Minembi
cases), o r w hen one group is routed (as in the Jika Maipngel case). Secondly, w hen it becomes
difficult to maintain support for the war effort in terms o f m anpower and resources, especially
cartridges in contem porary gun warfare (as in the case o f the Kawelka). A third factor was that
o f cross-cutting kinship ties, especially in the contem porary context w here relatives from warring
groups can m eet at w ork places, in hotels and hom es in urban centres, away from the battlefields
(as in the Rem di case). Finally, after all these factors have been brought to bear on the outcom e
o f the war, the third party intervention becomes a reality. Any prem ature intervention,

24.

An im portant point w orth mentioning here is that there is no clear winner in this confrontation, although
one group may route another (as occurred during the Jika Maipngel war).
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particularly w hen uninvited, may result in further problem s, such as truce violation (see
Kawelka-M inembi case). It is partly because o f die difficulties involved in reporting that these
factors I have m entioned are rarely brought to the attention o f authorities in Waigani. In
new spapers, for instance, w e only read o f peace settlem ents and the involvem ent o f church and
governm ent agencies, but rarely o r none at all on ‘human interest* stories about the role o f
individuals in peace settlem ents (like die tw o PN G D F soldiers that I have m entioned in the
Rem di-M inembi case).
T he role o f the churches, nonetheless, is an im portant one. The Evangelical Lutheran Church o f
Papua N ew G uinea (ELC-PNG), for example, has an on-going program on inter-group
conflicts. It began w ith church leaders, com prising pastors, circuit councillors and headm en {miti

rup mua, ‘m an w ho has custodian o f the gospel*) from neutral groups contacting their
counterparts in w arring groups to see if they would be receptive to a peace proposal Meanwhile,
the congregations w ithin the various circuits were form ed into prayer groups, each responsible
for a particular conflict T he prayer groups, mostiy headed by w om en, m et every night praying
for peace, and their fellowships often ended in the early hours o f the m orning. T he church
leaders, on die other hand, maintained frequent contact until they were convinced that the
com batants were ready for peace, hence their congregations’ prayers were answered. Their
w arring counterparts’ task was to convince their fellow clansmen to end the war. O nce this
process, which may take m onths o r even years, was com pleted, they would report back to their
peace-m aking counterparts that they were ready for peace. The church leaders would then
proceed by inviting governm ent agencies to witness a peace settlem ent on a date convenient to
all parties.
A m ission-sponsored, state-sanctioned, peace settlem ent was symbolically marked by a
cerem ony in which leaders o f rival groups would pledge to G od (by taking an oath on the Bible)
and State (by signing an agreement) to end hostilities and seal the agreement by shaking hands. It
is a public cerem ony in which the com batants are said to ‘shake hands’ (k i titim bil). It is also
rtnring this cerem ony that the church will erect a w ooden cross on the border o f the com batants’
territories, as a symbol o f peace (but it may decide to do so earlier in an effort to stop them from
fighting). Muke reported a particularly interesting example o f church intervention by way o f a
placard ‘planted’ in the battlefield, which read in Tok Pisirr.

Pimsim pail biiong Kondtka na Konumbka Olsem na ol man i sakim tok biiong Gavaman, ol i
sakim tok biiong Godtu. Olsem na bat olikisim pe nogut biiong olyet (Rom 13:2) [italics mine].
T h e K ondika an d K onum bka fight m ust stop. T h o se m en w h o disobey d ie
governm ent, also disobey G od. T herefore they w ill receive th eir bad rew ards (R om ans

13:2) (Muke 1994:113-114).
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A lthough it is n o t d ear from his discussion about the origins o f the placard, we can assume on
the basis o f its message that it was put there by members o f one o f the churches. Muke’s
com m ents, how ever, are useful for our purpose:
This placard is interesting because of the unique combination o f authorities and belief
systems it refers to. Most obvious is the presence of the Christian G od Warfare is
disapproved of by God and its missionary envoys, and it is God's divine justice that will
punish the wrongdoer. Unequal relationship between God and man is inherent to
Christianity because it is believed that God created man and that man must worship the
divine creator... At the same time, the authority of God extends (or is extended) to the
government, which has its own system of laws and sanctions. Lastly, the placard
displays also an indigenous symbol o f peace. This is the taboo substance known as milt
bol {fern), often erected by a neutral group at the boundary of the battle-ground This
taboo substance, o f die highest order of moral and religious sanction symbolises the
willingness o f the third party group to bring the opponents together by conducting a
peace ceremony which would bring the war to an end (Muke 1994:114).
Muke’s final point reg a rd in g taboo substance is w orth com m enting on. Hageners, too, have
taboo o r divination substance called mi (see A.J. Strathem 1981:15), upon which oaths are taken
w hen c la im in g innocence in any w rongdoing and certain taboos, o r “don’ts” (which carries with
them supernatural sanctions), are observed. As others have previously noted (Strauss and
Tischner 1962; A.J. Strathem 1972:40), the origin myth o f each Hagen tribe contains a reference
to its mi, explaining how this was revealed to a tribal ancestor either by Sky Spirits o r by a ghost,
as in the case o f the Kawelka. The Kawelka mi o r mystical divination-substance (cf. A.J.
Strathem 1972:34), for example, is the cordyline plant {keiya koema), which, according to one
older inform ant (the Kawelka M embo big-m an, G oim ba O nom be), was used by third parties in
an attem pt to stop m inor warfare between the Kawelka K undm bo and M embo clans. N o
recollection, however, was made o f the mi being used in m ajor warfare, nor is there any m ention
o f it by A.J. Strathem (1966b) who conducted his fieldwork in the sixties.25 If, however, it was
used to stop warfare in the past, then the situation has changed considerably over tim e, as
evident in both the Remdi-M inembi and Kawelka-Minembi cases in which the influence o f
Christianity was m ost apparent The com parison between South W ahgi and H agen use o f taboo
substance may not o f course be valid on the basis o f cultural differences, but this, I think, is n o t
die case, as there are far too many similarities (almost to the point o f exact likeness). It may well
be the case o f the ‘ethnographic past* versus that o f the ‘ethnographic present. I now return to
the Lutheran (ELC-PNG) program m entioned earlier.
A fter a peace settlem ent was reached, the next step for Church leaders was to re-educate the ex
com batants about Christianity and its virtues o f forgiving and peaceful co-existence. M embers o f
the W ahgi congregation, headed by Pastor Petro Tim bi, for instance, were assigned the task o f

25

In a footnote, A.J. Strathem (1966b:365), however, did admit that “a close account o f the strategy o f
peace-making was n o t obtained by me.’
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mili omkl (‘gospel revision*) w ork am ongst the M inem bi congregations o f K eraldong and M okla
(also spelt Moga). This is the long-term aspect o f group relations in which church leaders can
play a crucial role in the m aintenance o f peace and order. The state, however, as pointed o ut by
Jika K om api C ouncillor Tepra (and also by the Roklaka Councillor, D ot Roltinga, and Muglamp
Village C ourt Chairm an , Pirn K oldpi), does n o t always recognise this. In stead, its over
enthusiastic and rather clumsy efforts in attem pting to stop tribal warfare has alm ost inevitably
failed, Police riot squads have been largely responsible for damaging the image o f the police and
the ultim ate decline o f die state. O ne local observer, appalled by the destructive m anner o f riot
squad operations, has described them as “the rape and pillage squad o f the Highlands” (Mangi
1992:118). H e goes on to argue that:
The Mobile Riot Squad o f the Police Force based in the Highlands is as much a
criminal element as any petty criminal; only they are in uniform and under the
protection o f the Law o f the land... They know no bounds and go in to rape and pillage.
As their superiors often put it ‘This is Operation Mekim Save” (Operation: Teach a
Lesson). There are many cases pending before the courts throughout the Highlands
whereby the people are claiming compensation for damages done by the police when
raiding villages. These range from assault charges to ones where whole villages and
settlements have been razed to the ground (Mangi 1992:118).
I can only add here that such claims are n o t unfounded because I too have heard o f and
w itnessed police brutality. Elsewhere, I have reported on one case o f destruction in which the
R iot Squad destroyed an entire K onum bka village near Minj “with the sensitivity o f a N azi
blitzkrieg” (Ketan 1989c). As asked by Mangi, one w onders “how the hell does the Police Force
expect to w in the cooperation o f the people if terrorism is the only m ethod they apply w hen
dealing w ith the people?” (Mangi 1992:118).

Phase VI: Reparation Payment
This refers to com pensation for killings o r reparations for losses sustained by one’s allies (A.J.
Strathem 1981:12). In tribal warfare, principal combatants are called elpukl wua (‘fight root man*)
and allies w ho have sustained losses as km wua (‘dead man5). It is the elpukl wua, on both sides, as
‘ow ners’ o f the fight, w ho pay com pensation o f wealth items (mainly pigs, pork and cash) to
respective allies. Referred to as wuapeng (‘m an’s head5) in Hagen, and using moka principles, this
is usually reciprocal paym ent for solidtory gifts, wua omhil (‘m an’s bone’), previously received
from the km wua Such com pensations, according to A.J Strathem (1981:12), are largely aimed at
pnsnring an ally’s goodwill in future fights, but also to maintain one’s prestige (see also A J.
Strathem 1966b; 1971; 1981).
T he com pensation o f allies for w ar deaths is called wuapeng (‘man’s head5) paym ent It is made
after a w ar to com pensate for losses, especially o f warriors, incurred by allies while providing
military assistance. There are tw o strategies involved in allies com pensation: (1) direct payment;
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and (2) a series o f payments involving solicitory gifts, and counter-gifts, which may develop into

moha. The two cases given below illustrate these strategies. In the latter case, a nma peng
compensation usually follows a nma ombil (‘man’s bones’) solicitor}7gift In this case, moha may or
may not eventuate, depending on the individuals involved.

Kawelka w ua p en g paym ent to allies
Following the second approach, Kawelka received solicitor}7gifts before reciprocating in a large
presentation o f pigs to its allies. The allies may or may not return the gifts as moha in future,
although it is generally accepted that some form o f reciprocal payment will be made in future to
compensate for Kawelka men who died whilst fighting on the Kopi-Kimbo and Klamakae
fronts. As indicated in Table 5.7, Kawelka received 30 pigs as nma ombil gifts from its allies. In
return, Kawelka gave 300 pigs to Kopi, Kimbo and Klamakae.
T a b le 5.8: K aw elka wua peng paym ent to allies

Allies

Items (pigs) receivedfrom allies as Items (pigs) given to allies as wua
peng compensation

wua ombil gifts
Kopi

10

100

Kimbo

10

100

Klamakae

10

100

Total

30

300

Source:

Based on inform ation supplied by Yap Gotm ba, Tangka Timbi and K om on Ongky, Kuk-Mbakla village,
M ount Hagen.

Note:

T he 300 pigs given as nma peng com pensation were contributed by all Kawelka clans: M em bo (100);
K undm bo (100); and Kurupm bo-Klam bo (100).

Apart from the nmapeng compensation, the Membo clan o f Kawelka also made a nma ombil moka
to Kundm bo, soliciting compensation or nma peng payment for the loss o f three men (Kumi,
Pengk and Keripa) who died on the Kundmbo front against the Minembi.26 A total o f 20 pigs
and three cows were given to the Kundmbo, who were planning to use these to celebrate a
successful election win. Much of which will, o f course, go to voters and supporters. Further,
Kawelka as a group gave a nma ombil moha to its Kimbo and Kopi allies, soliciting compensation
for the loss o f four men (Wump, Ruk, John and Kel) who died while fighting on the KopiKimbo front against the Minembi. Membo, Kundmbo and Kurupmbo-Klambo contributed 10

26

In late 1996 the Kawelka K undm bo clan reciprocated M em bo’s solicitory gifts by making a large nmapeng
paym ent. For details, see Chapter Six.
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pigs each tow ards the wua ombilgifts. O f all deaths, only the allies (Kopi, K im bo and Klamakae)
deaths w ere com pensated by Kawelka through wua peng payments after receiving wua ombil
soRdtory gifts. T he others w ere delayed for mainly tw o reasons: (1) owing to Kawelka’s status as

elpukl wua (‘fight ro o t m an5), b oth K im bo and K opi cannot be pressured into rushing payment;
and (2) the K undm bo wuapeng paym ent to M em bo has been tied up with the W estern Highlands
Provincial G overnm ent election campaign, in which M embo sponsored a K undm bo candidate
(as part o f soliciting for payment). See the concluding chapter o f this thesis for an update o f this
situation. M em bo also contributed towards his campaign by provision o f funds and other
econom ic resources (see Chapters 7-8).

R em di wua peng paym ent to allies
Unlike Kawelka, w ho tied up allies5com pensation in moka and election campaigns, Remdi took a
sim pler approach by opting for direct paym ent in roasted pigs, which means that these payments
will n o t be reciprocated in future. As indicated in Table 5.7, the Remdi Jikam bo dan, as ‘owners
o f die fight5, gave away a total o f 1,750 pigs (all roasted) in reparation payments. The m ajor
recipients were the Mul Council-based T ipper Remdi5section, w ith 500 pigs in 1990 for the loss
o f two m en, and die Kimka-Roklaka tribe-pair, w ith 1,000 pigs in D ecem ber 1994 for die loss o f
six m en in battle. Rem di Penam bim bo and Kiklpukla were paid 200 pigs in 1992 for the loss o f
three m en, while Enga and Simbu migrants received only 50 pigs for die loss o f two m en in
batde.
T he highly disproportionate nature and possibly the sequencing o f the paym ent partly reflects
the nature o f relationship between these groups, whilst at the same time emphasising the
potential fear o f retribution— o r lack o f it— from kid wua groups. The T ipper Remdi5section,
for instance, belongs to a separate political field, the Mul-Baiyer electorate, and is an im portant
political and military force in the Mul Council area. The social, administrative and geographical
distance between die tw o Remdi sections, Tipper5 and Tow er5, m eant that the com pensation
am ount, talcing into account th e num ber o f deaths, had to be o f a reasonable size and TJpper
Remdi5given priority over other allies.
Conversely, the Enga and Simbu m igrants, because o f their clientage relationship w ith the
Rem di Jikam bo as patrons, were perhaps inadequately com pensated for two deaths. The Simbu
and Enga m igrants, despite losing as many m en as TJpper Remdi5, were paid only 10 per cent o f
w hat the M ul Council group g p t Apparently, Remdi Jikam bo leaders saw no danger in dow n
playing the contributions from their Enga and Simbu clients. These m igrant groups live and
w ork at the G um anch coffee plantation, and w hilst they were definitely n o t used as mercenaries
here, one cannot help feeling that they may have been used as a new form o f labour in warfare.
Furtherm ore, the feet that these m igrant groups do n o t have the numerical strength w ith which
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to dem and reparation paym ents was n o t lost on Remdi political strategists. A lthough it is a
norm al practice in H agen for hut wua groups to dem and com pensation and even threaten to kill
pigs and rape w om en o f the elpukJ wua group, it is d ear that Remdi leaders took advantage o f
the ‘foreignness’ o f their clients. It is typical o f Hagen groups to treat diente — such as refugees

('womb età), m igrants {tepa-pd womb), and ‘servants’ (klntmant wamB) — with indifference, alm ost
contem ptuously, and certainly w ithout the kind o f respect and esteem which they themselves
expect and som etim es dem and from others.
Similady, the Rem di Penam bim bo and Kiklpukla, though losing three m en, were given only 200
pigs because o f their dose association with the Rem di Jikam bo dan. The Kiklpukla are alm ost
incorporated into the Rem di Jikam bo d an , while some Remdi Penam bim bo share territories
w ith Jikam bo clansm en near the Muglamp station. It seems that both these groups were treated
as part o f the Jikam bo clan and therefore shared responsibilities o f ‘fight ownership’.
M eanwhile, the Kimka-Roklaka, w ho lost six m en, were paid 1,000 pigs, which works out to
166.66 pigs for each death. T he Remdi-Kimka-Roklaka alliance, as evident in Chapter Three and
involves a high degree o f complexity, which will be examined later in the thesis (see Chapters 7-8),
b u t it is perhaps w orth m entioning here that the Remdi Jikam bo made two vital mistakes. In
light o f recent developm ents, especially the 1992 and 1997 national elections, Remdi Jikam bo
strategists firstly erred in their judgm ent that the Kimka-Roklaka pair o f tribes were not
im portant enough to w arrant priority over others in reparation payments, and secondly, their
blunder in assum ing that the Kimka-Roklaka would ‘commoditise’ their votes as solidtory gifts
for reparation payments was n o t corrected earlier. In retrospect, it would seem that by 1992, it
was far too late, as the Kimka-Roklaka had already sponsored their own candidate, Puri Ruing,
to oppose the Remdi Jikam bo candidate, K oi Ranpi.
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T a b le 5.9: R em di w ua peng paym ent: allies d eath s & co m p en satio n

Year

Group {Allies ofRemdiJikambo)

Number
Deaths

of Items

Pigs Per Death

(Roasted Pigs)

1990

‘U pper Remdi’

2

500

250

1992

R. Penambimbo & Kiklpukla

3

200

66.66

1992

Enga & Simbu migrants

2

50

25

1994

Kimka-Roklaka

6

1,000

166.66

Total

17

1,750

102.94

Source:

Based on inform ation supplied by Ivan Tau and Maip Kei, Muglamp, M ount Hagen.

The different approaches in reparation payment selected by the Remdi and the Kawelka groups
reflects, among other things, the varying degree o f corporate emphasis placed on arenas o f
competition and cooperation. The Kawelka, for instance, have been successful in moka, setting
trends in incorporating new ideas and resources (see discussion on Moka), whilst Remdi has had
major successes in business. Significantly, prominent individuals such as Ongka and K ont who
acquired their big-men status through moka, are still active and very much influential amongst the
Kawelka, whilst those among the Remdi, men such as Maip Kei, have been either converted to
business or replaced by younger and Western educated leaders, such as Puklma Kopi, Stanley Pil
and Ivan Tau, who made their name through business and government positions. Pig-rearing is
a full-time occupation, requiring considerable investment o f time, labour and energy. Men such
as Puklma, Stanley and Ivan are already committed to full-time occupations and, though they
may find the energy, do not have the time nor the labour required in pig management.
Consequently, most men in this category do not have pigs o f their own — as aptly described by
Chris Owen’s (1990) documentary film on PN G ’s first professor, John Waiko — they are ‘men
without pigs’. When they do need pigs, they just simply buy them or acquire them on credit basis
through social networks. For example, during the 1994 Remdi reparation payment to its KimkaRoklaka allies, Madang O pen MP Stanley Pil brought two truckloads o f pigs from the coast
while others went shopping for pigs in nearby villages and hamlets. The point is that these men
cannot engage in moka for sustained periods without seriously jeopardising their business and
career prospects in government. O n the other hand, men like Ongka can and do take every
opportunity to do so because that is what they do best and their position in society depends on
it
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Phase VII: M oka
T here are three types o f exchanges: (1) enemy com pensation; (2) ally reparation payment; and (3)
pure moka (see A.J. Sfcrathem 1971). Enem y com pensation involves gift exchanges w ith m inor
enem ies, thereby creating relationships o f enmity into exchange networks for political purposes
(as in the Remdi-Jika Kilampi case m entioned above). Ally reparation involves the paym ent o f
com pensation to ones allies for assistance rendered and losses sustained in war (see above
examples). Pure moka, w hilst initially may have developed from warfare exchanges, take the form
o f gift exchanges between established partners. The link between w ar payments and pure moka
has been noted by A ndrew and Marilyn Strathem:
In practice pure moka and warfare exchanges become intertwined. An important feature
o f all ceremonial exchange relations in Hagen is that they are expected to continue over
a number o f years. If one group compensates, reparates, or gives moka to another it
expects that the recipients will reciprocate after a few years. Moka relations are explicitly
based on this norm o f reciprocity; war payments come to follow the same pattern since
it is often the case that there have been reciprocal killings or ally-losses between dans.
Thus A pays B for losses and later B pays A, much as done in moka itself (1971:48).
I have recorded no examples o f enemy com pensation except the M inembi Engam bo clan’s
approach to the Kawelka candidate, William Pik, with m inor gifts and prom ise o f votes during
the 1995 provincial assembly elections (see Chapter Eight). This may lead to com pensation, but
they are m ajor enemies. If it does eventuate, then it will be a result o f elections as an allencom passing event Examples o f ally reparation payments, as m entioned above, ate (1) the
Remdi paym ent to die Kimka-Roklaka and other allies; and (2) the Kawelka payments to their
allies.

Phase VIII: Peaceful Relations
A fter bouts o f w arfare, reparation payments and moka exchanges are necessary to bring about
peaceful relations between local groups. However, it is w orth m entioning here that neither peace
n o r w ar are natural states o f hum an societies. M oreover, peaceful relations may even be only
truce periods, that is, a tem porary political arrangement, just as warfare is temporary. A true
picture o f society, thus can be interpreted as one o f alternating peace and war. In fact, the Hagen
case studies presented in this study suggest that the dynamics o f Hagen society can be best
described in term s o f cycles within a megacycle (see Chapter Nine for further exposition o f this
point).
T he cydes and sub-cydes o f Hagen sodety are the key features o f Hagen sodety, a sodety
w hich is still going through the m otions o f change. In the second chapter o f the thesis I
presented an erratic cycle o f Hagen history, characterised by alternating periods o f peace and
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war, w here the exchange o f blows and gifts was prom inent In each case, we have seen the rise
to prom inence o f certain leadership types, each w ith special skills. In this chapter I have shown
that despotic leaders, although n o t necessarily o f the ruthless type described by Salisbury (1964)
and W atson (1971), have a place in society, and m oreover, that their value to their groups
becom es m ore significant w hen their societies are caught in the grips o f warfare.
T he recent resurgence in warfare in the H ighlands can be understood in the context o f social
and political change, coupled w ith a remarkable resilience o f traditional custom s and values o f
H ighlands societies and a corresponding weak institutional capacity o f the post-colonial state, a
significant point to which I shall return in the next chapter o f this thesis.

Conclusion
T he key issues raised in this chapter need further elaboration here. Traditionally, warfare has
always been an im portant arena o f com petition and cooperation for Hagen groups and their
leaders. Prowess in fighting skills was an im portant criterion for acquiring leadership status. Also
im portant w ere skills in management o f large-scale events such as warfare and specialist
knowledge o f esoteric activities, especially in the conduct o f rituals regarding w ar deaths.
Traditional Hagen warfare, like contem porary W ahgi warfare, was ritually regulated.27 This and
other studies (see, for example, Meggitt 1977; A.J. Strathem 1977 and 1992; G ordon and Meggitt
1985; Burton 1990; Muke 1994) show that group warfare was never an uncontrolled descent into
H obbesian chaos. Evidence presented in this study and in Muke’s (1994) study provide support
for a corrective to W estern assum ptions (about Melanesian warfare) that conflict escalation
corresponds to a progressive breakdown o r abandonm ent o f social controls (cf. O ’H anlon
1995:472).
C ontem porary Hagen warfare is less ritually regulated than W ahgi warfare, mainly because o f its
political and econom ic dimensions. The influence o f Christian m issions, new econom ic
resources and technological innovations such as the gun have significantly altered the pattern o f
Hagen warfare. In particular, gun warfare, w ith rising cost o f guns and cartridges, can becom e
expensive exercise. T he econom ic costs can be measured in millions o f kina, but w hat is really
shocking for observers and participants is the high num ber o f deaths involved in gun warfare.
T he way in w hich Hagen warfare has been systematically linked to other arenas o f com petition,
especially reparation paym ents, moka exchange and elections — to form a megacycle — may be
unique to H agen. H ow ever, the inherent intergenerational pow er struggles between older style

27

gee M uke (1994) and O 'H anlon (1995) for accounts o f Southern and N orthern Wahgi warfare, respectively, See also
Rappaport 1984[1968] for a sophisticated discussion on ritually regulated warfare among the M ating people o f the Jim i
and Simbai valleys.
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leaders such as big-m en and new style leaders has w ider implications for Bougainville, Melanesia
and elsewhere in the w orld, an im portant point to which I shall return in the concluding chapter
o f this thesis.
Secondly, the case studies on Hagen warfare suggest that the persistence o f organised violence in
the H ighlands and in other parts o f the country represents the m ost powerful and consistent
challenge to state authority, thereby exposing the weakness o f the post-colonial state. The PN G
state s lack o f adm inistrative capacity in policy implem entation and its inability to penetrate,
dom inate and regulate society has substantially diminished its legitimacy in die eyes o f its
citizens. M oreover, the challenge to public order and particularly to the state’s

c la im

of

m onopoly over the legitimate use o f force raises wider questions about the definition and
function o f the m odem state. F or instance, w hat exacdy is a ‘state? A ccording to one textbook
definition:
The state refers to the authoritative decision-making institutions for an entire society, to
which all other groups, institutions and persons are legally subject In other words, die
state is legaly supreme: in the last resort, its authority is compulsory. The state is the
ultimate regulator of the legitimate use of force within its territory (Hague, Harrop and
BresKn (1992:6).
In fact, as pointed out by D ahl, in practice "the G overnm ent o f a State does n o t necessarily

monopolise the use o f force, b u t it has the exclusive authority to set the limits within which force
may legitimately be used” (1976:10).28 In Papua N ew Guinea it is this particular claim o f
authority and indeed the state’s legitimacy which has come under fire from local groups in recent
times.
Finally, it is precisely in those areas that he state has failed to assert authority where PN G
Highlands societies such as Hagen were effective, as indicated by die relative ease with which
conflicts are resolved especially after governm ent efforts in peace negotiations fail Actions by
local groups which may at times appear to be in defiance o f state authority, upon closer scrutiny,
may in feet prove to be n o t only necessary but perhaps the only course o f action open to
participants. A series o f unsuccessful attem pts at peace settlements initiated by the state in
conflict areas dem onstrate this p o in t The Hagen case studies on warfare presented in this thesis
show that the state’s peace attem pts were prem ature and governm ent officials lacked local
knowledge o f conflict resolution skills. A bit o f local research would have indicated to state
agencies that group warfare comes to a form al conclusion only after outstanding debts in
reciprocal killings between the warring factions are balanced It is therefore partly due to lack o f
28.

A fter W eber, Dahl (1976:10) says that “The Governm ent is art]/government that succestftdly upholds a claim to the
exclusive regulation o f the legitimate use o fphysicalforce in enforcing its rules within a gven territorial area. ” (italics in
original). Furtherm ore, he says that “the political system made up o f the residents o f that territorial area
and the G overnm ent o f the area is a State”’ {ibid).
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understanding o f historically proven m ethods o f local conflict resolution, and also because o f
inadequate and at tim es, inappropriate, police action in dealing with local conflicts, that there has
been an escalation o f violence in Hagen, the PN G H o lla n d s, and odier parts o f the country.
T he other reason o f course lies w ith people’s reactions to structural changes and the state’s
incapacity to deal w ith such problem s, a trend which is evident in other arenas o f com petition
such as elections, w hich form the focus o f analysis in the next three chapters.

Chapter

6

ELECTIO NS A N D T H E HAGEN MEGACYCLE
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Introduction
In this chapter I present an overview o f elections in the Highlands o f Papua New Guinea, in
order to situate the case studies discussed in the next two chapters. Basically, it deals with two
m ajor issues: elections and violence. A particularly worrying feature o f elections in recent times is
the escalating cost o f election campaigns and correspondingly high rate o f election-related
violence in Papua N ew G uinea (see, for example, Iam o ed. 1992 and Saffu ed. 1996; see also A.J.
Strathem 1993b; Standish 1994; and D innen 1996b). While these and other observers have
reported instances o f election-related violence in varying degrees o f severity, none has attem pted
to provide detailed analysis o f the underlying reasons for such violence. A nd w hilst some
observers have com m ented on election campaign expenditure and associated problem s (see, for
example, Standish 1989), perhaps none may have pointed out the economic irrationality o f
elections. This chapter, largely based on observations in Hagen, attem pts to help rectify that
situation.
Accordingly, the escalating levels o f violence, in addition to the deliberate infringem ent o f PN G
electoral regulations, and the use o f large sums o f cash to buy votes, are discussed in the context
o f electoral m anoeuvring by powerful individuals, as an innovative extension o f the rivalry
between equally pow erful and, in some instances, party-aligned 'interest' groups operating within
well established arenas o f com petition and cooperation. These election case studies o f local-level
politics again raise w ider issues o f com peting legitimacies and state-society interactions.
T he chapter starts by providing some essential background inform ation on elections in the
H ighlands, highlighting som e im portant symbolic and functional parallels between traditional
Hagen and PN G state political systems. It then looks at the specifics and elementary aspects o f
elections, com m enting on behavioural patterns o f participants and the general characteristics o f
contem porary H agen political culture. M ore specifically, it examines factors such as the
respective power-bases o f nationally prom inent Hagen leaders, disruptive pow er struggles
between national and provincial politicians, and the rivalry between party-aligned 'interest5
groups. A relatively prolonged history o f confrontation between the N ational G overnm ent and
the W estern Highlands Provincial G overnm ent highlights this perpetual pow er struggle between
national and provincial politicians. Such a situation ultimately led to the abolition o f the
provincial governm ent system in Papua N ew Guinea, the implications o f which include a
possible increase in the intensity o f com petition as people realise that the stakes are now higher
since the sphere o f com petition has been considerably narrowed.
It is essentially an analysis o f political strategies o f local groups and their leaders in com petition
for state-derived resources, prestige and power. O ne o f the m ost sophisticated and effective
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strategies analysed here is the skilful use o f the Hagen megacycle and its sub-cycles o f warfare
and reparation payments as political resources by candidates and their supporters in their
attem pts to m obilise support for elections. Also examined in this chapter are some salient
features o f Hagen elections, such as ‘cash-for-votes’ and ‘name-list’ groups, Vote-banks’ and
‘base-vote’, the pervasive practice o f voter coercion, and the problem s created by the rising cost
o f elections and unrealistic expectations o f elective office.
T he final part o f the chapter attem pts to place the empirical evidence in wider theoretical
perspectives. In particular, it argues that some o f the current problem s faced by PN G are the
cumulative effects o f a new political culture, which can be examined in the context o f (1)
com peting legitimacies and the re-invention o f legitimisation processes by local groups to
facilitate their aims and goals; and (2) the weak state/ strong society dichotomy. By drawing from
the experiences o f other Third W orld countries, especially in tropical Africa, this chapter
concludes by pointing out that, despite being blessed with a wide range o f natural resources in
generous proportions, the P N G nation-state’s current econom ic, social and political problem s
are alm ost like a m irror image o f the kind o f problem s faced by some African regimes before
crumbling.

Background
O ne o f the m ost striking aspects o f Papua New Guinea Highlands societies generally and,
Hagen in particular, is the spirit o f com petition. B oth ethnographers and casual observers tend
to agree that it is here in these densely populated high valleys that one finds extraordinarily
com petitive societies in which groups and individuals constantly com pete for tem porary
advantages over one another. The traditional spheres o f com petition are warfare, ceremonial
exchange, bridewealth and various types o f com pensation payments — all o f which are statusoriented and can be described as m onum ental prestige institutions. These institutions o f both
positive and negative reciprocity have shown great resilience in the face o f rapid social change
and now exist side by side w ith, and in some ways are incorporated, into m odem spheres o f
com petition such as commercial business enterprise and elections, one o f which forms the
subject under scrutiny here.1 This competitive character o f Highlanders is partly based on an
ideology o f equality, although in practice big-m en have m ore influence and prestige than others.
O rdinary m en, however, believe that they too can become big-m en (cf. Feil 1987:116). Few in

The way in which traditional Highlands ideologies and practices have been incorporated into elections can
alm ost be equated to the processes o f socio-religious syncretism which occurred in the Caribbean;
voodooism (or what Haitians respectfully label vodou, vodun, or tmdou), for example, arose from contact
between Aftican ‘paganism’ and European Catholicism, but whether the current trends in politics will
develop into something uniquely Highlands only time can tell.
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fact actually do, b u t that is n o t the point; w hat needs to be stated is that there is a system o f
ideological equality, o r w hat others may call ‘egaktarianisiri, which fuels such com petition.2
H ow ever, it is crucial that com petition also involves some form o f cooperation. F or it is true
that m em bers o f society, either as individuals o r as a group, m ust cooperate in order to com pete
effectively against those perceived as com m on opponents. Certainly, large-scale socio-political
events like tribal warfare require cooperation between m ost, if n o t all, segmentary com ponents
(clans and subclans) o f a politically and militarily autonom ous group (tribe) to avoid routing and
possible decim ation. Tribal strength and individual status, for instance, depends on successes
and failures in group activities so it is not surprising that we find well-developed arenas o f
com petition and cooperation in m ost parts o f the Highlands. Although Highlands societies all
exhibit form s o f com petition for status, and the com petition is often expressed through a
struggle for control over valued scarce goods and their disbursem ent through reciprocal
exchanges (A.J. Strathem 1982:138), it is here in Hagen (and Enga) where m ore advanced
reciprocal exchange systems requiring astute entrepreneurship are found (see Feil 1987; see also
A.J. Strathem 1971; and Meggitt 1977). W hile traditional spheres o f com petition and
cooperation, especially warfare and ceremonial exchange systems, have warranted much
attention (see, for example, A.J. Strathem 1966b; 1971; 1977; 1992; Meggitt 1977; and Muke
1994), a m ore m odem form o f com petition (and cooperation), perhaps o f similar magnitude, is
the focus o f this chapter.
In spite o f the fact that European contact with the PN G Highlands was made only recendy —
beginning in the Eastern Highlands in 1929 and the W estern Highlands in 1933 — and formal
elections for Local G overnm ent Councils and the colonial H ouse o f Assembly were introduced
in the early 1960s, elections in general and especially provincial and national governm ent
elections have becom e an im portant sphere o f com petition and cooperation for Highlanders.3
T he level o f political integration and cohesion between Highlands groups is far m ore advanced
than coastal and lowland groups could ever achieve because o f the inherent structural and
institutional differences between them. This is evident in the mobilisation and management o f
massive econom ic resources required in elections. W e may add here that candidates in coastal
areas, by contrast, generally spend less money on election campaigns and that participation levels
are m uch lower.

In his criticism o f those in search o f an ‘egalitarian’ Highlands and a timeless ahistoric big-man model, Feil
(1987:116-118) has pointed out that while structural, enduring inequalities may be absent, they can be
subtie and marked by an ideology o f equality. Even today the Highlands has that character.
See Chapter T m for m ore information on the background o f Hagen politics as they have developed
historically during colonial and post-colonial periods. See also A J. Strathem (1977,1984,1992,1993b) for
similar discussion. For a comparable discussion o f historical events in Simbu, see Standish (1992,1994; see
also Warry 1987).
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This conform s to a generally observed pattern in electoral behaviour. In a comparative analysis
o f electoral behaviour, a colleague and I noted that:
In some societies, elections are serious events which can draw a high level of interest
and participation. Elections in the Highlands, for example, are marked by aggressive
campaigns and a very active and responsive public. Election campaigns are usually
characterised by placard-carrying convoys o f supporters in traditional finery, political
rallies, mob oratory, emergency party conventions, traditional dances, massive pig
ceremonials, and seemingly endless beer parties. This active interest and participation
often leads to exceptionally high, or even inflated, voter turnout at polling places.
Conversely, in other societies, elections are not such serious events and the level of
interest and participation can be very low (Ketan and Eyre 1991:18).
Indeed, in three PN G governm ent-supported election m onitoring and assessment studies4 (in
w hich I was involved) covering by-elections in the coastal provinces o f East New Britain and
Central, one could n o t fail to note the general lack o f fanfare that so typically depicts elections in
other parts o f the country, especially in the PN G Highlands (Ketan and Mangi 1991; K etan
1991; K etan and Eyre 1991). D uring the Gazelle O pen By-Election, in May 1991, it was found
that:
Voter turnout was poor. Not many people turned up for voting. They were not very
enthusiastic about it as if they would, say in die Highlands o f Papua New Guinea. For
example, when we visited the polling booth in some of the areas around 11:00 a.m.
there was hardly anyone who had turned up to cast their votes. When this was
rechecked in the afternoon the turnout had not really improved at all (Ketan and Mangi
1991:10).
Similarly, in two Central Provincial G overnm ent by-elections voter turnout was especially low:
as poor as ten o r less votes in at least two polling stations during the June 1991 K uni By
Election in Kairuku D istrict (Ketan 1991); and members o f at least one village in Cloudy had to
be notified on polling day in August 1991 because they had no idea that there was a by-election
underway (Ketan and Eyre 1991). As in Gazelle, voters here in Central showed a general lack o f
interest in both by-elections. In Cloudy Bay, for instance, we noted th a t
There ware no convoys or rallies, and no feasting or dancing. Such fanfare and gaiety
which depict elections in other parts o f the country were lacking here. Except for
posters, there was hardly any campaigning. Some prospective voters were not even
aware o f the feet that there was a by-election being held at Cloudy Bay. If this is any
indication, the level o f political awareness is believed to be exceptionally low in Cloudy
Bay (Ketan and Eyre 1991:18).
With a view to improving elections in Papua New Guinea, the PN G Electoral Commission assigned the
PN G National Research Institute the task o f election m onitoring and assessment. I was involved here as
principal researcher in three by-election studies in 1991: (1) Gazelle Open (with Jo Mangi, Anthropology
D e p t, UPNG); (2) Kuni; and (3) Cloudy Bay (with Henry Eyre, formerly o f UPNG). Based on these and
one other study (by Wari Iamo and others), the Electoral Commission made significant changes to the
electoral system, including the introduction o f one-day polling in PN G elections. However, other
recommendations, such as the re-introduction o f preferential voting, interagency cooperation in a single
and unified dvil registration system, etc, were sadly ignored.
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In the absence o f any systematic nation-w ide study, it is difficult to say w hether these differences
in electoral behavioural outcom es are largely dependent on the level o f sociopolitical, econom ic,
and infrastructural developm ent
H ow ever, it is fair to say that significant differences in electoral behaviour, including high levels
o f violence in som e areas and relatively peaceful conduct in other parts o f the country, can be
explained in the context o f markedly contrasting cultural backgrounds. Highlanders, for
instance, were perhaps m ore ‘qualified’ than their coastal counterparts in entering this new arena
o f com petition and cooperation because o f their cultural background which is characterised by
im pressive prestige institutions such as the M ount Hagen moka and other ceremonial exchange
systems. Moka is the term in Melpa language for reciprocal exchanges o f wealth between
partners, in w hich the rule is that a main gift should exceed an initial o r initiatory one (A.J.
Strathem 1981:10; 1971). The main item s o f exchange used in moka are pigs, pork, previously
peadshells and nowadays cash. In a return moka, which may take place several years later, one
m ust give m ore than he had received. The increm ent is referred to as ‘making mokd. G roup
prestige and individual status is derived from ‘making mokd. Similar systems existing in other
parts o f the Highlands are: the tee in Enga and mok ink in Mendi. The W ahgi konggar and Simbu

huglagende are slightly different in the sense that their emphasis is predom inantly on the exchange
o f roasted pork. All, however, operate on the principle o f delayed exchange, where goods
received in one cerem ony will be reciprocated with similar kind in another at a later date.
Furtherm ore, there are symbolic and functional parallels in the m odem state and traditional
H ighlands politics. Im portant clan issues are discussed by clan mem bers in the m en’s house
w here it is usually the big-men w ho dom inate such meetings. The Hagen m en’s house, for
example, is called manga rapa. In front o f the manga rapa stands the pukla mho m onum ent which
com m em orates the first moka. Hageners, as indicated in Table 6. /, easily associate the N ational
Parliam ent H ouse with manga rapa, the national flag with pukh mho, the Prime M inister and his
cabinet m inisters w ith wua nuim mumuk (major big-men), budget speeches with el-ik (‘fight talk’),
w hich is the m ost form al kind o f public oratory.5 It is, therefore, easy to understand why
elections are im portant to Highlanders because they fit in well with existing institutions and
cultural practices. Some symbolic and functional parallels are given in Table 6.1 (below).

O ne Hagen inform ant, Jerry Yar Rombina, himself a skilful orator and a big-man o f the Remdi Jikambo
clan, gave me a m ore specific picture: that o f Paias Wingti as major big-man, his handling o f the national
budget as a m ajor pig ceremonial, and Wingti’s speeches in parliament as el-ik that goes with ceremonial
prestations involving the distribution o f roasted pork. See A J. Strathem (1975) for the delineation o f
Hagen speech form and its functions; veiled speech (ik-ek) and el-ik (‘fight talk5) as the m ost formal kind o f
oratory.
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T a b le 6.1: Sym bolic a n d fu n ctio n al parallels in p o litical system s
Point
1

j

TraditionalMount Hagm

Modem PNG State

(a) T he manga rapa as a sym bol o f clan

(a) T he N ational Parliament as a sym bol o f

solidarity, its internal structure o f converging

dem ocracy; (b) as central m eeting place w here
legislation (regarding im portant issues and disputes)

rafters held together by a central p ost is
associated w ith a big-m an surrounded by his
follow ers; (b) as central m eeting place w here
im portant issues and disputes are resolved

is passed collectively through debate; and (c) the
P N G national flag as a sym bol o f national solidarity,
a statem ent o f unity in the face o f diversity.

collectively through consensus; (c) the pukla

mbo com m em orating the first moka, and (d)
the moka pern as the cerem onial ground for
display o f m en (during singsings) and wealth
(during moka prestations).
2

B oth the m ajor and m inor big-m en are
prom inent in clan m eetings just as they are
pre-em inent in moka.

3

T he

big-m en, through

control o f moka

exchange networks, have m ore access to
valued scarce resources than ordinary m en.

4

T he m anagem ent and distribution o f valued
scarce resources is controlled by big-m en
through selective moka exchanges.

5

6

The prime m inister as ch ief executive and his
cabinet m inisters have m ore say in matters
regarding respective portfolios.
The prime m inister and his cabinet m inisters, as
political heads o f governm ent departm ents, have
m ore access to econom ic resources than ordinary
MPs.
T he m anagem ent o f national resources and
distribution o f wealth is controlled by the PM and
his cabinet m inisters through budget allocations.

Individual status and group prestige is derived

Individual status and ‘good ’ governm ent is based on

from success in moka exchanges.

sound econom ic m anagem ent and delivery o f
goods and services.

M ajor big-m en are skilled orators w ho make
extravagant claims o f group achievem ents
during el-ik speech-m aking.

A prim e m inister and his m inisters are constantly
defending their actions (or inactions) during crises,
often claim ing success (even w here there is
apparent failure) and take credit for positive
outcom es.

7

8

T he achievem ent and m aintenance o f bigman status is dependent on individual ability
to attract follow ers and wealth through

The basis o f a continued role in Parliament
ultimately lies w ith the voters but is dependent on
personal ability to m obilise and maintain a solid

reciprocal exchanges.

support-base in respective electorates.

Big-m en are generally good leaders w ho lead

Politicians are often their ow n w orst enem ies,
creating problem s (such as m isappropriation o f

by exam ple, but there are som e ‘good ’ bigm en and others are h ad ’ big-m en w ho

public funds) w hich ultimately bring their dow nfall

default creditors and are despotic in nature.

There are ‘good ’ politicians just as there are ‘bad’

Such h ad ’ big-m en often lose follow ers to
rival big-m en, ultimately resulting in a loss o f

ones w ho make m ockery out o f the w ord
‘representative’.
Such
‘bad’
politicians
are

status.

consistently punished by seem ingly unforgiving
constituents.
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Elections involve a significant change in the level o f participation — a marked shift away from
com petition between a select band o f individuals to one o f active participation on a m nrh wider
scale. Unlike warfare and cerem onial exchange, w here com petition for status and struggle for
control over valued scarce resources was restricted to warriors and big-m en, elections are m ore
encom passing, involving far m ore ordinary people. Although it is difficult to establish precisely
how pow erful big-m en were in control over valued scarce resources before European contact in
the 1930s, the early accounts o f G erm an Lutheran missionary-anthropologist, G eorg Vicedom
w ho w orked in M ount H agen between 1934 and 1939, suggests that the pow er o f big-men sixtyfive years ago was then greater. Big-men were described as chiefs, belonging to rich lineages and
ruling over clans. The chiefly lineages m onopolised the peadshell valuables and circulated these
in moka transactions only am ong themselves. Pigs could be reared by all but only the pearlshells
carried prestige (A.J. Strathem 1966a:362; see also Vicedom and Tischner 1943-8: VoL2, cited
from Strathem 1966a and Feil 1987). The w ork o f other eady observers, such as Ross (1936) and
G itlow (1947), which is largely based on Ross, confirm s this picture o f the M ount Hagen
political order as one o f a high degree o f local class stratification. A large middle class, a class o f
‘rubbishm en’ and one o f ‘serfs’, called ‘slaves’ by Vicedom, lived as dependants and at the behest
o f the m ore rich and pow erful class (see Feil 1982; 1987).
A w ord o f caution here: too m uch weight placed on the accounts o f missionaries and others
could lead to unnecessary com plications, and even portraying a somewhat misleading picture o f
the M ount H agen political order. W hile accepting that there was some degree o f inequality, the
descriptions o f Hagen social classes by these early observers, as pointed out by A.J. Strathem
(1987) is far too rigid — n o t too different to that o f feudal Europe. Although Vicedom’s work
in particular provides useful insights into M ount Hagen society before contact, it is influenced
by his ow n background and the times in which he was writing — European feudalism,
colonialism , and especially A dolf H itler’s fascism. It is extraordinary that he was able to publish
three large volumes at the time o f the Second W orld W ar in a country ravaged by disease and
chronic shortage o f basic needs.6
European colonialism, however, drastically altered the M ount Hagen political order, first by the
inflation o f the local exchange econom y with plane-loads o f peadshells in the millions (see
Hughes 1978; see also Connolly and A nderson 1987; and Chapter Two in this thesis), and then

As indicated in Chapter One, Vicedom’s work, as evident in his ‘master race’ theory, was apparently
influenced by Germ an fascism. His belief that the original inhabitants o f Hagen were dark-skinned dwarfs
which were colonised and subsequently displaced by a fight-skinned tall race from the west reflects Nazi
Germany’s Aryan race policy. See A.J. Strathem (1971 and 1987) for a mote critical review of Vicedom and other
earlier interpretations of Hagen as a highly stratified society.
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through the processes o f ‘development* in general, and m ore specifically by the creation o f
m odem political structures.7
In a drastically altered econom y, through the introduction o f cash, cash-crops and education,
elections offer ordinary m en and, perhaps m ore significantly, wom en the chance to com pete for
pow er and influence. In other w ords, it opens doors for people w ho otherwise would have been
shut out by traditional big-m en w ho had a m onopoly over exchange networks in pre-colonial
times. This partly explains aggressive electoral behaviour. As evident in recent elections,
H ageners approach the campaign nail w ith the same passion and vigour which they take onto
the battlefield: to w in at all cost! Like warfare and ceremonial exchange, which produce leaders
such as fight-leaders and big-men,, so too do elections which generate a special brand o f leaders.
W hilst all o f them are referred to as wua nuim (leader*), politicians are com m only known in
Hagen as ktkptih wua> a pejorative term which roughly translates to the English ‘rogue*.
Retrospectively, a person w ith no principles o r scruples is often called politik wua (‘political
man*), w hich, in reality, can be far less flattering than is initially apparent.

PNG Highlands-style Electioneering: A Unique Experience
P N G Highlands-style electioneering is a culture in itself, with election fanfare unm atched
anywhere else in the country. W ith floats o f awe-inspiring warriors and full-bodied women in
m agnificent plumes o f birds o f paradise8, simultaneous orchestration o f exchange sequences,
and m obilisation o f supporters, Highlands election campaigns have few parallels in size o r scale,
and in sophistication o f strategies and ploys involved. It is n o t uncom m on to find candidates
and supporters in varying states o f intoxication, n ot from alcohol consum ption but simply
because o f the frenetic pace o f events and the way in which the various events o f social,
econom ic, political and religious significance are all brought together to coincide with elections.
Relations o f enmity, for instance, can be transform ed into ones o f alliance, o r tem porary truce
can be mutually reached by warring factions to cater for the higher priority o f elections (see
K etan 1996). Similarly, those w ho hold the ‘ropes* o f moka will simultaneously release them , thus
resulting in a series o f return payments.9 Furtherm ore, reparation payments to allies for losses
7.

D . K. Feil describes colonialism as die second great revolution, after die introduction o f sweet potato
(ipomoean revolution) which altered the status quo o f the then political order through an intensification o f
pig production and the exchange o f surplus products (1987:115-120).

8.

The men wear km head-dress which are largely made o f Puqygam and King o fSaxons sprays while women
wear m k and rumba tails o f Princess Stephanie and Skkkbill (an influence o f Wahgi styles). For decoration sets
and the way in which particular types o f feathers distinguish between different festivals, see A.J. and AM .
Strathem (1971). The King ofSaxony feathers, for example, were reserved for the more im portant occasions
such as moka. When men are ready to make a big moka, they say, ‘the bird is on its way", meaning, ‘now the
Saxony plumes will appear5 {ibid. 63).

9.

See, for example, Parua Kuri’s return moka to the Kawelka in 1984 (Ketan 1996). For a discussion on moka
sequences and those who hold the ‘ropes’ o f moka {moka kan ambromiri), refer to A J. Strathem (1971).
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sustained in war, com pensation o f m inor enemies for killings, and even peaceful negotiations
betw een m ajor enemies will be made in deliberately ordered sequences prior to and culminating
in elections, thus creating w hat I call the Hagen megacycle.
Conversely, rifts can occur w ithin alliances and groups once allied to each other may find
them selves on opposite sides. Electoral m anoeuvring, for instance, may involve negotiations
w ith m ajor enem ies, abandoning existing military allies in the face o f war, and the use o f criminal
gangs and guns by politicians and their henchm en to manipulate voters. In a recent study on
violence and political change in M ount H agen, A.J. Strathem reported th a t
••- the recurrent suspicion on the part o f ordinary people (and some electoral officials
also) that certain politicians are among the most important suppliers o f guns to their
constituents, largely because guns buy votes. Politicians’ henchmen distribute guns to
their networks and build their own influence on the putative possession o f powerful
weapons (1993b:47).
H ere I can only add that such suspicions are n o t uncom m on, no r unfounded, because I too
have heard and seen instances o f guns and am m unition being distributed by aspiring politicians.
In my discussion on the Tepuka-Kawelka alliance in the context o f the 1992 D ei O pen election
and o f the Kawelka-M inembi W ar (1986-1990), I have explored the way in which electoral
behaviour is dictated by the type o f relations maintained by individuals and groups, and how this
is translated into election results (Ketan 1996).
Electioneering is also an extremely serious business involving millions o f kina and vast am ounts
o f other econom ic resources c h a n g in g hands between thousands o f individuals and hundreds o f
groups. In many ways it involves the redistribution o f wealth in varying am ounts and ways, from
simple cash handouts inside a haus-man (men’s house) to ceremonial prestations on a grand scale
involving thousands o f people. Iambakey Okuk’s distribution o f 4,000 cartons o f beer at
Kundiawa airport during the 1982 N ational Election ranks as one o f the m ost spectacular o f all
♦im p.

Bill Standish, a keen observer o f Simbu politics since 1972, reported th a t
Okuk’s most spectacular innovation was on the eve o f the [1982] election liquor ban to
give out 4,000 cartons of beer, each with twenty-four bottles, at Kundiawa airstrip on
the 29 May, following an all night string band competition. In ten years I had not seen
him wear traditional dress, but on this occasion Okuk did wear the traditional apron
and breach clout The story of the hare-bottomed M F and the deputy prime minister’s
wife ‘dancing bare breasted’ at the beer barrel election’ was duly reported internationally
along with front-page photographs (Sydney Morning Herald 5 June 1982; ABC Background
Briefing 6 June 1982; The Age 2 June 1982), but this was not an occasion for mockery.
Witnesses said that Okuk— who as at Maki spoke in Tokpisin— again said that he was
the son o f a traditional Chimbu leader and asserted a tight to political power under the
Simbu ideology o f hereditary leadership. At least 10,000 people came to collect the beer,
with Okuk as master o f ceremonies distributing huge piles for supporters in each open
electorate and fifty cartons each for the police, Pangu supporters [his principal
opponents] and the mostly expatriate Hash House Hamers (Standish 1989:194; see also
Domey 1990; and Standish 1992).
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Such flagrant flaunting o f personal w ealth, w hilst usually justified through the use o f the
traditionar ideology o f big-m en as magnets for attracting w ealth, can sometimes have an adverse
effect, as in O kuk s case. A lthough O kuk was quite clever in dressing traditionally so that he
could cite custom as a defence against possible bribery charges10, he obviously foigot that gifts
given through inter-personal netw orks create obligations while those given at a public level are
merely dism issed as pabhk semiring hilong kisim tasol (‘public things to be taken only’, n o t m eant to
be reciprocated).
Subsequent events in H agen and other parts o f the Highlands suggests that m odified versions o f
O kuks innovation have been adopted by other politicians throughout the Highlands and in
som e parts o f the country, especially in the capital, P ort M oresby, w here many Highlanders live
in a num ber o f relatively large settlem ents and until 1997 a Simbu, David Unagi, was a M P for
the P ort M oresby N orth-E ast O pen electorate.
T hat O kuk adm itted having spent between K240-250,000 in Chim bu, com pared with the
eventual w inner, John Nilkare’s admitted K45,000 (Standish 1989:195) and still lost the election
suggests, am ong other things, that factors other than mega resources are also im portant in
elections. I now turn to the key players w ho interact between the local Hagen political field and
the P N G national scene.

Powerful Individuals and Political Parties
A t the centre o f the expanded H agen-PN G political field are some o f the country’s m ost
wealthy and pow erful m en com peting for super-big-man status. F or instance, the leaders o f the
country’s m ajor political parties are based in M ount Hagen, where party-aligned business and
tribal groups are clearly at work, perhaps reaching a higher level o f political integration than in
other parts o f the country. Names such as Paias W ingti, Paul Pora and Michael Mel are known
way beyond local boundaries. A history o f com petition between ‘party-aligned groups’ is
analysed here in the context o f the W estern Highlands Provincial G overnm ent and the rivalry
between the People’s D em ocratic M ovement (PDM) Party and the N ational Party. Both PD M ,
headed by Paias W ingti, and the two factions o f the N ational Party, headed separately by Paul
Pora and M ichael Mel, have strong following in the M ount Hagen Central area, but are n o t as

As pointed out by Bill Standish, “Okuk dressed traditionally in order to be able to cite his use o f custom,
which is supported in the National Constitution, should he later need to defend himself against any
possible charges under the Criminal Code o f treating (corruptly providing food, meat, drink or
entertainm ent in order to influence votes). Bribery and the exercise o f undue influence (threats or use o f
force obstructing the free exercise o f voting rigjhts by an elector) are grounds for rendering a poll null and
vo id ’ (Standish 1989:194; 1992:237-238). In this regard, Okuk’s grand performance seems to have been
based on a conscious and calculated decision. He further goes on to say that “Okuk had read reports in
which (Standish] had argued that gift-exchange for prestige purposes could be defended as customary,
with generosity and display intrinsic to Melanesian leadership” (Standish 1992:238; 1978b).
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strong in other parts o f the province. The other major PN G parties with Hageners as leaders
are: Pangu Pad (Kombukla tribesman, Pati Wamp, as the national president); and the People’s
Progress Party (PPP), with Jika Milakamb clansman, Glen Komomga, as its national president
However, both Pangu and PPP are relatively weak in terms o f party7following in Hagen because
m ost people view them as namhis or coastal parties and their nominal Hagen leaders as mere
window dressing (bilas tasol). Table 6.2 shows the local groups, power bases and government
positions o f six prominent Hagen leaders in the last 20 years.
T ab le 6.2: P ro m in en t H a g en leaders an d th e ir pow er-bases

Hader

Healgroup

Power-base and Party-aligned Interest* Position
groups

Paias Wingti

Jika Mukaka

Wingti and P D M have a strong
following in one half Maipngel,

Leader o f PD M , MP (1977-97),

Andapunts & Mukaka sections o f
&

Minister
(1985-87;
1987-88;
1992-94), Governor o f W HP
(1995-1997).

Pora and his faction o f the
National Party have a strong

Leads one half o f National Party,
MP for Hagen Open (1987-

following

present),
former
Minister (1988-92).

Jika, Kungunka-Palka
Kukilka Kluika section.
Paul Pora

Yamka Pepka

am ong

the

pair,

Kinjika-

Yamka, som e Mokei sections and
Elti-Penambi tribe-pair.
Michael Mel

N okpa

Deputy PM

(1982-85), Prime

Finance

Mel and his faction o f the
National Party have a strong

Leads one half o f National Party,
Pipilka
Chairman,
former

following am ong the KopiNokpa, Roni-Lati, and the Pipilka

national government Treasurer
& MP for Anglimp-South Wahgi
(1987-92).

Coalition-style Alliance.
Pati Wamp

Kombukla

Kombukla-Minembi, Welyi-Kuta
Coalition-style Alliance.

President o f Pangu Party

Glen K om onga

Jika Milakamb

Jika Maipngel section

President o f Peoples Progress
Party

Lucas Roika

Mokei
Akelemb

Mokei Nambka and Andakelkam

Last
Premier
of
Western
Highlands (1995) and National
Party strongman.

Anda-

subsections.

All, except Michael Mel (Anglimp) and Pati Wamp (Dei), are from Hagen Central tribes.
Significandy, all o f the Western Highlands Provincial MPs have been Hagen Central men:
Raphael D oa (Mokei Nambka); Kindi Lawi (Jika Opromb); and Paias Wingti (Jika Mukaka),
emphasising my point that here in Hagen Central super-big-men, backed by sections o f large tribes,
are able to compete for positions o f great power and influence. However, it must also be noted
that whilst Wingti, Pora and Mel could definitely be described as super-big-men, the same could
not be said o f D oa and Lawi.
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Political parties have virtually failed to reach the grass-roots level, where voting is principally
based o n die kinship system and personal netw orks, and while it is not my intention to pretend
otherw ise, it needs to be pointed out that: (1) parties are a good source o f econom ic resources
for use in election campaigns; (2) party m em bership may have advantages in securing
em ploym ent for the party elite, thus, conform ing to the true spirit o f “jobs-for-the-boys” m ode
o f patronage and spoils system; (3) party alignment is often a m ajor factor in securing
governm ent-funded projects and developm ent funds; and (4) it is widely believed that partyaligned interest* groups and prom inent individuals often receive preferential treatm ent in
business deals and governm ent contracts. It is chiefly for these reasons that individuals com pete
for party leadership, and Hageners have been particularly successful in this regard. In each o f the
cases m entioned above the party followings (or followers) are o f course supporters o f influential
leaders and their num bers, depending on the fortune o f the leaders, flux and wane, just as the
relations between individuals are constantly shifting.11 Paul Pora, for example, led his supporters
out o f Pangu and into N ational when he switched parties before the 1987 N ational Elections,
but defected back to the Pangu-led O pposition when the other N ational Party faction, led by
M ichael Mel, entered into an alliance w ith PD M to form the governm ent after the 1987
elections. H e was then Finance M inister in a Pangu led governm ent from 1988 to 1992.
N onetheless, as noted by Burton (1989a:271), party is im portant in Hagen in the sense that sets
o f party-aligned groups are at work. This is perhaps m ore so in Hagen Central than elsewhere
because my own investigations revealed no evidence o f party-based political organisation in
peripheral areas such as D ei, Mul and Anglimp. If there is any party confrontation which comes
to the fore o f political discussions by Hagpners, then it is the rivalry between PDM and National
in the context o f the W estern Highlands Provincial G overnm ent versus the PDM -dom inated
national gpvem m ent in early 1987.
T he background to this rivalry is given below, based in part on Burton (1989a:270-271) and
B urton and K eher (1997). T he N ational Party, led by Philip Kapal, came to pow er in the
W estern Highlands Provincial G overnm ent through a no-confidence m otion in April 1985.
Kapal’s governm ent was suspended by the W ingti-led national governm ent in eady 1987 and
n o t reinstated until after the 1987 elections.1
12
1 As was widely tipped at the time, this cost PDM a
11.

While the party following in Hagen is generally along the lines indicated above, it needs to be pointed out
that the actual situation can be far m ore complex. Despite party-aligned groups at work here, there is far
m ore fluidity in individual choice, as in instances where families are split between candidates. Cash
inducem ent is also a m ajor factor in the final analysis o f a voter’s choice o f candidate, but there are other
factors (such as kinship ties, intermarriage, and moka exchange relations).

12.

The suspension was based on an Auditor-General’s report in February 1987 which alleged “gross
mismanagement o f finances in the years 1982, 83, 85 and 86”. Prem ier Kapal, however, appealed against
the decision, claiming that it was politically motivated and his administration unfairly penalised for the
wrongdoings by the two preceding governments, those o f Nambuka Mara and Kagul Koroka. In
September 1987 a National C ourt judge, Justice HinchKffe, ruled that “the Auditor-General’s report o f
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great deal o f support in H agen Central and W ingti, w ho had held the Hagen O pen seat since
1977, was forced by Paul Pora’s candidacy in Hagen O pen into nom inating for the W estern
H ighlands Provincial seat. Paias W ingti and Paul Pora w on the Provincial and Hagen O pen seats
w ith big m ajorities o f over 40 and 30 per cent o f the total vote, respectively. A fter the elections
and in the subsequent governm ent form ation, the principal com batants then faced each other
on the front benches o f the N ational Parliam ent— W ingti as Prime M inister and Pora as senior
O pposition spokesman.
T he W estern Highlands Provincial G overnm ent remained in suspension until fresh elections
w ere called in June 1988. This time the N ational Party, again led by Philip Kapal and his deputy,
Lucas Roika, was returned to pow er for a second term in office with a tw o-thirds majority in the
provincial assembly. It was reported that:
Western Highlands Premier Philip Kapal and his deputy Lucas Roika unanimously
retained their respective positions yesterday [5 July 1988] following the swearing in of
the new government Mr Kapal collected 19 votes defeating his PDM party challenger,
Kagul Koroka who only collected five votes. Mr Roika also collected 19 defeating the
opposition sponsored member Mr Er Tal who only got five votes (Post-Courier, 6 July
1988).
F or Philip Kapal and the N ational Party, it was a m ajor victory against PD M and Paias W ingti in
particular because it was W ingti w hom many people in Hagen — rightly o r wrongly — saw as
being responsible for the suspension o f the provincial governm ent The People’s D em ocratic
M ovem ent Party’s com prehensive defeat in W estern Highlands in 1988 led many people to
suggest the end o f PD M in provincial politics.13 This trend was continual at the national level
w hen Paul Pora, w ho had earlier defected to the O pposition with five National Party m em bers,
was rewarded w ith the pow erful Finance and Planning Ministry after Paias W ingti was defeated
— 58 votes to 50 — by Rabbie Namaliu in a no-confidence m otion on M onday 4 July 1988

(Ntugim Nius, Editorial 5 July 1988).

February 1987, which the then Provincial Affairs Minister, M r Warena, tabled in Cabinet was incomplete”,
which m eant that the suspension was invalid. The report referred to “major unsatisfactory matters”, much
o f it during die years prior to Mr Kapal’s time, but some matters did refer to his governm ent Justice
Hinchliffe said he was satisfied that Cabinet was wrong in law when it said that the m atter “can only be
pu t right by suspension”. H e added that there was a lot o f work to be done because it appeared the
financial mismanagement prior to Kapal’s government was “quite staggering” (Buruka, Post-Courier,
Septem ber 1987; cited in PN G Electoral Commission, Press Covenge o f 1987 Elections). The National
G overnm ent, however, appealed against the decision and in Novem ber 1987 a full-bench Supreme Court
quashed the order o f the National Court and declared that the provisional suspension o f the W estern
H ighlands Provincial G overnm ent by the N EC was valid (PNG Electoral Commission, ibid).
The People’s Democratic M ovement Party and die National Party had each endorsed candidates in all 26
constituencies. PDM pledged to upgrade the M ount Hagen hospital to a base hospital whilst National
prom ised a scholarship scheme for grade 7, 8, and 9, and to build enough dormitories in High schools to
enable all students to be boarders (Bengi, Post-Courier.; 6 May 1988).
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T he W estern Highlands Provincial G overnm ent was again suspended soon after W ingd w on
back the reins o f pow er following the 1992 N ational Elections. This tim e it was n o t reinstated
even though W ingti was replaced by his deputy Sir Julius Chan as Prim e M inister in A ugust
1994. D espite court challenges brought against the N ational G overnm ent by suspended Prem ier
Lucas Roika

w ho had replaced K apal in an internal pow er struggle— die W estern Highlands

Provincial G overnm ent rem ained suspended until N ovem ber 1994 w hen fresh elections were
called to be held in January 1995.

The Provincial Government Factor
T he W estern H ighlands Provincial G overnm ent came into existence in 1977 as part o f the
decentralisation process throughout Papua New Guinea. The history o f post-independence
decentralisation in Papua N ew G uinea has been adequately covered by others (see, for example,
Conyers 1976; Standish 1979; Axbne 1986; G hai and Regan 1992; Regan 1997a and 1997b; and
May and Regan ed. 1997), so it is n o t necessary to go over the same ground here. It is, however,
necessary to m ention that after considerable pressure from some parte o f the country —
including Bougainville, the Gazelle Peninsula, and the Papuan region — action was som ewhat
reluctandy taken in 1977 to establish nineteen provincial governm ents based on the existing
nineteen administrative districts o f the country, apart from the N ational Capital D istrict (see
Peasah 1990; G hai and Regan 1992; and Regan 1997a). As Peasah says:
T his dem and fo r substantial devolution o f governm ental pow ers and functions to th e
d istrict/p ro v in cial level reflected a dram atic em ergence o f intense m icro-nationalist
sentim ents an d in terests in m any p arts o f th e country in th e decade im m ediately
p reced in g independence in 1975. I t w as m o st strongly expressed by such m ovem ents as
th e M a ta u n ^ n A ssociation o f th e G azelle P eninsula, th e N apidakoe N avitu o f
B ougainville D istrict, an d th e P apua B esena in th e P apuan R egion. B ougainville D istrict
an d , to a lesser degree, th e P apua B esena (o n b eh a lf o f th e P apuan R egion) w en t to th e
ex ten t o f even threaten in g secession o f th eir respective areas from th e state o f Papua
N ew G uinea. In th e process, a th ree-tier system o f governm ent com prising th e national,
provincial, an d local levels has replaced th e previous tw o-tier system o f th e national an d
local levels (Peasah 1990:2).

W hile establishing the provincial governm ent system the national parliam ent retained the pow er
to suspend those considered by the national governm ent as being incapable o f looking after
their ow n affairs. T he grounds for suspension, as outlined in the Papua New Guinea N ational
C onstitution, are if:
(a) th ere is w idespread co rru p tio n in th e adm inistration o f th e province; o r (b) there has
b een gro ss mismanagement o f th e financial affairs o f th e province; o r (c) them has been
a breakdow n in th e administration o f th e province; o r (d) th ere has b een a deliberate
an d p ersisten t fru stratio n o f, o r failure to com ply w ith , law ful directions o f th e N ational
G o v ern m en t (C o n stitu tio n s s .l8 7 E (l) and 187E(4), cited in P easah 1990:12).
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Peasah goes o n to say that “the actual procedures for suspending a provincial governm ent have
been simplified since 1983 to the point o f perm itting the N ational Executive Council to
provisionally suspend that governm ent, subject to later confirm ation by the Parliament” (ibid).
A nthony Regan, a keen observer and consultant to the PN G governm ent on provincial
governm ent, makes this point clearly:
In addition to the provisions on disallowance o f provincial laws by the National
Parliament, it is the provisions for suspension o f provincial governments contained in
the Constitution and OLPG [Organic Law on Provincial Government] which most
emphatically assert the unitary nature of the provincial government system In their
original form, the suspension provisions contained various procedural safeguards
designed to protect provincial governments from precipitate or politically-motivated
action by the national executive. The two laws were amended in 1983, removing or
modifying almost all the safeguards, a step which shifted the balance in the

It was under this pow er that the K apal governm ent in W estern H ighlands was suspended in
1987, and in many instances it seems that the national governm ent, w hen confronted with
problem s o f unaccountability at the provincial level, has dealt w ith them in rather ruthless
fashion. Accordingly, and since 1983, num erous provincial governm ents have been suspended
chiefly for ‘gross m ism anagem ent o f financial affairs’. The then Prim e M inister, Paias W ingti,
w hile addressing the P ort M oresby C ham ber o f Commerce in O ctober 1992, estim ated that
“over h alf o f the provincial governm ents in die country have been suspended for gross
m ism anagem ent and corruption at one time o r another” (Wingti 1992:8). In fact, Regan says that
“as o f early 1994, fourteen provincial governm ents have been suspended, the first (Enga) in
1984 and the latest (Madang and Enga again) in eady 1993” (1997b:49).
W hilst the problem s o f ‘mismanagement o f public funds’, o r ‘corruption in adm inistration’, o r
any other m atters o f incom petence and personal enrichm ent are n o t restricted to provincial
governm ents, it would seem that the national governm ent has acted on the somewhat misguided
principle that such problem s could be resolved through suspension. Since the problem s o f
corruption and financial mism anagem ent are widespread throughout national as well as
provincial departm ents, provincial politicians, w hose governm ents can be suspended by national
politicians (who them selves, however, appear im m une to suspension under similar grounds),
often view their national counterparts as rivals rather than partners. This situation is further
com plicated by patronage relations between som e national politicians and their provincial
counterparts. But, generally, the relationship betw een national and provincial politicians is one
based on m utual distrust, characterised by confrontational debates on the level o f autonom y in
regard to m ineral resource developm ent rights and similar issues o f both national and provincial
interests. A t the core is th e persistent and sometimes disruptive pow er struggle between national
and provincial politicians.
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T he struggle for control over state resources is a key elem ent in any political confrontation, but
even m ore so in a system o f patronage w here the ‘rules o f the game>14 are bent towards
m axim ising profit for key players and their followers. This is particularly true in Papua New
G uinea w here elective office-holders have converted their representative role into one o f
patronage tow ards their electorates (see A.J. Strathem 1993b:49) and the spoils o f office are
flagrantly displayed during elections and at other times. D ictated by the harsh realities o f PN G
elective office in w hich politicians are judged n o t by their stand on policy issues but by how
m uch they can personally deliver to their voters, politicians at all levels have quite consciously
concentrated on extending their personal networks. This, am ongst other things, has resulted in a
direct confrontation between national and provincial politicians. N ational politicians, as
indicated by form er Prim e M inister Paias W ingti, argue that ‘‘this costly second tier o f
governm ent [arose] as a result o f blackmail from one provincial grouping [Bougainville]” (Wingti
1992:4).15
Furtherm ore, provincial governm ents are seen by national politicians as “an unnecessary
interm ediate layer betw een them and their electorates, and thereby obfuscating the usefulness o f
national politicians in the eyes o f the voters” (Peasah 1990:15). In a country w here there is a lack
o f distinctive ideologies and political party platform s, complicated by the h ig h ly localised nature
o f party-aligned interest groups, the anxieties o f politicians to prove themselves as the link
betw een their people and governm ent resources has generated suspicion and antagonism
betw een national and provincial politicians.
T he evidence for m utual antagonism and suspicion (subsumed in a generalised pow er struggle),
as indicated by Peasah (1990) is dem onstrated in the following.
•

the scant regard normally given by the national government to recommendations
o f the Premiers>Council conferences;

Using F.G. Bailey’s (1969) game analogy o f political competition, where competitiors agree that the prize is
w orth having and they accept some basic rules o f conduct; ‘rules’, as used here, refers chiefly to what
Bailey calk normative rules. “Rules which express such ultimate and publicly acceptable values are called
normative rules” (1969:4). Norm ative rules, he goes ont to say, “are very general glides to conduct; they are
used to judge particular actions ethically right or wrong” (ibickS). The w ord ‘game’, however, should not be
taken literally, as PN G politics is fir m ore serious than th a t
According to Wingti (1992), a total o f K329 million goes into delegated functions o f the provincial
governm ent system every year. “Five hundred and fifty provincial politicians and their provincial
governm ent staff took up just over K10 million in 1991 in wages bill alone, [which] excludes perks and
privileges for 240 provincial ministers” (1992:4). Wingti makes an interesting comparison between PN G
and New Zealand, a country “with a similar population as PN G [but] a fir m ore advanced economy
which supports only 97 politicians [compared to] PN G taxpayers supporting 659 politicians” (1992:5). The
97 politicians, he says, “costs the New Zealand taxpayers $7 million per annum [in] salaries and allowances.
T hat works out to about K3.5 million [in 1992; before the devaluation o f the PN G Kina]” (ibid). If 550
provincial politicians cost K10 million, then surely 109 national politicians would cost a lot more, and a
total o f 659 politicians would definitely be much higher, perhaps five times that o f New Zealand.

Elections and the Hagen Megacycle

•

the emasculation o f the National Fiscal Commission, one o f the most important
aspects o f the constitutional machinery for overseeing national-provincial
relations;

•

the extra-legal accretions and even sometimes arbitrariness on the part o f the
national government in the fiscal relations between the national government and
provincial governments;

•

the lack o f adequate consultation and notification (contrary to constitutional
recommendations) in passing national or provincial laws;

•

the unconstitutional establishment and retention o f provincial administrative
departments despite a court decision on the unconstitutionality o f these
departments;

•

the foisting o f national parliamentarians on provincial assemblies; and

•

the increasingly free hand assumed by the national government and the Parliament
in suspending provincial governments (Peasah 1990:14).
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G iven these unfortunate and rather sad circumstances, it came as no big surprise w hen the
N ational Parliam ent finally decided to abolish the provincial governm ent system in June 1995.
A ccording to the PN G Foreign Affairs D epartm ent News Summary.
Papua New Guinea’s 20-year-old provincial government system was yesterday [28 June
1995] abolished in an historical passage of reform bill The controversial bill was passed
86-15 following the third reading which was introduced by Prime Minister Sir Julius
Chan. However, five prominent Government Ministers did not vote for the Bill
[together with] prominent senior Opposition MPs Sir John Kaputin (Rabaul) and
Masket Iangalio (Wapenamanda). The obstinate Ministers were John Momis
(Communications), Bernard Narakobi (Agriculture and Livestock), Bart Philemon
(Public Service), Jerry Nalau (Labour and Employment) and Paul Pota (Civil Aviation
and Tourism). Mr Momis and Mr Narakobi are the parliamentary bosses of coalition
partner Melanesian Alliance [Party]. Mr Philemon and Mr Nalau are from Pangu Pati
and Mr Pora heads National Party. The MA pair and Mr Pora abstained from voting. .
Mr Philemon and Mr Nalau voted against the Bill. They had all declined a request to
resign and are likely to be sacked by Sir Julius (News Summary, 29 June 1995, p.2).
A s it transpired, all five governm ent m inisters were later replaced, but it is significant to note that
Paul Pora had quite sensibly abstained from voting. There is no doubt that if Pora had voted for
the bill, he w ould have antagonised his henchm an, Lucas Roika, w ho had only five m onths
earlier been voted in as Prem ier o f W estern Highlands Province. Roika has considerable
influence in H agen Central, w hich is the heart o f M ount Hagen O pen politics, and Pora needs a
man like Roika to m obilise support during national parliam ent elections. W hilst Pora’s decision
may have been weighted by m ore parochial struggles in H agen, Momis and N arakobi’s had
m ore to do w ith m atters o f principle — these two Melanesian Alliance leaders are generally
credited for being the founding fathers o f the provincial governm ent system in Papua New
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G uinea. D espite their noble stand, they were overwhelmingly outnum bered by those favouring
abolition. H ence:
In place [of provincial governments] is now a system which abolishes provincial
politicians and enables [national politicians] to become members of provincial
assemblies. Local Government [Council! presidents will now form the new provincial
assemblies together with their MPs. Regional MPs will automatically become
Governors, except for a Prime Minister or Deputy Prime Minister, plus funds for
development purposes will be channelled directly to local-level governments. Financial
powers will be centralised and provincial development programs or similar (projects]
will now have to get the blessings o f Waigani (PNG Foreign Affairs Department News
Summary,June 29, p.2).
Back in H agen, the term ination o f the last elected W estern Highlands Provincial G overnm ent,
headed by Lucas Roika o f the N ational Party, which ceased operations in July 1995, is another
factor w hich will com e into the equation w hen the heavy-weights clash in future elections. In yet
another interesting tw ist to this rivalry between PD M and N ational Party, the abolition o f
provincial governm ents, saw Paias W ingti resign from his position as Leader o f O pposition and
take charge o f W estern Highlands as the first G overnor o f die province* thereby, in effect,
displacing Roika.
M ost people in W estern Highlands would see this as yet another defeat o f N ational by PDM ,
b u t those familiar w ith Hagpn history will know the traditional rivalry between Hagen’s two
largest groups, Jika and Mokei. It goes back to the colonial period, w hen Jika leaders were said to
have laughed at M okei leaders w ho were told to wear red laptops supplied by the Australian
adm inistrators. M okei leaders, angered by w hat they considered to be deliberate ridicule,
challenged Jika to a contest in log-dragging w hilst w orking on road constructions. This rivalry
was later transferred into sports, business and politics.16
T he M okei, as traditional owners o f land now occupied by the M ount Hagen tow nship, feel that
they should have m ore say in the m anagem ent o f the town. The Jika, on the other hand, feel that
they have die tight, by virtue o f size and strength, to control tow n affairs. This has in the past
resulted in som e conflict betw een these tw o large tribes, and will continue because the Mokei
will view the replacem ent o f the Roika governm ent by the W ingti governorship as an extension
o f that rivalry. As H ageners say, w hen giants lock horns in the sky there is bound to be thunder
and lightning. Similarly, the clash between political and econom ic heavy-weights will surely
produce turbulence o f massive proportions.
Elections in M ount H agen, at best, are times o f uncertainty and, at w orst, o f widespread fear and
anxiety. These are natural psychological phenom ena in times o f conflict, but the 1997 N ational
16.

The historical background to the Mokei-Jika rivalry was given to me by Mathew Nokkie o f M ount Hagen.
Nokkie’s tribe, (Kum) Kopi, has strong ties with the Mokei.

Elections and the Hagen Megacycle

222

Election17, following recent structural changes, o r m ore specifically the abolition o f provincial
governm ents, caused the jitters in certain circles, notably am ong the churches. A m idst
w idespread violence during the

1995 W estern Highlands provincial elections, entire

congregations w ithin the W ahgi Parish (Melpa Circuit) o f the Lutheran Church (ELC-PNG)
w ere n o t only vigilant in prayer b u t held their considerable num bers away from trouble through
som e pow erful preaching and com m unity w ork. Anticipating trouble in 1997, many church
leaders had expressed the need for an end to inter-church rivalry and greater cooperation
betw een the various Christian denom inations towards achieving m ore peaceful and fair elections
in future. I now turn to strategies o f candidates in elections.

Cash-for-Yotes
T he strategies adopted by candidates in soliciting for votes vary, ranging from m ore subtle form s
such as m ini moka to use o f threat o r force. But the use o f cash has becom e a com m on
denom inator in the m ad scram ble for votes. Cash-for-votes, o r open bribery, is a com m on
practice and accepted as an integral part o f electioneering in M ount H agen society, but
candidates express disgust at clan leaders w ho openly solicit for m oney in return for prom ise o f
votes on polling days. O f the candidates interviewed, m ost o f them admitted that cash-for-votes
is indeed a bad practice, w hich n o t only goes against the spirit o f democracy but also contributes
to election-related violence, yet it is practically im possible for a candidate to avoid such a
situation w ithout seriously jeopardising his chances o f winning.
As previously indicated, there are parallels in traditional spheres o f com petition and cooperation
such as the M ount H agen moka cerem onial exchange system and a m odem election campaign.
B oth involve som e form o f cooperation between m utual interest groups, such as clans o f a
particular tribe, in order to com pete effectively against other similar groups. As in moka, where
big-m en try to outdo each other w ith the size o f their gifts o f pigs, pork and cash, in election
campaigns candidates try to outdo each other w ith ‘gifts* mainly o f cash. In both instances, clan
support is considered vital, w here both the big-m en and candidates depend on fellow clansmen
and relatives for resources to launch their careers as well as consolidating their positions.
T he difference, how ever, lies in the m anner o f approach and type o f return payments. In moka
the original gift is given in good faith to exchange partners w ho are usually kinsmen o r affines
and will be repaid w ith an increm ent o f similar kind at a later date. O n the other hand, elections
involve transactions between relatives as well as total strangers, and econom ic resources —

This would be PN G ’s eight national election and the fifth since political independence in 1975. After four
different Prim e Ministers and nine governments, PN G , while I was writing this chapter, was preparing for
1997 which is possibly the nation’s m ost im portant election in history. See Appendix V I for a full list o f
PN G national governments, 1972-1992.
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mostly cash, but other valued scarce items such as pigs, cattle, cars, guns, and beer, too — are
often directly exchanged for votes, or in the hope o f receiving votes.
Moreover, the economic irrationality o f Western Highlands elections in particular raises
considerable concern. It is shocking to find so much resources committed to an office which
carries a basic salary o f less than K500 per fortnight for ordinary members o f provincial
assemblies. However, what appears irrational to outsiders makes perfect sense to Hageners
whose behaviour is governed by clearly defined rules and their efforts driven primarily by
prestige rather than profit motive. A major aim o f individuals is simply to become the biggest
big-man in the area. In other words, it is mostly big-men competing for super-big-men status.
Monetary considerations become secondary issues here.
Two candidates from D ei Council, during an interview conducted in M ount Hagen in early 1995
less than 48 hours before polling for the provincial assembly, revealed that they had spent
K 10,000 and K12,000 respectively, while another’s costs were approaching K 15,000. It was
estimated that about eighty per cent o f that money was used in buying o f votes. Although this is
an accurate representation o f campaign expenditure in peripheral areas such as Dei, it does not,
however, reflect actual election expenditure in M ount Hagen generally because it is in the Hagen
Central area where the super-big-men operate. It is believed that here in Hagen Central, candidates
spend well over K20,000 in provincial elections alone. The figure for National Elections, in view
o f major political party confrontations and personality clashes, is much higher. Equivalent
figures for D ei O pen in 1992 went beyond K250,000. That should give us a picture o f how
much a candidate spends in Hagen Central during both provincial and national elections. As
shown in Table 6.3, projected expenditure for Hagen Central (Open) in 1997 was K100,000 to
one million kina, which means that each candidate’s expenditure will fall roughly between these
figures.18
T ab le 6.3: E stim a te d E lectio n E x p en d itu re in M ount H ag en : A rea by A m ount (kina)

Area

1992 National

1995 Provincial

1997 National

Dei Council

20-250,000

10-15,000

50-500,000

Hagen Central

50-500,000

20-50,000

100-1,000,000

Bill Standish provides comparable figures for campaign expenditure in Simbu during the 1982 elections
when Okuk said that the National Party had spent K1 million in total, o f which K547,000 was his own.
Okuk himself spent close to a quarter o f a million in Simbu (Standish 1989:195; see also Standish 1992).
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It should be pointed out that these are conservative estimates o f expenditure in cash alone; add
other wealth item s such as pigs, pork and beer, and it presents a m ore accurate picture o f pure
econom ic irrationality. D uring the 1992 Elections one candidate in an open electorate was said
to have spent m ore than K200,000 in less than a week. In one village this same candidate came
across an aging big-m an w ho was ill. A fter learning that the old man was suffering from a bad
cold, the candidate reached into his breast pocket and said: “You seem to be suffering from the
same cough as I. H ere are som e cough medicine that I have been taking.” The medicine was a
K50 note! Such generosity however did n o t win votes for the candidate because he gave out
cash outside o f the context o f social relations, which means that his kind gesture may have been
interpreted as gris mom (‘grease money*) intended to influence voters rather than m eeting social
obligations.
In this som ewhat strange game o f massive spending and correspondingly high levels o f violence,
various breeds o f leaders, representing different interest groups, have emerged. A m ongst these
are som e w ho represent w hat is commonly known as ‘name-list* groups, som e fictitious but
others real, com prising an average o f fifteen voters. T heir names are listed roughly on a piece o f
paper and delivered to a candidate by their leader w ho negotiates for cash in return for prom ise
o f votes which may or may not be actually delivered on polling day. The same list may be
delivered to one o r m ore candidates and cash collected. A nd the candidates know o f such
practice, yet they persevere in their quest for su p p o rt19 Thus, it becomes a game o f deception
w hich can be mutual. This supports a particular theory which holds that theirs is a relationship
o f m utual deception, gullibility and ridiculous naivety (see Iamo and K etan 1992:2-3; see also
K etan 1995). The ‘name-list* group is one with perhaps the m ost sinister o f motives. Candidates
will tolerate them only to a certain extent, by dealing w ith them for as long as they believe that
the group genuinely exists in neutral locality o r n o t being part o f a larger base-vote belonging to
a rival candidate.
In die event o f an imbalance in reciprocity, w hen cash is n o t reciprocated with votes, retribution
will surely follow in varying forms. Post-polling violence in W estern Highlands during the 1992
N ational Elections included murders, rape, injury to person, destruction o f property, and even
banishm ent o f fellow clansmen from tribal territorial boundaries. Banishm ent is perhaps the
harshest o f penalties for members w ho do not conform to clan policies regarding elections, but
there are o f course m ore hideous forms o f punishm ent (such as death) which can be handed out

Although candidates are not easily fooled by self-styled leaders such as those claiming to represent name
list-groups, they persevere in their quest for electorate-wide support because o f the common belief that he
who consistently picks up marginal votes, in addition to a solid base-vote comprising his local group, win
eventually win (see Ketan and Eyre 1991). In spite o f conclusions reached by a previous study (Burton
1989a), primordial factors can alter the course o f an election quite significantly in Hagen politics, as
occurred during the 1995 Western Highlands provincial assembly elections (see Chapter Eight).
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to ‘nonconform ists’ from outside the clan.20 In the instance o f a clan having endorsed its own
candidate, clan m em bers automatically becom e mem bers o f w hat is commonly known in Hagen
as a ‘base-vote’, som ething that has led some people to believe in the existence o f Vote-banks’.
B oth concepts are the focus o f discussion in the next two sections.

‘Vote-banks’
It can be argued that issues, policies and political parties are not significant factors in Papua New
G uinea elections. My own experience with election m onitoring studies is that election campaigns
are n o t based on com prehensive policy issues, nor on party ideologies, but are rather based on
kinship systems and personal networks. K in-groups are undoubtedly im portant factors in
elections. In fact, clan and tribal loyalty, as noted by Standish (1978a), are o f prim e im portance in
directing voters during elections and remain the principal resource available to skilled
m anipulators. In any election it is quite norm al for candidates to claim dan-w ide support as well
as significant proportions o f other dans and sections from both within and outside o f their own
tribe. Such claims, coupled with the actual practice o f ‘block-voting’ in a candidate’s hom e-base
area, has led many people to believe in the existence o f Vote-banks’. T he com position o f a
‘base-vote’ and how it is nurtured and protected from rival candidates will be the subject o f the
next section, but the following discussion will show that Vote-banks’ are merely based on claims
made by candidates, while a *base-vote’ actually represents mobilised support
D espite claims o f clan-wide support, there is no such thing as a ready-made group which
automatically form s into a Vote-bank’ that a candidate can call upon when required. W hile there
is a a id e o f relatives and intim ate friends in w hom he invests considerable material and
em otional resources, an aspiring leader still has to m ould that group and those beyond w hat
Boissevain (1974) calls the intim ate circles into a ‘base-vote’. A nd that requires skill as well as
knowledge o f social networks. In other w ords, anyone can claim support o f primary kin-group,
b u t it requires superior capacity to m obilise support required in elections, which means that
leaders need to invest a great deal o f resources in each individual within his personal network.
This essentially means that there are no absolute units, o r parameters w ithin which a candidate
can safely Haim automatic support w ithout keeping his relations warm w ith others around him.
Some groups, therefore, are easier to manipulate than others. The H agen sodal networks are
schem atised below (see Figures 6.1-6.2).

20.

Retribution, as a political option in asserting tribal authority, is m ore commonly sought in patron-client
relations, where the client population offend the patron-group by voting for a candidate other than the
patron-group’s choice. During the 1992 national elections, for instance, a Simbu migrant was killed
because it was believed that he and his fellow Simbu migrants, whilst residing on one Hagen group’s land
(and therefore being clients o f the landowners in a patron-client relationship), had voted for another
candidate instead o f the local candidate (see Ketan 1996; see also Chtyter Seven in this thesis).
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Both diagrams are based on Bossevain’s representation o f network structures, specifically the
centrality o f an individual in personal networks (1974:47-48). Figure 6.1 is a simple concentric
model o f Hagen social relations. It represents the various levels o f organisation, sometimes
arranged as segmentary structures (see examples given in Appendix 1). Figure 6.2 is a model o f a
person’s first order zone in a concentric form. In his model o f personal networks, as told to him
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by Maltese inform ants, Boissevain (1974) identified five analytically distinct, though sometimes
overlapping, zones:
A t th e centre is E go. A round him are clustered (I) Personal Cell, usually com posed o f his
clo sest relatives and possibly, a few o f his m ost intim ate friends. H e invests a great deal
o f his m aterial an d em otional resources in these persons. B eyond his personal cell there
is a range o f people w ho are also em otionally im portant to him , his intim ates. [His
intim ates are divided in to tw o categories based o n the nature o f relations: active and
passive]. (11) Intimate Zone is com posed o f very close friends and relatives w ith w hom
E g p m aintains active, intim ate relations. (JUI) Intimate Zone B consists o f b o th friends and
relatives, w ith w hom he m aintains m ore passive relations b u t w ho nonetheless are
em otionally im po rtan t to h im (TV) Effective Zone is a circle o f persons w ho are im portant
to him in a m ore pragm atic sense fo r econom ic and political purposes and th e logistics
o f daily life. A num ber o f people in this zone are there, rather than in Z o n e V because
o f th eir ow n netw orks. A s these contain strategic persons w ho m ay be useful to E go, he
keeps his relations w ith th em w arm so he can gain access to friends o f his friends. T hus
m any in Z o n e IV are instrum ental friends rather than em otional friends, Still farther
from E go in subjective term s is w hat could be called his (V) Nominal Zlone, persons he
know s b u t w ho m ean little to him pragm atically and em otionally.. .T hese persons, and
those beyond his first order zone, form th e (VI) Extended Zone o f his netw ork
(B oissevain 1974:47-48).

This m odel can be modified to suit particular purposes. In the case o f Hagen, for instance, we
may use this m odel to explain the behaviour o f individuals, specifically big-men and other types
o f leaders, in their attempts to mobilise support for elections and other corporate activities.
In the context o f a concentric form, those closer to him emotionally would be ideally easier to
mobilise and as one moves outward and away from his personal cell it would become
progressively m ore difficult to do so, thus requiring m ore skilful use o f economic resources to
manipulate them. But there are exceptions. First, interest groups, such as ‘name-list’ groups can
be quite unpredictable and even deceptive in their behaviour. Since profit— in the form o f cash
handouts— is their primary motive, they are loyal to none and the word ‘honour’ is not part o f
their vocabulary.
A second factor which complicates this process is the fact that those from within a candidate’s
primary kin-group are, as individuals, primarily free agents who may choose to support an
opposing candidate simply because o f relations which they consider m ore pragmatic in their
own personal networks. And if they stand to gain m ore from supporting someone outside their
own kin-group, as opposed to their own candidate, then they will vote that way.
In whichever the case it may be, it certainly requires a m ore skilful candidate to manipulate
networks — his own as well as those o f others to reach friends o f friends — to mobilise enough
support to form a com fortable ‘base-vote’ upon which to launch his campaign. Needless to say
that it is the m ore skilful candidates who can convert that support into votes, and go even a step
further by com peting effectively in areas peripheral to respective ‘base-vote’ areas, who will
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ultimately win elections. Therefore* one may conclude that there are no such th in g s as Votebanks , som e groups are easier to mobilise than others, and it requires superior capacity and
skilful use o f resources to manipulate individuals within the various circles. A primary kin-group,
how ever, rem ains an im portant resource to skilful candidates in mobilising support for
respective ‘base-votes’, which forms the basis o f my discussion in the next section.

'Base-Vote’
‘Base-vote is a term used by Hageners when referring to a candidate’s power-base, or
stronghold, which is basically com posed o f secured votes. It may be, depending on the level o f
elective office, com posed o f a subclan, clan, an alliance o f clans, o r in some cases, an entire tribe
o r tribe-pair. As previously m entioned (fCetan 1995), in the instance o f a clan having endorsed
its own candidate, clan members automatically become members o f the ‘base-vote’. This basevote, which may num ber up to several thousand eligible voters, is protected jealously by
supporters. Anyone believed to be courting with rival candidates is deemed to have betrayed
tribal o r loyalty and punished accordingly. The punishm ent, which is normally delivered during
o r after polling, may range from a severe beating to banishm ent V oters are told to call the name
o f the local candidate loudly w hen voting, or face the consequences.
A n effective way in which Hageners try to convert a base-vote into actual votes on polling day is
to conduct open voting either by calling the name o f the local candidate loudly o r alternatively
by asking the presiding officer to mark each registered voter’s ballot-paper in favour o f the local
candidate for every person who passes through the polling booth. To deviate from this can
mean trouble for m ost people. For example, during the 1988 W estern Highlands provincial
elections, supporters o f a losing candidate organised a punitive raid in which they beat a fellow
clansman and his family, a woman was allegedly raped, and a man’s house burnt down because
they believed that he had voted for the w rong man (see A.J. Strathem 1993b:49-51, Case /, for a
discussion o f events leading up to this case). This illustrates the potential for supposed members
o f a base-vote to defect to the opposition side, which means that group membership is not an
absolute indicator o f com m itm ent from its members. The conversion o f an assumed base-vote,
thus, rarely meets with a hundred per cent success rate, as indicated in William Pik’s case during
the 1995 W estern Highlands provincial elections (see ChapterEight).
N evertheless, there are ways in which a base-vote can be protected from rival candidates. Since
the base-vote is a predom inantly localised group, territorial boundaries which run mostly along
rivers and m ountains act as natural barriers to vote-poachers. Anyone who belongs to a rival
candidate’s Han o r in any way connected to him will be told to leave if found within the basevote area. Candidates regularly warn each other against poaching but encourage their supporters
to do so and they themselves are active in soliciting defectors. Consequently many o f them have
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ended up w ith injuries and loss o f vehicles at road-blocks set up by enraged supporters o f rival
candidates. T he road-blocks, usually set up at entrances into respective base-vote areas, are
mainly designed to catch rival candidates and their supporters w ho visit villages and hamlets in
the dark o f the night with bags o f cash for the purpose o f buying votes. F or instance, in a single
week o f pre-polling violence during the 1992 D ei O pen election, four vehicles were damaged,
two others were im pounded, and one candidate was abducted at such road-blocks. I have
reported cases o f election-related violence elsewhere (Ketan 1996; see also Chapter Seven).
Vehicles are a prim ary target because large amounts o f cash, m eant for vote-buying, are usually
transported by road, b ut individuals with smaller amounts are known to have been dropped o ff
at the entrances into base-vote areas during the day.
In instances w here a neutral group — one not having sponsored its own candidate -— is split
between tw o o r m ore candidates, voter blocks aligned to the various candidates are physically
transferred across into the base-vote areas o f their preferred candidate, where surveillance is
m ore effective and they are treated alm ost like royalty. As I have previously m entioned (Ketan
1995), they are kept busy with entertainm ents o f the Hagen mortya dance, local version o f disco
called six-to-six^ and some feasting. Both the ntorlya and six-to-six provide avenues for courting in
which young people actively participate, eventuating in marriage for some, but have m et with
disastrous consequences for others. In one N orth W ahgi area, W arakar, near Banz, for example,
a m an was killed and others sustained injuries following an argument over a girl at a six-to-six
associated w ith the 1995 W estern Highlands provincial assembly elections.
A nother way in which Hageners try to ensure hill cooperation horn members o f a base-vote is
through the use o f threat, force, and violence to prevent them from voting for the w rong
candidate. By forcing voters to call the name o f the local candidate at hom e polling booths,
husbands can m onitor their demand that their wives (and children in some instances) vote the
same way as they do. Hageners have deliberately turned the democratic feature o f secret ballot
into an open event, thereby drastically curtailing an individual’s right to freedom o f selection.
This apparently gross infringem ent o f an individual’s right to vote freely has been continuously
ignored by authorities over the decades and has now becom e an accepted evil in Hagen politics
(Ketan 1995). It is fair to say that this happens only at polling stations within a candidate’s basevote area. Conversely, in neutral areas, polling is a less painful exercise in which polling officials
are less intim idated and voters enjoy m ore freedom in their choice o f candidates. Polling
officials, w ithout police support, are often at the mercy o f the local candidates’ supporters who
virtually dictate policy. I have witnessed polling stations in which polling officials were told to
place an *X’ beside the nam e o f the local candidate as voters passed through the polling booth. It
was understood that everyone was voting for the local candidate In this way one can expect the
conversion o f a base-vote into actual votes as near as possible to achieving a hundred per cent
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success rate. Y et, as the results indicate, one can never be sure, because some will always get
away through abstention o r defection (see Chester Eight).
Based on previous experiences and current assessment o f the situation in M ount Hagen, I am o f
the opinion that it will be difficult to prevent these instances o f violence from occurring again,
both in 1997 and in future elections. Therefore, it is hardly unreasonable to suggest that we will
continue to see: (1) leaders o f various groups subm itting lists o f names o f voters to m ore than
one candidate for cash payments; (2) candidates visiting villages and hamlets with bags o f cash
(usually at night); (3) the practice o f ‘open ballot9voting at candidates9hom e booths; (4) women
being forced to vote the same way as their husbands; and (5) violence resulting from candidates
and supporters seeking retribution for non-deliverance o f votes. These are the features o f an
emerging political subculture in contem porary Hagen politics. I now turn to some problem s
associated w ith the high cost o f election campaigns.

Campaign Expenditure and Associated Problems
D espite the underlying ideologies and principles governing com petition and political action,
m uch o f election-related violence, especially post-polling violence, stems from this practice o f
massive spending in election campaigns. Furtherm ore, it leaves winning candidates in the
unenviable positions o f immense pressure to reward voters for their votes, repay supporters for
their campaign contributions, and to settle debts with creditors. There are a num ber o f ways to
fund election campaigns, including private donations o f cash and other resources (mostly
vehicles) from local businessmen and educated elites, political party sponsorship and
contributions (of cash and pigs) from kinsmen. However, ‘serious’ candidates, according to the
H agen w orld view, m ust dem onstrate n o t only leadership qualities but also the ability to attract
wealth. T hose considered as ‘serious’ candidates m ust have sufficient personal funds, at least
K10,000 for provincial and K20,000 or m ore for national elections, before announcing their
candidacy. In other w ords, as Hageners say, you need to have ‘big’ money to contest elections
these days. This mentality has forced many intending candidates into seeking commercial bank
loans o r overdrafts against business and personal assets (see, for example, Standish 1989), others
into withdrawing their life-savings o r retrenchm ent benefits and superannuation (m die case o f
ex-govem m ent employees), and even a few into crime (ranging from illicit sale o f drugs such as
alcohol and marijuana to ‘white-collar’ crime such as stealing money by fraud). As a result, many
have ended up bankrupt, and a few in jail In the case o f the recendy suspended W estern
Highlands Provincial G overnm ent, nearly all o f them are faced with the difficult task o f
balancing the system as they have now caused a situation o f disequilibrium in their relations with
others. T he following case, that o f Kawelka candidate William Pik should illustrate this final
p o in t
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Pik s campaign effort, like that o f his rivals and many others, was considered as a collective
investm ent Accordingly, all the Kawelka clans were involved in one way o r another. The
campaign cost nearly K20,000 in cash, 25 pigs, num erous roasted hindquarters o f pigs, tonnes o f
vegetable food (for visitors), and thousands o f man- and wom an-hours. Nearly half o f the cash
and about three-quarters o f the pigs were contributions from kinsmen. In addition to that, Pik
received donations o f several 44-gallon drum s o f fuel from a provincial politician from the Mul
Council area, som e electrical equipm ent (including an overhead loudspeaker system) from a
form er national politician from the D ei Council area, and his election posters were arranged by
an aspiring national politician, also from the D ei Council area. Finally, his campaign vehicles
w ere donated by individuals: a Toyota Tand-Cndser from a fellow K undm bo clansman; a Toyota

Dyna truck from a D ei Council man; and a Ma^da utility from an Engan businessman.
C onsistent w ith Hagen ideology o f group solidarity, die tribe-wide support for William Pik was
expressed through bloc votes, thereby enabling him to score almost a hundred per cent o f total
votes cast at his hom e-booths (98.1%): Kuk I (99.51%); Kuk II (99.47%); and M ope (93.53%).
Amazingly, he lost a total o f just 35 votes at hom e-booths, 28 at M ope and 7 at Kuk. The
slightly higher num ber o f votes lost to other candidates at M ope was put down to poor
*8603131/, which dearly implies that his scrutineers were n o t totally effective in directing all voters
along tribal lines.
D espite w inning the election and becom ing a deputy prem ier o f the province, the abolition o f
the provincial governm ent system caused him considerable problem s, a significant point to
which I shall return in Chapter Eight. A t this stage, it is w orth m entioning here that, although the
group ‘nam e’ factor is im portant in mobilising support and resources for elections, obligations
are continually created through such actions. For instance, individuals who contribute large sums
o f cash, pigs and other economic resources expect a return on their investm ent O ne cannot
overestim ate the kind o f pressure to w hich candidates subject themselves.

Implications: Competing Legitimacies and Violence
O ne condusion derived from this rather complex matrix o f M ount Hagen sodo-political
relationships is one o f com peting legitimades and the re-invention o f democracy to suit M ount
Hagen needs and life-styles. It is n d th er rejection nor acceptance o f democracy as a political
process, but rather an innovative use o f democracy, by adopting new resources but using M ount
H agen rules and ideologies. In his study on Simbu paths to pow er, Standish (1992) comes to
similar condusions.21 As new resources became available, both Simbu and Hagen leaders readily

21

In another study, based on Chuave politics, Warry (1987) pointed out the persistence o f traditional beliefs
and behaviour that continues to affect political action in the H ollands.
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incorporate them into both traditional and m ore m odem spheres o f com petition and
cooperation such as the use o f cash, cattle and beer in Simbu bugla gende pig ceremonial, the
Hagen tnoka system, and in election campaigns. The use o f beer in election campaigns, creating
obligations and in entertaining constituents, is not restricted to Hagen, since it as been reported
elsewhere (see Standish 1978b, 1989 and 1992; Reay 1982; W arty 1987; see also Marshall 1982).
Similarly, in warfare, the adoption o f W estern technological innovations such as guns — many
o f which are believed to have been supplied by politicians and their henchm en — have added
yet another dim ension to this sphere o f com petition and cooperation, resulting in m ore fatalities
because o f a general shift in emphasis from one based on display and adornm ent to that o f
am bush and slaughter, an im portant point already discussed in the previous chapter (see Chapter

Fire).
In term s o f coping w ith introduced state structures, Hageners have been quick to recognise that
local m ethods can be quite effective in pursuit o f political office. In a system where tribal loyalty
overrides that o f national sentim ents, local group objectives appear far m ore practical than
national goals. A nd local groups will go to great lengths to achieve desired results. Traditional
m ethods o f coercion, through use o f shame, threat and violence, have worked well in many
cases.
It has also becom e painfully clear that n o t having som eone from your own local group in key
political and administrative office means no access to goods and services. Politicians, owing to
the nature o f the electoral system, tend to favour a particular group and neglect others
considered peripheral to respective pow er bases. Because o f the first-past-the-post system, in which
the candidate w ith the largest vote wins even if it is only a small minority o f the total,
representatives at both provincial and national levels need not command electorate-wide support
and consequently may seek to represent only those considered as part o f their base-vote group,
w hich may turn out to be a single tribe o r an alliance o f clans.22 It is only natural that MPs and
MPAs concentrate their efforts on base-vote areas, for instance, by allocating resources such as
the Electoral D evelopm ent Fund to a single area rather than the whole electorate as intended. A
tribe's access to pow er, therefore, becomes increasingly im portant; and elections provide a good
opportunity for a group to have their own man placed firmly there. Empirical evidence suggests
that local groups will do everything within their power, including deliberate infringem ent o f
national laws, and the ever increasing use o f force, to achieve that gpaL In many ways, elections

O ne way o f overcoming such problems would be to introduce preferential voting which ensures wider
representation. Reilly (1996) has discussed the voting systems in some detail. Elsewhere, I have discussed
the problems associated with the current electoral system and made necessary recommendations so it is
now up to the PN G Electoral Commission and the National Parliament to consider changes along those
lines (see Ketan 1991; Ketan and Eyre 1991).
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in H agen and the Highlands, as suggested by Standish (1996), now represent a bizarre form o f
democracy at gunpoint
The strategies and ploys used in getting a tribesman elected to political office may vary
depending on the specific nature o f each case but the m ost commonly recurring ones are:
•

the intim idation o f polling officials;

•

die infringem ent o f constitutional rights (via absence o f secret-ballot);

•

the violation o f electoral regulations (via double o r multiple voting, im personating o r
representing deceased and absentees);

•

the use o f threat, force, and violence to prevent members o f a base-vote group from
voting for the w rong man;

•

the reactivating o f traditional alliance networks and old exchange partners (via ‘gifts’ o f
cash and other economic resources);

•

the courting o f ‘name-list’ groups from neutral areas (mainly through use o f cash); and

•

the prevention o f rival candidates suspected o f poaching votes from entering the basevote area, which involves guarding territorial boundaries o f the local group as well as
those o f traditional allies w ho have pledged support

M uch m ore sophisticated strategies are used where confederacy-type alliance networks exist
This is particularly true for the Dei Council area in which alliance systems are characterised by
complex networks centred around three large coalitions — Pipilka, Raembka and Welyi-Kuta —
which com pete in business, warfare and elections (see Chapters 3-4). These networks have
facilitated a process described in this study as the Hagen megacycle, the details o f which are
outlined below.

The Hagen Megacycle
Recent developm ents in Hagen suggest that there has been a definite merging o f spheres o f
political com petition, between ‘traditional’ Hagen and m odem PN G arenas o f competition and
cooperation. It is not only a fusion o f ideas and practices, borrowed from one field to use in
another, but also involves die deliberate and systematic ordering o f major events to form a
megacycle. In one way, as A.J. Strathem (1992) says, it represents an actual widening o f spheres
o f political action, while at the same time, it emphasises the major political lines o f cleavage
between local groups, factions, and coalitions.
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The megacycle involves a high degree o f complexity which cannot be adequately analysed
without understanding the social relations involved. It is therefore necessary to go into some
detail, before returning to an analysis in the next section, in order to explain some o f the more
complex processes at work in this turbulent society. A particular megacycle described in this
study is given in Figure 6.3.

F igure 6.3: P olitical com petition as a m egacycle: the D ei C ouncil case

As indicated above (in Figure 6.3), the expanded field o f competition covers a number o f
important political events occurring over a period o f around fourteen years, beginning with a
seven-year period o f hostilities (1984-1990), punctuated by a combined church and state-
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sponsored one-year truce period (1989-1990) during which two separate peace settlements were
negotiated, first between the Remdi and Minembi in 1989 and later between the Kawelka and
M inembi in 1990. This was followed by a six-year period o f intensive reparation payments and
gift exchanges (1990-1996). The seven-year period o f hostilities was twice broken by short
intervals o f m utual truce, first in 1987 for a short while during the national election, and ag^in
briefly in 1988 during the provincial governm ent elections. The one-year truce period also
coincided w ith preparations for the national governm ent election in June 1992. The last six-year
period o f peace, between 1990 and 1996, was apparently building towards the 1997 national
elections.
D uring a large-scale alliance warfare involving over ten tribes during 1984-1990, a total o f nearly
100 men were killed, large populations were brutally evicted from their homes, and property
valued in tens o f thousands o f kina was destroyed, and there was perhaps millions o f kina in lost
incom e (see Case 1 and 2 in Chapter Fit#). W hilst the war was predictably fought along lines o f
historically established military alliances, the introduction o f guns in late 1986 changed the
pattern o f Hagen warfare, involving a major transition from massed confrontations between
bow m en and shield carriers on battlefields to raids and ambushes, which resulted in an
alarmingly high num ber o f deaths on both sides. It also necessitated the contracting o f allies
from neighbouring alliance networks to form super-networks or fight joint-ventureships called el

hompani (‘fight-company5) systems, thus resulting in a physical widening or expansion o f the
political field. The expanded field o f warfare and alliance between Mul and Dei Councils, as
pointed out by A J. Strathem (1992:236-237), is associated with the use o f firearms. As indicated
in ChapterFive, the political field has also expanded into the Hagen Central area. There are cross
cutting ties through which guns, military intelligence and other types o f sensitive and secret
inform ation travel from one conflict to another.
The w ar was formally concluded in 1990 after protracted peace negotiations were initiated by the
Christian missions. In m ore than seven separate compensation ceremonies, between 1990 and
1996, over 2650 pigs were given by the ‘owners5o f the fight, or the elpukl nma (‘fight-root-m en5)
groups, in reparation payments to allies for losses sustained while assisting them in war. M ost o f
these payments were built around election times, in an obvious attem pt to secure assurances o f
support for candidates put up by the respective ‘owners5o f the fight The following examples o f
m ore recent reparation paym ent should clarify this p o in t
•

O n the 12* o f O ctober 1996, the Kawelka K undm bo clan, as ‘owners5 o f the KawelkaM inembi W ar (1986-1990), made reparation payments o f 400 pigs to the neighbouring
Kawelka M embo clan for three M embo men who died fighting alongside the Kundmbo
against an alliance o f M inembi dans (see Case 2 in ChapterFive, see also The National, O ctober
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16,1996, p .l and 2). The timing o f the payment is a significant factor here, considering the
fact that K undm bo clansman and form er W estern Highlands Deputy Premier, William Pik,
was contesting the D ei O pen seat in 1997. William Pik wanted to ensure as much support
and as many votes as possible from allied groups.
•

In D ecem ber 1996, the M inembi Nambka, as ‘owners’ o f the Remdi-Minembi W ar (1984
1989), made reparation payment o f nearly 200 pigs, plus some cattle and horses, to another
M inembi clan for losses sustained while assisting the Nambka in their fight against the
Remdi (see Chapter Four, Case 1). Again, the timing o f this payment is a significant factor, in
light o f M inembi Nambka’s decision to endorse one o f their clansman and form er PN G D F
officer, M ajor Pun Kaip, as a candidate for the Dei O pen in 1997, and o f course to
maximise his vote.23

Previous cases o f reparation payment were also centred around elections. In four separate
ceremonies, the Remdi Jikambo clan, as the el pukl nma, or ‘owner o f the fight’, during the
Remdi-M inembi w ar (1984-1989), gave away a total o f 1,750 pigs (all roasted) in reparation
payment to their allies for losses sustained (13 deaths) while assisting Remdi in fighting an
alliance o f M inembi clans: the first in 1990 when they gave 500 pigs to the Mul Council-based
TJpper Remdi’ section o f the tribe for loss o f two men in battle; the second, in 1992, when they
gave 200 pigs to Remdi Penambimbo and Kiklpukla for the loss o f three men; the third
ceremony was also in 1992 during which a total o f 50 pigs were given to Engan and Simbu
migrants residing at Gumanch Plantation for the loss o f two men; and the final one was in
D ecem ber 1994 when a massive presentation o f 1,000 pigs was made to the Kimka-Roklaka pair
for loss o f six men.
The first three compensations were built around the 1992 elections, attem pting to secure
assurances o f support for the Remdi Jikambo candidate, K oi Ranpi. Remdi’s gamble in not
com pensating Kimka-Roklaka before the 1992 elections was based on the assumption that
because the Kimka-Roklaka were owed reparation payment, they would n ot complicate matters
by endorsing their own candidate. Furtherm ore, it was assumed that the Kimka-Roklaka pair
would support the Remdi candidate, thereby ‘commoditising’ votes as valuables used as
solidtory gifts, a form o f request for reparation payments. As indicated in Chapter Seven,
misjudging the Kimka-Roklaka was a major blunder on the part o f Remdi strategists, which may
have cost K oi Ranpi an election victory. The Kimka-Roklaka, who had lost six men while

Both Major Pun Kaip and William Pik, however, were unsuccessful. Both were closely associated with Pep
before die 1997 election. It is however difficult to determine whether or not the voters saw them as Pep’s
political stooges. According to the victor, Puri Ruing, there have been reports that Pep and Pik were seen
together on friendly terms after the elections (personal communication, January 1998). This I cannot
confirm o r reject here.
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supporting Remdi during the Remdi-M inembi war, were obviously upset over n o t receiving
either set o f reparation payments as well as the non-paym ent o f dividends from the giant
G um anch Coffee Plantation. Gumanch is jointly owned by the Pipilka alliance, comprising
Rem di Jikam bo, Kimka and Roklaka, but controlled by a predominantly Remdi Jikambo
m anagem ent As a result, the Kimka-Roklaka pair w ent ahead and endorsed their own candidate,
P un Ruing, for the D ei O pen seat during the 1992 elections, thereby splitting the relatively small
Pipilka alliance base-vote between two candidates (see ChapterSevern, see also Ketan 1996).
The fourth and final ceremony in Decem ber 1994 was designed partly to correct their blunder in
1992 and also to make way for another Remdi Jikambo candidate, Willie W undaki, a senior
officer with the PN G Electricity Commission, to contest the D ei O pen seat in 1997. W undaki
and his supporters, however, failed to convince Puri Ruing to step aside in Wundaki’s favour,
and Ruing ultimately proved that he alone was the strongest Pipilka candidate by winning the
election.
Likewise, the Kawelka K undm bo clan, as the elpukl wua, o r ‘owner o f the fight", during the
Kawelka-Minembi w ar (1986-1990), gave away 700 live pigs24, in two separate ceremonies, to
allies for losses sustained (15 deaths) while assisting Kundm bo in fighting an alliance o f
M inembi clans: the first in 1993 when they gave 300 pigs to K opi, Kimbo and Klamakae for loss
o f nine men; and the other a presentation o f 400 pigs to the Kawelka M embo clan in O ctober
1996 for loss o f three men.25 The first payment was an attem pt to mobilise support for the
K undm bo candidate, William Pik, for the 1995 provincial elections (see Chapter Eight), while the
second was designed to mobilise support for William Pik for the 1997 national elections.
T he evidence presented here suggests that elections are highly coordinated events involving
meticulous planning and deliberate exploitation o f underlying social and political relations
between local groups. Existing relations such as the confederacy-type alliances, strengthened by
intense intermarriage and frequent moka exchanges, are im portant resources utilised by skilful
leaders. This is because election campaigns are essentially tied in with moka sequences, ally
reparation payments, and military alliances.

In fact, Kundmbo gave only 500 pigs because in the first ceremony, 200 o f the 300 pigs were contributed
by the other Kawelka clans, Membo (100), Kurupmbo (50) and Klambo (50). The Membo contribution
o f 100 pigs, followed by a further gift o f 20 pig?, three cows and nearly K1,000 cash, together with the
sponsorship o f William Pik’s candidacy during the 1995 provincial election, was made in die form o f a nm
om til moka, soliciting compensation, or nm peng payment for three men who died while fighting alongside
die Kundmbo.
Although the Kawelka Membo clan lost five men while assisting Kundmbo during the war against the
Minembi, only three (Kumi, Pengk and Ketipa) died fighting on the Kundmbo front, while the other two
(Wump and Ruk) died on the Kopi-Kimbo fro n t
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In addition to these ‘positive’ political strategies, politicians and other types o f leaders have also
been im plicated in processes that exacerbate violence in Hagen society. In recent times,
politicians have been blam ed for encouraging others to fight, as part o f electoral manoeuvring,
o r as part o f punitive action against supporters o f rival candidates. Such blame on politicians,
although based in part on rum ours and allegations, is not entirely misplaced, as there are cases in
w hich politicians and oilier leaders are said to have been the principal instigators. As pointed out
to m e by Bill Standish, conflicts can boost a leader7s role — he may put him self in a dispute as
stirrer, m ediator, com pensator, o r whatever fits at the time — to increase his influence (personal
com m unication, August 19%; see Standish 1992:113 for Siwi K urondo’s role in a Simbu dispute
which resurrected his political career after his 1972 election loss).
In the D ei Council area, for instance, at least two recent wars were triggered by incidents
involving national election candidates and a third case involved a certain MP w ho was alleged to
have supplied guns to traditional enemies o f a group which is allied to his own by a traditional
pairing (see A.J. Strathem 1993b). Instead o f assisting the group that was allied to his own, the
M P “attem pted to gain favour with their m ore num erous enemies as a part o f electoral
m anoeuvring” (A.J. Strathem 1993b:50). The MP’s alleged role here, as pointed out by A.J.
Strathem , “was unsubstantiated rum our, but it affected people’s attitudes” (ibid). Stories about
the involvem ent o f politicians in warfare may be partly based on unsubstantiated rum ours and
allegations, b u t if believed by the people to be true, then they will be true for them in their
consequences, thereby conform ing to w hat is known in sociology as Thom as’s theorem (see
Standish 1992). In this regard, reputation is w hat matters here; if a particular politician is believed
to have initiated a conflict, then he will be principally held responsible for its consequences.
T he closest I came to docum enting the involvem ent o f big-men and politicians as initiators o f
w ar (and peace) was in 1992. A fter the 1992 N ational Parliament elections, war broke out
betw een the Welyi and K entpi tribes o f D ei Council over election results (Ketan 1996:263-4). A
prom inent big-m an and form er provincial governm ent m em ber outlined a strategy to me, which
he argued w ould win the support o f both Welyi and K entpi voters for the Tepuka candidate,
Reuben Parua. H e argued quite convincingly that it was in Tepuka’s interest to encourage the
antagonists to fight for a while and then step in w ith gifts o f pigs and cash to settle the dispute,
thus putting them into positions o f obligation towards Tepuka as the peace-maker. As it
transpired, the conflict was resolved and the K entpi candidate, Philip Bobby, was persuaded to
step aside in favour o f his fellow Raembka candidate, Parua, and some Welyi voters shifted
allegiance to Parua during the 1993 D ei O pen By-Election. This case suggests that there is a
strong possibility o f big-m en and politicians exploiting conflict situations for personal and group
interests.
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While the kind o f evidence presented here may not be accepted as proof o f guilt in a court o f
law, it does not, however, suggest that we cannot make any firm statements about the role o f
leaders in initiating war as a strategy to achieve personal goals. Perhaps the m ost im portant point
to make here is that there is always a elpukl mia (‘fight root man5), or ‘owner o f a fight5, on both
sides o f a conflict And regardless o f whether real or perceived, an individual (usually a leader) is
always identified as principal instigator and his group held responsible for losses sustained by
supporters on both sides. This is to facilitate compensation o f allies, and whilst establishing the
‘owner5o f a fight or dispute over an accidental killing is a straightforward matter, leaders who are
perceived as being perpetrators o f trouble are less likely to admit responsibility — precisely
because o f the devious nature o f their political strategies. A point worth emphasising here is that
the inability to dearly identify leaders as culprits in conflict situations presents a problem only
for law enforcement agencies and researchers. The people who are involved in these conflicts,
by contrast, are aware o f such schemes designed by conniving politicians and have often repaid
them in kind

at election time —simply by accepting gifts o f cash in return for promise o f votes

on polling day (while, o f course, knowing full well that they would do no such thing). In other
words, the megacycle, despite the planning, may not always work.
O ne may ask that if politicians are such cunning, deviously scheming characters whose actions
have generated more pain than pleasure, why accommodate them at all? Firstly because they are
seen as local creatures, and as prom inent members o f local groups, factions and coalitions, they
are im portant links through which government funds and resources can be channelled towards
local events. Even after wars have been triggered by the words and actions o f politicians, they
are still useful to the combatants in various capacities. One such capacity in which politicians
have excelled is the somewhat dubious role o f the firearms supplier. Ultimately, too, they are
needed to make peace.

Discussion
There are many issues involved here — and I may have raised more issues than I have answers
for — but the general point is the acceptance o f certain practices as ‘necessary evils5 o f
electioneering in M ount Hagen. Firstly, violence in terms o f its increasing frequency and its
apparent inevitability has added a dangerous dimension to elections. Physical attacks on persons
and destruction o f property are almost natural consequences o f election losses. Secondly, cashfor-votes or bribery is now an integral part o f election campaigns. Various categpries o f voters,
such as ‘name-list5groups, are constantly on the market in search o f the best possible deals with
candidates. Politicians, therefore, in their search for power, no longer depend on platforms or
policies but rather on the contexts o f violence and cash payments (A.J. Strathem 1993b;56). The
extent to which people will go in order to get one o f their own group members elected includes
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physical coercion, infringem ent o f electoral laws, and the disbursem ent o f vast econom ic
resourcesIn all o f these, the state has been unable to intervene, o r to take control o f the situation in an
authoritative way. This, coupled with an escalation o f criminal gang violence in urban centres
and a resurgence o f tribal warfare in many parts o f the Highlands, has led to a general decline in
the legitimacy o f the state. The politicians whom people could look up to for guidance are
themselves entangled in intricate webs o f social relations in ‘V hich they on the one hand make
laws to control crime and violence and on the other hand are implicated in the processes that
escalate the overall level o f violence in their areas” (A.J. Strathem 1993b:57). In M ount Hagen,
as in other parts o f the Highlands, it is difficult for politicians to perform their electoral duties
w ithout being influenced by their personal social networks. They, o f course, are members o f
local groups and, in the Hagen world view, it is their primary kin-group to which they owe their
first loyalty, n o t the state.
In advanced liberal democracies like Britain and Australia, where there are well-organised parties,
elections do determ ine change in governm ent and policy. Contrarily, in Papua New Guinea,
elections do n o t necessarily determine change in gpvem m ent o r change in policy. Instead, PN G
elections are im portant for the way in which they affect groups and individuals in terms o f the
allocation o f the spoils o f office and renown. This is mainly because o f the fact that state
resources are regularly used in local arenas o f competition.
In any case, such a scenario represents the m ore complex aspects o f electioneering in M ount
Hagen society, whilst the strategies m entioned earlier indicate a lack o f respect for election
procedures and, ultimately, raises the question o f com peting legitimacies. Although the
legitimacy o f the state may n o t be questioned directly, it is, however, implicit in many cases that
people are aware o f the state’s inability to assert authority. It also shows that people are m ore
interested in achieving w hat they consider to be m ore practical goals rather than adhering to
rules and regulations set up by a largely faceless system which has little bearing on their lifestyles.
H ere lies the danger that w hat appears to be harmless disdain may actually lead to minimally
organised chaos in future elections.
In a country where corruption in governm ent offices is ram pant, local or tribal loyalty overrides
that o f national sentim ents, and a checks-and-baJance system is seriously flawed by the selfish
m anipulation and chronic shortage o f funds, future elections in PN G could be a nightmare for
law enforcem ent agencies. Already there are insufficient police to even attem pt to control all
polling booths in a one day p o ll Events such as elections m ust be approached cautiously with
meticulous planning and inter-agency cooperation to ensure maximum use o f scarce resources
required for m onitoring and policing procedural aspects o f elections. Knowing full well that
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inter-agency cooperation between governm ent departm ents rarely meets with a hundred per
cent success rate, it is perhaps time to approach the churches to assist in some capacity,
preferably in logistics and identifying personnel for recruitm ent as polling officials.
Turbulence o f some sort is expected and, in Hagen, considered an inevitable consequence o f
rapid political and social change. T he W estern Highlands provincial governm ent story illustrates
this. It was voted into office in January 1995 after a lengthy suspension, but abolished together
w ith others throughout P N G in July 1995, thereby further complicating an already complex
situation. F or many assembly m em bers, the 1995 provincial election was a wasted effort
especially after w hat they consider to be a full five year-term investm ent, instead o f less than a
year.26 U ndoubtedly, many o f them feel cheated and decided to enter the race for national seats
in 1997 and future elections. T hat alone can be enough to raise the intensity o f com petition.
Election-related violence, given these unfortunate circumstances, cannot be avoided, yet
concerted efforts towards minimising this particularly disruptive process m ust be attem pted But
w hether the intensity o f this com petition will reach new and possibly dangerous heights, and
precisely how the nature o f democracy in PN G will be shaped by mostly isolated local events,
even in an area o f national im portance such as Hagen needs further academic debate and
speculation (as started in Standish 1996). Having summarised the main points o f this chapter, I
now attem pt to place the evidence in the context o f wider theoretical perspectives.

‘Weak5 state versus ‘strong5societies
A m ajor them e identifiable throughout this thesis, and one that can be supported by available
data, is the tension between a ‘weak* state and ‘strong" societies (Migdal 1988). Arguing from a
state-society interaction perspective, Standish (1994), using Migdal’s terminology, suggested that
Papua New Guinea has ‘strong" societies, autonom ous but divided. Migdal’s (1988) main
concern is states, and the degree o f control — compliance, participation and legitimation —
they have. It seems the ‘strength" o f a society is basically to do with the degree o f autonomy o f
the many and varied groups, quite apart from w hat is done by the state. The state, by contrast, is
«weak" (Migdal 1988; Standish 1994). In a m ore recent paper, Standish (1996) added that:
It [the PNG state) lacks administrative and service capacity, without political strength to
difficult policy decisions and implement programmes; it does not politically
penetrate and dominate the society. Sometimes state resources can be used for local
benefit, but politicians lack authority outside their own communities, and the state as a
whole lacks popular legitimacy, worsened by its own excesses in the attempt to gam
Only m onths after the election provincial assembly-men were given notice by Paias Wingti, as incoming
G overnor o f the province, to vacate their offices. Surely, someone m ust have known that provincial
governments would be abolished in 1995, so why conduct an election in January o f the same year? It has
been a wasteful exercise for both candidates and the Electoral Commission. Needless to say, winning
candidates w ho have committed massive amounts o f resources to a seat in the assembly have been
unfairly victimised.
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control The societies are increasingly isolated from the state, which is irrelevant to their
needs, and withdraw from engagement with the state (Standish 1996:319-20).
M any o f the problem s w hich characterise the weak nature o f the state are com m on to many
developing countries, especially the recently decolonised states o f Africa and the small Pacific
island states. In many ways the problem s such as lack o f resources, inadequate m anpow er
training facilities and underdeveloped economies are a distinct legacy o f the colonial past. If the
colonial state was relatively strong, then it is because it was highly centralised in P ort M oresby
and had strong control over fairly efficient operatives in districts (see Standish 1996:320). But it
clearly did n o t wholly dom inate, nor completely penetrate into the societies it claimed control
over. A t the periphery (in this case, the entire country outside the national capital and the much
smaller dots symbolising the provincial m etropolitan centres), the Melanesian societies
functioned m uch in the same way as they did for thousands o f years, although changing and
incorporating new ideas and innovations w hen it suited them.
T he im position o f rigid hierarchical state structures onto fragmented but autonom ous and in
many ways ‘sovereign’ groups o f the Papua New Guinea Highlands inevitably resulted in
com peting legitimacies, o f state versus society, and conflicting roles for politicians, policemen
and other governm ent officials, between their roles as state employees and members o f local
groups. By contrast w ith many African societies, A.J. Strathem (1993b:42) noted that the smallscale societies o f Papua New Guinea tended to be politically acephalous, and in the Highlands
there were no established centralised chiefdoms that could have been used to graft indigenous
politics onto the introduced colonial state. H e goes on to say that:
Big-men were leaders of groups, coalitions, and fictions in pursuit of competitive ends.
When populations of this kind are introduced at first to colonial and then to post
colonial power, we should not expect diem to invent overnight a respect for the
hierarchical authority. They obeyed die colonial power out of a combination of fear and
self-interest When fear is no longer there, they will continue to pursue the self-interest
part of the equation unless curbed. In short, the national government, inheriting die
colonial state apparatus in 1975, was not initially equipped with any automatic
legitimacy in the people’s eyes (AJ. Strathem 1993b:42).
Indeed, the state system was flawed from die beginning and the people in the Highlands, as in
other parts o f the country and elsewhere, recognising its lack o f capacity to assert its authority,
have deliberately m anipulated various aspects o f the state for self gain.27 As indicated by the
evidence presented here and that o f others (Reay 1987; Standish 1992, 1994 and 1996; A J.
Strathem 1993b; and D innen 1996), the people engage with the state on occasions, such as
elections, w hen the opportunity for econom ic gain is m ost clearly present Otherwise, they have
becom e increasingly isolated, and withdraw from engagement w ith the state (see Standish 1996).
27

T hat elections are a farce, with inflated voter turnout, intimidation o f polling officials and gross
infringement o f electoral regulations, is indicative o f this sad state o f affairs.

Eledions and the Hagen Megacycle

243

In this regard, die data presented in this paper and elsewhere (Ketan 1995 and 1996) supports
Standish’s assessm ent o f the state as being weak and now lacking administrative capacity and
coordination, both at the centre and at the periphery (1996:320).
If, in fact, the PN G state is weak, we then can ask w hether Hagen and other PN G Highlands
societies m ust be strong. A part from the autonomy o f society and its high level o f social control
as characteristics o f a strong society (Migdal 1988:34-35), there is n o t m uch else that Migdal says
about strong societies. T he strength o f Melanesian societies is in their kastoms> values, autonom y
and effective m aintenance o f public order. If strength is to be defined in terms o f kastom,
ideology and cultural practices influencing the behaviour o f people in their engagement with the
state, then, Hagen society is indeed strong.28 In this regard, we may consider Hagen political
strategies — including violent means o f asserting authority and compliance, use o f state
resources in local com petition, and defiance o f state authority — as manifestations o f a strong
society. Clearly, the state, by contrast, does n o t function in a coherent m anner, which indicates
the absence o f w hat Migdal calls integrated domination, in which die state as a whole establishes
broad pow er and in which it acts in a coherent fashion (Migdal 1994:9). But this in no way
suggests that the reverse is true, such that the society has been dom inant in changing parts o f the
state. W hilst accepting that the PN G state has been relatively ineffective, it is equally im portant
to realise that, generally, the state and society are mutually transform ing, which means that
Hageners, as citizens o f the PN G state, are affected by political decisions made in P ort M oresby,
but as m em bers o f local groups, coalitions, and factions, they also subvert the state when it suits
them . This ‘mutuality o f state-society interactions’ conform s to Migdal et ah generalisation that
“states may help m ould, but they are also continually m oulded by the societies within which they
are im bedded” (1994:2), a significant point which leads us to our next theoretical perspective.
Beyond the rather statist state-versus-society perspective is the state-in-society perspective
proposed by Migdal etal (1994) for the comparative study o f the state and politics in developing
countries. The form er perspective, they argue, “is misleading in so far as it renders the state in an
adversarial position vis-a-vis the society, and instead favour viewing the state as part o f society”

(ibid4). T he state-in-society perspective is largely based on the ‘mutually transform ing’ aspect o f
the interactions between com ponents o f the state and society. Nevertheless, Migdal et al (1994)
do focus on degrees o f state dom ination o f society. The Papua New Guinea situation, as evident
here and in the w riting o f other observers (see, for example, Reay 1987; A.J. Strathem 1993b;
Standish 1994 and 1996), fits into a category conceptually labelled by Migdal et al (1994) as

dispersed domination. A ccording to Migdal, it is a form o f dom ination “in which neither the state

28.

N oting the ‘strength’ o f Melanesian political cultures in adapting to and surviving ‘revolutions’ such as
colonialism, Standish concluded that “Melanesian ideologies and political strategies have colonised the
state” (Standish 1994:60; see also Standish 1992).
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(nor any other social force) manages to achieve country-wide dom ination and in which parts o f
the state may be pulled in very different directions” (Migdal 1994:9), H e gpes on to note th a t
C onflicts flare u p o v er specific th rusts and parries: attem pts by th e state to increase tax
collection, effo rts by local figures to gain con tro l over particular state offices and
resources, initiatives by state agencies to regulate certain behaviour, attem pts by local
strongm en to extend th e area o f th eir ow n dom inance, and m ore. T h e struggles in these
m ultiple settings en d u p reshaping b o th th e state an d society (M igdal 1994:9-10).

All o f these points are applicable to the PN G situation, especially in the context o f elections in
w hich local groups and their leaders com pete for political office and pow er to control state
resources, and in the PN G Highlands where the state has unsuccessfully tried to stop tribal
w arfare, and attem pts by politicians to build their networks and consolidating existing pow er
bases by converting their representative role into one o f patronage towards their constituents
(A.J. Strathem 1993b; see also Boone 1994 for comparable discussion o f a patronage system in
post-colonial Africa). Papua New G uinea is like the African state o f Senegal where the political
practices, based on a system o f patronage, seem to underm ine the administrative capacities and
resource base o f the Senegalese state (Boone 1994). Such evidence, as pointed out by Migdal
(1994), present great difficulties for state-centred theories which are based on the assum ption
that state organisation is powerful and cohesive enough to drive society. Such a perspective, as
noted by Migdal (ibid), leaves us at a loss to explain such instances as Senegal and Papua New
Guinea.29 Boone’s (1994) study o f the Senegalese state presents a strong warning for Papua New
Guinea, and in many ways portrays an image that m ost PN G people (including some foreign
observers) in Papua New G uinea will be familiar with. Commenting on Boone’s study, Migdal
(1994) reported th a t
T h e {Senegalese] state itself cam e to be based o n a system o f patronage in w hich chiefs
an d o th er local-level authorities exercised a trem endous degree o f discretion in local
areas. T hese local pattern s o f dom ination cam e to be ro o ted in th e state organisation,
crippling it and rendering it unable to deal w ith th e pressing problem o f eroding
national p ro d u ctio n th at left th e state w ith a drastically declining tax base. A uthoritative
an d autonom ous forces in society shaped th e state as m uch o r m ore th an they w ere
shaped by it (M igdal 1994:20).

Amazingly, this could have been w ritten for Papua New Guinea. A definite parallel between the
Senegalese case and Papua New Guinea would become even m ore apparent if we were to
O w ing to the difficulties involved in attem pting to use a state-centric view o f security as som ething created
or im posed from above, Standish (1994), explicitly follow ing Clifford e t a l (1984), urged the need to
recognise that la w and order* can only em erge b ottom -u p' from w ithin the society and m ust com e from
w ithin the com m unity as w ell as fo e state (Standish 1994:61). Similarly, w e need to shift away from a state
centric perspective and view Third W orld states as interacting w ith societies and at the sam e tim e
recognising that there are significant differences betw een them as w ell as w ith those in developed
countries, gaining insights from com parison w hile treating each case strictly on the basis o f empirical
evidence.
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form ulate further questions. In the context o f patron-client relationships and lack o f public
accountability, have our national leaders becom e too powerful, and in Hagen have big-m en like
W ingti, Pora and Mel, in pursuit o f super-big-m en status, become too big for their small local
groups? W ill die abolition o f the provincial governm ent system create even m ore disparities in
w ealth and pow er betw een this type o f super-big-men leaders and their people, and therefore,
extend their dom ination beyond local boundaries? Is the patronage system o f dom ination an
hindrance to effective governm ent? A re the current economic, social and political problem s in
Papua N ew G uinea rooted in this system? The answers, though contestable, are implicit in the
questions, a significant point to which I shall return in the concluding chapter o f this thesis. It
suffices here to say that the people and state o f Papua New Guinea face great problem s, which
are the cumulative result o f their colonial history, the political practices o f leaders and followers,
and the w ider processes o f social and political change. Many o f these problem s stem from
ineffective state penetration, and the distinct lack o f administrative capacity to formulate and
im plem ent appropriate policies, and m oreover, are a direct result o f a political culture based on
parochialism and the pillage o f national resources. That is, the state is in a different m oral sphere
from the local groups.
Finally, if the African experience has any implications for PN G , then a key issue is the m anner in
w hich the em erging political culture is taking shape: that elections are viewed as the fastest road
to wealth, pow er, and influence; that state resources are constantly used for personal enrichm ent
and nepotistic patronage; that local cultural values and political practices have dom inated state
politics; that they have thereby rendered the state ineffective in dealing with problem s o f public
accountability, security, and policy implementation. M oreover, as Zartm an (1995:6) says, “the
norm al politics o f dem ands and responses atrophies; the political processes for popular
legitimisation are discarded o r prostituted; politics and economics are localised; and the centre
becom es peripheral to the workings o f society” at the local level. The fact that some African
states, w hich had experienced problem s similar to those currently faced by Papua New Guinea,
have collapsed (see, for example, N g’ethe 1995; Ottaway 1995; and Zartm an 1995) ought to be a
strong warning for PN G leaders, observers and others. I shall return to discuss this point on
state collapse in the concluding chapter o f this thesis. As preparation for this argument I now
present a couple o f election case studies in the next two chapters, so as to provide further
o f and insights into the dynamics o f Hagen society and the way it interrelates w ith state
politics.

Chapter

7

ELECTIO N CASE I: GROUP-BASED CAMPAIGNING A N D VIOLENCE IN
T H E D E I O PEN ELECTORATE: T H E 1992 ELECTION
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Introduction
T he 1992 D ei O pen election was w on by Pangu Party candidate, M elchior Pep, with 5,435 votes
o r 27 per cent o f the popular vote and 1,998 m ore than his nearest rival, an independent
candidate, K oi Ranpi, w ho polled 3,437. A nother independent, Reuben N am ba Parua, came
dose behind in third place with 3,036. M elchior Pep beat seven other candidates to retain his
seat, which he had w on in 1987 by beating Reuben’s father, Parua Kuri, a long-time M P since
the colonial H ouse o f Assembly days.
This chapter is pardy based on an earlier version published in Saffu (ed. 1996), in which I
examined structural group-based campaigning in W estern Highlands and the supposed law and
order problem s stem ming from such behaviour. The chapter starts by providing some basic
background inform ation about the electorate o f D ei O pen. It then moves onto a discussion o f
the candidates and their local group affiliations, with particular reference to the large coalitions
w hich were outlined in Chapter Three, in an attem pt to highlight the dynamics o f local Hagen
politics and the way in which local groups com pete for elective office.
T he second part o f the chapter deals with election-related violence. Purported ‘electoral
violence’, for instance, is analysed in the context o f the underlying relationship between groups
and individuals. The concept o f electoral violence can be rather misleading when analysed on its
own. Thus, one can argue that forms o f violence during elections can be explained in terms o f
historical and structural organisation o f local groups in the Papua New Guinea Highlands.
Similarly, it can also be said that the various types o f violence can be identified and categorised
for possible analysis. The final part o f the chapter argues that local group-based campaigning
and election-violence is a way o f asserting group solidarity, strength and cohesion within a weak
state. It also shows local m ethods o f coercion and maintaining social control are m ore effective
than state agencies. Like warfare, election-related violence poses a serious threat to the state’s

rUim over the legitimate use o f force. In effect, these are challenges to the state’s authority,
thereby exposing the weakness o f a state with flawed policy-making and implementation and
limited capabilities.

Background to the Dei Open Electorate
T he D ei O pen electorate is part o f the Hagen N orth D istrict o f W estern Highlands province.
W ith a population o f 41,849 persons (1990 Census), D ei is the largest Local G overnm ent
Council area-cum -O pen electorate in the area. It comprises almost half o f the Hagen N orth
population, which makes it the only local governm ent council area considered big enough to be
defined as an open electorate. The population figures for the Local G overnm ent Council areas
in Hagen N orth district are given in Table 7.1.
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T ab le 7.1: L ocal G overnm ent C ouncils in H ag en N o rth D istrict

Vocal Government Council

Population (1990)

Mul

18,813

21.84

Dei

41,849

48.58

Baiyer1

18,692

21.70

6,796

7.90

86,150

100.00

Lumusa1
Total:

%

1.

Although separate census divisions, Baiyer and Lumusa are far too small for separate local government
councils.

Source:

Based on final population figures for 1990 Census (National Statistical Office 1993; 1994).

The electorate o f Dei is strategically placed in a geographically unique position. Contrasting
features within its boundaries are: (1) the N orth Wahgi swamplands which are currently the
centre o f intense commercial activities, including one o f the largest coffee plantations in the
Southern Hemisphere; (2) the rolling plains o f Hagen North, covered by thick layers o f volcanic
ash and debris, which are home to some o f the world's oldest agricultural systems (cf. Loffler
1977; Steensberg 1980; Golson 1981; 1982; Górecki 1982); and (3) the rugged terrain o f the
southern slopes o f the Sepik-Wahgi Divide which are densely covered with rainforest
The Dei electorate shares administrative boundaries with five other open electorates: Hagen;
Mul-Baiyer; Jimi; N orth Wahgi; and Anglimp-South Wahgi. In the east it shares a common
border with N orth Wahgi at Kimil. Westwards it runs parallel with the Wahgi River and the
Jimi-Wahgi Divide till it reaches the Gugla creek, a tributary o f the Gumanch River which
empties into the Wahgi at Rukmump. In the northwest, it drops over the Jimi-Wahgi-Baiyer
Divide at Mbukl, then crosses the plains o f Baiyer and onto the slopes o f the Miti Range where
it separates Dei from MuL In the southwest Dei shares a common border with Hagen Central at
Kuk (see Burton 1987a; 1987b; 1988). In the south the Wahgi River separates Dei from
Anglimp-South Wahgi.
The bulk o f the population occupy the fertile valleys, where the population density is about 200
persons per square kilometre and, in parts o f the valley where portions o f land had been
allocated for resetdement, the figure is even higher. Swamplands which were once considered as
the domain o f bad spirits (kor rakm in Melpa language) are now filled with human setdements.
This is a by-product o f a shift in perception o f the socio-religious system, largely influenced by
the Health Department’s malaria eradication programme which began soon after European
contact, and also by improved methods o f swamp drainage introduced by the Department o f
Agriculture and Livestock (DAL). Being ideal breeding grounds for mosquitoes, the Wahgi
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Valley floor was avoided and the high fever which resulted from malaria was generally regarded
as the w ork o f malevolent spirits (Melpa: korrakm, Wahgi: kangi, see Muke 1994:55-56; see also
G órecki 1979). But in recent times, after both the mosquitoes and the evil spirits were driven
away from the valley by draining the swamps into the W ahgi River, human populations have
returned in greater num bers. A J. Strathem (1984:87-88) provides a discussion on relocation o f
settlem ents. Examples o f such m ovem ents are: (1) the Kawelka’s return to their lower-altitude
K uk territory from M bukl (A.J. Strathem 1984:88; Górecki 1982); Tepuka kinsfolk w ho have
joined the Kawelka there and also at the ancient Raemb settlement n o t far from Kuk (A.J.
Strathem 1984:88); (3) the m ovem ent o f various groups, including many M inembi clansmen,
w ho have migrated dow n to the Baiyer valley around Tiki plantation, where coffee grows fast at
an altitude o f less than 2,000 metres (A.J. Strathem 1984:88); and (4) M inembi and Kombukla
tribesm en w ho have m oved dow n to the Kugmi and N orth W ahgi swamplands. This
considerable relocation o f settlement, both towards roads when they are newly built and, m ore
strikingly, from high to low-altitude terrain (A.J. Strathem 1984:87), is a widespread
phenom enon. Muke (1994) presents an excellent discussion on both historical and prehistórica!
population m ovem ent in South Wahgi. As inward migration continues to accelerate towards the
tw enty-first century, these fertile valleys will face m ajor population pressure. In fact, it has already
resulted in conflicts between the occupants, with several clans brutally evicted from the Tiki area
following the Kawelka-M bem bi war (1986-1990) and another war fought over the Kugmi
swampland between the Kombukla and Kimka-Roklaka tribe-pair during the early 1980s (see

Chapter Five). Furtherm ore, the Remdi-M inembi war (1984-1989), although triggered by an
incident at a local tavern, had its roots in conflicts over land That the Tenga valley was used as a
battlefield was n o t incidental; antagonists on both rides had their eyes on such prime land
A bove the tribal level is a loosely organised level which I have described as coalition-style
alliance. T he m ajor coalitions in D ei are the Pipilka, Raembka and Welyi-Kuta. As indicated in
Chapter Three, these groups were formed to serve two basic functions: (1) to facilitate the
plantation acquisition scheme which began in the mid-seventies; (2) to facilitate the political
ambitions o f groups and individuals in both warfare and elections. The form er D ei MP Parua
K uri, for example, had successfully utilised both Raembka and the Tepuka-Kawelka alliance as
his political foundation for three successive parliamentary terms (1972-1987), until Kawelka
pulled out o f flie alliance in 1987. Likewise, Kuri’s successor, M elchior Pep, appeared to have
consolidated his position within his Welyi-Kuta group since taking office in 1987. H e was
returned to Parliam ent during the June 1992 elections but was throw n out o f office by the PN G
Leadership Tribunal after found guilty o f 17 breaches o f the Leadership Code (Ombudsman
Com m ission 1993:66).
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Between the tribe and coalition-style alliance levels can be found another level o f organisation
called the tribe-pair. These are mainly political units whose membership is drawn from
traditional ties based originally on military alliances between tribal groups. Although Hageners
have no definite term for this, it is, however, a widespread phenomenon, in which moka
exchange is usually intense and many wives are taken from each other. Within the TepukaKawelka pair, for example, members o f each partner refer to those o f the other as ang wua
(‘brother-m an’). The intriguing phenomena o f tribe pairing and neo-traditional coalition-style
alliance have already been discussed in Chapter Three. In any case, it must be emphasised that in
Hagen, politics at both local and national levels are generally organised along these broad lines.
There is evidence suggesting that candidates have been sponsored by all levels o f group. Former
D ei MP Parua Kuri, for example, had largely been a (Raembka) coalition-based candidate during
his eady days in the House o f Assembly and later a (Tepuka-Kawelka) tribal pair-based candidate
when tribes from within Raembka began sponsoring their own candidates. In contrast, his son,
Reuben Parua, was a (Tepuka Kiteipi) clan-based candidate during the 1992 elections. Paias
Wingti was another clan-based candidate when he first contested the Hagen Open seat in 1977.
Melchior Pep is a good example o f a tribal-based candidate. While he may have consolidated his
position amongst the Welyi-Kuta coalition-style alliance during this election, his Kombukla tribe
provided the necessary foundation for his win during the last election. The candidates and their
groups are given below (Table 7.2).
T a b le 7.2: C an d id ates, trib es, trib e-p airs an d coalition-style alliances o f D ei

Candidate

Tribe

Tribe-pair

Coalition-style
alliance

K oi Ranpi

Remdi

Kumdi-Remdi1

Pipilka

Puri Ruing

Roklaka

Roklaka-Waklupka2*

Pipilka

Wikai Membi

Minembi

Kombukla- Minembi

Welyi-Kuta

Michael Yona

Minembi

Kombukla-Minembi

Welyi-Kuta

Melchior Mack Pep

Kombukla

Kombukla-Minembi

Welyi-Kuta

Philip Bobby

Kentpi

Kumungaka-Kentpi

Raembka

Reuben Nam ba Parua

Tepuka

Tepuka-Kawelka

Raembka

Matrus D okta Mel

Tepuka

Tepuka-Kawelka

Raembka

1.

Although the Kumdi-Remdi is a m ore traditional alliance, and the relationship is continued in Mul Council
area (where “Upper Remdi” is paired with Kumdi), the Remdi in D ei (a.ka. “Lower Remdi”) are now
closely associated with the Kimka-Roklaka pair.

2.

Like Remdi, Roklaka is also geographically divided. The Roklaka nu-porpd (‘those w ho live downstream5)
are com m only paired with the Waklupka while those residing at Gumanch are paired with Kimka.
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Candidates and Group Affiliations
D uring die N ational Elections in June 1992, eight candidates contested the D ei O pen Electorate
seat held by M elchior Pep, a Pangu party m ember. As indicated in Table 7.2, the m ajor coalitionstyle alliances

Pipilka, Raembka and W elyi-Kuta — were all represented by candidates. B oth

Kaembka and W elyi-Kuta had three each while Pipilka had two candidates. The candidates’ bio
data is given bellow:

•

Matrus (Dokta) Mel, aged 35 (9 /7 /6 2 ), was bom into the K elm bo K opim bo clan o f the
Tepuka tribe. H e spent his eady school years with his K entpi m aternal uncles while
attending N unga Community School (1969-1974). H e com pleted his secondary education at
the Fatim a Catholic M ission High School near Banz (1975-1978), before entering the
University o f Papua N ew Guinea w here he graduated with a com bined Bachelors Degree in
Econom ics and Commerce (1979-1985). H is first em ploym ent after com pleting university
studies in February 1985 was with Coopers and Lybrand A ccountants in M ount H agen as a
trainee accountant. A fter having progressed full accountants status in the Tax and
A ccounting Division o f the fitm , M atrus resigned for personal reasons. From 16 February
1987 to 16 M arch 1988, he was employed by Touche Ross and Company (Chartered
A ccountants) in the Tax and A ccounting Division o f that firm before being transferred to its
auditing division. In M arch 1988, Matrus resigned because o f a job offer from the Highlands
Regional Secretariat, but did not take up the offer because o f infighting am ongst m em ber
governm ents o f the Secretariat In stead, he w ent into private business as owner-manager o f
a retail shop in M ount Hagen. In 1989, M atrus was elected a Local G overnm ent Councillor
and, in January 1990, he ousted fellow Tepuka tribesm an and prom inent D ei businessm an,
G oim ba K ot, as C h a irm an o f the D ei D evelopm ent C orporation, the business arm o f the
D ei Local G overnm ent Council, w ith interests in coffee plantations and investm ents in
N iugini Loydds Bank, Farm set (a farm supply store) and plantation m anagem ent A fter the
com pany closed dow n all its operations in 1992, due to w hat Matrus described as “econom ic
crises coupled w ith the depressed price o f coffee” (personal com m unication, January 1995),
he left the now defunct com pany to contest the 1992 PN G N ational Elections. M atrus first
contested the D ei O pen seat, then held by fellow Tepuka tribesm an, Parua K uri, during the
1982 P N G N ational Elections, w hilst still a student at U PN G . A fter losing to Parua K uri,
w ho successfully retained the seat he had held since the H ouse o f Assembly days in 1972,
M atrus returned to U PN G to finish his studies. Again, during the 1987 PN G N ational
Elections, M atrus contested the D ei O pen seat, but both he and Parua lost to Kombukla
trihpsmarv M elchior Pep. The rift between M atrus Mel’s K elm bo clan and Parua K uri’s
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K dtipi d an widened, just as Mel and Parua’s rivalry intensified, and culminated in Mel’s
w renching o f pow er from Parua K uri and Goim ba K ot in D ei Development Corporation.
By the 1992 PN G N ational Elections, as will be seen, Matrus appears to have resigned to
the fact that his Kelm bo base-vote is for too small compared with Parua’s to launch a serious
campaign. Since the rift between his group and Parua’s had deteriorated to a level where
differences could not be resolved, Matrus struck a deal with Melchior Pep and Pati W amp,
Pangu Party president, rather than throwing his support behind Parua’s son, Reuben, during
the 1992 elections.

•

Reuben Namba Parua, aged between 35 and 40, was bom into the Keitipi clan o f the
Tepuka tribe. Reuben is the eldest son o f the former D ei MP, Parua Kuri, w ho is
undoubtedly one o f the m ajor ‘traditional’ big-men in the whole o f the Hagen area. Despite
the lack o f tertiary educational qualifications, Reuben is an astute businessmen, can be quite
articulate at times, sophisticated, and forthright in manner. H e can be m ost eloquent when
he wants to be, but can sometimes be quite unpredictable. H e has considerable experience
in the hotel industry. Reuben served his political apprenticeship with a num ber o f
prom inent politicians, including Ted D iro, Paias W ingti, and o f course his father Parua Kuri.
Having been away from his hom e electorate for m ost o f his adult life, Reuben relied heavily
on his father’s extensive social networks, especially among the core Raembka groups such as
the Tepuka-Kawelka pair and Nelka, to launch his election campaign. H e lives in Port
M oresby and this was his first attem pt in elective office,

•

Melchior Mack Pep, aged between 40 and 45, belongs to Rondong clan o f the Kombukla
tribe. H e worked with the Health D epartm ent as a Health Inspector before entering
parliam ent in 1987. D uring the 1987 National Elections, he contested the D ei O pen as a
Pangu candidate and ousted sitting member, Parua Kuri, a long-serving MP since 1972. He
briefly served in the O pposition backbenches, but after the W ingti government was ousted
in July 1988 through a successful no-confidence motion, M elchior was appointed Minister
for Correctional Services in the Namaliu governm ent Before the 1992 elections, Melchior
and two other governm ent ministers were forced to resign in order to avoid facing charges
brought against them under the PN G Leadership Code. In a deal reached between the
ministers and die Prime M inister, they were paid K100,000 each as compensation for being
replaced in a ministerial reshuffle. The other ex-ministers charged together with M elchior
were Tim othy Bonga (Nawae Open) and Peter G arong (Tewai-Siassi Open). All o f them
knew that the chaiges would be brought against them in the event that any, o r all o f them ,
were to retain their seats, but that did not stop them from contesting the 1992 elections.1

1.

As it did transpired, Melclior Mack Pep did in feet win the 1992 Dei Open election, but was thrown out o f
office after being found guilty o f breaching the Leadership Code.
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Puri Ruing, aged between 35 and 40, is a member o f the Roklaka tribe. Puri is a Port
Moresby-based policeman but has remarkably strong ties with his kinsmen at home. A
devout Christian and a somewhat reluctant politician, Puri entered the campaign way behind
his rivals. It is widely believed that he was pressured by certain individuals, including a
prom inent Roklaka big-man, into contesting the elections. His candidacy was also viewed as
a protest against the Remdi candidate, K oi Ranpi, for reasons to do with corporative
business deals. There was an obvious rift between the Remdi and the Kimka-Roklaka pair
over non-payment o f dividends from the giant Gumanch Coffee Plantation which they
jointly own but which was controlled by a predominantly Remdi Jikambo management In
addition, the Kimka-Roklaka, who lost men while supporting Remdi in their fight against
the M inembi and therefore were owed reparation payments, may not have been impressed
by the Remdi election fanaticism. It seems highly conceivable that Puri may have been used
by Kimka-Roklaka leaders to get back at Remdi. Despite such rumours and allegations, there
is no conclusive evidence to prove this point, nor is there any substance in a claim that Puri
may have been endorsed by Melchior Pep to split Koi Ranpi’s vote. As will be seen, Puri
appears to be a serious candidate, with a genuine interest in the people, and as voters come
to understand him better, he will become an im portant candidate in Dei Open elections.

Koi Ranpi, aged between 45 and 50, is a member o f the Remdi Jikambo clan and has been
a local government councillor for many years. H e took over the coundllorship from Maip
Kei, an im portant Remdi Jikambo leader and a former provincial government minister,
thereby symbolically inheriting the Remdi leadership and the right to contest government
office through elections. Accordingly, he has dutifully contested every national election since
1977. The 1992 election was his fourth attem pt In both the 1977 and 1982 national
elections, Koi was runner-up to Parua Kim, and in 1987 he was again runner-up to Melchior
Pep. Iitd e did he know that history was about to repeat itself, yet again in 1992. Unlike his
rivals, K oi is a ‘traditional’ big-man, with skills in oratory and knowledge o f local alliance
systems, but has limited knowledge o f the wheeling and dealing nature o f modem PN G
politics (including its evils).

Wikai W eeks’ Membi, ag^d between 35 and 40, is a member o f the Minembi Nambka
dan. Wikai was employed by the Justice Department as a Court Clerk before going into
private business with interests in real estate. Wikai is distantly related to both Koi Ranpi and
Melchior Pep th rou gh marriage ties. Both Kai’s Nambka dan and Koi’s Jikambo dan were
the ‘fight-root-man’ (elpukhmd), or ‘owners’ o f the Remdi-Minembi War, fought between
1984 and 1989. Because o f the Minembi Nambka clan’s elpukl wua status and outstanding
debts in reparation payment owed to groups in alliance with them, Wikai’s candidacy came
as a surprise to Melchior Pep, who did not take this too kindly, taking into account o f the
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feet that Melchior*s Kombukla group had given assistance to the Minembi in a largely non
fighting capacity. Wikai, according to one Minembi Nambka informant, should have waited
until after the 1992 election, after Pep’s second resignation, to contest the by-election in Dei.
The masoning behind this lies with a belief that both Melchior Pep and Pati Wamp would
have supported Wikai for the 1993 D ei O pen By-Election if Wikai had supported Pep in
1992. As it transpired, both Pep and W amp vowed n o t to forgave Wikai for contesting
against Pep in 1992, even though in the final analysis, Wikai’s candidacy made little
difference, as Pep w on quite easily. In a complicated sequence o f events following Melchior
Pep’s second resignation after winning the 1992 Dei O pen Election and subsequent by
election, Wikai briefly lost his liberty and although it cannot be substantiated, many ordinary
people suspected that his political enemies had something to do with i t

•

Philip Bobby (Kupakl), aged between 45 and 50, is a member o f the Tembokambo N u
W urung section o f the Kentpi tribe. H e is a school teacher by profession and this was his
first attem pt in political office, but it ended in disaster (see post-polling violence in this
chapter; see also Ketan 1996), which ultimately led to his decision not to contest the 1993
D ei O pen By-Election. Following the Kentpi-Welyi fight after the 1992 elections, in which
three men were killed, Tepuka leaders saw this as an opportunity to persuade Philip Bobby
to step aside in favour o f Reuben Parua chiefly on die basis o f the argument that the Dei
O pen seat m ust be retained by the Raembka alliance and Reuben (through his father’s
network) had a much better chance o f doing that than Philip. As a result, a deal was struck
between these two Raembka candidates, ensuring Philip’s predominantly K entpi supporters
to vote for Reuben in the by-election, thus effectively transforming Philip Bobby’s status
from one o f serious contender to that o f political henchmen. Philip Bobby has now
switched his attention to growing coffee.

•

M ichael Y ona, aged between 35 and 40, is a member o f the Minembi Napakae clan. H e
QttpndpH M ount Hagen High School in the late seventies and briefly worked as a car
salesman with w hat was then called New Guinea M otors (now merged with the giant M ount
Hagen-based W amp Nga group o f companies) before going into private business with .
interests in trucking and haulage. This was his first attem pt at elective office and, judging
from his poll perform ance, appears to be his last After an especially disastrous attem pt in
politics and business, Michael Yona has finally returned to his previous profession as a
salesman with W amp Nga M otors.

O ut o f the eight candidates, only four were serious contenders with Trig money*, resources and
strong support They were K oi Ranpi, Wikai Membi, Namba Parua and the incumbent Melchior
Pep. The others, in spite o f genuine interest they held in contesting, provided little competition
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for Pep and mostly ended up being used as political stooges by others for the purpose o f
splitting votes in opposition strong-holds. It was widely believed that Melchior Pep, with Pati
Wamp’s assistance, encouraged Matrus Mel amongst the Tepuka and, possibly, Puri Ruing2
amongst the Roklaka to split both Raembka and Pipilka votes, respectively. This facilitated the
prevalence a id dominance o f Welyi-Kuta in Dei. Either accidentally or by design, the choice o f
candidates available for voters somewhat favoured the sitting member. While the results indicate
the employment o f the principle o f divide-and-rule, this, however, cannot be proven
conclusively. The Dei Open election results are given in Table 7.3.
T ab le 7.3: T h e 1992 D ei O pen E lection R esults

Candidate

Votes Polled

%

Koi Ranpi

3,437

17.19

Puri Ruing

1,989

9.95

Wikai Membi

2,345

11.73

Michael Yona

85

0.43

Melchior Mack Pep

5,435

27.19

Philip Bobby

2,079

10.40

Reuben Namba Parua

3,036

15.19

Matrus Dokta Mel

1,539

7.70

Informal

45

Total

19,990

Source:

100.00

Papua N e w G uinea Electoral C o m m issio n (1992:115).

It is, nonetheless, interesting to note that Tepuka Kelmbo clansman Matrus (Dokta) Mel
appeared to be emerging as a ‘power broker’ type o f candidate in Dei generally and, particularly,
in Raembka politics. He is, by virtue o f tribal membership and a special relationship maintained
with his maternal Kentpi uncles, in a unique position to influence stability in Raembka politics.
Conversely, he could easily cause instability because o f his vulnerability to external forces. This
appears to have eventuated in 1992. By accepting a campaign vehicle from Pangu Party
president and Kombukla tribesman Pati Wamp, Matrus may have compromised his own
position, in addition to jeopardising the chances o f his fellow Raembka candidates by splitting*I
2.

In spite o f what other people may have said and believed at the time, after having spoken to the candidate,
I am not convinced that he was a political stooge. That Puri Ruing has made a significant improvement
during the 1993 D ei Open By-Election reinforces this view that he may have been a serious contender
during both elections and will be an important candidate in years to come. In fact, he did win the 1997
elections!
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their vote. But M atrus alone cannot be blamed for risking the position o f the Raembka group in
D ei politics because all the Raembka candidates were equally responsible for narrowing
Raembka chances. W hile one may have been a safe bet, for three to stand was always going to
be risky.
As it turned out, Tepuka-Kawelka votes were mainly divided between Matrus Mel and his fellow
tribesm an N am ba Parua, while a large proportion o f Raembka votes were spread between the
three candidates. Although Matrus was expected to pick up a good fraction o f the KumungakaK entpi votes, it is difficult to determine a more accurate figure due to lack o f relevant data.
Progressive tally sheets, with records o f individual ballot-box counts, are essential for this type o f
analysis. These, however, were not available at die time o f w riting 3
Meanwhile, at Gum anch, fellow Pipilka candidates Pun Ruing and K oi Ranpi were pitted against
each other in a contest which would ultimately determine the fete o f Pipilka as a unit in Dei
politics. The Pipilka, now also a registered business name, historically4comprised the mainly Dei
resident Kimka, Roklaka, Remdi, Waklupka tribes and the Hagen, Anglimp and Nebilyer
resident K opi-N okpa tribe-pair (Burton 1988:1.5). This indicates Pipilka’s relatively small size in
D ei and the difficulties involved in trying to win elections. But Puri Ruing won in 1997, proving
that the biggest group does not necessarily win (see ChapterEight for comparable discussion).5
It can be argued that Puri Ruing was able to collect votes which otherwise may have gone to K oi
Ranpi. Furtherm ore, he picked up Waklupka votes which otherwise may have gone to Philip
Bobby and Nam ba Parua. Yet, it can also be argued that had Puri Ruing not contested, his votes
would not necessarily go to Koi, because the Waklupka votes would have gone to Philip Bobby
and his fellow Raembka candidates.
Even at this crude level o f analysis, it is clear that a Raembka candidate was never going to win.
It was boxed in from all comers right from the beginning. Pipilka, likewise, was never going to
make it either. W ith the Kimka-Roklaka alliance thrown behind Puri R uing K oi Ranpi
depended entirely on his own Remdi tribe with a bit o f help from some Kawelka and a few

3.

Pending results o f challenges in the court o f disputed returns, the chief electoral commissioner, Reuben
Kaiulo, is understood to have instructed his officers not to release any results (but see footnote 18).

4.

The historical roots o f Pipilka are very remote, suggesting that it could well be a more recent construct,
based on the business association o f the same name founded by Michael Mel, to facilitate the plantation
acquisition scheme in the 1970s (see discussion in Chapter Two and Three).

5.

Puri Ruing*s win in 1997 however does not constitute as a win for the Pipilka coalition because he was a
Kimka-Roklaka candidate, and was opposed by Willie Wundaki, a candidate from with the Remdi half o f
Pipilka. Puri Ruing won because o f an electorate-wide perception that he was the best man for the job. A
devout Christian, Ruing was perceived as a humble man who could be trusted. The other reason was that
William Pik was quite effective in splitting Reuben Parua’s votes (see G xpter Eight).
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others. Although the Kopi tribe belong to the Pipilka alliance, they live closer to the Tepuka and
are in fact Namba’s matrikin. Namba, therefore, picked up most o f the Kopi votes and Koi only
a few.
The Welyi-Kuta group, on the other hand, were well in control. The votes o f their principal
candidate, Melchior Pep, mainly came from his own group, the Kombukla, the Minembi Papeke
clan who reside on Kombukla territory, as well as ‘bloc votes’ from the Welyi tribe. That was
enough to give him a good foundation. He made up the extras from the Kawelka Kundmbo
clan, through his relationship with, Pik Ruin6, and he may have picked up the usual marginal or
swing votes from all over. Considering that he was a minister in the Namaliu government, his
chances o f picking up swing votes were pretty good.

Figure 7.1: Group performance in 1992 Dei Open Election
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That Namba Parua was able to come third must be a strong warning to the others because no
one expected him to do that well Although his father, Parua Kuri, was a former MP, Namba
was believed to have been rejected by some Raembka leaders in favour o f his younger brother,
Ilam (Robert) Parua, during the planning stages. But he insisted on standing as an independent
Even his own father, who was silently entertaining the idea o f re-entering national politics
himself, did not endorse Namba’s nomination. This became more apparent during Namba’s
abduction by Nengka tribesmen when Parua was said to have 'celebrated* with two cartons o f
beer at his Urunga home: “What did I say? Go tell his mother, Kopi amb (woman)..., to go and

While Pik Ruin does enjoy a special relationship with Melchior Pep, the Kombukla-Kawelka Kundmbo
relationship is an historical one. For example, Strathem's analysis o f marriage patterns showed that
’’Kundmbo have intermarried mainly with groups among the Minembi and Kombukla with which they do
have either traditional military alliances or recently developed exchange partnerships" (1972:134). See
Chapter Seven for further discussion on the relationship between Melchior Mack Pep and William Pik
Ruin.
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get him” (Kawelka informants: pers. comm.). Part in anger, part in remorse at his helplessness,
he appeared to have blamed those who had endorsed his son as a Raembka candidate and
Namba for not consulting and listening to advice offered by his father. Whatever the case, what
matters most now is the fact that Namba attracted enough support to come third, after winning
candidate Melchior Pep and runner-up Koi Ranpi. With Melchior Pep’s political career in the
balance, pending the outcome o f the Leadership Tribunal hearing o f charges o f misconduct,
Namba could well give competitors a run for their money either in a by-election this year or in
five years time. Clearly, in the years to come, Namba Parua will be a force to be reckoned with.7
The primary political support bases o f these candidates have been discussed in Chapter Three. I
shall now discuss election-related violence.

Figure 7.2:1992 Dei Open Bection Results
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‘E lectoral Violence*: C ases and E xplanations
‘Electoral violence’, as a term denoting various types o f violence during elections, is being
deliberately avoided here mainly for analytical reasons. This is because o f the argument that there
is no such thing as ‘electoral violence’ per se. And that purported ‘electoral violence’ cannot be
fully understood without knowledge o f the underlying historical and structural organisation o f
the groups involved. The term, election-related violence, is used in stead. Election-related
violence can be divided into three broad categories: (1) any form o f violence that occurs before
polling (2) violence during polling and (3) violence that occurs after the polling period.

Following Melchior Pep's resignation, Reuben Namba Parua w on the 1993 D ei Open By-Election with
4 494 votes, improving on his 1992 position with 1,458 votes. Again, Koi Ranpi came second with 3,522
votes, only 85 more than his 1992 score o f 3,437. Puri Ruing made a significant improvement, from 1,989
to 3,138 (a positive difference o f 1,149 votes).
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‘Pre-polling violence’
"Pre-polling violence is a term that can be used when referring to election-related violence
which occurs before the polling period. It includes any form o f violent act; ranging from fistcuffs to the total destruction o f property and lives. During the 1992 Dei O pen election a num ber
o f cases fitting these criteria were observed. The first involved the alleged "kidnapping’ o f
Raembka candidate, Reuben N am ba Parua, in which he was said to have been forcefully taken
by members o f the Nengka 8tribe. Allegedly, Reuben angered the Nengjka by jumping onto the
bonnet o f a car they were driving and tried to rip the mesh on the windscreen. Afraid that he
would damage the vehicle, the dnver shifted into gear and took o ff abruptly, whereupon the
force sent Reuben sprawling onto the roof. He was pulled over into the back o f the utility as the
vehicle accelerated towards K otna and away from his home. His Tepuka tribesmen gave chase
rather gallantly but in vain. According to Remdi informants, he was taken into Nengka territory
and held captive until his release was negotiated by a fellow candidate (Koi Ranpi) and his
supporters on the following day.9
The second case involved a fight between supporters o f Melchior Pep and those o f two other
candidates, which resulted in damaged vehicles and minor bruises. Pep’s supporters were alleged
to have set up a road-block between K otna and Kondopina in an effort to stop other candidates
from "poaching? votes. Vehicles belonging to Puri Ruing and Wikai Membi were stopped at this
road-block and during the ensuing struggle, Ruing’s vehicle was extensively damaged while
Membi’s escaped with m inor dents.10 The next day, a PMV bus owned by a Kombukla bigm en, Krai, was confiscated by Ruing’s Roklaka tribesmen in a road-block at Gumanch and was
damaged in revenge.
Case three also involved the im poundm ent o f a vehicle. But this time the vehicle did n ot belong
to either the candidates or their supporters. It was the Returning Officer’s official vehicle which

8.

Nengka are traditional enemies o f the Tepuka and a number o f Raembka allies. In 1970 former Dei MP
and Tepuka tribesman, Parua Kuri (father to Reuben) sustained serious axe wounds to his cheek after an
attem pt was made on his Kfe at Muglamp by members o f the Nengka tribe. This violent attack, according
to Strathem (1984:25), was an attempted revenge for an earlier event in which a Mul driver was killed
inside Dei. Consequently, a member o f this Mul Council tribe was sentenced to jail for a lengthy period
because o f the attack on Parua.

9.

When questioned about the incident two weeks later, Reuben Parua, however, shrugged his shoulders and
brushed aside the issue as anything but im portant

10.

Wikai Membi's Land-Cruiser station wagon was said to have escaped with minor dents because o f the
extensive wire mesh and iron reinforcement on the windscreen and side glass. Wikai’s Minembi tribe is a
traditional pair partner o f Melchior Pep's Kombukla tribe; Puri Ruing's Roklaka tribe had fought a war
against the Kombukla over land (see Strathem 1984:24-25).
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was taken. Melchior Pep's supporters were alleged to have seized the vehicle from the Assistant
Returning O fficer11 while he was returning to MugLamp station from an official run.
These examples show that violence arising from issues to do with the structural and historical
relationship between Hagen groups is becoming increasingly im portant in elections. Reuben’s
apparent act o f aggression towards the Nengka can easily be explained in this context Naturally
he was suspicious o f the presence o f Nengka tribesmen inside Tepuka territory during an
election period. Certain historical events were carved into his young mind at an early stage and
probably will remain im portant in his life. At a tender age he witnessed the brutal attack on his
father, then as a young man he watched his father being toppled from power and now he saw
his clan’s traditionally loyal Raembka supporters turn their back on him. It is widely known that
a large num ber o f Raembka voters were successfully courted by Pipilka candidate Koi Ranpi.
The Nengka, owing to their traditional ties with the Remdi, were perceived by Reuben Parua as
supporters o f Koi Ranpi. In this context, their unceremonious flight from Tepuka territory, with
Reuben as captive, is quite understandable.
Likewise, the second pre-polling incident can also be understood from a structural and historical
perspective. Wikai Membi’s vehicle may have escaped with m inor dents because o f its
precautionary reinforcements but one must consider the fact that Wikai Membi is a Minembi
tribesman and Pep needs Minembi numbers in order to win elections. Any attempt by Pep’s
supporters to hurt Wikai’s supporters o r damage his property would be seen by the Minembi as
an offence against them as a group. Pep, therefore, would do his utm ost not to offend Minembi
voters. Conversely, to offend Puri Ruing and his Roklaka tribesmen would not be o f major
electoral consequence to Melchior Pep. It is generally believed that Pep does not rely on Roklaka
votes because they are not only traditional enemies but also a relatively small tribe.
The third incident involving Pep supporters and the Assistant Returning Officer can also be
explained in terms o f structural and historical relationship o f Hagen grouping. The Remdi are
traditional enemies o f the Minembi-Kombukla pair and modem business enterprises are
organised along similar lines. It is obvious that Pep supporters were suspicious o f a Remdi
tribesman, albeit an electoral official, found inside their territory with a government vehicle. In
this instance, it is also reasonable from a Hagen world view to suspect rival candidates and their
supporters o f Voter-poaching’ inside one’s own territorial boundaries, also known as a base-vote
area. Elsewhere, I have discussed the composition o f a base-vote group, how its nurtured and
protected from rival candidates, and other similar strategies designed by local groups in an
attem pt to win elections (see Ketan 1995).*
u.

The Assistant Returning Officer, Steven Korowa, happens to be a fellow Remdi tribesman o f Pipilka
candidate Koi Ranpi.
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This pre-polling violence fitted the patterns o f conflict which already existed, but flared up in the
context o f inter-group rivalry during the elections. In many instances, personal confrontations
between powerful individuals often made situations very volatile, invariably resulting in assault
on persons and destruction o f property such as vehicles.

‘Polling violence*
The term ,polling violence, is used here when referring to instances o f violence which occurs during
die polling period While some cases o f violence during this period can be explained in terms o f
traditional relationship between groups, it is disturbing to see that state-generated violence12 is
on the increase. Dissatisfaction over the logistical organisation o f the elections resulted in heated
arguments between electoral officials and candidates, which culminated in the punching o f a
Returning Officer.13 Generally, polling in Western Highlands was peaceful, with minimal
disruptions. In D ei it was no different; it was particularly pleasing to see that polling in the
home-base o f candidates was exceptionally peaceful and very orderly.
There were only two reported cases o f violence during polling in D el According to electoral
officials, a bus-load o f Pep supporters was attacked by Wikai Membi supporters at Kumbunga
village.14Compensation o f K90 was later paid to the Pep supporters and the conflict resolved.
The other incident involved an attack on Reuben Parua's supporters by those o f Melchior Pep.
Inform ants claimed that a vehicle hired by Reuben for his supporters was smashed, a man was
injured and a substantial amount o f cash was stolen from the truck .15
It is significant to note that the incident involving Pep and Membi supporters was resolved so
quickly while the case o f the missing money and the attack on Reuben’s supporters was not
treated with similar urgency. Again, it is a reflection o f the kind o f relationship that exists
between the various groups. In this light it would not surprise me should Reuben decide to drop
quietly the case o f the missing money.
12.

This refers to violence in response to action, or inaction, by polling officials, such as non-delivery o f
ballot-papers, coupled with an apparent lack o f police presence at polling stations.

13.

Western Highlands Provincial Returning Officer, Kapping Isong, was attacked on the 16th June 1992 at
Kagamuga, allegedly by supporters o f Paias Wingti, over the non-delivery o f ballot-papers. Mr Isong,
when questioned in Port Moresby over the incident, blamed die Electoral Commission for the delay
which resulted in his attack, but said he was reluctant to lay charges against the assailant

14.

This information was supplied by Assistant Returning Officer Steven Korowa and Presiding Officer
Henry Rumints. Stationed at Kumbunga polling place, Mr Rumints, who was on site, agreed that Wikai
supporters possibly resented the Kombukla intruders.

is.

As revealed by Robert Parua, a victim o f an incident at Mitamp on the eve o f elections, two o f Reuben's
campaign vehicles were allegedly attacked by Kombukla tribesmen, with damages valued at almost K3,Q00.
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‘Post-polling violence*
Any form o f election-related violence which occurs after the polling period is referred to as post

polling violence here. This also includes violence that continues even after the election results have
been announced. W hilst the data on post-polling violence is insufficient, my own assessment,
based on election m onitoring studies, suggests that post-polling violence usually culminates in
tribal fights, but not always. Again, these conflicts are organised along tribal and coalition-style
alliance lines, although its potential to escalate into full-scale alliance-based warfare, or it being
resolved m ore peacefully, depends on kinship networks. Since kinship networks cross-cut clan
and tribal boundaries, it can be a prime factor in conflict resolution.
Since the election, in June 1992, there has been only one serious case o f post-polling violence
reported for the Dei O pen electorate. It was widely believed that more than one case o f tribal
warfare would eventuate, and people gave predictions o f considerable violence during and after
the 1992 elections, but only this one resulted in fatalities. It has seen three brutal deaths, several
hospitalised with serious injuries and massive destruction o f property. A few months later the
situation had reached a temporary truce phase but was still very tense and, therefore, anything
was possible.
The conflict, referred to here as the Welyi-Kentpi War, started over the fatal shooting o f a
Simbu tradesman while employed by a business group representing Welyi-Kuta interests. The
deceased was one o f many Simbu workers employed by the company to work on its coffee
estates. H e lived at Yan, a small Simbu settlement inside Kentpi territory, with his family and
friends. Owing to their residential status, the Simbu migrants were expected to 'block-vote' for
the K entpi candidate Philip Bobby but, as it turned out, they were already committed to their
employer. It is commonly held that m ost o f them voted for Welyi-Kuta strongman Melchior
Pep .16
According to Raembka informants, the deceased was allegedly attacked by a gang whose motive
is believed to be robbery. Inform ants say, the gang members were after the labourers' wages and
coffee money which was kept at the factory office. The Kentpi and their Raembka allies
maintain that the deceased was an unfortunate victim o f circumstances and that there was no
foul play.
But the Welyi blamed the Kentpi, saying that they were upset over the election results and that
this was their way o f attempting revenge. Kentpi denied this and put the blame back on the
is.

In the absence o f progressive tally sheets containing results o f specific ballot-box counts, voting patterns
were largely based on assessment o f information supplied by scrutineers. Polling officials are an ideal
source o f information, but accessibility can be a problem for the casual observer.
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Welyi. W arfare erupted and in the battle two Kentpi warriors were killed. A Welyi sustained
injuries and is believed to have recovered in hospital
From an analytical stand-point, two explanations are possible: (1) that a murder was committed
as part o f an attem pt to restore tribal authority; or (2) that robbery was the motive leading to an
unplanned death, which triggered o ff conflict in an already strained relationship. If m urder was,
in fact, committed then it must have been a desperate act o f restoring tribal authority. The
Simbu settlers owed their jobs to the Welyi but the land to the K entpi By supporting the Welyi
in their election bid, they clearly compromised their neutrality, an act which could have been
interpreted as defiance o f Kentpi authority. Retribution comes in various forms — some more
hideous than others — and death might have just been one o f those. And, o f course, the
inevitable mayhem had to follow.
However, it is also possible that this may not have been premeditated murder; that the initial
motive was robbery and the Simbu man — a m otor mechanic — might have been shot on the
spur o f the m om ent In this instance, the shooting o f the Simbu could have been taken by both
the Welyi and K entpi as a good reason to wage war on each other. In any case, it is quite certain
that relationships may have deteriorated to an extent where both sides had to resort to violence.
That the outbreak o f war was so sudden, with litde attempt at exploring avenues for a peaceful
settlement, was indicative o f an unfriendly relationship. Hostility between the groups was so
h igh

that an outbreak o f fighting could have followed anyone o f many pretexts.

The magnitude o f this hostility had loomed large, considering the possibility that the Kombukla
and M inembi tribes could have thrown their support behind their fellow Welyi-Kuta coalitionstyle alliance colleagues. In which case, it was possible that fellow Raembka tribes o f
Kumungaka, Nelka and Gulka may have joined forces with Kentpi. Even, Tepuka, in spite o f
their differences, could have joined in with the rest o f Raembka members following suit That
would surely have resulted in large-scale coalition-style alliance warfare — something which has
been unheard o f in recent times.17

Conclusion
Electoral politics remains as complex as ever and exact mapping o f candidate or group
perform ance at die polls is still far too difficult a task to achieve. Only rural ballot box analysis,
with knowledge o f structural organisation, would help us understand this process better. But at1

17.

According to accounts gven by a Kawelka big-man, Goimba Onombe, the last major coalition-style
alliance war was fought between the Raembka and Welyi-Kuta some time in the 1930s, when the Welyi
were almost decimated by the combined forces o f the Tepuka-Kawelka pair and their Klamakae, Kopi
and Kimbo allies.
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this stage one m ust be content with the discussion on local group-based campaigning and
associated factors such as election-related violence.
My analysis o f structural organisation in Dei leads to two major conclusions: (1) that Dei politics
is still centred around neo-traditional coalition-type groups; and (2) election-related violence is
largely determined by these underlying social and historical factors.
D ei politics largely revolve around the major phratries o f Pipilka, Raembka and Welyi-Kuta.
While tribal groups may compete against each other in endorsing candidates, it is, however,
necessary for each candidate to court prom inent leaders in attempting to gain coalition-style
alliance-wide support. Fundamentally, this forms the central foundation for winning elections.
Both Parua Kuri and Melchior Pep used Raembka and Welyi-Kuta, respectively, in order to win
during various elections. Raembka, however, did not win during this election because o f a
num ber o f reasons. Perhaps the m ost im portant one was that Raembka had three different
candidates contesting the election, which resulted in the splitting o f Raembka votes. In addition,
none o f the candidates was able to muster the support o f ‘neutral’ groups from both within and
outside the coalition-style alliance. This raises an important point that in spite o f a primary kingroup, it takes superior capacity to mobilise support In other words, all candidates may claim a
solid vote-base, comprising kinsfolk and clansmen, but it is the more skilful candidates who can
convert that support into votes, and go even a step further by competing for votes in marginal
areas.
Similarly, election-related violence is rooted in the kind o f relationship maintained by individuals
and groups in the area. The type o f relationship is often determined by historical and structural
factors. The possibility and severity o f election-related violence depends on whose involved.
W arfare such as the one between the Welyi and Kentpi indicates an already deteriorating
relationship because other avenues o f resolving the conflict were not sought But the fact that it
did n o t escalate into a full-scale alliance-based warfare was largely because o f cross-cutting
kinship ties. G roups may be politically aligned differently, but individuals, including some very
powerful and influential ones, have interests on all sides. Large-scale warfare, in this context, is
almost an impossibility. Perhaps another reason why laige-scale warfare did not eventuate was
because o f the higher priority o f the election. After all, the fighting leading to deaths occurred
after the election, when the need for peace may have been less crucial, but once a by-election
was imminent, the need for peace once again prevailed. In closing, I am convinced that there is
no such thing as ’electoral violence' and that the reported instances o f violence during elections
have deeper meanings than what meets the eye. Merely to concentrate on such cases would be
symptomatic in approach, rather than identifying and addressing the root causes. As I have
consistently argued throughout this thesis, election-related violence, warfare, criminal raskolgang
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activities, and econom ic sabotage in many parts o f the country represent pow erful challenges to
the state's authority. It also represents self-help m ethods o f asserting local group solidarity,
som etim es in direct opposition to state-sponsored values. T he biggest problem remains: there is
lim ited state penetration, and the state has yet to com e up w ith effective strategies to prevent o r
lim it violence in society. In the next chapter I present a detailed analysis o f local politics in order
to highlight the preselection phase o f elections.

Chapter

8

ELECTIO N CASE II: T H E 1995 PROVINCIAL ASSEMBLY ELECTIO N
CAMPAIGN IN KOTNA-TIKI CONSTITUENCY
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Introduction
Every national election in Papua N ew G uinea since 1964 has been studied by observers from a
w ide range o f disciplines w ithin the social sciences (see references cited in the Introduction o f this
thesis). As aptly pointed out by Standish, “elections are striking events w hich n o t only reveal
political activity at its m ost intense”, but also because “they illuminate w ith singular clarity, the
dynamics o f state/local level interactions” (1992:10). F or people in Hagen and many other PN G
H ighlands societies w ho feel that their needs are habitually ignored by governm ent officials in
P o rt M oresby, elections provide real opportunities for maximising wealth and power. In spite o f
the fact that only a few stand to gain from election ‘investments*, many, if n o t all, m em bers o f a
tribe/clan contribute tow ards the campaign efforts o f local candidates, if only to ensure that the
group ‘nam e m ust n o t go down*.
M ost election studies in Papua N ew Guinea have concentrated on the output side o f politics .1
Such studies, w hilst providing im portant analyses on issues such as legitimisation o f rulers* claim
to rule over countries and com m and allegiances from its d ti 2ens, often neglect the processes
that take place before the form al campaign period. Studies that concentrate on the output side o f
politics, like a good polaroid camera, may at times capture spectacular events, b ut the observer
often leaves the field none the wiser as to why rifts occur w ithin ideally solidary groups. This
study suggests that if we understand the input side o f politics, then it is possible to predict n o t
only why b u t where the rifts will occur. G roups, factions, coalitions and their leaders may
choose to cooperate o r com pete with each other in elections for a num ber o f reasons. This
chapter aims to show that explanations for such behaviour may be deeply rooted in historical
events and the type o f relations maintained between the m ajor players.
It hardly needs stating that elections are only a small part o f H agen politics. By now it should be
clear that Hagen politics is multi-dimensional, many parts o f which been presented earlier as a
megacycle (see Chapter Six, see also Chapter Nine). M oreover, an im portant stage o f elections,
involving various form s o f preselection and the securing o f assurances o f support from nonaligned voter blocks, occurs years before elections (cf. Burton 1989a). This study differs significantly from other similar studies by examining the ‘preselection* phase o f elections.
This chapter provides a micro-analysis o f campaigning and voting in the K otna-Tiki
constituency o f the W estern Highlands Province. It contains a detailed analysis o f voter

1.

W ith few exceptions, notably H.K. and P. Colebatch, M. Reay, and A J. Strathem (1971), A J. Strathem
(1976); and to a lesser extent, Kuabaal (1976); and Burton (1989a), all o f which discussed pre-election
politics in an attem pt to examine the reasons why some groups cooperate in order to compete against
others. Com petition in elections is usually— but n o t always — based on a remem bered history o f warfare
between the com petitors.
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m obilisation and election campaign strategies utilised by Hagen leaders. It is based on personal
observation and inform ation derived from interviews with key players, including candidates,
their scrutineers, members o f campaign committees, big-men and other types o f leaders.
Although focusing on a particular candidate, this study aims to provide significant insights into
the dynamics o f Hagen politics and the way it relates to PN G state politics.

William Pik Ruin’s Election Campaign
In this second case o f M ount Hagen-style electioneering I present a fine-grained case study.
W hile observing the 1995 W estern Highlands provincial assembly elections, I paid particular
attention to Kawelka K undm bo clansman William Pik’s perform ance, docum enting significant
events leading up to the announcem ent o f his candidacy and nom ination, campaign strategies
adopted by his team, his election as a m ember o f the provincial assembly (MPA) for the KotnaTiki constituency following the declaration o f election results, and his subsequent election to the
office o f deputy prem ier o f the province.
Even after the form ation o f government and appointm ent o f ministries in W estern Highlands, I
was able to keep in touch with the member on a regular basis until the abolition o f all provincial
governm ents throughout Papua New Guinea in July 1995. His personal details are as follows:
William Pik Ruin, aged 35, was bom at Golke, just beyond the Mbukl patrol post, on the
Sepik-Wahgi Divide, where Andrew and Marilyn Strathem conducted m ost o f their
early fieldwork. W ithout finishing his secondary school education, in the late seventies
he left for Port Moresby, where he briefly ran a fast-food service with some Asian
business partners. A fter the business collapsed in 1984, Pik formed a security company,
with some assistance from M elchior Pep. H is business prospered and by 1987 he was in
a position to assist M elchior Pep in his attem pt to oust Parua Kuri in D ei Open. Pep
was successful and, after a brief spell in the governm ent back-benches, was appointed
M inister for Correctional Services in the Namaliu governm ent H e prom ptly rewarded
Pik with a ministerial staff appointm ent As Pep's henchman, Pik had direct access to
governm ent resources and, by disbursement o f such resources, Pik built up his own
influence. Being a son o f an im portant Kawelka big-man, and also a capable orator, Pik
quickly acquired the skills o f a m odem politician. In 1988 he contested the Kotna-Tiki
seat during the W estern Highlands Provincial elections, but was narrowly beaten by the
sitting m em ber, K ar K il H e returned to Port M oresby and continued working for
M elchior Pep until 1992, when Pep was forced to resign despite retaining his seat during
the national elections held that year. Pik sought employment with a local company
specialising in car spare parts. W hilst employed as a workshop manager — and also by
exploiting forest products from the old Kuk Agricultural Research Station on the side
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— he continued to extend his networks. D uring the peace settlement between the
Kawelka and M inembi in 1990, Pik played an im portant part in negotiating peace, just as
im portant as his role in the Kawelka war effort against the Minembi during 1986-1990.

The Preselection Phase
Political parties, as indicated in Chapter Six; are o f little relevance in rural Papua New Guinea. If
political parties have yet to develop grass roots following, then how do people in Hagen, the
Highlands region and elsewhere in the country select their candidates? Is preselection the same
everywhere? As pointed out by Burton (1989a), there are few functional differences in the way
Hageners, Australians, Americans or Britons assess a candidate’s suitability for office:
In each case the first phase is a form o f preselection to screen o u t th e candidates w ho
are perceived to have a p o o r chance o f w inning. T his can take place in the m en’s house,
a t party headquarters o r m ore publicly as in the U.S. B ut in all the system s m uch w eight
is placed o n a nom inee’s acceptability to as m any as possible o f th e interest groups
w ithin the com m unity. A com parison betw een th e A m erican system and P N G practice
bears analysis. In th e U.S., D em ocrat and R epublican presidential candidates attem pt to
w in vote guarantees through d ie system o f prim aries; in P N G electorates like H agen,
preselection is a m atter o f a candidate and his cam paign team securing arrangem ents
w ith o th er sections and clans o f the tribe th at they will back him and n o t nom inate their
ow n people. As in A m erica, this is undoubtedly w here personal leadership qualities
m ust shine (B urton 1989a:277).

Indeed, this chapter attempts to show that, despite significant differences in preselection
processes throughout the w odd, the way in which Hagen clans chose their candidates is just as
effective as any political party system in advanced liberal democracies. Although die interests,
motives and strategies o f key individuals and groups may differ from society to society, the aim
is fundamentally the same — that is, to get the best possible candidate to represent the
aspirations, hopes and dreams o f a group. In this section I present a discussion o f the way
strategies and ploys adopted by one Hagen tribe, the Kawelka, in an attem pt to achieve a
collective goal o f getting one o f their members elected to the provincial assembly.

The M apa meeting: A kind o f preselection
A meeting o f Kawelka elders, representing each clan, was convened at Mapa in O ctober 1994.
Tw o m ajor issues were discussed: (1) the resignation o f Kawelka M embo councillor, Nicholas
Nam ba, and identification o f candidates for the councillor’s post; and (2) the endorsem ent o f
William Pik as the only Kawelka candidate for the Kotna-Tiki constituency in 1995.
D uring this meeting it was resolved that each clan contribute K50 towards Pik’s nomination fee
o f K500, a strategy designed to show potential Kawelka candidates that Pik alone had the total
support o f all Kawelka clans. Pik was nominated by the M embo clan for reasons discussed later
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in tins chapter (see section on The Campaign). Although there was no expression o f interest from
anyone else for candidacy, the absence o f Klambo clan, with the exception o f Ongka Kaipa, a
well-known major big-man o f that clan (see A.J. Strathem 1979), was taken as an indication o f
protest by Klambo who were believed to be supporting their own candidate. It was later
revealed that a section o f Klambo, led by Yap Roklpa, a form er councillor and prom inent
Kawelka leader, was in favour o f Max Poka, a Port Moresby-based taxi operator. In the speeches
that followed, it was emphasised — perhaps overemphasised — that this would dramatically
reduce the chances o f a Kawelka candidate winning, and many warned Ongka that his clan
would be held responsible for failure in this instance. Ongka’s clan had suffered primarily at the
hands o f M embo and Kundmbo clansmen, following the loss by Pik during the 1988 provincial
elections, but he remained calm and composed, despite barely concealed threats made by m ost
speakers. H e suggested that Max Poka could be persuaded not to contest the elections, but
would not take the task upon himself because modem politics, as he aptly pointed out, was a
game played by young educated men. Thus, Ongka, being a shrewd operator, shifted
responsibility and possible blame for an election loss away from himself and his family.2
Following the Mapa meeting a series o f m inor meetings took place mostly at the subclan level
In these meetings, each subclan discussed Pik’s candidature and their role in the campaign effort
The M embo clan, for example, resolved that they would spearhead the election campaign, not
only by supplying economic resources but also by providing manpower to actually go out and
campaign, thus, sending out a signal to their allies that Pik, albeit a Kundmbo clansman, was
now a M embo candidate. That, M embo leaders argued, was the key to winning because Membo,
th ro u gh

moka and war alliance networks, had a much wider field from which to draw votes than

Kundm bo. As a Kundmbo candidate, Pik’s chances o f winning would have been minimal
because o f his clan’s status as the elpukl wua (‘fight root men5), or ‘owner o f the fight9, during the
Kawelka-Minembi war. All seemed well and the stage was set for a smooth election campaign.
Nonetheless, there was an immediate problem to be solved before nominations opened in
November. Max Poka was the problem. H e was considered an election risk because o f his
background: he was young and inexperienced; belonged to the smallest Kawelka clan and he
lived in Port Moresby. The following is a record o f what transpired at a meeting o f selected
individuals, mostly leaders and some young educated elites, at Kuk-Rungamundi hamlet in
William Pik’s manga rapa (‘men’s house9) in Novem ber 1994.

During the previous provincial government elections, William Pik was beaten by the incumbent, Kar Kil,
by less than a hundred votes. It was alleged that Ongka’s clan was largely responsible for the loss, which
led to several incidents (see below). Ongka’s family suffered most because it was claimed that his son,
Namba, had taken a number o f voters to the Kil camp.
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P ik ’s supporters meeting a t bis m anga rapa (men’s house)
D uring this m eeting o f Pik supporters, at Kuk-Rungamundi, a strategy to dum p Max Poka was
put in place. M em bo leaders, w ith K ont K lent, Yap G oim ba and Yap Pokl, led the discussion.
T he M em bo leader, K ont, w ho had lost his son, Eki (see Appendix P7), during the previous
election in post-polling violence, was very vocal in pledging his support for Pik. H e expressed
his desire for Pik to win the election as well as his desire for Pik’s K undm bo dan to make wua

peng paym ent for the loss o f both his son and those who were killed during the KawelkaM inembi war. W hile n o t being explidt in their approach, it was im plicit in their speeches that
M embo speakers were rem inding K undm bo o f their w ar obligations towards their allied clans.
M oreover, it was implied that their support for Pik ought to be considered as part o f the wua
gifts, solidting for wuapeng payments. T hat was made perfectly dear and understood by the
K undm bo. But K undm bo leaders, led by Ruin and Rai, rem inded M embo that the job was still
unfinished, pointing out that M embo still had a task ahead in dissuading Max Poka from
running.
W ith a view to discouraging Max Poka and his group, tw o m ajor approaches were considered.
T he first was a direct approach suggested by K om orui o f M embo Keiyambo subdan to solving
the dual candidacy problem . A renow ned fiery speech-maker, K om orui suggested that they
express disgust at Klam bo’s irresponsibility in sponsoring their own candidate in Poka.
Furtherm ore, he w anted to raise historical issues, particularly one in which the M andem bo
section, com prising K urupm bo and Klam bo dans, had engaged in battle w ith the Tepuka
Oklem bo clan. It is said that Klam bo fled the fighting scene, leaving behind K urupm bo, w ho
w ere outnum bered and consequently lost several big-men. K urupm bo w ould have lost m ore if it
w ere n o t for M em bo’s intervention, w hich ultimately w on them the war. This argum ent was a
simple ploy designed to win K urupm bo support for the M em bo-sponsored candidate, William
Pik, while effectively reducing Max Poka’s chances by discrediting his group.
The second approach put forward by Kawelka M embo leader, Yap G oim ba, was m ore subtle
and involved coaxing and persuasion. M embo spokesm en, Yap G oim ba and Yap Pokl, took,
upon themselves the task o f gently persuading the Klam bo to withdraw Poka’s candidature.
K undm bo leaders, especially Ruin and Rai, being the pukl wua (‘ow ners’) o f this enterprise
favoured this strategy so others endorsed i t
B ut in the end a com prom ise was reached: (1) that W illiam Pik, w ith the assistance o f M embo
and other clans, would reim burse Max Poka’s expenses incurred during pre-election
preparations; (2) M embo leaders would persuade the Klam bo to withdraw Poka’s candidacy; and
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(3) the fieiy K om orui either control his speech o r to refrain from speaking (unless necessary,
that is, should Klam bo show signs o f stubbornness).

P ik Versus Poka: A Process o f Confrontation and Elimination
T he following day, 12 N ovem ber 1994, a Kawelka general m eeting was convened at K uk in
front o f the form er .Agricultural Research Station office complex. Those present, around 200
persons (including som e wom en and children), assembled in two roughly separate but adjoining
camps: the K lam bo on one side and the M em bo-K undm bo-K urupm bo on the other. Even
before a w ord was spoken, one could sense that this was no ordinary meeting. The atm osphere
was very tense. A fter a brief and precise opening speech by Yap G oim ba (Membo clan leader
and village court magistrate), stating the purpose o f the meeting, it was handed over to die
aspiring candidates — William Pik and Max Poka — to present their cases, mainly to state
reasons for their respective candidacies. William Pik took the opportunity to rem ind voters that
he had lost the last election by a very narrow margin. O w ing to post-polling violence, in which
his supporters had caused massive destruction o f property and the subsequent death o f Eki3, Pik
added that he had been reluctant to contest the elections, but the M embo endorsem ent had left
him w ith no choice but to stand as a candidate. Pik further pointed out that because o f his
M em bo endorsem ent, and with backing o f all Kawelka clans, he was confident o f w inning with
a big majority.
Max Poka, on the other hand, pointed out that it was Pik’s announcem ent n o t to contest future
elections, especially after the post-polling violence, which prom pted him to contest. A nd he
w ent on to claim that it was far too late for him to pull out o f the race, especially after having
expended considerable resources on the campaign effo rt H e, too, claimed the support o f many
Kawelka, including som e from w ithin the M embo clan, and said he was currently courting
support from segments o f groups traditionally allied to the Kawelka.
B oth Pik and Poka claimed solid support from the K elm bo clan, a segm ent o f Tepuka which
was split between the aspiring Kawelka candidates and the incum bent, K ar Kil, a Tepuka Kintke
clansman. Poka’s cause, however, was n o t helped when it was revealed that M atrus Mel, a*
K elm bo candidate in the previous three national elections, had throw n his considerable weight
behind William Pik’s candidacy. T hat was a big blow to Max Poka because Poka and his
K lam bo clansmen had always counted on Matrus Mel to deliver the votes w hen it m attered
m ost — on polling day. Poka was apparently disappointed with Mel for n o t reciprocating

The circumstances leading up to Eki’s death ate discussed in the next section (see M ax Poka’s Compensation,\
A m ore detailed version is given in Appendix X I).
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support which he had received from the Klambo and a handful o f M embo, largely through
Poka’s initiatives, during the 1992 National Elections.
W hen it became obvious that neither camp would bow out gracefully, a select band o f leaders,
mostly prom inent clan leaders, took the stage. M ost o f them took a middle stand, choosing their
words carefully, but emphasising the need for a single Kawelka candidate, until M embo
K om orui came out with a barrage o f words aimed at Klambo, blaming them for trying to
jeopardise Kawelka’s chances o f winning the election. But before he had done too much
damage, M embo Yap salvaged a rather tricky situation by taking control o f the m eeting and
offering com pensation o f two pigs and K1,000 to Poka for his campaign expenses.
However, Poka was not ready to go out w ithout a fight H e had to make a stand, for not doing
so would not only disappoint his supporters but also undermine his future in provincial politics.
Having already recognised the intention o f the speakers and the purpose o f the meeting — to
dum p him — Poka questioned the motive o f the speakers. And, further, he asked: “W hat am I
going to do with these pigs and cash o f K1,000?”
Although Poka’s question may have been a genuine reflection o f his dilemma, an unwinnable
position in which he was tom between his desire for political office and his clan’s precarious
position in Kawelka politics, the Pik camp took offence and launched an attack. It was really a
case o f closing in on a cornered and seriously wounded animal for the kilL Led by Yap Goim ba,
the M embo and K undm bo speakers switched from norm al to veiled speech mode. In a brief
review o f Kawelka history, the Klambo were reminded that it was M embo w ho had w on wars
for them at Mbukl4, reclaimed lost land at Kuk (see Appendix X for a brief history o f the
Kawelka), and made peace with potential enemies amongst the Kwi tribes o f Hagen Central by
sponsoring large moka prestations.5

Leaders o f Kurupmbo and Klambo, to their discomfort and embarrassment; were reminded o f the
Mandembo section’s lack o f participation during the Kawelka-Minembi war in the 1980s, and previous
instances in which acts o f cowardice were suspected.
One such moka prestation was made by Goimba Onombe to the Jika Kilampei dan o f the Andapunts
section in the early 1960s. Others followed and wives were given and taken, induding Goimba’s own
daughter, Beldepa-Mbo, being one o f the first Kawelka girls to be given as a bride to the Jika. BeklepaMbo’s marriage to Jika Kilampei Put, presently an im portant Kilampei leader and son o f an im portant bigman, Anda, strengthened Kawelka’s relations with Jika at such a crudal stage, when factions o f Kilampei,
led by an im portant big-man, Maip, were opposed to the Kawelka’s return to Kuk. Another Kilampei bigman, Waluwa, played an im portant role in the reoccupation o f Kuk. A t a colonial land dispute hearing,
Waluwa testified against Maip’s group, supporting Goimba’s claim to the land. A patrol officer— whom
Goim ba remembers as ‘Krepen’ (Griffin) — ruled in favour o f the Kawelka and Waluwa was rewarded in
mokavntix gifts o f pigs and a woman o f the Kawelka Kurupmbo dan given as a wife.
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Max Poka’s Compensation: Elimination o f a R ival
Eventually the meeting resolved the issue o f dual candidacy and Max Poka’s supporters, through
Klambo big-man Yap Roklpa, accepted the two pigs and K1,000 as adequate reimbursement for
Poka’s campaign expenditure. Yap Roklpa, a form er local government councillor and skilful
orator, could tell in which direction die speech-makers were heading so he quickly stepped in
front o f Poka and accepted what was offered, thus effectively shielding Poka from
embarrassment and his clansmen from being subjected to further insult Although sufficiently
veiled, or so it seemed to women and children, it was apparent to m ost m en present —
including some from groups which were politically opposed to Kawelka — that restrained
recital o f historical events would soon give way to graphic accounts o f contemporary incidents.
W hat Yap tried and succeed to do was prevent more recent incidents, including two very
sensitive cases o f perceived betrayal, from being raised.
The first had occurred in 1988 when a young M embo clansman, Eki, the son o f an im portant
Kawelka leader, K ont, was killed in Port Moresby by a man from another tribe. O ne o f a new
breed o f warriors in gun warfare, his death was considered a major set-back to the Kawelka war
effort against the Minembi (see Chapter Three, see also Chapter Five). His death occurred only six
hours after he arrived in the national capital from M ount Hagen. H e was m et at the Jacksons
airport by a Klambo man w ho drove him in his taxi to the assailant’s house at the Administrative
College, Waigani, where they got themselves entangled in a braw l A t around 9:00 p.m.,
according to the taxi driver and three other witnesses (all Membo clansmen), he was struck
down while attempting to stop a “deliberately staged fight between two men from the assailant’s
tribe”.6 The Klambo man fled in his taxi and so did the others, while the victim was bleeding to
death. He was not taken to the Port Moresby General Hospital until some six hours later,
around 3:00 a,m. on the following day, by some neighbours o f the assailant, but once there he
died in less than three hours.
Immediately after his death several telephone calls were made to M ount Hagen: one such call
probably saved the life o f a community school teacher, a clansman o f the assailant but m arried
to a Kawelka woman o f the victim’s subclan, while others reached various people and the
terrible news was relayed in whispers. Even so, none o f Eki’s kinsmen nor any M embo
clansmen received any message regarding the tragic event until more than forty-eight hours later.
It was alleged that the calls were made from a Klambo man’s house and that one such call was
received in M ount Hagen by his brother who deliberately kept the news from the Membo for
According to one witness, the fight was deliberately staged between the assailant and his own clansmen.
The victim was an innocent by-stander, which fuels rumours and allegations o f a conspiracy to murder
him, thereby eliminating an important fight-leader (see Annex XL for details, including names and historical
references).
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m ore than forty-eight hours. There are two im portant questions w orth asking: (1) had the taxi
driver n o t fled from the scene but raced the victim to the hospital, would he have survived?; and
(2) had the M em bo been inform ed earlier would they have avenged his death via pay-back
killing? M ost M embo m en I have spoken to have no doubt that Eki certainly w ould have
survived if he had been taken to the hospital earlier. O pinion on the second question is divided:
som e believe he w ould have been avenged (probably through the killing o f the school teacher);
while others only expressed anger over the fact that the assailant’s clansmen had been inform ed
ahead o f the victim 's relatives. W hichever the case may have been, there was a strong im pression
that Klam bo as a clan was guilty o f disloyalty to the tribe even though w hat was involved was
clearly the action o f a few individuals only.
The second case o f perceived betrayal is believed to have directly resulted in the death o f a
Kawelka K undm bo man in 1989. H e was travelling on a PMV to M bukl w hen the vehicle was
forced to stop at an enemy (Minembi) roadblock inside K om bukla territory on the HagenK otna road. Soon after being identified as a m em ber o f the Kawelka tribe, he was pulled o ff the
PMV (public m otor vehicle) and hacked to death by M inembi tribesm en in front o f horrified
fellow passengers. It was claimed that a m em ber o f the Klam bo clan had supplied inform ation
to the waiting enemy. This, however, was n o t substantiated. But the feeling am ongst the
K undm bo, as expressed by some to me, was that Klambo were responsible for this death.
A nother point that would have been raised by Pik's supporters in their speeches was the
defection o f som e Klambo w ho voted for a candidate opposed to Pik during the previous
provincial elections. Since Pik stood as a Kawelka candidate, endorsed by the tribal leaders, a
punitive raid was organised in which the hom es o f the defectors were burnt, pigs killed and a
w om an allegedly raped.
These and other similar incidents would have been raised if n o t for Yap Roklpa’s quick and
calculating m ind Yap intervened for two basic reasons: (1) the fiery talk w ould have implicated
im portant individuals and their families; and (2) given the case that there was a coalition o f
Kawelka clans against his own small clan, Yap knew that Klam bo would n o t have survived any
serious confrontation.
T he recital o f historical incidents involving indiscretion and cowardice can cause m uch
discom fort but they are often raised in veiled speeches, especially during intra-dan conflicts.
A nd, while individuals are responsible for the various transgressions, it is the group which will
collectively be blamed in speeches as part o f

political

manoeuvring. However, w hen

contem porary incidents are raised in an effort to discredit both individuals and groups, conflicts
can easily escalate to serious levels, often resulting in various form s o f fighting — hair-pulling
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(peng-ntimat), fisticuffs {ki-kum mal}, stick-fights (tembuklmal), aim ed warfare (el-kupanda mat) — or
even serious rifts leading to the breakdown o f military alliances,7

W illiam Pik’s N om ination
W iliam Pik Ruin’s nom ination at Kitip H igh School in N ovem ber 1994 was witnessed by over a
hundred people, including many supporters w ho braved the rainy w eather to attend From Kuk
he had taken tw o truckloads o f about fifty supporters w ho were joined by som e Welyi, Tepuka
and other supporters at Kotna. Still many others came out o f curiosity, perhaps to get a personal
view o f Pik and others w ho nom inated As registered on the com m on roll, Pik was nom inated
as Pik Ruin, using his father’s first name as his surname, rather than both his own nam e, William
Pik, as he was com m only known throughout the constituency. T hat caused a slight problem
w ith voters so Pik's team had to spend some time educating the voters about the change o f
name and how it w ould appear on the ballot-paper.
In addition to Pik, five other candidates nom inated to contest the K otna-Tiki seat There were
tw o Welyi candidates, Oikai Pana and Buldung Apa, one Tepuka K intke, K ar Kil, and two
M inembi, the Elyipi candidate David N em a and K im bo candidate Joseph K it K it, a school
teacher, w hose dan , although structurally part o f M inembi, is currently in a military alliance with
Pik’s K undm bo clan, was n o t very happy w ith Pik and his K undm bo clan because he had been
told that Pik would step aside in his favour. W hen he heard o f Pik’s candidacy, he refused to
enter into any preselection deals and w ent ahead and nom inated instead, thereby threatening to
split Pik’s votes. However, it seems highly unlikely that he made some sort o f deal with Pik’s
principal rival, K ar Kil, n o r is it possible that there were other vote-splitting deals involved, as
happens in national elections.

T he Cam paign
Election campaign strategies employed by candidates cover a wide range o f possibilities and
have been discussed in a general context earlier in Chapter Six, but here I only deal with Pik’s
campaign in detail As previously indicated, William Pik’s candidacy was sponsored by a clan,
other than his ow n as part o f solicitory gifts (wua ombil) requesting reparations (wuapeng) for men
lost while assisting Pik’s Kawelka K undm bo clan during a recent w ar against an alliance o f
M inembi clans. O w ing to K undm bo’s status as elpukl wua (‘fight root man’) and since n o t all o f

As confirmed to me by Membo big-man, Kont, these issues were raised after the elections, during a
homicide compensation settlem ent between the Membo and Klambo. A young Membo girl suspected o f
courting a married Klambo man was killed by one o f his wives. Although a compensation o f K9,600 and
80 pigs were paid, relations between the Membo and Klambo have since deteriorated to a level where
joint ventures such as election campaigns and business enterprise would be extremely difficult to negotiate
(see discussion on Aftermath, below).
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its allies (including Membo) were compensated for losses sustained, mobilising support for Pik
or any other Kundmbo candidate would have been difficult. This was further complicated by
Pik’s close association with former Dei MP, Melchior Pep, a Kombukla tribesman, whose
kinsmen could not vote for Pik because they belonged to a separate provincial assembly
constituency. This problem was replicated on a larger scale involving Pik’s clan which has
traditional ties with groups that are based either outside of, or residing in areas considered
peripheral to the Kotna-Tiki constituency.
The densely populated Muka valley, in the context o f political activity, is the heart o f that
constituency. Previous provincial assembly member, Kuma Rukla, the incumbent Kar Kil,
former Dei MP, Parua Kuri, and the then incumbent Dei MP, Reuben Parua, are all based in the
Muka valley and are members o f a single tribe (Tepuka). By supporting Melchior Pep, who
unseated Parua Kuri in 1987, and again in 1992, when he beat Parua’s son Reuben, William Pik
may have jeopardised his own chances in the Muka valley. Table 8.1 shows the elected
representatives o f Dei in both the national parliament and provincial assembly.
T ab le 8.1: E lected R epresentatives: D ei O pen and K otna-T iki C onstituency

Dei MPs andMPAs

Tribe

Tribe-pair

Constituency

Period

Parua Kuri

Tepuka

TepukaKawelka

Dei Open

1972-1987

Melchior Pep

Kombukla

KombuklaMinembi

Dei Open

1987-1992

Reuben Parua

Tepuka

TepukaKawelka

Dei Open

1993-1997

Puri Ruing

Roklaka

KimkaRoklaka

Dei Open

1997- present

Kuma Rokla

Tepuka

TepukaKawelka

Kotna-Tiki

1980-1984

Kar Kil

Tepuka

TepukaKawelka

Kotna-Tiki

1984-1994

William Pik

Kawelka

TepukaKawelka

Kotna-Tiki

Jan-July 1995

That is where Membo came to the rescue. Whilst Kundmbo maintains strong ties with the
Kombukla, Membo have equally strong ties with the Tepuka, particularly with Parua Kuri’s
Keitipi clan and its Oklembo clan-pair. Since the Keitipi-Oklembo clan-pair forms the core o f
Reuben and his father’s base-vote, it is highly unlikely that any o f its members would have voted
for William Pik if he had not been sponsored by Membo. As a Membo candidate, and with
Membo clansmen actually on the ground in Tepuka territory, Parua and his clansmen could not
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ignore him. For doing so would have been an insult not to Pik but to Membo who are
predominandy Parua supporters. And so William Pik was accepted as a Membo candidate by its
allies and Keitipi-Oklembo clans were split almost equally between Pik and their fellow
tribesman, Kar Kil.
Having resolved the candidacy status problem and once the campaign parameters were
established, through the classification o f target groups, it was business as usual on the campaign
trail. Individuals with strong personal connections were appointed as campaign committee men
and sent out to live with the target groups. The committees were assigned the primary task o f
mobilising support using their own social networks. Most o f them were leaders and had few
problems being recognised, some were there to reactivate old moka ties, while others depended
on the goodwill o f their relatives to mobilise support.
Based on the degree o f support received from external groups and the type o f relations
maintained with them, target groups were classified into three vote categories: (1) Kawelka basevotes; (2) external support votes; and (3) marginal votes. These, together with the number o f
promised votes, are given in Table 8.2.
T ab le 8.2: V ote C ategories an d n u m b er o f pro m ised votes

Kawelka Base-votes Expeded
Votes

External Support Votes
Groups
Promised

Marginal Areas Votes
and Groups
Promised

Kuk

T. Keitipi

250

Kenamb

T. Oklembo

120

Ruina

50

T. Kelmbo

175

Mam G or

15

Welyi

150

M. Elyipi

3

M. Engambo

250

M. Kimbo

10

Kopi

100

Total

83

Mope

Total

1,403
430

1,833

Klamakae

75

Kurunga-Pakl

45

Total

1,165

5

Source:

Based on information supplied by William Pik and his campaign committee.

Note:

A n estimated grand total o f 3,081 votes. A comparison o f this figure with that o f actual number o f votes
polled will give an indication o f the successes and failures in the conversion o f support into actual votes
(see Results, below).

Since the first category constituted the Kawelka setdements o f Mbukl (Mope) and Kuk-Mbakla,
campaigning was limited to speeches during meetings and no economic resources were required
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in m obilising support from w ithin the various dans and subclans. T hat task was left to the
persuasive skills o f d an and subclan leaders.
All econom ic resources were channelled tow ards the campaign effort covering the second and
third categories. A total cash sum o f K12,500 and 25 pigs were given as gifts to the various
groups in exchange for prom ise o f votes. A further sum o f about K2,500 was spent on store
goods — mostly on frozen m eat, sugar and coffee — to feed visiting groups. Also, a great deal
o f pork hindquarters presented to individuals via personal networks were used in entertaining
guests. A lm ost tw o-thirds o f the cash and nearly all the pigs were presented to groups from the
second category w ho visited the candidate at hom e, while a third o f the cash was exchanged for
prom ises o f votes w ith ‘name-list* groups during visits to their respective areas. The claims o f
‘name-list* groups were investigated by campaign committees and only after being verified were
they paid cash. M ost o f the ‘name-list’ groups were from marginal areas but some also came
from the second category. In m ost instances, leaders o f ‘name-list* groups represented genuine
voters, but there were a few fictitious ones too. It was the job o f the com m ittees to separate the
fake from the real and generally they did a fine job in isolating swindlers. In m ost cases w hen
swindlers are identified, skilful candidates will o p t n o t to expose them publicly, but play along in
the hope that they can eventually be persuaded W hile no money is given, they will be treated
politely and excuses will be given for non-paym ent o f cash.

Target Groups and Committees
Target group I: W elyi
Although the Welyi are m ajor traditional enemies o f the Tepuka, and Kawelka, by virtue o f the
Tepuka-Kawelka alliance, have fought them as m inor enemies in warfare before European
contact, they have in recent times established strong ties with Kawelka through inter-marriage.
T he M embo in particular through its Oyambo subclan have very strong relations w ith the W elyi
There are three sisters o f im portant Oyambo big-m en — including K ont K lent and Yap Pokl
— married into Welyi while at least five Welyi wom en are m arried into the Oyam bo subclan.
Because o f this relationship three Oyambo m en, K ont K lent, Yap Pokl and Rembil Toki, were
selected to lead the campaign am ongst the W elyi T he Welyi connection is expressed in term s o f
intermarriage ties outlined below (see Table 8.3).
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T ab le 8.3: M em bo O yam bo m arriage ties w ith W elyi

Oyambo
women Year
married to Welyi

Child-Age
(Years)

Oyambo Men married Year
to Welyi

Child-Age
(Years)

Nukundi Klent

1950s

>30

Rangmba Pokl

1960s

Childless

Talke’ Puklum

1960s

>25

Kum Pokl

1960s

Adult

Polti Pori

1970s

>20

K ont’s sister

1960s

Adult

Rambil Toki

1970s

>20

Kum Ukl

1970s

Adult

Dokta Ntip

1980s

5-10

Mou Nukundi

1980s

15-20

Ekip Pana

1980s

Childless

Torou Nukundi

1990s

5-10

Source:

Based on information supplied by Ben Kont, Kawelka Oyambo clan, and on personal observation.

Rambil Toki, who has two adult sons and had once lived with the Welyi for some years in the
1980s, was asked to spend the entire campaign period in Welyi territory. In his day to day
activities he was assisted by K ont’s nephew, himself a young leader, and also by Kum’s son, Fred
Rop, who has dual residency with both the Welyi and the Oyambo. Both K ont and Yap made
daily trips and were sometimes assisted by a Kurupmbo clan leader, Kei Akil, who also has
strong connections with the Welyi Kei’s mother and grandmother were both abducted by
Membo Oyambo big-man, Ntip Dong, from the Welyi during a war in the early 1930s, but the
Kurupmbo big-man, Akil (a fearless warrior himself), was allowed to mart}7the girl because Ntip
claims to have been not yet ready to settle down with a wife. Although now firmly established as
a Kurupmbo leader, he is often affectionately referred to as Welyi Kei’ for his connections to
that tribe. He was able to mobilise his kinsmen with whom he still maintains active relations.
Together they brought in a total o f about 150 supporters from the Welyi.

Target group II: Tepuka
Two field camps were established amongst the Tepuka: one at Ambukla, managed by Tepuka
Kelmbo clansmen; and the other at Muka with the Keitipi-Oklembo clan-pair. Two campaign
vehicles, including one donated by a Kelmbo clansman, had Kelmbo drivers and were virtually
based there, operating out o f Ambukla.
Kawelka’s relationship with Kelmbo is a recent one, established largely through the initiatives o f
an aspiring national politician and businessman, Matrus (Dokta) Mel, who has in successive
elections since 1982 tried to court traditional Parua Kuri-supporters among the Kawelka with
some degree o f success. Like William Pik, Mel is closely associated with Kombukla leaders,
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Melchior Pep and Pati Wamp (see Chapter Seven). Although they initially built their own ties
through this common Kombukla connection, they have in recent years extended those ties to
their own subclans. This was reaffirmed in 1994 at a Kelmbo ceremony in which Pik and some
other K undm bo leaders were presented with gifts o f pork.
The Kelmbo team also called upon the support o f Kawelka sisters’ sons, including a young
leader, K ont Ruing, who has strong ties with the Membo Elpuklmbo subclan. K ont’s mother is
the daughter o f an important Membo big-man, Goimba Onombe. Moka ties between the
Kelmbo and Membo were initially established through this connection. And Matrus Mel utilised
this network by gaining some Membo votes during both the 1987 and 1992 elections. Mel now
has a strong supporter in K onfs uncle and Goimba’s eldest son, Nukundi, an important
Elpuklmbo subclan leader. The Kelmbo team, through these connections, were able to bring in
about 175 supporters from within the Kelmbo clan.
The Keitipi-Oklembo field camp at Muka was headed by a young Oklembo leader, Merowa
Doa, who was assisted mosdy by Membo leaders, some o f which have affinal and moka ties,
others being sons o f Oklembo women, or descendants o f Oklembo men accepted as refugees
o f war (see Table 8.4; see also Table 8.5a and 8.5b). Merowa has strong ties with the Kawelka in
general and especially with his maternal uncle, Kei Akil and his Kawelka Kurupmbo clan.
T ab le 8.4: D escen d an ts o f O klem bo w ar refugees w ith M em bo clan

Name

Status

Age

Subclan

Pana N urum 1

Big-man

Recendy deceased

Oyambo

Ropa Nurum 1

Big-man

65-70

Oyambo

Kontil2

Minor big-man

>50

Oyambo

Mel2

Ordinary man

>50

Oyambo

Gena2

Ordinary man

45-50

Oyambo

Poiya Mel

Ordinary man

35-40

Oyambo

Miti Mel

Ordinar)7man

25-30

Oyambo

Ai Mel

Ordinar man

20-25

Oyambo

Plang Mark

Minor big-man

35-40

Elpuklmbo

Note:

D espite their historical ties to Oklembo, these m en are fully recognised as members o f the Kawelka tribe,
with as many rights as anyone else, and many o f them would have difficulty tracing their genealogy (for
whatever its worth; see discussion in Chapter Three on non-agnates and genealogies).

1.

Pana and Ropa are brothers; their father, Nurum, was a boy when his Kawelka Oyambo mother brought
him back to her natal group. Both Pana and Ropa are important Kawelka big-men; they married many
wives and had many sons. Pana’s sons are: Tiptip, Kingal, Ouwa (Ou’ndi), Timbi, Pati, Miti, Ekip, Kerot
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N oki, and Burrdi Puri. Ropa’s sons are: Rumint Rungwua, Philip Pepa, Simon Makop, James Ntembari,
Eldi Put, and Raema Rumbndi. The information on Pana and Ropa were given to me by Ben Konts,
M em bo Oyambo clan.
2.

Kontil, Mel and G ena were young boys w hen their Kawelka Oyambo mother, Karekl, brought them back
to her natal group. Poiya, Miti and Ai are Mel’s sons, while Plang’s father, Mark, was adopted as a young
boy by the Kawelka Elpuklmbo big-man, Goim ba Onom be.

The Membo, as noted earlier, are closely associated with the Keitipi-Oklernbo pair, previously
through military alliances and currently by political alliances. This has been reinforced by intense

moha exchanges and more wives are given and taken. Former Dei MP, Parua Kuri’s mother, for
instance, was given to Keitipi big-man, Kuri, as part o f a big moha prestation made by the
Membo before European contact. Since then, other moha prestations, including ‘Ongka’s big

mokd o f 1974 (see A.J. Strathem 1979), followed. These events involving massive economic
resources and astute entrepreneurial skills culminated in 1984 during Parua’s moha to the
Kawelka. This relationship has been nurtured by important big-men on both sides. Significantly,
Tepuka’s most important big-men, Parua Kuri, Kuma Rokla and Dei businessman, Goimba
Kot, are all sons o f Kawelka women. While Keitipi-Oklernbo women married into Kawelka
generally are too numerous to mention, only those married into the Membo clan are given in

Table 8.5a (and Membo women married into the Keitipi-Oklernbo pair are indicated in Table
8.5b).
T ab le 8.5a: K aw elka M em bo m en m arried to K eitipi-O klernbo w om en

Membo men married to Status ofhusband
Keitipi-Oklernbo women
Ntip D ong
Kuntil Dong
Ken Ripa
Mepa-endi Kaukla
Koim Goimba
Rumint Ropa
Ekip Engdi Rop
Paul Wamp
William Kumi
Jim Ken
Timbi Pana
Pah Engk
Bob Waklup
Dokta Pun
Source:

Big-man
Minor big-man
Big-man
Ordinary man
Son o f big-man
Minor big-man
Ordinary man
Emerging big-man
Ordinar}7man
Minor big-man
Minor big-man
Ordinar big-man
Ordinary man
Ordinary man

Wife’s clan

Year/Period of Child-Age
(Ywrs)
Marriage

Keitipi
Keitipi
Keitipi
Keitipi
Keitipi
Keitipi
Keitipi
Keitipi
Keitipi
Oklembo
Oklembo
Oklembo
Oklembo
Oklembo

1950s
1950s
1950s
1950s
1970s
1970s
1970s
1980s
1990
1970s
1970s
1970s
1970s
1990s

Adult
Adult
Adult
Adult
>20
>20
>20
Childless
<10
15-20
15-20
>20
15-20
<10

Based on information supplied by Ben Konts, Kawelka Oyambo clan, and on personal observation.

Election Case II: Kotna-Tiki Constituency

283

T ab le 8.5b: K aw elka M em bo w om en m arried to K eitipi-O klem bo m en

Membo
women Relationship to Membo Husband's
married to Keitipi- men
clan
Okembo men

Year/Period
ofMarriage

Child-Age (Y?ars)

Memb-amb1

Keitipi

1930s

Adult

Keitipi
Keitipi
Keitipi
Keitipi
Keitipi
Keitipi
Oklembo
Oklembo
Oklembo
Oklembo

1940s
1960s
1970s
1970s
1970s
1980s
1965-1970
1970s
1980s
1990s

Adult
Adult
Adult
Adult
Adult
childless
Adult
15-20
10-15
Childless

Nengi
Geunt
Kaka
Yara
Kuipa
Pora
Unknown
Dokta Tiptip
Baem Tiptip
Noman

Kuntil
and
Ntip
D ong’s sister
K ont Klenfs sister
Andpi’s daughter
Waema’s daughter
Pana’s daughter
Ropa’s daughter
Kontil’s daughter
Puklimp’s daughter
Tiptip Pana’s daughter
Tiptip Pana’s daughter
Kingal Pana’s daughter

Source:

Based on information supplied by Ben Konts, Kawelka Oyambo clan, and on personal observation.

1.

Memb-amb (‘M em bo w om an’; real name: Nomani), is the m other o f Tepuka’s major big-man and former
D ei MP, Parua Kuri. She was given to the Keitipi big-man, Kuri, as part o f a large moka prestation during
the 1930s. The marriage itself is as significant as the moka which set in m otion a chain o f events, including
many reciprocal moka exchanges and an alliance system based on cooperation in warfare against major
enemies such as the Kombukla-Minembi tribe-pair. The association between Kawelka and Tepuka was
later extended to cooperation in m odem politics and business enterprises.

That William Pik was assured the support o f 250 Keitipi and 120 Oklembo members was
generally attributed to the Tepuka-Kawelka tribe-pair alliance and more specifically because o f
M embo’s special ties with the Keitipi-Oklembo clan-pair.

Target group III: Minembi Engambo
The Minembi Engambo, like most other Minembi clans (except Kimbo), are major traditional
enemies and recent relations with the Kawelka are one o f intense hostilities. However, there are
individual links through intermarriage and blood ties suggesting that there may have been
alternating periods o f warfare and peaceful relations. Although Andrew Strathem, who began
fieldwork in 1964, reported in some detail on relations o f alliance and enmity between groups in
the area, his discussions are mostly o f events prior to European contact in the 1930s and does
not give us clues towards establishing time periods in which those events took place. My
discussion here and elsewhere, however, is based on accounts o f warfare given to me by Hagen
informants as well as on personal observation o f a more recent conflict (see Case 2 in Chapter

Five).
Whilst individual ties still exist, any threads o f relations at the corporate level were drastically
severed by the Kawelka-Minembi War fought between 1986 and 1990. Given these unfortunate
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circumstances, especially w ith the high num ber o f deaths and massive destruction o f property
on both sides, M inembi dans were n ot considered as m ajor campaign target groups during
William P it’s election campaign. T hat is why their approach with a prom ise o f 250 supporters
was received cautiously and w ith scepticism. But when a delegation o f Engam bo clansmen was
sent to Kuk, inside die heart o f enemy territory, n o t once but several times, bringing with them
gifts o f store goods to assist with the campaign effort, William P ifs supporters received them
w ith open arms and treated them as long lost brothers. In fact, when reunited with some o f their
kinsm en for the first time in m ore than ten years, many cried with tears o f joy and vowed that
there w ould be no such w ar again.
T he Engam bo were praised for initiating peaceful relations and rewarded with gifts o f cash, pork
and a pig on one occasion. A lthough the gifts were exchanged in the context o f an election
campaign, the individual donors and recipients themselves viewed them as initiatory gifts, which
would be reciprocated in moha items some time in the near future. As for the election, the
Engam bo leaders (including a son o f a K urupm bo woman) came to William Pik, rather than
their own candidate, a Elyipi clansman, because they believed that he had the best chance o f
w inning and wished to see him bring some form o f ‘developm ent’ — in schools, roads and
bridges — to their area. Owing to a num ber o f factors such as warfare and the rugged nature o f
die terrain, the Engam bo and a num ber o f other M inembi clans live in virtual isolation and have
been som ewhat systematically marginalised by successive governm ents at both the national and
provincial levels. By com ing to William Pik, w ho was not only an enemy but a leader o f a dan
seen by many as perpetrators o f the Kawelka-Minembi W ar, the Engam bo were making a
pow erful political statem ent — the implications o f which I explore elsewhere (see discussion on

Shifting Allegiances in Chapter Six). Simply, they were asserting that there are m ore im portant things
in life than just warfare; that there had been enough killing and suffering on both sides; and that
it was now time for peace, all o f which conform s with a consistent pattern in Hagen o f
alternating relations o f peace and enmity.

Target group IV : Others
The M inembi Elyipi and K im bo clans, each had sponsored candidates so they were avoided.
But the other m arginal groups such as K opi, Klamakae and the Mapkli-Palke tribe-pair were
covered by both K undm bo and M embo leaders. These groups did n o t receive campaign
com m ittees to their areas mainly for econom ic reasons but were visited occasionally by
campaign teams operating out o f Ambukla and Kuk. All o f these groups, however, sent
delegations representing ‘name-list’ groups w ho negotiated cash for prom ise o f votes on polling
day. But, as indicated by the election results, these and other categories o f target groups did not
deliver in fulL
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The Kuk Rally: A Show of Strength
Some weeks after William Pik’s nom ination a political rally was organised at the old K uk school
grounds in D ecem ber during w hich candidates for the Kotna-Tiki constituency were invited to
give speeches. It needs to be stated at the outset that such rallies are m ajor election events
involving num erous groups and the distribution o f economic wealth on a grand scale8. Am ongst
other things, such rallies are organised by a candidate’s supporters to serve two basic functions:
first, a rally provides an avenue through which an opponent can be tested; and second, it is
usually used as a show o f strength o r support for the local candidate. This particular rally
attracted representatives o f m ost candidates but only the incum bent Kotna-Tiki m em ber and
provincial works m inister, K ar Kil, attended in person. The other candidates did not give
themselves much chance against Pik in his base-vote area since he was w hat Hageners call a ‘hot’
candidate. K ar Kil, however, has in previous elections managed to pick up not only votes o f his
fellow Kint-Kengeke clansmen w ho reside inside Kawelka territory but some Kawelka votes as
welL
The absence o f rival candidates — with the notable exception o f the incum bent MPA K ar Kil
— at William Pik’s rally conform s to a general pattern in which candidates deliberately avoid the
base-vote o f certain candidates, especially in instances where a particular base-vote is believed to
have been secured by die local candidate. Some base-votes, therefore, are m ore secure than
others. Rival candidates concentrate only on those which they believe are loosely constituted,
such as those founded upon weak principles o r within which there is internal conflict In this
particular case, w here William Pik as a Kawelka candidate was popular qua Kawelka — an
extremely rare position enjoyed by very few candidates in any election — his opponents
believed it a waste o f time attending the rally (which could be seen as provocative). M oreover, at
no stage o f the election did they make any serious attem pt to lure voters away horn Pik’s basevote. Pik accepted it as a sign o f respect and reciprocated by staying away from their base-vote
areas, except in a few instances w here he was specifically requested to attend meetings organised
by interest groups.
The rally, as intended, was used by leaders representing various groups from within the
constituency to pledge their support for Pik. By assembling them in respective groups, many o f
which were distinguished by dance costum e, it was almost a head count o f Pik’s supporters,
which gave his campaign team a fair indication o f w hat to expect on polling day.

As previously mentioned in Chapter Six, in many ways electioneering involves redistribution o f wealth in
varying scales, from simple cash handouts inside a haus-man (men’s house) to ceremonial prestations on a
grand scale involving thousands o f people. Iambakey Okuk’s distribution o f 4,000 cartons o f beer,
together with pork and other goods, at Kundiawa airport during the 1982 national elections ranks as one
o f the m ost spectacular o f all time (see Dom ey 1990:21-23).
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The opening speeches were made by leaders o f ‘neutral* groups9 such as clans w ho had not
endorsed their ow n candidates o r those residing in neighbouring constituencies. M ost speakers
emphasised the need for a m ore peaceful election and criticised politicians in general for
election-related violence and m isappropriation o f public funds. In short, they were asking for
equal distribution o f wealth and m ore accountability in governm ent office.
In a short speech on rural developm ent, or lack o f it, William Pik was m ore direct in his criticism
o f K ar Kil’s perform ance in office. W hilst serving two consecutive terms as a provincial
governm ent m inister, Kil, according to Pik, had done nothing for the people o f the Kotna-Tiki
constituency. Furtherm ore, Kil was asked to explain how he had spent funds intended for his
constituency.
A lthough Pik’s criticism was mild and certainly n ot unusual o f election rhetoric, to the
intoxicated mind it can be interpreted quite differently. In this case, K ar Kil was attacked as he
came forward to respond to William Pik’s queries. The assailant, a M embo man w ho operates a
beer black m arket even during liquor bans (as in this instance), was drunk. H e also damaged the
windscreen o f Kil’s vehicle. B oth Pik and Kil have affinal ties with him — one o f his sisters is
married to Pik while another is married to a man from a clan which is closely paired with Kil’s
own clan. Because he was said to have been drinking with some Tepuka m en earlier that day, Pik
believed the incident was deliberate sabotage designed by his political opponents to hinder his
election campaign10.
O n the following m orning, when asked to explain his behaviour, he blamed it on the alcohol,
but failed to make a contribution towards the compensation. A com pensation o f K200 and a pig
was offered to, and accepted, by K ar Kil and his supporters, thus resolving the m atter peacefully.
Three M embo leaders, led by Yap Pokl w ho has some Kint-Kengeke connections as well as
with the M inembi, were chosen to represent Pik at this prestation. Pik him self being an obvious
target for retaliation was advised n o t to attend the ceremony. It was im portant to make peace
w ith Kil’s group because his Kint-Kengeke clan-pair control access into the Muka valley, which
is the heart o f Kotna-Tiki politics. A part from having the capacity to provide an effective barrier
into the area, K ar Kil’s group would have sought retribution for this cowardly attack on him.
While their groups can be considered ‘neutral’, open to courting and being bought by candidates, the
leaders who make speeches at such rallies are m ost often politically aligned to the candidate who sponsors
the rally. O ne o f the speakers, Jika Kilampi councillor David Maip, for instance, was throwing his weight
behind Pik Ruin. O thers, o f course, can be spies for opposing candidates but their activities are open
secrets since any information w orth knowing would have been already made available to the local
candidate via personal networks.
William Pik maintains a less than warm relationship with his immediate affines. The assailant was in fact
against Pik’s marriage to his sister in 1986. She, a high school graduate, became Pik’s second wife, which
obviously did n ot sit too well with her brother who had tried unsuccessfully to prevent the marriage by
physically attacking Pik.
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A O ne day P oll
D uring the 1992 N ational Elections, W estern Highlands was one o f the four Highlands
provinces w hich opted for a one day poll. It was considered a success logistically but m et with
considerable security problem s (see Standish 1996; see also Ketan 1996). In spite o f this, the
W estern Highlands again opted for a one day poll in 1995 provincial elections. O nce again, it
resulted in m ost polling booths operating w ithout police protection, which m eant that in many
instances voters and polling officials were left at the mercy o f candidates and their henchmen.
Specific instances o f voter coercion, infringem ent o f electoral regulations and the use o f violence
in elections, and the wider implications o f com peting legitimacies have already been discussed
(see Chapter Six). H ere, I deal with events that transpired at William Pik’s hom e booths o f Kuk
and M ope.
Polling com m enced soon after 9:00 a.m. on the 9th o f January 1995. The polling station at the
old K uk D PI station was already packed with voters by the time the polling team arrived just
after eight D espite the lack o f police presence, polling was mostly orderly, with Pik's henchm en
keeping voters assembled in sub-clan blocks and ensuring that all eligible members o f a
particular lineage o r family voted when it was their turn.
H aving been personally involved in the updating o f the electoral roll as well as in the creation o f
a supplementary roll, Pik and his campaign team knew exactly how many people were on the
roll and made it their business to learn their whereabouts. O n polling day they made sure that
everyone was present; the young and able were told to walk while the old and physically
handicapped were transported to the polling station in a num ber o f vehicles. Following a general
pattern in Hagen, voter turnout at hom e polling booths is very high and this one was no
different Only those living outside the Highlands region did not vote. Just five out o f nearly one
hundred Kawelka residents in Port Moresby, for example, flew hom e to vote. The others could
n o t make the trip mainly because o f AirNiugini’s expensive airfares (K270 return fare in 1994).
O ne incident which alm ost resulted in violence occurred at Kuk. The presiding officer was
forced to turn away m ore than 300 voters because o f shortage o f ballot-papers and the indelible
ink used to marie fingernails as people vote. Since it is the responsibility o f a Returning O fficer
to assign the correct num ber o f ballot-papers, the presiding officer in this case was let o ff lightly
and the Assistant Returning Officer, a Tepuka Keitipi clansman, was blamed for this mistake.
It may have been an unfortunate oversight but, in view o f the problem s associated with TepukaKawelka relations, as previously m entioned, this was interpreted differently. T he Assistant
Returning Officer, M r M apa K onge, was alleged to have conspired with his fellow tribesman
and sitting-member, K ar Kil, to jeopardise the Kawelka candidate’s chances by supplying less
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than the required num ber o f ballot-papers to William Pik’s hom e booth. It was further alleged
that the shortage o f ballot-papers and ink was deliberate and, in fact, a strategy designed by the
A ssistant Returning O fficer, w ith foil knowledge and endorsem ent by prom inent Tepuka
leaders.
Soon after the polling team left; for Muglamp station, where ballot-boxes were gathered for safe
keeping, a quick m eeting o f Kawelka leaders was convened to propose and discuss a course o f
action. A fter m uch confusion and heated arguments, it boiled down to two options: (a) to
confront the Assistant Returning Officer directly, thus taking die law into their own hands by
handing out tribal justice; o r (b) to seek legal advice and trust the introduced state structures to
w ork in their favour. In the end it was decided that further inform ation was required before any
action could be considered. Although apparently angry and frustrated by w hat they considered
to be an unfair o r unjust treatm ent from the Assistant Returning O fficer, the supporters o f the
Kawelka candidate decided to investigate further the causes o f the problem. M ore than twenty
young m en followed the polling team to Muglamp to seek an explanation from the Assistant
Returning O fficer, while the others gathered around the nearby ceremonial ground, discussing
the m atter in small groups.
In the evening, am idst the deafening sound o f gun-fire from across the valley, where fighting
had already began, some insisted on seeking retribution by way o f physical attack but m ost saw
reason; com m on sense, however temporarily, prevailed- Late that night a message came through
that m ore ballot-papers would be provided for polling to continue on the following day. Many,
m ostly wom enfolk, slept but others stayed up discussing the m atter in separate houses, while
church-goers stayed up till the early hours o f the m orning praying for peace.
Polling did continue the next day and voters turned away previously were able to cast their vote.
But when the polling team took the ballot-box into town, they were m et by rival candidates who
protested that this was highly im proper and demanded the box be excluded from counting.
They even threatened to throw the box out w hen the Assistant Returning O fficer, w ho by this
time was safely inside a police Land-Cruiser surrounded by armed policemen, ignored their
complaints. This m eant that Pik had to organise his own security to guard the provincial
electoral office where the boxes where k ep t All rival candidates and their supporters were
warned to keep away from the premises. O ne particular supporter, that o f K ar KH, who did not
get the message was m anhandled by Pik’s supporters and throw n into police custody. O thers
were chased away.
T he po o r Assistant Returning O fficer was now caught in a ‘catch-22’ situation as he was sought
for retribution by both his own group, for w hat they considered to be betrayal o f tribal loyalty,
and those o f other candidates’ for allowing an ‘extra’ box from Pik’s hom e booth. Faced with
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the possibility o f retribution from his ow n group, especially the supporters o f the sittingm em ber, the Assistant Returning O fficer tried unsuccessfully to seek refuge am ong William
Pik’s supporters. G iven that there is often widespread violence o f massive proportions —
including m urder, rape and plunder, destruction o f property and burning o f houses — following
the declaration o f election results in the W estern Highlands, the Assistant Returning Officer’s
fears were real and pressing. H is is an unenviable job, especially w hen he is seen to have
com prom ised his neutrality as a public servant H e should never have been asked to w ork in his
hom e electorate, w here there is clearly a conflict o f interest between his job and his tribal
allegiances.11

Results: W illiam Pik’s Victory
As expected in William Pik’s, case and consistent w ith a generally observed pattern in Hagen, the
conversion o f supporters into votes rarely meets with a hundred per cent success rate, even at
the hom e polling booths o f candidates. There is no indication that William Pik’s perform ance
changed that trend, even though he w on the election quite comfortably w ith 2,421 votes, beating
his nearest rival and sitting m ember, K ar Kil, by m ore than 300 votes. Even at his base-vote
areas o f K uk and M ope, despite dose scrutiny from his henchm en, he failed to score a hundred
per c en t As indicated in Table 8.6 (see also Table 8.7 and Figure 8. /), the bulk o f his votes came
from his base-vote areas, Kuk (1,399) and M ope (405) and the rest from Tepuka (265), Minembi
Engam bo (103), K opi (95), Welyi (58) and Klamakae (51). A part from the Kawelka settlements
o f K uk and M ope, where he scored 99.71 and 94.19 per cent, respectively, he also did well (in
term s o f conversion rates; see Table 8.6) am ongst the K opi (95%) and Klamakae (68%), which
are both currently in alliance with the Kawelka and were recently com pensated for losses
sustained while assisting Kawelka during the Kawelka-Minembi W ar, fought between 1986 and
1990.
As illustrated in Figure 8. 7, a total o f 1,804 or 76 per cent o f William Pik’s votes came from his
Kawelka base-vote, while

12 per cent o f the vote came from Tepuka dans, notably the

Keitipi-

Oklem bo pair and Kelmbo. The M inembi and K opi voters contributed five and four per cent o f .
Pik’s w inning vote o f 2,421.*

Returning Officers already operate under difficult situations, many have received threats, some have fled
for fear o f being killed, others have been physically assaulted. All because o f a common, if somewhat
misguided, perception that polling officials have not been completely neutral in the conduct o f elections.
O ne way o f reducing this problem would be to appoint Returning Officers from other provinces, and
presiding officers from outside the district or constituency. Previously I have pointed out this problem to
the PN G Electoral Commission but no action was taken during the provincial election. Let us hope that
this was an oversight and that the problem will be rectified in future elections.
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Figure 8.1 : How William Pik Scored

Minembi
Klamakae Kopi

2%

Tepuka
11%
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Welyi
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Kawelka

76%

Amongst the Tepuka groups, Kelmbo delivered 63.43 per cent o f the promised votes, while
Keidpi managed 45.6 and Oklembo 29.17 per cent William Pik picked up 5 votes from Kar
Kil’s home polling booth where it was least expected. The Oklembo promised 120 votes but
delivered only 35, which reinforces a widely held belief that Oklembo big-man and former
Kotna-Tiki MPA, Kuma Rokla, made a private deal with Kar Kil (who got 138 out o f 258, or 53
per cent, o f the total votes cast at the Oklembo polling booth o f Nunga I (see Table 8.7 and 8.8).
Rokla pulled out o f the campaign just before nominations opened. He accepted an offer o f
compensation from some prominent Tepuka leaders who believed that Kar Kil had a better
chance o f retaining his seat if there was no competition from within the tribe.12
In the other areas, Minembi Engambo delivered 41.2 per cent o f the total 250 promised votes,
while Welyi managed only 38.67 per cent o f the 150 promised votes. However, Pik’s overall
performance suggests that his campaign money was well spent and a good percentage o f
promised votes were actually delivered on polling day. He picked up 78.58 per cent o f a total
expected votes o f 3,081, which is an excellent conversion rate.

While the results clearly show that Kar Kil did not get the rest o f the Tepuka Oklembo votes, in fact
losing 120 to his rivals, Kit (47), Pik (35), Pana (29), N em a (6) and Apa (3), it does, however, raise an
important point here — doubts about the assumption that big-men can control or deliver on at least swing
votes in their groups.
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T ab le 8.6: C onversion R ates: V otes P rom ised V ersus V otes D elivered

Target Groups

Votes Promised

Votes Delivered

Kawelka (Kuk)

1,403

1,399

99.71

Kawelka (Mope)

430

405

94.19

Tepuka Keitipi

250

114

45.60

Tepuka Oklembo

120

35

29.17

Tepuka Kelmbo

175

111

63.43

Tepuka Kint-Kengeke

—

5

Welyi

150

58

38.67

Minembi Engambo

250

103

41.20

Conversion Pate (%)

—

Minembi Kimbo

10

Minembi Elyipi

3

5

166.67

100

95

95.00

Klamakae

75

51

68.00

Pakl

45

4

8.89

Others

70

40

57.14

3,081

2,421

78.58

Kopi

Total
Source:

—

—

Based on information supplied by William Pik’s campaign committees assigned to the various target
groups and also on tally sheets kept by scrutineers during the count. Despite several attempts to collect
tally sheets from the P N G Electoral Commission in Port Moresby, I have been repeatedly told that they
were not available- All my data on election results, therefore, is based entirely on tally sheets kept by
individual scrutineers.
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T ab le 8.7: B allot-box C ount

Count Box
No.

Village

PANA

APA

KIL

PIK

m ’

N EM A

1

0687

Mamgol

5

121

6

1

—

—

2

0141

Engki

—

—

40

25

23

—

3

0181

Pakl

165

—

14

4

5

5

4

Uk

Uk

166

—

10

9

27

4

5

Uk

Uk

335

—

29

6

6

—

6

Uk

Uk

—

—

4

—

1

241

7

0022

Kinapkla
School

1

—

51

60

—

7

8

0646

Mope

1

—

3

405

22

2

9

0293

Kentkena

263

124

30

21

3

17

10

0072

Nunga (I)

29

3

138

35

47

6

11

0172

Ambukla

145

9

197

111

43

7

12

0253

Kenimba

12

—

8

5

8

240

13

0285

Nunga (II)

41

2

272

114

41

5

14

0096

Kinapkla

1

—

19

10

66

15

0588

Kurunga

248

4

—

1

—

—

16

0183

Keiya

399

2

15

2

2

—

17

0080

Kimbiki

131

337

46

33

2

25

18

0487

Tiki (!)

—

—

2

—

588

—

19

0287

Kotna Station

15

4

6

—

—

—

20

0262

K in t®

21

4

616

2

—

15

21

0269

Kint (II)

1

4

550

3

12

—

22

0027

Tiki (II)

—

—

4

51

134

—

23

0120

Paklgi

—

11

45

103

99

24

0018

Kuk(T)

1

4

—

1023

—

—

25

Uk

Kuk (II)

1

—

1

376

—

—

26

Uk

Uk

—

—

1

22

31

TOTAL

1981

2107

2422

1160

Some:

629

—

142

—

716

Based on preliminary results, as announced via Radio Western Highlands, and also on progressive tally
sheets kept by scrutineers.

T h ere is a slight possibility o f m in o r discrepancies betw een m y data and that held by the P N G
E lectoral C om m ission — i f such data is still held — w hich m eans that b allo t-b ox m apping w ith
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a high degree o f precision is not possible here. However, that does not concern us here because
the primary aim o f the present exercise is to determine the performance o f candidates in their
respective home-booths. The data on home-booths is fairly accurate for rudimentary analysis,
such as the one I attempt here. As indicated in Table 8.8, only three candidates — Pik (98.1%),
Kil (94.95%) and Kit (92.68%) — scored more than ninety per cent o f the total votes in their
home booths.
T ab le 8. 8: C an d id ates’ hom e-base perform ance

Candidate

Horn-booths

Total
Votes

Votes
Tolled

%

Votes Host

%

O ikai P an a

Kentkena

458

Kurunga
Keiya

253
420

263
248
399

57.42
98.02

195
5
21

42.58
1.98
5.00

Total

1131

910

80.46

19.54

Kimbiki

337
121

58.71

Mamgol

574
133

221
231

90.98

12

41.29
9.02

Total

707

458

64.78

249

35.22

Kint (I)

616

93.62

42

6.38

Kint (II)

658
570

550

96.49

20

3.51

Total

1228

1166

94.95

62

5.05

Mope
Kuk (T)
Kuk (II)

433
1028
378

405
1023
376

93.53
99.51
99.47

28
5
2

6.47
0.49
0.53

1839

1804

98.1

35

1.9

588
134

85.22

2

Tiki (II)

690
189

70.90

55

14.78
29.10

Total

779

722

92.68

57

732

Paklgi
Kenimba

420
273

142
240

33.81

278

87.91

33

66.19
12.09

Total

693

382

55.12

311

44.88

B uldung A pa

K ar Kil

W illiam P ik

Jo sep h K it

D avid N em a

Source:

Total
Tiki (J)

95.00

Based on preliminary results, as announced via Radio Western Highlands, and also on information
supplied by scrutineers.

An amazing score o f 98.1% success at home-booths most certainly laid the foundation for
William Pik’s win. He lost just 35, votes, 22 at Mope to Kit but compensated for the loss by
picking up 51 at Kit’s Tiki (II) home-booth (see Table 8.7). Pile won because he was able to keep
his base-votes almost intact, whilst consistently picking up votes from the other polling booths.
Moreover, he scored well in polling booths from within his rivals’ tribal bases: over 250 votes
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from Kil’s Tepuka, more than one hundred from Kit and Nema’s Minembi, nearly sixty from
Pana and Apa’s Welyi group.

Despite the differences in base-vote population size and the shifting allegiances o f non-aligned
voter blocks, the results cleady show that ‘primordial’ factors are at work here. All seven
candidates polled more than 50 per cent at home booths, with Pik, Kil and Kit each having
scored more than 90 per cent, Oikai Pana managed 80 per cent, while Apa and Nema were not
far behind with 65 and 55 per cent, respectively. The candidates’ particularly strong
performances at their respective home booths is schematically presented below (see Figure 8.2).

In this context, Pik’s performance (compared with others) conforms to Burton’s generalisation
that “candidates owe their success (or lack or it) to the occurrence o f rifts within their
opponents’ tribes and their ability to keep their own tribes united” (1989a:273). He further goes
on to note that:
The structural division o f tribes do not determine when rifts will occur or how severe
they will be, but — like geological fault-lines — they do determine where the breaks will
come. The ultimate reasons for competition between tribes and for splits between the
sections o f tribes are often found in a history o f warfare and alliance (Burton
1989a:273).

The historical military situation is that the Kawelka Membo and Mandembo have paired against
the Kundmbo-Kimbo pair in minor warfare but combined against Minembi in major warfare,
fought between 1986 and 1990. The Membo-Mandembo pair have in a similar way fought
against the Tepuka Keitipi-Oklembo pair in minor warfare but combined against the Welyi and
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Minembi in major warfare. As illustrated in Figure 8.3, the Kawelka Membo-Mandembo and
Tepuka Keitipi-Oklembo groups have also combined against a similar group, the Tepuka KintKengeke and Mkuembi Elyipi alliance (For a more detailed analysis o f the historical military
situation, see Case 2 in Chapter Five; see also A.J. Strathem 1966b; 1971:Chap.2; 1972:179-80).

F ig u re 8.3: T h e K otna-T iki field o f w arfare an d alliance system

The
TepukaKawelka
pair
com pete against the
KombuklaMinembi pair in
warfare,
elections
and
in
business
activities. There is a
traditional el paraka
(major
warfare)
disjunction between
the
TepukaKawelka pair and
the
KombuklaMinembi pair.

The Kintke-Kengeke pair
and the Minembi Elyipi
clan
have
combined
against
the
KeitipiOklem bo and M embo
Mandembo pairs in major
warfare. The
Kintke
Kengeke
and
Elyipi
alliance was formed across
the so-called el paraka or
major warfare disjunction
between the
TepukaKawelka
and
the
Kombukla-Minembi tribepairs.

Pairing
In Alliance

Source:

Based on A.J. Strathem (1966b; 1971:Chap.2; 1992) and on personal observation.

All o f William Pik’s rivals were clearly disadvantaged by rifts within their tribes: the Welyi were
split between Pana and Apa (most probably along structural lines); the Minembi were split
between Kit and Nema (definitely along structural lines because o f the war, although the
situation is complicated by the displacement o f the population by the same war); and the
Tepuka, despite having a single candidate, were fragmented due mainly to the political
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aspirations o f Matrus Mel and Reuben Pania at the national level. At Ambukla polling station,
Mel’s Kelmbo clan gave 197 votes to Kar Kil (whose group is structurally part o f their own), 145
to Oikai Pana (who belongs to a group which is structurally different but shares a common
border with them)13, and 111 votes to William Pik (a close associate o f Matrus Mel; their tribes
are also closely associated). Meanwhile, at Nunga (II) polling station, Matrus Mel’s arch rival
Reuben Parua’s Keitipi clan gave 272 votes to Kil (whose group is structurally part o f their own)
and 114 votes to Pik (who is personally associated with Parua’s rivals, Matrus Mel and Melchior
Pep, but was corporately sponsored by a clan which has very strong ties with Parua’s clan).

Figure 8.4: The Rift within Tepuka clans

Oikai
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Buldung
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Kar Kil

William
Pik

Joseph
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David
Nema

Candidates

The rift within Tepuka is a significant one which I believe had a major impact on the election
and ultimately contributed to Pik’s win and, conversely, just as much as in Kil’s loss. The rift, as
illustrated in Figure 8.4> resulted in a three-way split (almost but not entirely along structural lines)
between Kil, Pik and Pana.
Pik’s nearest rival, Kar Kil also scored well at home. He lost a total o f 62 votes from his Kint
home-booths, 22 to Pana, 15 to Nema, 12 to Kit and eight votes to Apa, but reciprocally gained
45, 12, 6 and 46 votes from their respective home-booths. Like Pik, Kil’s overall performance
The Tepuka Kelmbo support for the principal Welyi candidate, Oikai Pana, is an interesting case which
reinforces Burton’s assertion that “a principle o f social propinquity, taking into account affinal and
exchange system ties, clearly does operate when lain fails to guide voters in their choice, or has been
disabled by hostilities with the structurally nearest candidate’s clan” (1989a:272-273). Accordingly, the
Tepuka Keitipi-Oklembo voters were split between the Kawelka candidate, William Pik, and the Tepuka
candidate, Kar Kil. Pik’s sponsorers, the Kawelka M embo, are closely associated with the Keitipi-Oklembo
pair. They share territory, intermarry closely, in the past have given refuge to each other, and have
com bined against Kar Kil’s Kint-Kengeke clan-pair in pre-colonial warfare.
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was good and, whilst securing more than ninety per cent o f the votes in his home-booths, he
consistently picked up votes from rival candidates’ home-booths. His biggest problem, however,
was in not securing voters from within his own Tepuka tribe. As a result, other candidates were
able to pick up Tepuka votes which otherwise may have gone to K il Among the Tepuka
Kelmbo (Ambukla), for example, Kil scored 197, compared with Pana, 145, and Pik, 111, and
Kit, 47 votes. A similar pattern was continued in the Tepuka Keitipi polling booth o f Nunga (II)
— where Kil scored 272, compared with Pik, 114, Pana and Kit, 41 each — and other Tepuka
polling booths (see Table 8.7). Even at his wife’s Kopi polling booths o f Kinapkla, his
performance was matched by Pik, 70, and Kit, 66, compared with Kil’s 70 votes. Similarly,
amongst the Minembi, who are traditionally allied to his own Kint-Kengeke clan-pair, he
performed no better than his rivals. In Paklgi polling booth, for instance, Kil scored only 45
compared with Nema (142), Pik (103) and Kit (99). Kil did not win because: (1) he failed to
secure voters from within his own Tepuka group; (2) he lost his traditional supporters from
groups such as Kopi and Minembi; and (3) he suffered from a common problem o f
incumbency, where the people obviously wanted someone new with fresh ideas. Kil’s overall
performance within Tepuka polling stations is given below (Table 8.9).
T ab le 8.9: K ar Kil’s P erform ance w ith in T ep u k a polling statio n s

Tepuka Clans (and Tolling
Stations)

Pana

Apa

Kil

Pik

Kit

Nema

Kelmbo (Ambukla)

145

9

197

111

43

7

Keitipi (Nunga II)

41

2

272

114

41

5

Oklembo (Nunga I)

29

3

138

35

47

6

Kintke (Kintke)

21

4

616

2

—

15

Kengeke (Kengeke)

1

4

550

3

12

—

Total (Tepuka)

237

22

1773

265

143

33

Note:

Kar Kil scored 1,773 out o f 2,473 votes cast in Tepuka polling stations (excluding Jikimbo-Wanyembo) __
compared with William Pik w ho polled 1,804 out o f 1,839 votes cast in Kawelka polling stations. Kil
collected 1,166 from within his own Kint-Kengeke pair and a further 607 votes from other Tepuka clans
(Kelmbo and Keitipi-Oklembo pair). However, he lost 700 Tepuka votes compared with Pik w ho lost
only 35 Kawelka votes.

The Welyi candidates, Pana and Apa, virtually knocked each other o u t Although Pana had an
overall success rate o f eighty per cent at his home-booths, he lost (or shared) 124 votes to Apa at
Kentkena, whilst picking up 131 from Apa’s Kimbiki home-booth. Apa managed to poll 64% at
his home booths, but, like Pana, failed to perform consistently in other polling booths.
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Together, however, they scored over 2,600 votes, which suggests that a single Welyi candidate
could have gone d o se to winning.
lik e the Welyi candidates, K it and N em a may have effectively cancelled each other out at hom e
w hilst n o t being able to perform consistently in other areas. Nema lost a total o f 278 votes at
Paklgi, 103 to Pik and 99 to K it, but foiled to score convincingly in other candidate's hom e
bases, no r in other areas. H e only managed 55 per cent at home. In contrast, K it did well at
hom e, polling 92 per cent o f votes at his hom e-booths o f Tiki, but perform ed poorly in other
polling booths. B oth, however, suffered from small base-votes.
Apparendy, the Kawelka-Minembi W ar (see Chapter Five) had an effect on the perform ance o f
som e candidates in the sense that the size o f some candidates' base-votes were reduced through
population dispersal, w hilst that o f one o r two others' may have increased. The Minembi Elyipi
candidate, David N em a, for instance, may have lost potential voters because o f his clan's elpukl

uwa, o r ‘ow ner o f fight', status. Joseph K it, owing to his clan's unique position — which is
structurally part o f M inembi but closely associated with Kawelka K undm bo clan and which
fought against fellow M inembi clans — was caught in between. Consequently, K it was unable to
attract votes either way: M inembi voters obviously considered him an enemy whilst Kawelka
voters viewed him as a political opponent A nother candidate who lost votes as a consequence
o f the w ar was K ar K il H e has strong connections with both K opi, through marriage, and
M inembi Elyipi, by way o f group alliance. Since both groups were at war against each other, it is
possible that one may have suspected Kil o f aiding and abetting the other. It is not unusual for
rival groups to accuse each other o f receiving assistance from politicians. In this case, however,
there is no evidence suggesting that K il favoured one group over another and it is possible that
he may have been a victim o f circumstances.
W hilst the war may have contributed to Kil's loss, and N em a and K it certainly did lose votes, it
is n o t clear why Pik scored well am ongst his M inembi enemies. This raises an im portant point in
that som e candidates may claim solid base-votes, but it requires superior capacity to mobilise
support (Ketan 1996), even am ongst enemies, as dem onstrated by Pik's performance.
Superior capacity best equates with the concept o f ‘strength', a com posite quality, which
according to surveys, is made up o f factors such as personal leadership qualities, educational
background and campaign resources (see Saffu 1989; 1996). ‘Strength', therefore is a m ajor
factor which determines a candidate's success or failure in elections (cf. Burton 1989a).
In Hagen O pen, Paul Pora's success during the 1987 national election, for instance, was
to such ‘strength' based on his involvem ent with the form ation o f the N ational Party
in the early 1970s and continued association with the party into the 1980s, success in business (as

Election Case lb Kotna-Tiki Constituency

299

one o f the m ost successful businessm en in Hagen, with interest in the haulage and coffee
m arketing industries), and his experience in various local and national offices (Burton 1989a).
O w ing to his status as one o f Hagen’s first millionaire businessmen and his strong association
w ith the N ational Party, he was “seen as having the greatest personal campaign resources, as well
as having the full weight o f the N P party machinery behind him” (Burton 1989a:258).
Like Pora in Hagen O pen, William Pik’s success in Kotna-Tiki Constituency can also be
assessed in term s o f personal ‘strength’. The basis o f Pik’s ‘strength’, nonetheless, differs from
Pora’s in the sense that Pik’s leadership qualities were assessed in the context o f local conflicts
while Pom ’s were obviously tested in a much broader field William Pik’s previous attem pt at
political office was an unsuccessful one in 1988 during the provincial elections, but with a strong
association w ith form er D ei M P, M elchior Pep, Pik was able to build his influence and extend
his netw ork through the disbursem ent o f governm ent resources. H is leadership qualities,
however, w ere best displayed during the peace settlem ent between the Kawelka and M inembi in
1990. In negotiations leading up to the settlem ent, Pik exhibited exceptional skill in dealing with
highly sensitive issues o f truce between warring factions and arranging reparation payments
between allied groups.
Since m ost negotiations are public events, witnessed by governm ent officials and leaders from
neutral groups, speech-makers tend to choose their words carefully in order to make an
im pression on the listeners. For an intending candidate such as William Pik, these events
provided the opportunity to impress as many people as possible. I personally witnessed two
such events, both traditional wua paka (lit: ‘uplifting man’) formal funeral ceremonies, during
w hich William Pik (among other leaders) spoke to hundreds o f people:
•

first at M bukl in January 1987 where at least three thousand m ourners from the KawelkaK opi-K im bo- Klamakae alliance, plus several hundred others from friendly and neutral
groups, were gathered to present their grievances (amongst other things) to the then
W estern Highlands Provincial Police Commander, Robert K orus, and his deputy, Jefferry
Kera, over the alleged killing o f a Kawelka Kundm bo man (which initially triggered the
Kawelka-Minembi War) and subsequent deaths during the early encounters;•

•

then in July 1989 at Kuk where m ore than two thousand Kawelka m ourners and a further
hundred o r m ote delegates from neighbouring tribes were gathered to make a similar
appeal for justice after Minembi violated a com bined Church and state-sponsored truce
agreem ent by k illin g a Kawelka K undm bo clansman, Kupakl, at a road-block on the
H agen-K otna road (see Case 2 in Chapter Viv$).
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T he latter event was witnessed by provincial governm ent officials, including the then Acting
Provincial Secretary, O seah John, w ho also spoke to those present at die ceremony, appealing
for peace and prom ising to look into the matter. William Pik in particular was impressive in
presenting Kawelka’s case, pointing out that Kawelka were the aggrieved party here, while at the
same time, warning state officials that inadequate or lack o f police intervention had in the past
resulted in death and destruction o f property, a situation that would easily get out o f hand if
unchecked In addition to acting as the principal mouthpiece for the Kawelka, Pik was equally
impressive in one other area — that o f disbursem ent o f economic resources. D uring KupakTs
funeral, Pik had in his possession the use o f a new four-wheel-drive utility (believed to have
been hired by M elchior Pep, then M inister for Correctional Services) which was used to
transport food and other items required for the ceremony. Im portant visitors, such as leaders
from neighbouring clans, were accommodated by Pik and his K undm bo clan leaders, which
means that this would have given Pik a further opportunity to make his intentions known in
addition to gauging the views o f such men o f some consequence.
A nd so it was this particular kind o f ‘strength’, coupled with a somewhat misguided perception
that Pik had access to corridors o f pow er in Waigani, P ort Moresby, and m ore significantly to a
seemingly limitless supply o f econom ic resources, which set him ahead o f the less influential and
younger rival, Max Poka, during the Kawelka preselection in N ovem ber 1994 — as well as
obtaining assurances o f support from clans o f other tribes, notably the Minembi Engambo and
Tepuka K elm bo.14
Supposing that ‘strength’ was the only factor determining success or failure in elections, my
analysis o f the results would m ost certainly lend me to a predictable conclusion: that the
Kawelka candidate, William Pik, w on because o f superior leadership qualities. Assuming that this
is correct, does it mean that the Tepuka candidate, K ar Kil, the incum bent and a provincial
governm ent minister, was less ‘strong’ than William Pik? W hat if all candidates were equal in
‘strength’ (measured in one form o r a com bination o f several factors), would the candidate from
the biggest tribe win?
First, ‘strength’, as measured by leadership qualities’ and campaign resources, is in practice not
the only factor in election wins or losses. In this respect, K ar Kil was probably as ‘strong7as Pik,
if n o t stronger, considering his experience as a provincial governm ent minister and his strong
association with form er D ei MPs, Parua Kuri, and his son, Reuben Parua.15 William Pik won not
14.

Compare with Paul Pora’s success in securing assurances o f support from the eastern Mokei o f Hagen
Open Electorate during title 1987 elections (see Burton 1989a).

15.

Apart from political associations, Kar Kil also has kinship ties with Parua Kuri and his son, Reuben. Both
K ar Kil and Parua Kuri are married to sisters from the Kopi tribe, which means that Kil is an uncle, o r as
Hageners say, a father, to Reuben and a brother to Parua Kuri.
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because o f superior leadership qualities but because o f a com bination o f factors, which I take up
later in this section.
Secondly, it is practically im possible for all candidates to be equal in ‘strength’; in fact, the
candidates here and elsewhere (see, for example, Burton 1989a) differed in ‘strength’, and their
circles o f support varied greatly in size. All the candidates did well at hom e booths, scoring
between 50-90 per cent o f the vote, but generally struggled at other booths.
Thirdly, the results indicate that the biggest tribe does not necessarily win. This is clearly
illustrated by the perform ance o f K ar Kil’s, whose group with over 5,000 people outnum bered
Pik’s w ith 4,000 (see Table 8.10). From a total o f 2,473 votes cast in Tepuka polling booths —
excluding the Jim i valley resident Jikimbo-W anyembo clan-pair — Kil polled 1,773 votes but
lost 700 to his rivals: Pik (265), Pana (237), K it (143), N em a (33), and Apa (22). The situation
here generally approximates to Burton’s (1989a) ‘segmentary enclavement’ m odel o f voter
behaviour, whereby:
... segmentary enclavement of support is evident, but it is modified by (a) a weighting
attributable to leadership qualities’; (b) the effect of a factor... called ‘social propinquity’
overriding structural closeness; (c) true floating voters; and (d) the shifting allegiances of
non-aligned voter blocks (Burton 1989a:279).
K ar Kil’s failure to secure Tepuka votes and the rift within his tribe (discussed earlier) fits well
into this m odel, but understanding William Pik’s success in holding his own tribe together while
at the same tim e securing significant support from clans o f other tribes (including Kil’s Tepuka
tribe) requires one to go beyond this m odel and explore the dynamics o f the Hagen megacycle.
As previously m entioned, Pik’s Kundm bo clan were the ‘owners’ o f the Kawelka fight with the
M inem bi (see Chapter Fire). The Kundm bo owed their allies — comprising K opi, Kimbo,
Klamakae and other Kawelka clans — reparation payments for losses sustained while assisting
them in fighting against the M inembi-Nguni alliance. The K opi, Kim bo and Klamakae were
recently com pensated for war deaths, but in the case o f the Kawelka M embo, payment was not
forthcom ing as easily as it did in other cases, which m eant that some ‘greasing’ was required to
speed up the process. H ence, the M embo sponsorship o f William Pik’s candidacy, thereby
‘commoditising’ votes as solidtory gifts for reparation payments, a significant point to which I
shall return later in the concluding section o f this chapter.
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T ab le 8.10: C an d id ates an d G roups: p o p u latio n d ata

Candidate

Tribe

1979 residents

1990pop.2

1995 est.

Votes cast3

counts1
Oikai Pana

Welyi

1,476

3,1094

4,500

2,623s

Buldung Apa

Welyi

As above

As above

As above

As above

K ai Kil

Tepuka

2,575

3,3516

5,000

2,4737

William Pik

Kawelka

1,631

4,168s

4,000

1,839

Joseph Kit

Minembi

1,524

2,0319

3,000

1,45210

David Nema

Minembi

As above

As above

As above

As above

7,206

12,659

19,500

8,387

Notes.:
1.

Data from Rural Community Register (NSO 1982). These figures are for people deemed to be ‘residents’.

2.

Data from 1990 National Population Census (NSO 1993).

3.

Total votes counted in polling booths within each candidate’s tribal group.

4.

Rurual Non-Village Census Units (Kotna Mission Station and Kitip High School, Penga Station, and the
two plantations, Tremeami and MamgogI) have a total population o f 897 persons, which brings the overall
total to 5,006. These, however, cannot be included here because all o f them contain predominantly
migrant populations (originally from Simbu, Southern Highlands and other parts o f the Western
Highlands).

5.

There is a strong possibility that this figure may well be far below the actual number o f votes cast in Welyi
polling booths. For instance, a total o f 785 votes from three ballot boxes (Counts 3, 4- and 5; see Table 8.7)
were n ot included here as Welyi votes because o f difficulties encountered in matching ballot boxes with
the actual identity o f voter blocks. Although the principal Welyi candidate, Oikai Pana, performed
exceptionally well here, collecting 666 votes and conceding only 119 to his rivals, Kil (53), Kit (38), Pik (19)
and N em a (9), the other Welyi candidate, Buldung Apa’s failure to score any votes at all suggests that these
may not be exclusively Welyi votes but instead a combination o f Welyi and possibly Mapke-Palke,
Klamakae and a few Tepuka votes. If, however, w e were to include these as Welyi votes, on the basis o f
Pana’s strong performance, the total Welyi vote would com e to 3,408 — a not too unlikely figure, taking
into account a large population o f around 5,000 people (including those in Rural Non-Village Census
Units w ho more often than not would vote with their hosts).

6.

Suspected underenumeration; Total Tepuka population is believed to be at least 5,000 persons.

7.

Excluding Jikimbo-Wanyembo votes.

8.

Including som e Tepuka, Poika-Ayka (ex-Nebilyer) and Enga migrants at Kuk.

9.

Population data for the Minembi clans — Kimbo, Elyipi and Engambo — which are part o f the KotnaTiki Constituency. The rest o f the Minembi belong to the Gumanch Constituency. The total KimboElyipi-Engambo population is believed to be at least 3,000 persons — underenumeration is 1990 Census is
very likely to have occurred mainly due to population dispersal through the Kawelka-Minembi War (1986
1990).

10.

Minembi Kimbo, Elyipi and Engambo votes.
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The data presented in Table 8.10 and Figure 8.5 reinforce an important point made in Chapter

Three o f this thesis that there is a tendency for smaller groups to be more united than large ones.
In other words, the level o f cohesion within groups is largely dependent on factors o f size,
historical military alliances and contemporary social relations. In this context, simplistic
assumptions about size, social class, political parties, and policy platforms as factors in elections
were easily discredited here — an important point to which I shall return in the concluding
section o f this chapter. I now turn to some specific problems faced by William Pik, in order to
highlight the effects o f powerful external forces on local politics.
A fterm ath: P roblem s for a new M em ber
Following the declaration o f the election results in Western Highlands and in the subsequent
process o f government formation William Pik was elected Deputy Premier in a predominantly
National Party-based government led by Premier Lucas Roika. Pik was chosen ahead o f more
experienced politicians backed by major political party-aligned groups such as Jika and Yamka.
This was a major victory for William Pik and his small Kawelka tribe because Pik had contested
as an independent and this was his first term in office.
In an ideal situation, after his victory Pik’s Kundmbo clan, with assistance from Membo, would
have hosted a large pig festival in which several hundred pigs and some cows would be
slaughtered for mass distribution amongst his supporters. Following that, his Kundmbo clan
were to make reparation payments in the form o f a large rnoha to the Membo for losses
sustained, including many deaths, while assisting Kundmbo in their fight against the Minembi.
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T hat was the plan, as agreed upon by Kawelka leaders, before the election. Alas, it was not to be!
Pik’s plan to reward the M embo and other supporters was thwarted by unforeseen events: two
m urders and the abolition o f the provincial governm ent system in Papua New Guinea.
T he com pensation payments for both murders were covered by the British Broadcasting
Corporation w ho were making a film on Kawelka big-man, Onkga, in May 1995. Charlie Clay,
w ho was researching for the film, called Ongkall, reported th a t
T h e K aw elka w ere em broiled in tw o considerable com pensation paym ents. B oth w ere
effo rts to settle m urders... T h e first m urder w as w ithin th e [tribe]; a young m an was
arranging his th ird m arriage w hen his second w ife fought and killed his bride to be. T he
second m u rd er w as n o t an intra-[tribe] affair. T w o K aw elka lads had becom e involved
in a d runken braw l w ith m en from an o th er H agen group, th e M okei. T his had resulted
in th e d eath o f on e o f d ie H agen m e n Life had becom e very difficult fo r d ie Kawelka;
th reats o f payback killings m eant th at they w ere forced to stay w ithin th eir ow n clan
territory. F o r a pro m in en t K aw elka politician, such as W illiam Pik, this w as disastrous.
H e w as unable to go to to w n and carry o u t his job u n til the situation was setded (Clay

1996:10).
In the first m urder, the victim was a young M embo girl. She was stabbed to death at a small
m arket beside the old Kuk D PI station. The assailant, originally from the Kumdi tribe, was the
second wife o f a Klam bo man. Contrary to Clay*s statement, the Klambo man was not arranging
his third wife. The assailant had struck merely upon suspicion that her husband may have been
courting the girl- However, when confronted at an inform al hearing in N ovem ber 1994, both
the girl and the man denied having had a relationship or having one. Both were warned at the
time to keep away from each other. Given this background, the M embo, as told to me by
M embo big-man, K ont, were furious when the young woman was killed by the same m an's wife*
As it were during the Pik versus Poka confrontation, the Klambo were again the target o f
com bined M embo and Kundm bo anger. The assailant's husband was Poka's brother. And Poka,
according to Pik's supporters, had failed to deliver his supporters to Pik, as agreed during Max
Poka's com pensation. The following is part o f a veiled speech delivered by M embo K ont during
the com pensation ceremony:
Y ou w ere th e o n e w ho dipped your cassow ary plum es in w ater,
Y ou w ere th e one w ho sm ashed your axe o n stone;
Y ou w ere th e one w ho drove th e car;
Y ou w ere th e one w ho m ade th e telephone calls;
Y ou w ere th e one w ho stole cash and pigs from us b u t did n o t help secure votes as
prom ised;
N ow you have taken m y girl’s Hfe;
W hat have I n o t seen th at you w ill give m e?

The first two points, referring to cassowary plumes and axe-smashing, were made in reference to
the Kawelka-Minembi W ar, in which Klambo leaders made war speeches inciting warriors to gp
to w ar against the M inembi but failed to supply any warriors. The second and third points refer
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to Eki’s death in P ort M oresby w hen he was driven by a Klambo man to the house o f the
assailant’s house w here he was killed and Klam bo’s telephone calls which warned the assailant’s
clansmen w ho thereby escaped possible payback killing. The fourth point is in reference to Max
Poka’s com pensation, in which it was agreed that Poka would deliver his supporters to Pik in
exchange for reim bursem ent o f election expenditure. H ere it is alleged that Poka and his
K lam bo clansmen lied and in a way stole horn Pik’s supporters. The sixth point is in reference
to the actual killing o f the girl, while the last point is in fact a warning that M embo would not
setde for less than maximum homicide com pensation16.
The pre-em inent Klam bo big-man, Ongka, who had been trying to get his son, Namba, to
hospital in Australia for heart surgery, was yet again distancing him self from his clansmen who
had failed to support him 17. A segment o f Ongka’s clan, the Poka-Pekaem lineage, has PMV
businesses in both Hagen and P ort Moresby. Ongka expected but did not receive assistance
from this group. It was this particular group who were causing much worry for the clan, first
w ith Max Poka's candidacy and, now with the m urder o f a young girl Furtherm ore, much o f the
speech directed at Ongka was n ot because o f Ongka’s personal failures but largely because o f
actions o f the Poka-Pekaem segment, particularly Max Poka’s immediate brothers who made the
telephone calls and were alleged to have deliberately delayed getting the message o f Eki’s death
to his M embo kinsmen. Yet again, Onkga was the centre o f unwarranted attention.
There are two general points w orth m entioning here. First, there is the general shift o f balance
o f pow er from traditional big-man, such as Ongka, to entrepreneurs. This has been largely
attributed to access to cash — those with large amounts o f cash can command considerable
pow er and influence. Secondly, a successful big-man, like Ongka, cannot be completely
outmanoeuvred. O w ing to his position, he constantly shields his group from attack from other
groups, just as he can be an arrow-head for his own group’s attack on others. H e can take credit
for group achievements, just as he takes blame for group failures. That is the way o f the true bigman.
In the end, the m atter was resolved peacefully. The assailant was jailed and Ongka’s Klambo clan
came up with a com pensation payment that was agreeable to the Membo. As reported by
Charlie Clay:

While there is no set am ount for homicide compensation, the average size for Hagen would be within the
range o f K10,000 to K50,000 and a hundred pigs or more. Homicide compensation payments for men are
usually higher than that o f women because o f their higher status in Hagen society.
W ithout the support o f his clansmen, Ongka was not able to raise funds to send Namba to Australia for
heart surgery and sadly lost his eldest son soon after the conclusion o f the compensation. Despite Pik’s
initiative and my own efforts to have Namba sent to Australia (where I had hoped to take care o f him), all
was in vain because o f an apparently higher corporate priority placed on homicide compensation.
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By the tune the (BBC film] crew was ready to film, Ongka m his own indomitable style
had wrapped up the first compensation. Ongka had organised nearly 100 pigs, K10,000
and a [15-seater] bus to help settle the murdered {girl’s] group. The situation was still
tense, but people were once more free to gp about their daily business (Clay 1996:10).
T he correct am ount, according to the M embo councillor, Nicholas Nam ba K om orui, was in fact
80 pigs, a cash sum o f K9,600 plus a PMV bus, valued at K5,000, and a cassowary.
A lthough Clay makes no m ention o f William Pik’s role in this particular com pensation, it is
understood that Pik, as a newly elected MPA and D eputy Premier, played a significant part here.
H e m obilised neutral groups o f mainly K urupm bo and his own K undm bo and even some
M embo to contribute towards the com pensation, while Ongka worked w ithin his own Klambo
group. Also, Pik urged M embo youth to exercise restraint, especially after the PMV 15-seater
bus was forcefully taken by the victim’s paternal uncle.
The second hom icide com pensation directly involved Pik because the young man principally
held responsible for the m urder o f the Mokei man was a K undm bo clansman. Pik’s
involvem ent here was m otivated by several factors: (1) the crises, albeit a local one, in the Hagen
w orld view, was an ideal test o f character for him as a relatively inexperienced provincial
politician; (2) he was an obvious target for payback killing, which m eant that he had little choice
but to mobilise resources for the com pensation; and (3) this provided yet another opportunity
for him and his tribe to better the previous record com pensation payment in a seemingly never
ending game o f one-upm anship.
In hindsight, William Pik did quite well. Together with Ongka and other leaders, he came up
w ith a com pensation paym ent that was n o t only acceptable to the Mokei but also widely
acclaimed as a record payment in Hagen. Homicide com pensation, owing to various
implications — including the ever present threat o f payback killing and its potential to escalate
into armed conflict — is a serious and complex matter. It requires strength and courage on the
part o f leaders, such as Pik, w ho m ust accept responsibility for the actions o f their tribesmen. In
this case, Pik’s task was made even m ore difficult when the culprit w ent into hiding. Charlie Clay
reported that:
The lad held principally responsible for the second murder had run away. He had
disappeared and nobody knew where he had gone, not even his reputed partner in
crime. This was bizarre behaviour and almost social suicide. The man in question’s only
real hope of rejoining society was to go to jail and take his chances with the courts while
his dan setded the dispute through compensation. The Mokei wanted those responsible
in jail and were waiting for the court system before they were prepared to talk
compensation. This was quite a headache for Pik, and he tried every available means to
find his clansman. Cars were hired to scour the Highlands Highway, photographs
distributed, and local radio station ran the story and a substantial reward was offered.
But to no avail Common sense prevailed and finally the compensation got off the
ground without the satisfaction of the accused being behind bars. Ongka and Pik

*
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mobilised the various men’s houses and factions within their group to raise an amount
that dwarfed the previous month’s payment It was a hard and tricky task, fraught with
many difficulties, but finally things came together. Ongka cajoled, persuaded and bullied
the Kawelka to donate pigs and money while Pik scoured the Dei Council area in his
ted pick-up truck, visiting other clans, calling upon old alliances and debts to add to the
total (Clay 1996:10-11).
A lthough Clay did n o t m ention the total num ber o f items included in this com pensation,
according to Councillor N am ba K om orui, the Kawelka gave K28,000 in cash, a total o f 150
pigs, together w ith 4 cows, 4 cassowaries, 2 horses, and a egg o f a wild cassowary as a symbol o f
peace and friendship, in a ceremony witnessed by the Premier, Lucas Roika, and other senior
officials from die D epartm ent o f W estern Highlands.
If the m urder cases were only stum bling blocks to William Pik’s plans, then the real knockout
blow was yet to come. It was one that Pik probably least expected The abolition o f the
provincial governm ent system by the PN G N ational Parliament in July 1995 broke his heart and
shattered a collective dream. lik e his colleagues in governm ent, Pik’s campaign effort costing
massive am ounts o f econom ic resources and thousands o f m an-hours was for a full five yearterm investm ent, but lasted only five short m onths. W hen I last spoke to him in June 1995, it
was a despondent William Pik w ho lamented th a t
What we say about possum hunting with dogs is true; the trail is warm and the dog has
a good strong scent, but the possum is not at home.
Pik used the M elpa phrase, mua mukl etpa, kui nambokJpa etim ni mel em>which literally translates as
‘the dog was h ot on its trail but the possum was not hom e’. H ere, William Pik was referring to
how close he had come in his attem pt to becom e the link between his people and governm ent
resources. W hat appeared to be a prom ising prospect, almost a dream start in provincial politics
w ith the second highest post in the new governm ent, was to end cruelly. Since hunting is
commonly a team effort and m ajor game-meat is shared, Pik’s election campaign was his
hunting and his subsequent win and ministerial appointm ent can be seen as getting close to the
prey, which is access to governm ent funds and economic resources for his supporters, but
unexpectedly the m etaphorical possum bolted away!
Needless to say that William Pik’s term in office was prematurely term inated and, consequently,
his supporters were robbed o f their pig-killing ceremony, while the M embo dan will have to
wait m uch longer for their moka from the K undm bo.18
Recent reports from M ount Hagen, however, indicate that the Kundmbo clan had made a large reparation
payment o f 400 pigs to the Membo clan in O ctober 19% for the Membo men who died fighting
alongside the Kundmbo against an alliance o f Minembi clans, including Elyipi, Engambo, Papeke and
Ruprupkae (personal communication; and The National O ctober 16, 19%, p.2). For details o f this event
and its political implications, see discussion on The Merging of Traditional* Mount Hagen and Modem PNG
Arenas o fCompetition and Cooperation in Chapter Nine.
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C onclusion
W hat I have tried to show here is that election campaigning in M ount Hagen society is a much
m ore com plex process than meets the eye. There is m ore to it than just fanfare, beer parties and
violence. Election campaigns are highly coordinated events involving meticulous planning and
deliberate exploitation o f underlying social and political relations between local groups. Existing
relations o f military alliances, strengthened by intense intermarriage and frequent moka
exchanges, are prim e targets o f aspiring politicians. This is because election campaigns are
essentially tied in w ith moka sequences, reparation payments, and military alliances. It is based on
die principle that once you fight one way, you are bound to vote the same way because it speeds
up the reparation paym ent process. It is a sound principle and one which had been previously
used by several politicians, including form er D ei M P, Parua K uri (see Chapter Seven) and William
Pik in his first attem pt during the 1988 W estern Highlands provincial elections.
H ow ever, a m ajor problem lies w ith the fact that a ‘fight-root-m an’ (elpukl mta) does not always
attract enough supporters because his group already owes allies reparation payments for losses
sustained in war. Sometimes a ‘fight-root-m an’ is able to persuade supporters from allied groups
to vote for him , thus ‘commoditising’ votes as solicitory gifts for reparation payments, but, as
both Parua and Pik will attest, this is a rather tricky game and very few have claimed success.
The way around this, as in Pik’s case, would be to seek sponsorship from another group,
preferably a kui wua (dead man") group, one which is owed reparation paym ent In this case, Pik
was sponsored by the M embo clan, which is the only group am ong K undm bo’s allies yet to be
com pensated (see discussion on Reparation Payment in C hapter Five). This leads us to the next
point on how local relations can be affected by national and provincial events.
William Pik’s political aspirations and his group’s relations with the M embo and other
supporters now hangs in the balance because o f the abolition o f the provincial governm ent
system by the national governm ent A fter having reached the second highest post in W estern
Highlands, Pik’s next step would be to contest the D ei O pen seat in 1997, and his clansmen
would argue at least on sentimental grounds that the tribal dam e m ust not go down’ (mbi mana

nepanka), but that remains an extremely difficult task.
Pik and his K undm bo clan have now caused a situation o f disequilibrium in their relations with
others. T o balance the system would require correct reciprocal action in terms o f reparation
payments to allies, rewarding voters for their votes, repaying supporters for their campaign
contributions, and settling debts with creditors, such as those w ho contributed towards the
M okei hom icide com pensation. Even if all these tasks were successfully accomplished, or
alternative arrangem ents were to be mutually reached, Pik would still need to convince his
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political m entor, one M elchior Pep, to step aside in his favour. Pep, however, may consider Pik
as a m ore attractive alternative than Matrus Mel as a political stooge. Pik may even prove m ore
effective in splitting Reuben Parua’s votes during a contest for the D ei O pen seat
M elchior Pep opted to resign before the June 1992 election in order to avoid facing charges
under the Leadership Code. Pep was then no longer subject to the Leadership Code, nominated
in A pril and w on his old seat back. The Leadership Code then applied to him and he was found
guilty o f breaking the Code and expelled from Parliament, creating a vacancy in D ei O pen.
Following Pep’s dismissal, Reuben Parua (the son o f form er D ei M P Parua Kud) then w on the
1993 D ei O pen By-Election (Ketan 1996).
B oth William Pik and M atrus Mel are closely associated with Pep, almost in patron-client
m anner, and have in the past received assistance from him: Mel received a Land-Cruiser wagon
from Pep’s fellow K om bukla tribesm an and Pangu Party president, Pati W amp, during the 1992
N ational Elections in an attem pt to split Reuben Parua’s votes; and Pik has worked mostly as a
henchm an for Pep. The danger for Pep is that M atrus and Pik in particular could break with Pep
and get strong enough to defeat him in a future contest for the D ei O pen. In fact, Pik did
contest the 1997 elections, but, as indicated in Chapter Seven, Pik and Pep both lost to Puri Ruing.
In an attem pt to secure assurances o f support for William Pik during the 1997 elections, the
K undm bo clan in O ctober 1996 made a reparation payment o f 400 pigs to the Membo clan for
three m en w ho died while fighting alongside the K undm bo during a recent fight against an
alliance o f M inembi dans. According to one inform ant, the Kundm bo did not indude some key
individuals, including an im portant fight-leader, w ho have since shifted allegiance from Pik to
rival candidates, espedally the incum bent, Reuben Parua. Furtherm ore, Pik did not honour his
com m itm ent to the M embo leader, K ont K lent, to w hom he had prom ised nm ombil (“man’s
bones’), o r reparation, payments but failed to deliver after the provincial elections. Apparently
dissatisfied over K undm bo’s reparation payments in 1996, K ont and his sons, Ami and Ben,
shifted allegiances to Reuben Parua after receiving a cash sum o f K2,000 from Reuben,
ostensibly as an additional compensation for the death o f K onfs son, Eki, in 1988. In the
afterm ath o f the 1997 elections, Pik’s supporters expressed their anger over this apparent
betrayal o f tribal loyalty by assaulting K ont and his sons.
A final point w orth emphasising here is that the lower the levd o f political com petition, the
greater the chance o f a tribe splitting. Overall, though Pik was able to sustain group unity and get
m ost o f the votes from within his tribe (plus external ones) and so was able to lift up Kawelka’s
name in a m odem arena o f com petition, in a similar way as older big-men such as Ongka, K ont
and G oim ba did m ore than a couple o f decades ago- These three outstanding leaders — all o f
which represented their tribe in the local governm ent council — have been particularly
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successful in lifting up the nam e o f Kawelka. The M embo leader, Goim ba, Kawelka’s first
councillor, reclaimed the Kawelka territories in the U pper W ahgi Valley (at Kuk and Baisu) after
defending his land claim in a colonial court, which is no mean feat for som eone with knowledge
o f neither the courts, n o r the T ok Pisin language. His successors, Ongka and K ont, have been
innovative in incorporating new resources such as m otor vehicles in moka exchanges.
In the final analysis, simplistic assumptions about size, social class, political parties, and policy
platform s as factors in elections were easily discredited here. William Pik w on because o f skilful
use o f the Hagen megacycle and its sub-cycles such as warfare and reparation payment as
political resources.

Chapter

9

CONCLUSIONS: T H E INCORPORATION OF T H E PNG STATE INTO
T H E HAGEN MEGACYCLE
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Introduction
This study has thus far presented w hat is essentially a micro-analysis o f processes o f political
com petition in the M ount H agen area o f Papua New Guinea, relating these to a com bination o f
interests in the arenas o f sociocultural anthropology and political science. The com bination o f
approaches was essential because o f the difficult and highly complex nature o f the data and the
problem s inherent in their interpretation. An effective strategy applied here was the methodical
shifting o f the volum inous anthropological literature on the New Guinea Highlands, especially
Hagen, and arriving at independent conclusions regarding social structure and leadership, which
were then fed into this account o f political com petition in the 1980s and 1990s. The dynamics o f
local-level politics, covering the main arenas, fields and sub-fields o f political com petition and
the principal actors, have formed the central focus o f analysis in this thesis.
In the final chapter we shall consider the main findings and conclusions o f the Hagen case
studies in the context o f wider theoretical issues. A m ajor aim here is to dem onstrate how
revealing local-level politics can be in our understanding o f national political cultures. Such an
exercise is especially vital in our scholarly pursuit o f knowledge o f kinship-based societies such
as those in Papua New Guinea, where the state at the local level is a m inor player and parochial
straggles, nepotistic patronage and the pervasive practice o f one-upmanship represent the main

game.
This concluding chapter o f the thesis is organised into three m ajor sections: the first contains a
summary o f the main issues raised in the study; and the second deals with a process described
earlier as the incorporation o f the PN G state and its events into the Hagen megacycle. The third
section looks at the relevance o f these findings and associated issues for the future o f PN G ,
com pared to other Third W orld states, and contemplates some o f the issues involved in state
collapse in tropical Africa to assess their relevance for PN G . Thus, the discussion, #
correspondingly, moves from a fine-scale empirically-based analysis to a m ore broad level o f
abstraction. A t times it may even appear somewhat over-stretched, but this is necessary to place
the Hagen case studies on political com petition into a broader context and draw out their
broader implications. The cumulative effects o f globalisation, and the powerful and effective
roles o f external forces in Third W orld societies, provide a compelling justification for analysing
the dynamics o f Hagen society in the wider context o f developm ents and problem s in PN G and
the Third W orid.

Conclusions: Incorporation o fthe State

313

My study on local-level politics has been to provide a Papua New Guinea corrective to
assum ptions in W estern theory about the centrality o f state institutions in regulating society. It is
also, I hope, a corrective to any tendency to think o f politics in non-W estem societies, especially
in the PN G H ighlands, as ‘tribal conflicts’. Contrary to the stereotypical and highly prejudiced
view o f PN G Highlanders as belligerent warriors, my study shows that politics is highly
integrated in the Highlands, where even the state and its agencies and political cycles have now
been incorporated into the local megacycle.1 M ore significantly, this study shows that state
politics is firmly connected to local politics chiefly because o f the interstitial role o f politicians. In
H agen, nationally prom inent leaders such as Paul Pora, Michael Mel and Paias W ingti operate in
the nexus between parallel moral worlds.*
2
W hile concentrating on the dynamics o f Hagen politics, I have shown how the PN G state and
Hagen society feed o ff each other through an exchange o f ideas and values, economic resources,
and political practices. The principal agents o f transmission here are leaders who operate at both
local and national levels. In Ekeh’s (1975) term s, the local power-base o f a politician represents
the ‘prim ordial public’ while the state forms the ‘civic public’. The prim ordial public, comprising
members o f the primary kin-group, dan or tribe, is moral while the dvic public is amoral which
means that it is morally acceptable to milk the state in order to feed the prim ordial public (see
Ekeh 1975:100). Ekeh’s theory is based on studies on Africa and m ore specifically Nigeria. My
study has shown that the phenom enon o f conflicting m oral realms is not unique to Africa, since
Hageners, too, have m oral concepts and values regarding w hat is right and wrong, which
contrast strongly with state-sponsored ones.
My examination o f the patterns o f political com petition and cooperation in Hagen indicates that
the m odem state o f Papua N ew Guinea faces difficult problem s — mainly o f conflicting
identities and allegiances, which create com peting legitimacies; o f limited state penetration, as

Admittedly, Highlanders can be fierce competitors and have therefore been extraordinarily successful in
business, politics, and in other spheres, but so are the Tolais, Bougainvillians, and Sepiks. As Ted Wolfers
constantly reminds me, we need to ask whether Highlanders are in any way m ore different than Keremas,
M orobeans, or Manusians are from the rest o f Papua New Guinea? Surely, this is a m oot issue. It would
be quite pointless to carry the argument further along these lines. Suffice it to say that there are remarkable
similarities between the various ethnic and regional groups in Papua New Guinea, just as there are
im portant differences between them, yet there is no outstanding characteristic that can be used to
distinguish one ethnic group from other PN G groups.
O thers have made similar observations: See Standish (1992) for comparable discussion o f Simbu leaders
benefiting themselves and their groups by “working in the nexus between the state and clan” (p.246); See
also A J. Sttathem (1993b) for a discussion o f the conflicting roles o f contemporary Hagen politicians, as
tribesmen and national leaders.
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evident in the state’s inability to regulate society; and o f glaring social, political and economic
disparities. T he resurgence o f inter-group conflicts, an escalation in crime and violence, and the
subversive actions o f m ilitant landowners in Bougainville and economic sabotage in other parts
o f the country are manifestations o f these problem s. The discussions in this study, though
solidly based on empirical evidence, also reflect my inform ants’ hopes and fears about the
prospects and problem s o f the country.
Political stresses, such as those arising from the secessionist m ovem ent in Bougainville, the
persistence o f group warfare in the five Highlands provinces, and the escalation o f urban crime
and violence in P ort M oresby, Lae and other m etropolitan centres, are o f course quite well
know n through extensive media coverage, both locally and internationally. But international
observers in Australia, N orth America and Europe hear little about the enduring trials and
tribulations o f the liberal democratic process in the m odem nation-state o f Papua New Guinea.
My overall case study shows that state form ation is a difficult process, with political pitfalls
w hich m ust be overcome by Third W orld leaders and peoples in attem pting to construct
national identities from politically, culturally and linguistically fragmented societies. It also shows
that, despite the best intentions o f national leaders, the nation-building process in PN G has
been constrained in a num ber o f ways by Melanesian cultural values and indigenous political
practices, quite apart from the well known problem s o f limited resources, poor management, the
pillage o f state resources and limited capacity for pokey planning and implementation, which are
collectively all problem s o f governance.3

State-Society Relations
Case studies on ‘traditional’ arenas o f com petition and cooperation such as warfare and the
payment o f com pensation dem onstrate die resiliency o f indigenous Hagen political institutions,
w hilst at the same tim e emphasising the weakness o f state capabilities. O n the one hand, the
incorporation o f new resources — such as cash, cattle, beer, m otor vehicles and guns — into
local arenas o f com petition does indicate cultural innovation, which is simultaneously a

3,

The relative strength and resiliency o f Melanesian kastom and the relative weakness o f the post
independence state has already been explored in Chapter Six. It will suffice here to say that many o f the
problems currently faced by PN G are in fact manifestations o f a weak state, driven by competing
legitimacies and conflicting loyalties. O ther studies have reached similar conclusions (see, for example,
Standish 1992, 1994 and 19%; Dinnen 1996a, 1996b, 1997a, 1997b and 1998; Regan 1997d; and May
1998). See also Kabutaulaka (1998) for comparable discussion o f the importance o f kin-group, regionalism,
and the wantok system in state politics in the Solomon Islands. Larmour ([ed.] 1995 and [ed.] 1998) provide
useful discussions on issues o f ‘governance’ and ‘good government* in the South Pacific generally.

Conclusions: Incorporation ofthe State

315

dim ension o f incorporation into the global economy. O n the other hand, however, the use o f
Hagen ideologies in justifying dubious political action at national and provincial levels suggests
that Hagen values dom inate state values. In analysing such processes, a num ber o f factors have
been identified as pertinent: the state as an entity with alien values; the resiliency o f indigenous
institutions; com peting legitimacies and com petition for the allegiance o f individuals; powerful
parochial loyalties and nepotistic patronage (as manifest in the Melanesian cultural practice called
the rnntok system); and the weakness o f the state and the relative strength o f local society. The
latter has been a m ajor focus o f discussion in Chapter Six> so I shall deal with the other issues
here.

The State as an Aden Entity and the Residency ofIndigenous Institutions
A n obvious conclusion to be derived from analysis o f die Hagen case studies is the resilience o f
indigenous political institutions and the use o f Melanesian cultural practices and values in
m odem arenas o f com petition and cooperation. Also apparent is the alien nature o f the state.
But since im position o f the state and the subsequent incorporation o f H agen and other smallscale Highlands societies into the global economy starting sixty-five years ago, the people have
neither explicitly rejected nor fully accepted the state’s claims o f m onopoly over the legitimate
use o f violence, sovereignty over territory, and authority to enforce its laws. Rather, they have
contested with the state for the allegiances o f individual citizens, and, at times, have subverted
the state when it suits them. The decisions people make in dealing with the state are largely
m otivated by self-interest and group interest, rather than fear, respect, o r a sense o f loyalty and
attachm ent to the state. W hilst the state is recognised as an im portant source o f resources, it is
rarely now seen as an entity for which an individual’s rights or group rights should be limited in
return for security, a situation which may only be possible in a rem ote future w hen, as Peter
Lawrence has speculated, the average individual has completed his “metamorphosis from
kinsman to dtizen-isolate” (1969:37). For the present time, however, this seems highly unlikely
because a closer scrutiny o f state activities in PN G will reveal that the state, through its clumsy
and retributive reaction to crime and violence, has in effect consistently waged war against its
ow n citizens (see ChapterFive; see also Mapusia 1986; Mangi 1992; Standish 1992,1994 and 1996;
D innen 1996b and 1998). The Hagen case study suggests that individuals have in fact gone back
into the relative safety o f their tribal cocoons rather than m etam orphosing into dtizen-isolates.
Selective engagement w ith, and withdrawal from , the state thus emphasise the contradiction
between the state as an alien entity and its subsequent incorporation into the Hagen megacycle
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as one o f the prizes o f com petition.

Parochialloyalties
The case studies on elections show that parochial loyalties override national sentiments, and that
official responsibilities o f state officials are often neglected. Politicians, for instance, occupy
ambiguous and interstitial roles between local and national politics; their situation is very m uch a
case o f playing conflicting roles in which their loyalty is pulled in opposite directions by the state
and by their local groups. Since politicians are local creatures as much as national leaders, where
do we draw the line between social obligation and bribery when it comes to cash handouts? The
use o f cash, as indicated in Chapter Six, is a m ajor factor in elections, but it m ust be used cleverly
because handouts do n ot automatically open eyes or win votes. Cash m ust be given in the
context o f historical relations and personal networks. In other w ords, cash given within the
‘m oral community’ o f a candidate can be justified as honouring social obligations, while cash
given outside such a boundary can be construed as bribery, just as crime and violence committed
against people from outside a certain group (subdan, dan, o r tribe) is acceptable (even praised)
while similar offences committed against the members o f one’s dose groups are n ot acceptable
(see Yamka K or’s case in Chapter Five). The Hagen ideology o f group solidarity and particularly
the cus-versus-them’ principle has been used to justify theft, especially armed robbery against
businessm en, and the m isappropriation o f public funds by politicians.

The Hagen Megacycle
T he PN G state, like its colonial predecessor, is unquestionably weak in terms o f institutional
capabilities. Its claims o f legitimate authority to regulate sodety are broad in scope but severely
limited by a distinct lack o f capadty for policy planning and implementation and by a political
culture largely based on nepotistic patronage- Like a wide blanket o f m orning m ist over
Highlands peaks and valleys, the state’s claim o f jurisdiction spreads over the land and sodety, yet its presence makes little o r no difference to those beneath and within i t There is a kind o f
institutional vacuum in which the Hagen m ode o f politics takes shape. T he Hagen megacyde,
com prising a chain o f positive and negative exchange cycles, is a local institution which can be
interpreted as alm ost a pre-emptive response to the state’s im potence in restoring public order.
In the expanded Hagen field o f com petition, a num ber o f processes are at work. The first is the
actual merging o f spheres, where one event (a reparation payment) follows another (warfare) and
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is tim ed to finally culminate in elections which are a test o f group strengths. O n the one hand
local events are built around elections, while, on the other hand, elections have been
incorporated into the local megacycle o f com petition. Secondly, w hat appears to be an example
o f integration into the m odem PN G state system is in fact a process o f ‘tribalization’, where new
indigenous pow er blocs are continually created as a result o f the incorporation o f the M ount
Hagen people into a centralised national state (see A.J. Strathem 1992). A third process at w ork
is the physical w idening o f the sphere o f com petition, where ‘traditional’ fields o f com petition
have been expanded to link into other fields, beyond electoral boundaries. In this thesis an
expanded field o f political com petition, involving a network o f confederacy-type alliances,
linking three electorates — D ei, Mul and Hagen — has been described in the context o f largescale alliance warfare (see Chapter Vive). My case studies on elections indicate that, ultimately, the
state itself— the national governm ent and its resources including business resources — enters
this expanded field o f com petition, yet it is im portant to realise that it does so through a process
o f selective engagement on the part o f the people rather than effective penetration by agents o f
the state.

Discussion
The Hagen that I know is full o f paradoxes, where the distinction between ideology and
sociological facts can be difficult to separate. O n the one hand, Hagen is a classic case o f a smallscale, historically stateless society caught in the seductive and powerful grip o f externally
controlled forces, while on the other hand, the innovative m anner in which Hageners have
included the state as one o f the prizes in their political com petition suggests that the Hagen case
may provide us the analytical tools with which to understand some o f the complex processes
currently at w ork in other Third W orld societies.
D espite considerable acculturation and western-style education, the dom inant trend is still the
Hagen m ode o f politics, where com ponents o f the state and its events have been fitted into the
local megacycle. Yet, paradoxically, significant factors like the timing o f elections, world
commodity prices, acculturation, education, parliamentary m otions o f no-confidence, and vital
econom ic resources (and their value) are all controlled by external forces. Are Hageners losing
control o f the new megacycle they have constructed? If so, will the powerful external forces
prevail and thus transform and possibly marginalise Hagen society completely? O r will Hageners
find ways to co-exist w ith them — win o r lose? In the context o f such short- and long-term
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dichotom ies, will the Hagen m ode o f politics last? If politics in PN G turns into som ething akin
to collapsed state polities, w ith the only rule by state warriors such as army brigands and police
gangs, then w hat role would remain for Hagen politics, o r in fact local politics everywhere in
PN G ? O r will there be rule by millionaire businessmen (who can ignore the welfare o f the state
and the ‘nam e’ o f the tribe)? These and other similar questions are considered below.
W hilst there is no doubt that Hageners have successfully incorporated the state into their own
political com petition, such incorporation itself may contain the seeds o f its own destruction: the
bigger the megacycle, the m ore likely the chance o f it collapsing as it becomes increasingly
difficult to manage — as occurred when the old shell money economy was superseded by cash
in the 1960s. Clearly the dynamics o f capitalist accumulation are a disincentive for the conduct o f
traditional Hagen institutions such as the moha exchange system. Furtherm ore, Hageners may
choose different paths — such as the university o r the military — to gain control o f
com ponents o f the state rather than merely incorporating bits o f it into their local megacycle
These processes have m uch wider implications. Is this already a case o f successful adaptation or
one system trium phant over another? It is still only a single generation since political
independence. In the longer term , are we observing the strengthening o r the destruction o f
Hagen society and the moka system as we know it in Hagen? Those who are familiar with the
great Highlands pig ceremonies would know that pigs put up one hell o f a fight before
succumbing to death. Is the analogy o f the spasms o f a dying pig appropriate here? Forecasting
the future is problem atic, but those who care about their country do ask: Mipeb strongyet hngg>

bet, opasin nogut bilong mipela bat bakrapimyutnt olgeta? (‘Will we prosper as a nation or will we be
destroyed by our own excesses?3). Apparently there are no straightforward answers to such
questions, but they are w orth raising here and it is useful to discuss some o f them in light o f the
cases presented here as well as in the context o f m ore recent crises involving issues o f probity at
the highest levels o f national politics in PN G .
The strengths o f small-scale societies, such as Hagen, Enga and Simbu, lie in their tremendous
capacity to absorb, adapt and influence change, through innovative mechanisms such as the
Hagen megacycle. Considering that such societies exhibit a considerable degree o f internal
fragm entation, it is perhaps amazing that in Hagen a megacycle requiring an exceptionally high
level o f political integration has been achieved. The conflicting political goals and interests o f
local and national leaders, taking into account the rivalries between local groups, mean that such
a level o f integration would be difficult — but not impossible — to replicate at either the
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provincial o r national level H ere lies the m ajor weakness o f the megacycle: it revolves around
the activities o f a small group o f prom inent individuals, mainly politicians and local leaders
engaged in patron-client relations. The political ambitions o f aspiring leaders and pow er
struggles between factional leaders often underm ine the stability o f groups and coalitions within
the megacycle. The fragility o f the megacycle is reflected in the complaints made by local leaders
against politicians for exploiting the megacycle for votes w ithout honouring their obligations
(see Chapter Right). In addition to the shifting allegiances o f voter blocs led by disgruntled local
leaders, there is a virtual certainty that truly floating voters in elections, like mercenaries in
warfare, will disregard corporate policy to sell their votes to the highest bidder. Because such
action is considered a betrayal o f group loyalty, defectors are consistently punished, so far.
D estruction and deaths resulting from such retributive actions will be a crucial test for the
megacycle, as they could erupt in a payback cycle, which could even break down into
unstructured conflict
A further weakness is that the megacycle is strongly constrained by electoral, geographical and
cultural boundaries. The megacycle is effective only within a specifically defined local political
field, such as the D ei Council field described earlier. The chances o f a megacycle being extended
beyond electoral boundaries are limited. W hilst individual cycles o f moka exchange, military
alliances and business networks can cross-cut electorate and local governm ent council
boundaries, a megacycle such as the one described here cannot be consistently linked up across
many o r even several electorates or provinces.

Implications for PNG and the Third World
The trends and patterns o f political com petition in Hagen indicate that the political and
econom ic transform ations prom ised by political developm ent and m odernisation theorists have
been proven highly unrealistic. The Hagen case studies also expose unrealistic assumptions by
state agents about state pow er and authority. The colonial state, for instance, exaggerated the
range o f its control outside the m ajor urban centres and neglected o r ignored the extent to
which local groups, factions, and coalitions could act to protect their interests, at all levels —
local, provincial and nationaL As a result o f this historical legacy, the post-colonial state
com m ands, yet fails to cultivate, obedience and loyalty among its citizens. Clumsy efforts by the
police force in attem pting to restore order through retributive action has often antagonised
citizens, thereby turning them against the state rather than winning them over.
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D espite the superim position o f a centralised state structure on PN G societies, the kind o f
cohesion still found at the very local level has n o t been replicated at the national level. Thus, two
decades after political independence, the contem porary nation-state o f Papua New Guinea still
remains at a very rudim entary level o f integration and its leaders face great difficulties in dealing
w ith m ounting problem s o f public order. An escalating level o f violence during elections, the
resurgence o f tribal warfare in the PN G Highlands region, coupled with increasingly violent
crime in urban centres, indicate that the PN G state, as Standish (1994) says, exists in the m idst o f
a turbulent society. These are clearly manifestations o f an ongoing and mom entous struggle
between the colonially-imposed state and indigenous political units— with both sides ultimately
com peting for the allegiances o f individuals.
A t die core o f this struggle is W eber’s ideal type m odel o f the state’s legal-rational authority and
the state’s claim as the ultimate regulator o f the legitimate use o f force within its territory (Weber
1964 [1947J:156; see also Hague, H arrop and Breslin 1992:6; D ahl 1976:10). By implication, this
particular claim o f a m onopoly over the legitimate use o f force has been consistendy contested
by PN G Highlanders in the arena o f tribal warfare, where all signs indicate that the PN G state,
despite its impressive raw power (the army and police), is losing the struggle for control. If the
state, as suggested by some observers (see, for example, Burton 1989b, 1990a, 1990b), has not
paid enough attention to warfare, then that may well be because its leaders see no real point in
continuing an engagement in which the only outcom e will be defeat for the state. A t times in
central governm ent circles it was thought in the early 1970s that for as long as the tribal warfare
issue was tucked away in isolated pockets o f the Highlands, there would be no real danger to the
state’s proclaimed legitimacy (Bill Standish, personal communication, 1996). However, with the
opening up o f the Highlands region, through agricultural developm ent and m ore recent major
gold and oil projects, the region is no longer isolated from the rest o f the w orld and provides
crucial revenue for die state. If, however, the dent made by persistent Highlands tribal warfare in
die arm our o f state authority has been minimal so far, then the magnitude o f the Bougainville
secessionist problem , with econom ic and fiscal costs and loss o f life, and the am ount and level
o f negative media coverage it attracts, m ost certainly does rank as a m ajor blow to the state’s
legitimacy, both domestically and internationally. The H o llan d s conflicts have huge destructive
potential, yet, as described for Hagen, the people have found ways to limit their escalation and
make peace — notw ithstanding the widespread introduction o f guns — usually w ithout direct
state help.
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D espite the apparent weakness o f the state, the country o f PN G has shown a remarkable
capacity for surviving crises. The evidence present«! in this study and in other similar studies
suggests that the PN G state has failed to assert its authority in key areas o f public order and
safety, including urban crime and violence, in tribal conflicts, election-related violence, and o f
course the Bougainville rebellion (see, for example, Clifford, M orauta and Stuart 1984; Harris
1988; G ordon and Meggitt 1985; May and Spriggs e d 1990; Standish 1992 and 1994; D innen
1996b; D innen, May and Regan ed. 1997). The March 1997 Sandline controversy, which arose
w hen the Chan governm ent hired mercenaries to kill rebels (and probably civilians) on
Bougainville, clearly indicated the desperation o f a state with flawed decision-making capacity
and limited military capability. Street demonstrations supporting the military (which opposed the
mercenary contract) and massed protests at Parliament showed popular hostility to governm ent
(O’Callaghan 1997a; see also D innen, May and Regan eds 1997; Martin 1997; Standish 1997). A t
a different level, in N ovem ber 1997 televised videos exposed some o f our m ost powerful leaders
drunk, boasting o f violence by and allegations o f corruption against Prime M inister Bill Skate
and Police M inister Thom as Pelika (Australian Broadcasting Commission, 28 N ovem ber 1997;
see also O ’Callaghan 1997b; Skehan 1997a; 1997b). These are contrasting examples from a range
o f political crises that PN G is now facing. They appear to result from limited political capacity
and state weakness, the rural o rigins o f which have been dem onstrated in this thesis.
Reacting to crises, rather than preventing them through coordinated pro-active policy
im plem entation, is a com m on practice in P ort Moresby (see Regan 1997), but the norm al
dem and and response procedure in politics can be a painfully slow process. Hegarty (1989) has
flagged some useful concepts to describe PN G ’s situation. A t times Charles Lindblom’s (1959)
notion o f ‘m uddling through’ crises, with a definite tendency toward the ‘slow fix’, or even ‘no
fix’ rather than the ‘quick fix’, is appropriate. Hegarty also m entions Myrdal’s (1968) idea o f a
‘soft state’ and Tinker’s (1965) concept o f a broken-backed’ state. The lack o f capacity for policy
im plem entation and difficulties involved in enforcing laws and the general maintenance o f
public order are clear manifestations o f a "soft state’, and an increase in corruption
correspondingly m atched by declining standards o f probity among high-placed politicians and
officials are both instances and causes o f the lack o f political legitimacy and societal integration
found in a Sveak state’.
Tinker’s concept o f the broken-backed’ state, as argued by Standish (1994:61), is applicable
w here the state cannot exert its authority throughout the country and the application o f law is
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uneven. The case studies given here clearly dem onstrate the state’s lack o f control Furtherm ore,
there is a widely held view in rural areas like Hagen that officials in the capital have little regard
for people in rural areas. This is largely based on the somewhat misguided view that Port
M oresby is a separate w orld, far rem oved from the rest o f the country and its problem s. The
over-inflated bureaucracy, for instance, is almost like a big jungle in itself, where constituent
departm ents and divisions often do n o t know w hat the others are doing and consequently end
up replicating tasks and responsibilities, thereby wasting scarce resources. That governm ent
officials in P ort M oresby in early 1998 were still politicking over food-aid intended for droughtstricken areas, while many people in rural villages were suffering starvation, is indicative o f no t
only an isolated, insensitive, divided and obstinate governm ent but also an indication o f a state
w ith limited capabilities.
It is precisely this kind o f governm ent incom petence that has had a m ajor influence on
Highlands people’s decisions regarding engagement and disengagement with the state. It has in
fact led rural people to see the post-colonial state as largely irrelevant to their lives, choosing to
engage w ith the state only when opportunities for personal gain are m ost cleady pronounced,
for instance at election times. Tinker’s ‘broken-backed’ m odel resonates again here. D espite
considerable violence and disorder, diminishing legitimacy o f the state and frequent breakdown
o f the national machinery, society need not disintegrate into a state o f anarchy according to
Tinker (1965:117). life , as he says, will continue (as usual) in the rural areas, which I suggest is
perhaps because o f the ‘strength’ and resilience o f indigenous societies. Tinker attributes this
continuity to the loo se’ (or generalised) nature o f non-westem societies (1965:118), which
appears similar to Migdal’s notion o f the strong society, one which has strength because o f its
autonomy.
Yet, in spite o f all the evidence o f weak state capabilities, o r ‘softness’, in terms o f the difficulties
involved in delivering services or enforcing law and order, and in spite o f all doomsday or
apocalyptic predictions, the PN G state is far from collapsing. State collapse, as evident in parts
o f Africa, the form er Soviet U nion and in Eastern Europe, is a m uch m ore serious problem
than political disintegration, o r even a com bination o f any o f the conditions described above. It
is in fact a m ore narrowly defined political phenom enon w ith serious social and economic
implications. As recently argued by William Zartm an, “state collapse is a deeper phenom enon
than m ere rebellion, coup, o r rio t It refers to a situation w here the structure, authority (legitimate
power), law, and political order have fallen apart and m ust be reconstituted in some form , old or
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new” (1995a:l). H e further aigues that:
C ollapse m eans th at th e basic functions o f the state are no longer perform ed, as
analysed in various theories o f th e state. A s th e decision-m aking centre o f governm ent,
th e state is paralysed and inoperative: laws are n o t m ade, order is n o t preserved, and
societal cohesion is n o t enhanced. A s a sym bol o f identity, it has lost its pow er o f
conferring a nam e o n its people and a m eaning to their social action. As a territory, it is
n o longer assured secunty and provisionm ent by a central sovereign organisation. A s
th e authoritative political institution, it has lo st its legitim acy, w hich is therefore up fo r
grabs, and so has lo st its right to com m and and conduct public affairs. A s a system o f
socioeconom ic organisation, its functional balance o f inputs and outputs is destroyed; it
n o longer receives supports from n o r exercises controls o v er its people, and it n o longer
is even th e target o f dem ands, because its people know th at it is incapable o f providing
supplies. N o longer functioning, w ith n either traditional n o r charism atic n o r
institutional sources o f legitim acy, it has lo st the right to rule (Z artm an 1995a:5).

An emphatic “no” would be the answer if we were to ask w hether the Papua New Guinea
nation-state is in a condition o f collapse. Even in rural areas like Hagen, where the state is weak
and often absent, it has not collapsed and the strengths, as I have defined them , o f local society
everywhere as a kind o f state substitute. Despite the stresses, the syndrome Zartman describes
has so far n o t occurred in PN G . Despite its weakness in PN G , there is a state that functions, in
an uneven fashion. Yet there are signs suggesting that we could possibly be starting to go down
the same well-wom path which many African countries took before reaching their present
predicam ent A m ajor characteristic shared by PN G and African countries (under their old
regimes) is the primacy o f what has been called the ‘political kingdom’, a situation where the
economy is not treated as a separate sphere where people can wheel, deal, and enrich themselves
even if they have no control over the levers o f political power (see Ottaway 1995:243). The
economy becomes so politicised and subject to political patronage that, as Ottaway says, there is
little to be fought over except political power (ibid). Also relevant here is Zartman’s (1995a:6)
assertion that politics and economics are localised; and the centre becomes peripheral to the
workings o f society. The evidence from the Hagen case studies suggest that such a situation may
already have taken root in Hagen and other parts o f the country. The actions o f nationally
prom inent Hagen leaders such as Paias W ingti, Paul Pora and Michael Mel are fundamentally
dictated by local agendas and interests rather than national policies and issues.
Although the PN G state is still functioning, it is on trial in all parts o f the nation and there are
warning signs o f im pending disaster. In the concluding section we shall discuss such warning
signs by looking at other Third W odd nations, and w hether there are parallels with Papua New
Guinea. H ow do we know that states are in danger o f collapsing? As pointed out by N g’ethe
(1995:261), one o f the m ost im portant signals o f collapse is the failure o f the state to pay salaries
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to the civil service, and perhaps the final signal is the failure to pay the military. Thus the
crum bling o f the civil service represents the m ost ominous sign o f the collapse o f the state {ibid).
A t tim es, recent Papua N ew G uinea governments have had difficulty finding funds to pay their
servants, but have so far avoided systemic collapse.

Conclusion
T he Papua N ew Guinea nation-state, like many other Third W odd countries, can be seen as part
o f a flotilla embarking on a journey into uncharted waters. Some o f die craft may turn out to be
unstable canoes, others may be dangerously overloaded, and a few may seem unseaworthy, but
all o f them are taking this trip. Notwithstanding workmanship and weather, the survival o f each
craft will depend crucially on die capabilities o f the crew and the captain, especially their skills in
making running repairs and undertaking ships reconstruction. Those with myopic captains
however will be am ong the first ones to sink.
Am ong Third W odd countries there is considerable variation in terms o f their economic
resource bases, political practices, cultural values, demographic com position, and potential for
developm ent (see Chazan et al 1988). Yet, all o f them are in our metaphorical flotilla because o f
their shared history o f colonialism. As Chazan et al (1988) reported for African countries, m ost,
if n o t all, Third W odd countries inherited at independence a num ber o f shared historical
constraints, including “the burden o f economic weakness” (p.25), “a history o f external
dependence” (p.25); “a small, W estern-educated elite, quite distinct from the bulk o f the
population” (p.26), “fragile state institutions” (p.26), and an “absence o f a constructive political
culture” (p.27). PN G matches these descriptions. Completing the journey for these ex-colonial
countries depends on a shared sense o f purpose in constructing statehood and a common desire
for economic prosperity and social well-being. However, w hether such goals can be achieved is
debatable. A t this stage o f developm ent o r progression w hether Third W odd peoples can ever

■m

qualify for First W odd o r other industrialised status is, again, debatable. Considering that First
W odd countries, for example, do n ot stop and wait for Third W odd countries to catch up and
are happy to continue neglecting a n d /o r exploiting them , it seems ludicrous to think that it is
possible for many Third W odd countries to progress in the foreseeable future to the level o f
developm ent now experienced by W estern countries. The Second (socialist) W odd role m odel
seems to have vanished in confusion in the last decade. Will social scientists invent new models
to cover options such as the Asian (paper-money) Tigers o r die authoritarian developmental
regime o f Latin America? Such unknowns can be seen as uncharted waters.
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Leadership in politics and administration remains a significant factor in each Third W orld
country’s direction o f developm ent Com petent, far-sighted, enlightened and selfless leaders are
assets while incom petent, myopic and selfish ones are liabilities to their countries. The
experiences o f some countries in Africa, for instance, show that political leadership — whatever
styles (and modes o f operation) there may be: charismatic, patriarchal, autocratic, populist, or
tyrannical — is a key variable in effective state formation and also in state collapse (see, for
example, Zartm an ed. 1995).
Clearly, there are lessons here for PN G as well as other Third W orld countries. Surely, PN G is
m uch wealthier in terms o f mineral deposits and other resources than many African countries,
and we have been so far lucky in n o t having tyrannical monsters as leaders; but we m ust always
rem em ber that African countries, such as Kenya, were once rich, too, with coffee and other
agricultural commodities. O thers have fish and are rich in minerals such as copper and gold, and
even diamonds and uranium. Their situation and strength comes down to the question o f
management, accountability for and equitable distribution o f scarce state resources. As recently
noted by Ottaway (1995:235), the collapse, o r threatened collapse, o f many African states at the
present tim e has its ultimate cause in the mismanagement and pillage o f resources, and in abuses
by authoritarian regimes that leave the majority o f the population w ithout a stake in the existing
system. In addition to mismanagement, corruption, and mediocre leadership, PN G shares with
Africa other characteristics. As pointed out for Africa by Ng’ethe (1995), social scientists o f the
early 1970s m odernisation school warned that successful state formation would confront
numerous crises:
T hese w ere (1) th e crisis o f identity, through w hich people leam to identify them selves
as citizens o f th e nation-state rath er th an as m em bers o f a particular ethnic subgroup;
(2) th e crisis o f legitim acy o r th e developm ent o f th e sense, o n th e p art o f th e governed,
th at th e governm ent in pow er has th e right to rule; (3) th e crises o f penetration o r the
developm ent o f the state’s capacity to enforce all decisions w ithin its territorial
jurisdiction; (4) th e crises o f participation, o r the provision o f m eans and opportunities
fo r th e citizens to influence state decisions; and (5) th e crises o f distribution, o r th e
evolution o f the will and th e m eans to solve at least the m ost glaring aspects o f social,
political, and, especially, econom ic inequalities (1995:254-255).

"

The evidence presented in this case study — o f parochial loyalties overriding national
sentim ents, o f nepotistic patronage, o f serious challenges to the w rit o f centralised authority, and
o f the significance o f prim ordial factors (or localised support) in elections — shows that the
PN G state is currently experiencing these crises in Hagen, and, I would argue, across the country
o f Papua N ew Guinea. Firstly, the PN G state has yet to overcome the crises o f identity, as m ost
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Papua New Guineans still actively maintain a m ind-set o f primary attachm ent to kin-group,
language, and cultural identities which they hold to be emotionally and materially m ore
significant than the ones sponsored by the state,4 This is compounded by the fact that the
primary kin-group, unlike the state, offers the individual a stronger sense o f security and purpose
than any other political attachm ent Unlike in industrialised countries, where individuals depend
mosdy on the state for personal security, social welfare and the provision o f economic
opportunities, in predominantly kinship-based societies like Papua New Guinea, individuals
regularly identify with, and naturally owe their first loyalty to, the entity which can perform these
functions. This is especially true in rural areas where people's livelihood is entirely based on the
land and relations with local groups. The state promises but rarely delivers in these areas. In
contrast, the kin-group is m ost effective in fulfilling absolutely fundamental requirements.
Secondly, the crisis o f legitimacy stems from the first condition, which is the issue o f the primary
identity. As pointed out by A.J. Strathem (1993b), we cannot expect an automatic
acknowledgment o f the legitimacy o f the state from people who depend on their kinsmen,

wantoksy and friends for their livelihood. A t the very least, it is perplexing for people dependent
on these types o f social relations to comply with rules made by a state which, in their view, is
irrelevant to their needs. W hether o r not the governm ent in power has some internationally
ordained right to rule is o f litde consequence to those who feel that their basic needs are not m et
by state officials sheltered and pampered by a faceless pow er structure based in the capital, Port
Moresby.
Thirdly, the crisis o f penetration stems from the state's inability to enforce its laws evenly
throughout the country. As a self-proclaimed guarantor o f internal security for its citizens, the
state has failed miserably. It has neither the capacity nor the resources to maintain public order,
and has very limited capabilities in policy implementation. Its m ajor law enforcem ent agencies
— notably the police force and the courts — are overwhelmed by the escalating rate o f crime»
and violence. As also noted by Standish (1994), this is com pounded by the fact that the police in
particular suffer from inadequate training, poor salaries, and poor discipline.
Fourthly, the crisis o f participation partly derives from political parties' inability to develop

For comparable discussions, see Standish (1994); Dinnen (1994,1996b); See also Clatk 1997 for an impressionist
approach to the analysis o f identities in PN G (from a Wiru and Tan perspective); Kabutaulaka (1998:132) for parochial
loyalties in Solomon Islands; and especially Ekeh (1975) for an excellent discussion on conflicting identities, loyalties and
moral realms from an African perspective.
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followings at the local level and to be accountable to tbeir supporters. A further contributing
factor is tbe rudimentary nature o f civil society in Papua New Guinea. Apart from isolated
episodes such as the active role o f the churches and N G O s in the recent Sandline crises which
led to the rejection o f the use o f mercenaries on Bougainville, the kind o f “developed civil
society” considered by social scientists as “essential for a functioning and viable democracy and
for good and efficient governance” (Standish 1997c:78), such as is found in the advanced liberal
democracies o f the W est, is virtually non-existent, or is at a rudimentary level o f development, in
Papua New Guinea. B oth conditions can be attributed to the fact that approximately 85 percent
o f the country’s four million citizens are rural-based, predominantly illiterate, and have little
access to mass media and communication services. As recently pointed out to me by Dei MP,
Puri Ruing, “our people are far too ignorant about governm ent policies and role played by their
elected representatives” (personal communication, January 1998). Hence, their inability to
influence state decisions. Recent events, however, suggest that even if they tried there is no
guarantee that the outcom e would be necessarily in their favour. The 1997 elections were a case
in p o in t Many voters believed that they had successfully voted out the ruling coalition, and
indeed half the seating MPs were defeated, but what they got was a governm ent in which many
o f the same people were back in power (either as part o f the current governm ent o r as behind
the scenes power-brokers).
Fifthly, the crisis o f distribution. In terms o f natural resources, PN G is wealthy by international
standards. It has, for instance, some o f the largest gold and copper deposits in the world, in
addition to large oil and gas reserves. Distribution, or, m ore precisely, equitable distribution,
however, has been a big problem. Some o f our leaders and their expatriate cronies have become
very wealthy, while the vast majority o f our people still live under kurni grass and scgo leaf
thatched houses in villages and hamlets, w ithout clean water supplies, electricity, schools, or
medical services — the basic essential services that m ost people in Port Moresby and elsewhere
in the developed w odd take for granted. Cleady, the political will and means to solve at least the
m ost glaring social, political, and, especially, economic disparities have yet to developed in PN G .
Overall, as N g’ethe (1995:256) says, the crises o f identity, legitimacy, penetration, participation,
and distribution — and the overall failure o f economic developm ent — all have som ething to
do with the collapse o f the state in Africa, and all are conceptually linked to leadership and
governance. Many Third W odd countries in Africa and Latin America, despite the influence o f
rhrifthan m oral values and considerable wealth in natural resources, have almost completely
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been destroyed by their leaders through mismanagement and systematic looting.
W hat does all this m ean for PN G ? Tilings are certainly n o t yet falling completely apart But the
country*s political problem s are accumulating and taken together may be far m ore serious than
they currently appear to us. The crises experienced by the country can be explained in terms o f a
m odified version o f Zartm an’s (1995) car crash analogy. In the Highlands o f Papua New Guinea
a m ost com m on practice during the 1970s coffee boom was the competitive purchase o f m otor
vehicles. As a reward for contributors, respective Hagen dans regularly organised trips to
G oroka and Lae. O ften these vehicles were overloaded with men, women and children. Large
quantities o f alcohol were often consumed during these journeys. Inexperienced drivers, rough
roads, fatigue and intoxication almost inevitably resulted in many accidents. Sometimes when a
vehicle goes o ff the road on a steep hillside like Daulo Pass it collides with rocks and trees, then
the driver may appear to regain control till the next little cliff and the car may appear to right
itself again. A part from dents and scratches, the vehicle may still function and may be driven off,
but every tim e such an accident happens, the vehicles systems are breaking down and eventually
the vehicle cumulatively reaches a stage where recovery is impossible and it can go nowhere.
This car is in a collapsed state. So far the PN G state has largely recovered from its upheavals.
In closing I should m ention that this study has been about political com petition, covering
various local arenas, fields and sub-fields o f competition which impinge on the country as a
whole. G roups and individuals in human societies everywhere compete for things which people
hold dear to their hearts. In this respect, Hageners are no different from Papuans, Africans, or
Australians. Perhaps w hat is m ost striking about Hageners is their conviction that their ‘name
m ust n o t go down*. There are different ways in which the name can go down, depending I
suppose on w hose o r w hich name we are thinking of: the tribe, Hagen, the Highlands, o r Papua
New Guinea itself. So that fundamental conviction remains an im portant issue. In seeking to
support their ow n nam e, Hagen groups, and other strong groups elsewhere in the country, have .
to be aware o f the danger that their efforts could help bring down the ‘name* o f the whole
country. They may be strong, at one level, but, as the Tok Pisin song o f a self-proclaimed
H agener, N adia Dubrowski, says, Yumi mas noken spak na longlong olsem ol Highway driver, nogut hoi

yumi oJgeta bakrap long rot! (W e m ust n o t behave like drunken Highway drivers because we can
easily end up destroying ourselves [and our country!5]).
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Figure 1.1: T epuka Segmentary Structure
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Figure 1 . 2 : Kawelka Segmentary Structure
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Figure 13: Kombukla Segmentary Structure
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Figure 1.4: Minembi Segmentary Structure
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II

PO PU LA T IO N DATA O F SOME D E I T R IB E S
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Table 2.1: Tepuka population data

CUNumber
boi
016
017
033
037

Census Unit

ClanSection

1979°

1990“

Am buga
Kints 1
K ints 2

K elm bo-W aem be
K engeke
Kintke

680
610
354

N unga 2

K eitipi-Oklem bo

Rank

jikimbo-W anyembo
Total

470
461

933
685
359
661

2,575

713
3,351c

Source a n d notes:

3.
b.

Data from PDS (NSO 1982).
Data from 1990 Census (NSO 1993).

C.

Suspected underenumeration in 1990 Census; total Tepuka population is believed to be at least 4,000
persons.

Table 2.2: Kawelka population data

CUNumber

Census Unit

ClanSection

1979°

1990b

002

Buk (Mbukl) 1
Buk (Mbukl) 2

M andem bo
M em bo
K undm bo

994

498
992

003
004

Buk (Mbukl) 3
G olke

045
050

Kuk-Bagla

346
291

K undm bo
M em bo
Total

N o t counted
N o t counted
1,631

1,018
465
1,195
4 ,1 6 8 f

Source a n d notes:

a.

Data from PDS (NSO 1982).

b. Data from 1990 Population Census (NSO 1993).
C.

Including some Tepuka, Poika-Ayka (ex-Nebilyer) and Enga migrants at Kuk

Table 2.3: Kombukla population data

CUNumber

Census Unit

1979°

1990*

008

K enem bo 1

009

K en em b o 2
K en em b o 3
K en em b o 4
Bitam
Total

565
373
591
733

675
419
604

N o t counted
2,262

418
2,939'

010
011
044

823

Source a n d notes:

a.

Data from PDS (NSO 1982).

b.

Data from 1990 Population Census (NSO 1993)

C.

Rural Non-Village Census Units, such as Bitam Plantation (CU 502), Kentagl Vocational School (CU 506)
and Kenembo Station (CU 519), with a total population of 558, were not included here (which would
otherwise bring the overall total to 3,497 persons.
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T able 2.4: M inem bi population data

CUNumber

Census Unit

1979'

1990b

013

K eta

676

921

018

K om apana 1 & 2

991

516

020

K oraldung

538

492

029

M oga

477

649

035

Palgi

673

403

039

T ig il
T ig i2

531

630

040

320

470

043

Y iem

390

N o t counted

047

K en em b o

N o t counted

528

T otal

3,596

4 ,6 0 9 f

Source a n d notes:

a. Data from PDS (NSO 1982).
b.
C.

Data from 1990 Population Census (NSO 1993).
Suspected underenumeration in 1990; total Minembi population is believed to be at least 5,000 and
approaching the 7,000 mark in 1997.

Table 2.5: Welyi population data

CUNumber

Census Unit

1979'

1990k

007

Keia

453

924

021

K otna 1

428

N o t counted

022

K otn a 2

N o t counted

046

K en am b /K eiya

595
N o t counted

049

K entkena

N o t counted

468

051
058

Kurunga

N o t counted

376

R u ln a/Plage

N o t counted

576

061

Tsipum p

N o t counted

Total

1,476

309
3 ,1 0 9 '

456

Source a n d notes:

a. Data from PDS (NSO 1982).
b.
C.

Data from 1990 Population Census (NSO 1993).
Rural Non-Village Census Units, such as Kotna Station (CU 509, pop. 117), Tremeami (CU 515, pop.
247), Mamgogl Plantation (CU 521, pop. 303), and Penga Station (CU 522, pop. 230), which have a total
population o f 8 9 7 persons, were not included here because of a predominantly migrant population
(originally from other provinces). If, however, we were to consider them as part of the Welyi (as it is often
the case at fWW»n
when they vote with their hosts), die overall Welyi total would come to 5,006
persons.
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Table 2.6: Kentpi population data

CUNumber

Census Unit

1979a

1990b

014

Kinjibi

488

639

015

Kinjibi 1

742

780

024

Mala 1

451

1,519

025

Mala 2

359

729

026

Mala 3C

514

374d

055

R om an ia

457

056

Rom banga
Total

N o t counted
N o t counted
2,554

5,532=

1,034

Source a n d notes:

a. Data from PDS (NSO 1982).
b.
C.
d.

e.

Data from 1990 Population Census (NSO 1993).
A total population of 514 Kumungaka have been included here with the Kentpi in 1979 and 374 in 1990.
Underenumeration suspected here; total Kumungaka population is believed to be at least 1,000 persons.
This figure includes the small Prandike, Gulke and Punti groups which share territory with, and have
almost been incorporated into, the Kentpi tribe. It also includes 374 Kumungaka in 1990. The Kinjibi
plantation (Rural Non-Village), with a predominandy migrant population of 254 persons, has not been
included here (which would otherwise bring the total to 5,786 persons).

Table 2.7: Kimka-Roklaka population data

CUNumber

Census Unit

1979'

1990

005

G um ants 1
G um ants 2

600
781

936
N o t counted

1,381

936'

006

Total

.

Source a n d notes:

a. Data from PDS (1982).
b.
C.

Data from 1990 Population Census (NSO 1993).
Underenumeration in 1990 Census; Gumants 2 has been unaccounted for — a population of 781 in 1980
virtually disappeared in 1990.
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T able 2.8: Remdi (‘Lower Remdi’) population data

CUNumber

Census Unit

1979‘

1990b

030

M uglam p 1

649

84

031

M uglam p 2

339

503

T otal

988

587'

Source a n d notes:

a.

Data from PDS (NSO 1982).

b.
C.

Data from 1990 Population Census (NSO 1993).
Suspected underenumeration in 1990 Census; Muglamp 1 population of 649 in 1979 drastically reduced
to only 84 persons in 1990. Rural Non-Village Census Units, such as Gumant Plantation (CU 504, pop.
832) and Muglamp Station (CU 512, pop. 168), which have a total population of 1,000 were not included
here because of a predominantly migrant population. I£ however, we were to include such population, die
total would come to 1,587 persons. Taking into account of underenumeration, a more likely estimate
would place the Remdi village population at more than 2,000 persons in 1997.

T able 2.9: Roklaka-Waklupka population data

CUNumber

Census Unit

1979’

1990t

023

K utinga

N o t counted

401

Penda

N o t counted

614

036

1,015

Total
Source a n d notes:

a.
b.

Data from PDS (NSO 1982).
Data from 1990 Population Census (NSO 1993).

Table 2.10: N elka population data

CUNumber

Census Unit

1979’

1990*

032
057

N u nga 1
Ruti
Total

770
N o t counted

321

Source a n d notes:

a.
b.

Data from PDS (NSO 1982).
Data from 1990 Population Census (NSO 1993).

770

795
1,116

.
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Table 2.11: Kopi population data

CUNumber

Census Unit

1979°

199(f

041

T ig i3

545

233

042

T iff 4
Total

419

281

964

514 C

Source a n d notes:

3.

Data from PDS (NSO 1982).

b.

Data from 1990 Population Census (NSO 1993).

C.

Population dispersed by the Kawelka-Minembi War (1986-1990); Kopi Ku-mundi dan residing at Engki
were not counted in 1990 Census. A more realistic Kopi population figure would therefore be around
1,500 persons.

Table 2.12: Klamake population data

CUNumber

Census Unit

1979°

1990"

038

Rodllna (Ruina)

581

335c

Source a n d notes:

a.
b.
C.

Data from PDS (NSO 1982).
Data from 1990 Population Census (NSO 1993).
Suspected underenumeration in 1990 Census; a more likely figure would be around 1,500 persons.

Table 2.13: Minembi (Kimbo, Elyipi and Engambo clans)

CUNumber

Census Unit

Clan Section

1979°

199Ú'

035

Palgi (Pekli)

Engam bo

403

039
040
047

T iff 1
T iff 2
K en em b o

K im bo
K im bo
Elyipi
Total

673
531

'

320
N o t counted
1,524

630
470
528
2,03 I e

Source a n d notes:

a. Data from PDS (NSO 1982).
b.
C-

Data from 1990 Population Census (NSO 1993).
Engambo and Elyipi population were dispersed by the Kawelka-Minembi War (1986-1990); total
Engambo, Elyipi and Kimbo population is believed to be at least 3,000 persons.
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SEL E C T E D D E I CLANS AND LEADERS

Key to Symbols:
H—1—h

Outstanding leader
(‘super-big-man5)

++

Major big-man

+

Big-man

' -+
-

Aspiring big-man
N ot a big-man
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3.1. TEPUKA CLANS AND LEADERS

Nine Tepuka Clans: Kiteipi-Oldembo pait, Jildmljo-W#etel5Q pai% the tiny Htimbo
group, Kelmbo-Waimbe and the Kint-Kengeke pairs j^egihehtaiy itruciure is given
elsewhere; see Appendix II: Segmentary Structures; see also Aj^peh3ix;iII for population
data).
"
*

Table 3.1.1: T epuka Kiteipi
Leader

Position

Big-man

Wives

Father’s Position

Parua Kuxi

Former Bosboi, President of
Dei
Local
Government
Council, MP for Dei Open
1972-87, and businessman
Former MP for Dei Open
(1993-1997) and Port Moresbybased businessman

+++

4

Major big-man

1

Former MP for Dei
(see Parua Kuri)

2
2
2
2
1
2
1
3

Minor big-man
Big-man
Big-man
Minor big-man
Minor big-man
Minor big-man
Big-man
Big-man

1

Ordinary man

3
2
2
2
3
2
2
2
2
2

Big-man
Minor big-man
Minor big-man
Minor big-man
Big-man
Minor big-man
Big-man
Minor big-man
Minor big-man
Minor big-man

Reuben Parua

Konge Kundi
Pep Kuri
Pukla Kuri
Huidui Lama
Engdi Ok
UklOk
Pangk Mek
James Papa Ugl

James Koiya
Kerowa Rop
Rumint Mel
Rokpa Nikint
Kaip Nikint
Wai Diting
Jacob Rumint
Tiptip Jimi
Puklum Numdi
Moti Koldop
Wei Reilka

-

Village Court Magistrate
-

Former Committee
District Coordinator, Hagen
North, and former Sports
Officer with Provincial Youth
Affairs, Western Highlands
Province
O.I.C., Koma Health Centre,
and church leader
-

-

.

'

+
+
+
+
+
+
+

+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+

’

A ppm àces
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T able 3.1.2: T epuka Oklembo
Leader

Position

Big-man

Wives

Kuma Rukla

Father's Position

Former Local Government
Councillor,
Provincial
Government Member and a
National election candidate
(1972)
Aid-post Orderly (APO)
Village Court Magistrate
'
- .
Church leader

++

1

Big-man

+

2
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
2
2
1

Pulii Kont
Jaep Kewa
Merowa Doa
Napil Warike
Muld Rukla
Pen Eik
Konga Eik
Gou Goi
Kuim bKit
Wakupa Mel
Wamp Mara

+
+

-

+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+

-

.

Big-man
Ordinary man
Minor big-man
Big-man
Big-man
Big-man
Minor big-man
Ordinary man
Ordinary man
Big-man
Big-man

Table 3.1.3: T epuka Jildmbo
Leader

Position

Big-man

Wives

Father's Posihon

Onn—
Rumini Onn

Former L.G. Councillor
—
■

++
+

2
2

Eink—
Muka Pana
Pep Meka
Moen Waema
Kuni Paeng
Miti Paeng

- .
-

+
+
+
+
+
_+

2
2
1
3
2
1

Unknown
Big-man
&
Councillor
Ordinary man
Ordinary man
Big-man
Big-man
Big-man
Big-man

.

-

-

Table 3.1.4: Tepuka Wanyembo
Leader

Position

Big-man

Wives

Father's Position

Uklwang Doa
Wamp Pank
ReiyaTiki
Puri Pena

Local Government Councillor
Church Leader

+
++
+
- +

Big-man
Big-man
Big-man
Ordinary man

WunumPena

-

- +

3
2
1
Not
Known
1

Minor big-man

Ex
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T able 3.1,5: T epuka Eltimbo
Leader

Position

Big-man

Goimba Kot

Businessman; former Chairman
of
Dei
Development
Corporation, former Lutheran
Mission Worker, and a National
election candidate (1972 and
1987)
Lawyer,
Public
Solicitor’s
Office,
Goroka,
Eastern
Highlands Province

++

K uiK ot

Wives

Father's Position

1

Minor big-man

1

Minor big-man

T able 3.1.6: Tepuka Kelmbo
Leader
Matrus Mel

Konga Dekni
Muld Mel
Pim Manga
Ruing Rumba
Kipa Rumba
Koiyati Okiti
Opum Kul
PoklWat
Koi Konga
Kont Ruing
Apeli Nema
Opa Nori
Moka Kei
Konga Rai
RaiTei
Ninfi Kzi
Mokei Anda
Nunumdi Mokar
Pun K ad

Position
Chairman,
Raembka
Investments,
Accountant,
Councillor
and
National
election candidate (1982, 1987,
1992,1993 by-election)
Village Court Peace Officer
Committee
Small businessman
-

.

-

Teacher
Church Elder
-

■

-

Church leader
-

Former Local
Councillor
Church leader

Government

Big-man
++

Wives

Father's Position

5

Big-man

+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+

1
2
2
2
3
1
1
1
2
2
1
2
2
1
3
2
Nil
2

Big-man
Big-man
Big-man
Minor big-man
Minor big-man
Minor big-man
Minor big-man
Ordinary man
Minor big-man
Big-man
Minor big-man
Minor big-man
Ordinary man
Big-man
Big-man
Ordinary man
Ordinary man
Big-man

+

1

Big-man

344

Appendices

Table 3.1.7: T epuka Waembe
Leader

Position

Big-man

Nukunt Kumi

Chairman, Dei Council Peace
and Good Order Committee
Village Court Magistrate
Small businessman
Small businessman

++

Wives
4

+
+
+
+

1
1
1
1

Wulana Burdui
Poiya Koipa
Kein Gung
Gong Konga

Father's Position
Minor big-man
Big-man
Minor big-man
Ordinary man

T able 3.1.8: T epuka Kengeke
Leader
Yei ]imi
Romrui Kop
Hai Ripa
Mouldi E1
Rank Rumba
Tit Rumba
Kapi Rumba
Rank Moep
Non Monga
Noti Rumba
Kuriti Rai
Kewa Rai
Dami Koklarui
Koparui Koklarui
Huldui Lama

Position

Big-man

Wives

Father's Position

Government

++
++
+
+
+
+
+
+

2
1
2
1
1
3
2
2

Big-man
Big-man
Minor big-man
Minor big-man
Big-man
Big-man
Minor big-man
Unknown

Government

+
+
++

1
2
2

Minor big-man
Ordinary man
Ordinary man

1
1
1
1

Village Court Magistrate
Locai Government Councillor
-

-

Former Local
Councillor
Former Local
Councillor
-

+

-

-

-

+

-

+
+

.

Big-man
Minor big-man
Minor big-man
Minor big-man

T able 3.1.9: T epuka Kintke
Leader

Position

KarKil

Councillor
Provincial
Member

Maet Miti
KalgMoka
Kuruwa Kundl
Puri—
Dami Nikint
Kuie —
Ken Rumba
Pengk Onn

-

and
Former
Government

Former Committee
Aidpost Ordedy (APO)
-

Big-man

Wives

Father’s Position

++

1

Ordinary Man

+
+

1
1
1
1
1
1
2
1

Minor Big-man
Minor Big-man
Ordinary Man
Unknown
.
Minor Big-man
Unknown
Ordinary Man
Ordinary Man

-A -

+

-

-

+

-

-

+

'
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3.2.

KAWELKA CLANS AND LEADERS

Four Kawelka clans: Membo, ICumpmbp-Klâmbppair, ândl^^âMbpi |séèAppcn^Î? 1
segmentary structure and AppendixH forpopulatipn data^l
,
,1
’ **
T able 3.2.1: Kawelka M embo

'

Leader

Position

Big-man

Wives

Father's Position

Kont Klents

Former Committee, Local
Government
Councillor,
Village Court Magistrate, and a
Provincial election candidate
(1980)

++

3

Big-man

+
+
- +
- +
- +
+
- +
- +
++
- +

3
2
1
2
1
1
1
1
4
1

- +
- +
+
+
- +

1
2
1
2
1
1

Big-man
Big-man
Big-man
Big-man
Big-man
Big-man
Big-man
Ordinary man
Big-man
Big-lhan and
committee
As above
Minor big-man
Ordinary man
Big-man
Big-man
Ordinary man

+
++

3
3

Big-man
Big-man and former
Tultul
and
Local
Government Councillor

++

3

Ordinary man

- +
+
- +

1
2
2

Ordinary man
Ordinary man
Big-man

+

1

Big-man and former
L.G. CoundEbt
Big-man

Gip Andpi
Yan Kael
Han Andpi
Kingal Pora
Rumint Ropa
Kum Kaukla
Konga Moka
PalimMang
Ken Ripa
Yakla Ken
Dokta Ken
Pati Manga
Onom Moka
Kingal Nikint
Yap Pokl
Tengdui Kram
Ropa Nurum
Yap Goimba

Goimba Onombe
Palim Muka
Aoel Kiri
Kui Apel
Pupdi Goimba
Namba Kum

_

—

_

_

A.OG. Pastor
Lutheran Mission Worker

_
_
Former Committee
-

_
Lutheran Church leader
Former Committee
Former Peace Officer
Lutheran Church Worker and
small businessman

_
Village
Court
Magistrate,
former Chairman of Muglamp
■Village Court Area, gifted
orator
Former Tultul and Local
Government Councillor

_
_
Important Fight Leader and
Orator
Circuit Councillor, (F.LC-PN G)
Local Government Councillor
& ELCOM employee

2

former
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T able 3.2.2: Kawelka Kurupmbo
Leader

Position

Big-man

Wives

Father’s Position

Ru Kundil

Author of an autobiography
and the main character in a
documentary film, Amb Kor
(Female Spirit Cult)
Former Committee
Catholic Church Elder
'

++

4

Big-man

++
+
- +
-+
- +
+

3
1
2
. 2
1
1

Kei Akel
Goimba Nui
Nema Kor
Oklom Kor
Pim Kuiupa
Nykint—

-

'

'

Big-man
Big-man
Ordinary man
Ordinary man
Big-man and Warrior
Unknown

T able 3.2.3: Kawelka Kundmbo
Leader

Position

man

Wives

Father’s Position

Ruin Kapi

Local Government Councillor
and skilful orator
Former
Deputy
Premier,
Western Highlands Province,
and
a National
election
candidate (1997)
Village Court Magistrate and
skilful orator
'
Committee
Former Local Government
Councillor
Former Local Government
Councillor
-

++

2

Big-man

++

3

Big-man

++

3

Big-man

+
+
+
+
+
++
++

3
1
2
2
2
3
3

Big-man
Big-man
Ordinary man
Big-man
Ex-Tultul & Bosboi
Ordinary man
Big-man

+
+
++

1
2
4

Unknown
Big-man
Big-man

-+
-+
-+
-+

2
1
1
1

Big-man
Big-man
Big-man
Minor big-man

Pik Ruin

Rai Kum
Kael Kont
Raem Mark
Malt Korope
Tamai Muld
Kuntil Ai
Damba Koldpi
Nykint Damba
Kitan—
Makla Kundi
Minimbi Kien
Pora Minimbi
Pup Epkla
Kuri Makla
Paldi—

-

’
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T able 3.2.4: Kawelka Klambo
Leader

Position

Ongka Kaipa

Former
Tultul
&
Councillor and very
orator
-

Puklum Pundukl
Komorui Kuklup
Yap Roklpa

Pakl Roklpa
Penge Geklmba
Wakri Kaip

Big-man

Wives

Father's Position

L.G.
skilful

++

4

Big-man

■

+
+
++

1
1
1

Big-man
Ordinary man
Big-man

+ '
-

1
3

Big-man
Minor big-man

-

1

Ordinary man

Lutheran Church Elder
Former Local Government
Councillor, currently Chairman
o f Mend-Want Pty Ltd,
businessman, and skilful orator
Former Committee
Port Moresby-based PMV and
Taxi Service Operator
Village Court Peace Officer

3.3. KOMBUKLA CLANS AND LEADERS
Seven Kombukla Clans: Kumane, Mandeng, Pukaenimbo, Ayndpei, R on ^n g , KSinaangke
and Waklmakai (see Appendix I for segmentary structure, ¿nd u^pentfi* i f for pSptilation
data).
'

;;"rf

T able 3.3.1: Kombukla Kumane
Leader

Position

Mapa Nykint
Bom Nuke
Minimbi Kein
Krai Malt

Village Court Magistrate
Former Tulttul
—

Member, Peace & Good Order
Committee, and former Tultul

Father's Position

Big-M an
+

Wives
2

+
+
++

4
5
3

Ordinary man
Big-man.
Big-man
Big-man

++
++

5
1

Unknown
Big-man
Minor big-man
Big-man
Big-man
Minor big-man
Minor big-man
Big-man

Reiya Mok
John Mas

—

Kupal Minimbi
Put Krai
Moka Kuntil
Opa —
Kuntil —
Reiya Moka

—

+

L G . Councillor

-

—

Former Committee
Former Village Court Peace
Officer 2nd Magistrate

+
+
+
-

3
2
3
2
3
3

Ruk Dat

—

+

3

—

+

2

Minor Big-man
Fight-leader
Minor big-man

—

+

1

Minor big-man

Korowa
Yapi
Hupe Dat

Former MPA
Councillor

(Etpac;

and

LG .

—

and
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T able 3.3.2: Kombukla M andeng
Leader

Position

Big-Man

Wives

Father's Position

Pangk Nui
Rangk—
Roimb Rui
Kai Para

Former Committee
—
—
Church Leader

4
4
+
+

3
1
1
1

Ninkint Pangk
Panga —
Pukla Kont
K ont Pelga
Waelye —

—
Former Committee
—
Peace Officer
—

+
+
4
'+

1
1
1
1
1

Big-man
Minor Big-man
Minor Big-man
Big-man, Fight-leader
and former Tultul
Minor Big-man
Minor Big-man
Minor Big-man
Big-man
Minor Big-man

T able 3.3.3: Kombukla Pukainembo
Leader

Position

Big-Man

Wives

Father's Position

Konga Owa
Ruing Keat
Puklum Kuri
Wauldi Rape
Makla Kont

Councillor
—
—
Village Court Magistrate

4
+
+
-

—

+

Big-man
Minor Big-man
Minor Big-man
Big-man
Minor Big-man

Ruk Kaip
Paenga Kaip
Puklum Ok
Yakla Kumbdi
Bopi Yangke
Namba Kuri

—
—
Committee
Village Court Magistrate
—

+
+
+
+
+
+

1
2
1
1
Not
Known
1
1
1
1
1
1

—

.

Minor Big-man
Big-man
Big-man
Minor Big-man
Big-man
Big-man

T able 3.3.4: Kombukla Aundepei
Leader

Position

Big-Man

Mulkae Kumbakl
Romb Kumbakl
KeingTei
Plep Kundl

Village Court Magistrate

4
4
+
4

—

Committee
Former Local
Councillor

Government

Pei Mel

Wives
2

Father's Position

1
1
1

Minor Big-man
Minor Big-man
Minor Big-man
Minor Bjg-man

4

2

Big-man

Wives
4

Father's Position

T able 3.3.5: Kombukla Rondong (Rondou)
Leader

Position

Big-Man

Melchior Pep
Pati Wamp

Former MP and businessman
Pangu Pati President and
businessman

44
4

7

Big-man
Big-man
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Ruing Wamp
Nam bTei

Businessman

+
+

—

4
2

Big-man
Minor Big-man

T able 3.3.6: Kombukla M ando (Mandong)
Leader

Position

Big-M an

Wives

Father's Position

Pangk Nukunts
Rot Mel

—
Foreman,
Works

+
+

1
1

Minor Big-man
Minor Big-man

D ot Polnei

—

+

3

Minor Big-man

Department

of

T able 3.3.7: Kombukla Kaimangke
Leader

Position

Big-Man

Wives

Father's Position

Kitan Manga
K en—
Paul —
Nikints Moni
Robin Kuri
Manga Kut

National Election Candidate
Committee
—
—
Businessman
Former Councillor

+
-I+
+
+

2
1
2
1
1
1

Big-man
Minor Big-man
Big-man
Minor Big-man
Big-man
Minor Big-man

Wives

Father's Position

1
1
1
2
1
1
2
3
1
1

Minor Big-man
Big-man
Big-man
Minor Big-man
Minor Big-man
Big-man
Minor Big-man
Minor Big-man
Minor Big-man
Big-man

T able 3.3.8: Kombukla Waklmakae
Leader

Position

Miti Muka
Kewa Kuntil
Mama Warike
Pup Konga
Papa Worinu
Rumint Ruk
Huwa Noki
Roimb D ot
Kewa Miti
KuriTimbi

Village Court Magistrate

Note.

^
'

—

Big-Man
+
+

Committee
Committee

-

+

—

+

Peace Officer
Committee

-

—
—

—

-

+
+
+

Some of these Hve with the Warike near the Wahgi River (Kindeng and Avi settlements). The
Kombukla are sometimes historically linked with die Warike of Anglimp-South Wahgi as well as with
the North Wahgi group, Komblo, of North Wahgi (see O ’Hanlon 1989). However, the Kombukla,
now paired with the Minembi, have no special ties with the Komblo, but do have some dealings with
the Warike.
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3.4. M IN EM B I CLANS AND LEADERS
There are some eleven Minembi dans, but onjjr severi' a it xcptesented here:' Papekc^
Engarnbo, Nambkae, Ropke, Rapake, Mimkae andNapdcae. N ot induded here are thè
four d a n s
Etyipi, Kìmbó, Komoankae and Rupruf>kae L —winch were disposed through
recent-warfare during 1986-1990 (see Appendix I fofsegmfe^tary stmnture and Appendix 6
for population data).
' \ .
: :
:
T able 3.4.1: M inem bi Papeke
Leader

Position

James Kewa

Local Government Councillor

Kuk Andpei
Toua K or
Porya Koi
KahvaTei
Mark Tapi
Mamb Nukundi
Tiptip Tapi
Olga Makinda
Kopi Rangk

.

Big-Man
-

_

Wives

Father’s Position

N ot
Known
2
3
1
1
4

Big-man

—
Catholic Mission Worker
•
—
—
Former Local Government
Councillor
Former
Village
Court
Magistrate

+
+
+
+
+
+

1

Big-man

—

+
+
+

1
1
1

Big-man
Minor Big-man
Minor Big-man

—

Minor Big-man
Big-man
Minor Big-man
Minor Big-man
Big-man

Table 3.4.2: M inembi Engam bo
Leader

Position

Kapis Mulgae
Pik Tapi
Yakla Kum

Local Government Councillor
Village Court Magistrate
Former Local Government
Councillor

Mamb Tei
Punum Koipa
HkiRaklpa

—

RukTei
M aid Topa
Rama Poua

—

Kouga Moka
Kar M bb

—

Village Court Magistrate
Former Local Government
Councillor

.

Peace Officer
Small
businessman
Lutheran Pastor
—

and

Wives

Father's Position

+

1
1
2

Big-man
Big-man
Minor Big-man

+
+
+

1
3
2

Minor Big-man
Big-man
Big-man

+
+
+

1
1
1

Minor Big-man
Big-man.
Big-maa

+
+

1
1

Ordinary Man

Big-Man
+
+

-
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T able 3.4.3: M inem bi N am bkae
Leader

Position

Big-M an

Wives . Father's Position

Korowa Mel

Local Government Councillor
and Tice President (Dei LGC)
Former Committee
—
.
Committee
—
'
Driver (PMV)

+

1

Big-man

+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+

2
2

l
4

Big-man
Minor Big-man
Minor Big-man
Ordinary Man
Big-man
Minor Big-man
Minor Big-man
Minor Big-man
Big-man
Minor Big-man
Big-man
Big-man
Big-man

-

1

Big-man

+

N ot
Known

Unknown

Wives
2

Father's Position

Raima Yopa
Nentipa Konts
Kahal Kundl
D ot Manga
John Keplga
Konga Pena
Rumints Tapi
Nikints Pena
Malinta Dopaim
Dapena Olga
Kerowa Peil
Bauir Opa
WikaiMembi
Pun Kaip
Goimba Tapi

—

—
.
—
—
—
Village Court Magistrate
Provincial election candidate
National election candidate and
businessman
Major, PNGDF and national
election candidate
—

1
1
1
3
2

1
3
Nil

T

Table 3.4.4: M inembi Ropke
Leader

Position

Big-Man

Mark Tei
Waluwa Koim
Weimba Tei
Makla Pirn
Ongka Kupakl
Bien Kandakli
Gabriel Roimb

Local Government Councillor
Village Court Magistrate

+
+
+
+
+
+
+

—
—
—
—

Catholic Mission Leader

3
2
1
2
1
1

Big-man
Big-man
Minor Big-man
Minor Big-man
Big-man
Minor Big-man
Unknown

Table 3.4.5: M inembi Rapake
Leader

Position

Big-Man

Pilep Nikints
Kund Aants
Kilt Dupae
Rape Koi

Local Government Councillor
Village Court Magistrate

+

—

+
+

Gapa Wai
Wesley Ruk
Nema Wai

■

Former Local Government
Councillor
National election candidate
Provincial
Government
Member
—
'

Wives
2

Father's Position

4

Big-man
Big-man
Minor Big-man
Big-man

+
+

3
2

Minor Big-man
Big-man

+

1

Unknown

4»

3
2
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Koim Mäkle

Provincial election candidate

+

3

Unknown

T able 3.4.6: M inembi Mimkae
Leader

Position

Big-Man

Rombukl Konga
Kaemb Tei
Weilya Koim
Wangdui Gouya

Local Government Councillor
—
Former Committee
Former Local Government
Councillor

+
+
+
+

Wives
2
1
1
1

Father’s Position
Big-man
Minor Big-man
Minor Big-man
Big-man

T able 3.4.7: M inembi N apakae
Leader

Position

Big-Man

Pupdi Welya
Goimba Noki
Konga Galdo
Rapa Mapa Wai

Small businessman

+
+
+
+

—
—

—

3.5.

Wives
2
2
2
2

Father’s Position
Minor Big-man
Minor Big-man
Big-man
Minor Big-man

WELY LEADERS

T able 3.5: Welyi
Leader

Position

Big-Man

Wives

Father's Position

Wara Koi
Apa Korope

Local Government Councillor
Former Local Government
Councillor
Village Court Magistrate

++
+

3
2

Big-man
Big-man

+
+
+

1
4
1

Big-man
Minor Big-man
Big-man

++

2

Big-man

+

4

Big-man

+
+

1
3

+
+
+

3
1
1

Minor Big-man
Big-man
and
Councillor '
Big-man
Ordinary Man
Minor Big-man

Maip Ken
Kaipa Miti
Sapom Kipa

Kumin Dei
Pok Pim

—

Businessman
and
former
Director, Wely-Kuta Business
Group
Former President of Dei Local
Government Council
Former Local Government
Councillor

EIN um
Rombukl Wara

—

Kingal Pop
Nurum Kuntil
Dokta Mel

Village Court Magistrate
Former Village Court Clerk

National election candidate

L.G.

•
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3.6. REM DI LEADERS
T able 3.6: Remdi
Leader

Position

Big-Man

Wives

Father's Position

Maip Kei

Former Provincial Government
Member
and
Local
Government Councillor
Nominal
director,
Pipilka
Development Corporation

++

3

Big-man

+

1

Big-man

+
+

4
2

Big-man
Big-man

+

2

Big-man

++

2

Big-man

++

1

Big-man
Committee

+

1

Fight Leader

++

3

Big-man

+

2

Big-man

+

2

Big-man

+
+
+

1
1
1

Unknown
Unknown
Big-man

+

3

Big-man

Raem Kei
Pen Kei
IvanTau

—

Jerry Yar Rombina
Puklma Kopi

Stanley Pii

Wakupa Pep

Koi Ranpi

Henry Tiki
Henry Rumints
Rumint —
Koi —
Eric Ranpi
Moni Orth

i\elc

Captain,
PNGDF
and
businessman
Ex-Police corporal & gifted
orator
Company Secretary, Pipilka
Development Corporation, and
businessman
Former MP (Madang Open),
businessman and rugby league
administrator
Village Court Magistrate and
Chairman of Muglamp Village
Court Area
Councillor & National election
candidate (1977, 1982, 1987,
1992)
Businessman and Agriculture
Bank Employee
Accountant, Mount Hagen
Town Authority
—

Former police corporal
Businessman (Highlands Gold
Resources)
Port Moresby-based PMV
operator
.

&

Ex

Onlv 'Lower’ (or Dei Council) Remdi leaders are given here. The most notable 'Upper (Mul Council)
Remdi leader would of course be none other than M et Nukuntz, dte former MP for the Mul-Baiyer
electorate.
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3.7.

KUMUNGAKA LEADERS

T able 3.7: K umungàka
Leader

Position

Big-Man

Wives

Father's Position

Reiya Mara
Jacob Wani
Kar Mek
Paraka Moka

Local Government Councillor
National election candidate

+
+
+
+

1
1
1
2

Big-man
Big-man
MB
MB

+
+
+
+
+
+
+

2
2
2
.1
1
1
1

Mou Mark
Mark Kumb
Yana Koklpei
Yap Yona
Miti Mek
Wakii Mek
NoriWakupa

—

Former Local Government
Councillor
Small businessman
—
—
—

Peace Officer
—

Church leader

3.8.

.

Big-man
Ordinary Man
MB
MB
Ordinary Man
Minor Big-man
Big-man

GULKE LEADERS

Table 3.8: Gulke Dapei Kakaparambo
Leader

Position

Tei Kumi

President,
Dei
Government Council
Small businessman

Rumint Non

Locai

Kaemb Non

Small
businessman
and
Supervisor, Works and Supply
Department

Koi Nori
Kulua El
Kuntil Kerowa
Kenan Kupa
Eik Kupa
Rurdi Kupa

—
—
—
—
—

—

Big-Man

Wives

Father's Position

++

3

Big-man

+

3
1

Big-man and former
Dei L.G.C. President
Big-man

2
3
2
1
1
1

Big-man
Big-man
Ordinary Man
Big-man
Minor Big-man
Minor Big-man

+
+
+
+
+
+
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A PPENDIX IV:TRIBES OF H A G EN

T h ere are at least 85 tribes in the H agen cultural-linguistic area, com prising so m e 160,000
M elpa and T em boka speakers. T h e D e i Council area has the high est num ber o f tribes (28),
fo llow ed by N ebilyer (21), A nglim p (14), H agen (13) and M ul (9). M ost these are either
paired or in close association with o n e or tw o others, w ith w h o m there is frequent
intermarriage and exchange relations and may cooperate in warfare, elections, and in other
activities. T h ey may even share territories and have com m on corporate property. A number
o f sm aller groups, after having b een dispersed through pre-colonial warfare, share
territories w ith, and are alm ost incorporated into, the larger groups from w h ich they sought
and w ere given refuge.

Tribes of Hagen: by Census Division
Hagen Central

Dei

M ul

Anglimp

Nebilyer

Jika1

KombuklaMinembi
Kimka-Roklaka
Tepuka-Kawelka

K um di-Rem di3

Kuli-Warike

Ulka

Munjika-N engka
Mile

Kulka
Upuka

M okei1
Yamka-Kinjika
Elti-Penam bi
Kemi-Kukilka
Kungunka-Palka
Ruruka-M imka
‘K u m ’ K opi2

13

KumungakaK entpi
Mapkle-Palke
EpilkaeDakapkae
Mungapka-Purke
‘K opon’ K opi2
Remdi3
Nelka
Gulke4
D api4
Punti4
Prandike4
Opei
Welyi
O kknoni
Klamakae
Waklupka
Kiklpukla5
Ndilika5

Milaka-Klalka6

Roni-Maninge
KinapuklMungka
Tungei-M enjpi

Kenapkla7
Punti7

Andakelkam
O nom be

K opia-K ubuka
Poika-Palimi

Lati
N okpa8
Mamalke
Koukla

T ea-D ena
Tola-Wanaka
N okpa8-Anamiyl
Kusika-M idipu
Epola-Alva
Lalka
Tilka

28

9

14

21

Mujika-Laulka

Appendices

Sources: Based on A.J. Strathein (i971:230-231; Appendix I); A.M. Strathem (1975:434; Appendix 4); Burton
(1989a:257; Table 2)-, Medan and Rumsey (1991) and on personal observation.
1.

The Hagen central area (Hagen Open electorate) is notable for the dominance of two very large tribes, the
Jika and Mokei, with estimated populations in 1997 of around 20,000 and 15,000 respectively. These two
are sometimes paired as the most numerous groups in Hagen, but their members have little to do with
each other, and the pairing is not as strong as it is for the other pairings in the area.

2.

The ‘Kum’ Kopi in Hagen Central are paired with the Anglimp and Nebilyer resident, Nokpa. Although
there are two other Kopi groups, 'Kopon’ Kopi in Dei and Kopia in Nebilyer, there is little cooperation
between them in arenas o f competition because of divergent political fields.345678

3.

The Remdi are split across the Dei-Mul electorate and local government council border. The *Lower’
Remdi in Dei are closely associated with the Kimka-Roklaka tribe-pair, while ‘Upped Remdi in Mul are
paired with the KumdL

4.

Previously dispersed through pre-colonial warfare, diese tiny tribes (or what is left of them) are closely
associated with the Kentpi tribe. Gulke, Dapi and Punti are almost incorporated into Kentpi whilst
Prandike acts independently in some events but combines with Kentpi in other areas such as elections.

5.

Some members of the Kiklpukla and Ndilika tribes are almost incorporated into the ‘Lower’ Remdi
section.

6.

Previously dispersed through pre-colonial warfare, some members of the Milaka-Klalka pair are almost
incorporated into the ‘Upper’ Remdi section.

7.

Also dispersed through pre-colonial warfare, some members of the Kenapka and Punti tribes are almost
incorporated into the Kumdi tribe.

8.

The Nokpa are split across the Anglimp-Nebilyer electorate and local government council boundary.
Those in Anglimp are paired with ‘Kum’ Kopi while the other half in Nebilyer are paired with Anamiyal.
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A PPE N D IX V: SPECIFIC CASES O F M U L T IPL E V O TIN G (1995)
T h e follow in g is a record o f specific cases o f double or m ultiple votin g witnessed
personally in a num ber o f polling stations during the W estern H ighlands Provincial
G o vern m en t E lections in January 1995. G ross infringem ent o f constitutional rights and
violation o f electoral regulations have been pointed ou t by num erous studies, but n o effort
has been m ade towards reducing this and other problem s, and it is poin tless to carry the
argum ent towards this end. Suffice to say that the P N G Electoral C om m ission has a lot o f
w ork to d o before the N ational E lections in 1997. Instances o f double or m ultiple voting;
•

A n E ngan migrant voted six times, thus causing premature closin g o f polling
station. B ut the presiding officer was threatened and forced in to re-opening and
votin g continued;

•

A w om an, also Engan, w h o voted twice was identified by the presiding officer.
Supporters claim ed her being an identical twin sister o f the on e w h o voted earlier;

•

A n old w om an claiming to be the absentee w ife o f a youngster follow ed him into
the polling b ooth to vote. H e was m ocked by supporters w h o called: “H e w ho
sleeps with old w om en , hurry up”, implying that she w as an imposter;

•

A fem ale attem pting to vo te under the nam e o f an absentee m ale w as told o f f by
the presiding officer “W hat are you? Male or female?”;

•

A m an taking the place o f a w om an was turned back by the presiding officer but
supporters claimed typographical error, pointing o u t that the ‘F ’ (for female)
marked beside her nam e should correctly read £M ’ (for male); •

•

Persons thrown into the polling booth to vo te o n b eh alf o f absentees an d the
deceased often forgot the nam es o f those they claim ed to be w h en the presiding
officer asked for their names;

•

A n underage school girl, in grade six, voted on b eh alf o f an adult absentee; and

•

A husband and wife, b oth know n to the presiding officer, w ere represented by an
Engan man and a Simbu wom an. T he presiding officer look ed up and said: “So, I
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see, your nam e is Jane1”, and to the man, he said: “A n d yours Jack? Since w h en did
you b eco m e Jane and Jack?” Embarrassed, they b oth w ere turned away (but
believed to have voted later). I f only they had k n ow n that the presiding officer was
Jane's brother. W hen the presiding officer m et Jack after the polling was
com pleted, h e said: “I did n o t see you earlier, but I think you did cast your vote”,
clearly im plying that som eon e else had voted under Jack’s nam e. *

Although the events described are real and .did occur in a number of polling stations during the
1994/95 Western Highlands Provincial Elections, names of individuals mentioned in the text, like
Jane and Jack, are pseudonyms.
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A PPEN D IX VI: PN G NATIO N AL PARLIAMENT ELECTIO N S (1972-1997)

N a tio n a l

G overnm ents

E lection

elections

1972

Michael Somare

1977

fo rm ed

follow ing

S u c c tsfu l

no-confidence

Period

'Prim e M in ister

m otions

as Chief

Michael

Somare

1972-1975

Minister

(Chief Minister)
Michael Somare

1975-1977

Michael Somare and Julius

Michael Somare

1977-1980

Julius Chan

1980-1982

Michael Somare

1982-1985

Paias Wingti

1995-1987

Chan as Deputy

Against Somare in 1980
by Chan and Iambakey
Okuk

1982

Michael Somare with Paias
Wingti as Deputy

Against
November

Somare

in

1985

by

Wingti and Chan
1987

Paias Wingti with Julius Chan
as Deputy in November 1987.

Against Wingti on the

Paias Wingti

1987-

1988

Rabbie Namaliu

1988-

1992

Paias Wingti

1992-1994

Julius Chan

1994-

4th July, 1988, by Rabbie
Namaliu and Akoko Doi.
1992

Paias Wingti with Julius Chan
as Deputy on 17th, July 1992.

Against Wingti on 30th
August, 1994, by Chan
and Chris Iveta.'

Source;

Based on information supplied by John Kewa (23 January 1996), as told to him by officers within the
office of the Governor of Western Highlands, Paias Wingti.

N o te;

Only Michael Somare and Paias Wingti, backed PNG's largest political parties, Pangu and PDM,
have been able to form governments following national elections, but were replaced twice through
no-confidence motions. All of diem have been coalition governments.1

1.

In September 1993 Wingti resigned while Parliament was in session and was re-elected minutes
afterwards. Wingti’s ploy to preserve his position against a vote o f no-confidence for a further 18
months was challenged by the leader of the Opposition [Chris Haivetta] who argued this action was
unconstitutional and took the issue to the Supreme Court which rejected the challenge (Turner
1994:230). The leader of the Opposition, however, won on appeal in August 1994 and Wingti was
ousted from office.
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A PPE N D IX VII: IN TERG R O U P CONFLICTS IN H A G E N (1980-1990)

Case

Groups

District

Proximate Cause

Escalated into Peacefully
War
Resolved

1

Remdi-M inem bi

Dei

Beer

+

-

2

Kawelka-M inembi

D ei

Beer

+

—

3

K opi-N guni

Dei-Mul

T heft o f pig

+

4

Kim ka + Roklaka-Kombukla

D ei

Land

+

5

T epuka W anem bo-Palke

D ei

W oman

-

+

6

Tepuka Keitipi-Kawelka M em bo

Dei

Beer

-

+

7

T epuka Kengeke-Kintke

D ei

T heft

-

+

8

Kum di-N engka

Mul

-

+

-

9

M unjika-Kopelka

Mul

Land

+

-

10

Munjika-Klgupka

Mul

Land

+

-

11

K um di Oynam b-Kum di

Mul

Children's game

+

.12

N engka
Elpuklm bo
+
Kaklam b-N engka K inm bum b

Mul

Historical

+

Jika Andapunts-Rem di

Dei-Hagen

Historical

Hagen

Beer
woman

13
14

'

• Jika Rukumb-Jika
Akelem b

K om b

+

+
and

+

15

Jika Maipngel-Kukilka

Hagen

Marijuana

+

16

Uklga + Ukupka-Kuklga

Nebilyer

W oman

+

17

Rokla + Wanke-Teiyandena

Tam bulNebilyer

Land

+

18

Kepka
Yapo

Tam bulNebilyer

-

19

U kni 2-Ukni 2

Baiyer

Land

+

Tepaka-Kuklmint

20

Krupka-M iamka

South
Wahgi

Rascal
activity

21

Kondika-K onum bka

South
Wahgi

-

22

Tangilka-Kukika

South
Wahgi

-

+
+
gang

+
+

+

-

-

-

-

'

-

Source: Based on information supplied by participants at an ELC-PNG conference at Kuk-Mbakla village in
January 1991. Informants: Pastor Petro Timbi, Wahgi Congregation, Jesky Koi and Kelly Ken, Kotna
Circuit, Komori Ongky, Tengdui Kram and Jimi Doa, Kuk-Mbakla village, Mount Hagen.
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Appendix VIII
Average number of candidates per electorate (1964-1997)
Election Year

N um ber o f
Electorates

N um ber o f
Candidates

1964

54
84
100
109
109
109
109
108

298

1968
1972
1977
1982
1987
1992
1997

484
611
879
1125
1513
1655
2343

% Increase

—

■

62.4
26.2
43.9
28.0
34.5
9.4
41.6

Average num ber
o f Candidates
Per Electorate
5.5
5.8
6.1
8.1
10.3
13.9
15.2
21.7
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Figure 1.5: Number of Candidates (1964-1997)

— ♦— CANDIDATES
- • — ELECTORATES

ELECTION (YEAR)

Figure 1.6: Lowest to Highest Candidate categories in
1997 elections
....

2

15

10

1..5

6..10

11..15

16..20

21 ..25

26..30

31 ..35

Candidate Categories

36..40

'

41 ..45

46 ..
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Figure 1.7: Candidate Categories in 1992 and 1997
National Elections

Table 1.3(?): Candidate Categories ïri 1992 and 1997 National Elections

Candidate Categories

7992

1997

1-10

36

15

11-20

48

39

21-30

16

31

31-40

7

18

41-

2

5

T otal

109

108»
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Sourcesandnotes:
Based on P N G Electoral Commission (1992); Saffu (1996 \AppendixA); Post-Courier, April
24, 1997, “Election *97 Special Supplement” (page 1-8); and
“Provincial N ew s” (p.20-21).

Excluding Huon Gulf Open electorate.

Post-Courier, April 25,

1997,
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A PPEND IX IX: T H E M INJ FUNERAL CASE
T h is is a classic case o f conflict b etw een traditional and introduced ideas about death rites.
T h e denial o f a full traditional funeral cerem ony to the deceased angered his relatives,
especially Jo Mangi and his younger brother, w h o considered this as an infringem ent o f
individual rights as w ell as a violation o f traditional custom . T h e dispute resulted in Mangi
pulling a stunt o n his clansm en, w h ich eventually cost him a pig.

.

M angi and his younger brother w ere so upset by the m anner in w h ich the funeral was
con d u cted that they decided to teach them a lesson by arranging for a chem ically-induced
self-illum inating incandescent tube to b e tied on to a tree at the cem etery w h ere their uncle's
b od y w as buried. A ccom p lishing this proved easier than im agined. T h e m en w ere gathered
insid e the nearest h ou se beside the cem etery, w here in groups o f three or m ore to o k turn in
guarding the cem etery against ‘w itches’. Protection o f the corpse against so-called
cannibalistic w itches

{kum koimb-nui warnp)

is a widespread p h en om en on throughout the

W ahgi and parts o f H agen. T hese ‘w itches’, m ostly female b u t som e m ale also, supposedly
have supernatural abilities to approach the cemetery in the form o f mainly dogs (as well as
other animals) to take the bod y w ithou t physically disturbing the burial ground and coffin.
In this case, as one shift was com in g off, Mangi and his colleagues kept them busy with
debates about elections in general and the approaching 1987 elections in particular and
w h eth er or n o t W ingti w ould return to Parliament as Prim e M inister, w hilst M angi’s
youn ger brother and tw o others offered to take the next s h ift T h ey took this opportunity
to fasten the candle-like tube on to a branch o f a tall casuarina tree in the centre o f the
cem etery. S oon after the plastic object was bent in half, tw o separate chem icals contained
w ithin the halves merged and the chem ical reaction gave out a bright greenish light. It wjas
first n oticed by neighbouring groups from other hill-top ham lets. T hey started yelling,

“koimb (‘w itch’)

has arrived”, and soon others joined in the shouting. U p o n hearing the

sh outing from across the hills, the m en in the hou se w ith M angi cam e ou t w ith their
w eap on s and started firing arrows at the strange lig h t T his w e n t o n for several hours, b u t
the light w as still up there in the tree. A fter a while som eo n e suggested that it could n o t b e
a

koimb, bu t instead,

the H oly Spirit A n d so they called in th e church elders and started

praying. S o o n a pastor from the local Nazarene church and a Catholic priest am ved to
co n d u ct a lengthy service w hich ended at dawn. A t first m orning light a man discovered
sh o e tracks leading into and out o f the cemetery and follow in g this into the cem etery h e
n oticed the sam e prints on the freshly dug grave-yard and the unm istakable yellow clay o n
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the trunk o f th e casuarina tree, u p o n w h ich the light hung from a cotton string. The
o ffen d in g object w as prom ptly rem oved from the tree and in a subsequent investigation
blam ed th e U P N G team for the offen ce, w h ich w e may add w as a serious one. N o n e o f the
U P N G team m em b ers claim ed responsibility and am idst the con fu sion w e left for Minj
tow n . Later, M angi adm itted to deliberately attem pting to playing a practical joke as revenge
for lack o f respect sh ow n to his uncle, and consequently had to com pensate his clansm en
w ith a b ig p ig for offen d in g them.
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A PPE N D IX X: A B R IEF HISTORY OF T H E KAWELKA AT KUK
A ccord in g to the Kawelka origin-story, the Kawelka tribe originated at a place called
K oum pou pp uk l, near present-day Kelriga

mat kundkona {ret-pelagraun, ochre), less than ten

m inutes drive w est from M ount H agen township. O n e day, an old m an (putative ancestor)
and his son s w ere roasting a pig inside the clan sacred grounds w h en a cordyline

koemer, tanget in

(keiya-

Pidgin) leaf fell u p on the earth-oven. Interpreting this as a bad om en , the

old m an and his sons left the place w ithou t eating the pork. Since that day, the
b ecam e the Kawelka

ketya-koema

mi or taboo substance, a proscription, or a ‘d o n ot’, w h ich carries with

it supernatural sanctions. O aths o f allegiance to group, o f in n ocen ce w h en accused o f

mi may result in sickness and ultimately
ketya-koema is a taboo substance am on g the

certain crimes, and o f similar kind m ade upon the
death i f n o t honoured, for it is said that the
K awelka (keiya-koematetimni).2

A ccord in g to oral historical accounts given to m e by the K awelka big-m an, G oim ba
O n o m b e, the Kawelka, as op p osed to a com m on perception, are n o t a
in fact o f

Kama origin.3 H e

Kopott group, but are

m entioned Kimininga, K uam p, D o b e l and Lganga as Kawelka

settlem ents before K enta, M apa and Kuk. T h e first tw o (K im ininga and K uam p) are
presently occupied by the Jika Milakamb clan, while third and fourth (D o b el and Lganga)
are currently occupied by the Yamka Pepka clan and the fifth, K enta, is n o w occu pied by
the Jika Kilampi dan . T h e last tw o are presently h d d by the Kawelka. T here w ere tw o
brothers, K onga and Makla, still living at K uam p in the late seventies, b u t have since
migrated to K u k Similarly, at K enta, there was a large Kawelka population in co-existence
w ith the Jika Kilampi and only recently in the early dgh ties m oved to K uk and M apa. Som e

2.

The observation o f taboo substances is common among Hagen groups; die m substance for die
Tepuka, for instance, is die neng plant, die m i for the Remdi is the wantep tree; and the Mragmba tm is
the stone. For a more detailed discussion of die Kawelka origin-story and the taboo substance, see
A.J. Strathem (19~2L

\

Kum a » d K tfm appear to be arrhair Mdpa directional terms for 'west* (jw kum a) and 'north* (met
kspm f), bnt m a u m thcv are commonly used when referring to different cfenatic zones: kapcu for
low
tempexase areas «m-ti as the Baiyer and Jinu valleys; and kum a for high altitude areas such
as Ogdbcng ar»HTokpa {dams. The opposite of kuma ('west*, wulhand), as a directional term, is m dpa
feast*, a ! melpa), from whence comes the cultural-linguistic labels, die Kuma o f the Wahgi and Melpa

of Hagen. To the Simbu, the people of the Middle Wahgi, or the Minj-Banz area, are the ‘Kuma’,
whilst the Middle Wahgi people themselves see Hagen people as the ‘Kuma Hagen*, and the Hagen
people, in turn, call those living west of Tokpa as the *Kuma’. In a similar way, the people living west
of Tokpa refer to those in Hagen as the ‘Melpa’, but the Hagen people themselves refer to those in
the Middle Wahgi and Simbu as the ‘Melpa’.
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K aw elk a still h ave their co ffe e gardens at K enta, but others have planted n ew co ffee trees
at K uk,

W h ile livin g at K uk, oral history has it that the K awelka tribe underw ent a m assive

ipaka angtek ik netung>were
address public gatherings such as singsings and cerem onial exchanges.

p o p u lation exp losion ; such w as the grow th that high platform s
required for leaders to

D u rin g su ch festivities, the dancers w h o w ere organised in several row s, w ere described as a
‘sea o f m e n ’ (ivua numpitim). T here is so m e exaggeration here, as is usual o f H ageners w hen
sp eak in g o f their o w n groups, but there is also so m e truth in this statem ent because,
eventually, num erical strength brought the K awelka their dow nfall. It is said that th e tribe
grew so large that it becam e very difficult to function cohesively as a unit, that it w as highly
fragm ented, and m ore im portantly, its m em bers b ecam e increasingly belligerent. Strangers
w h o p a ssed through K awelka territories w ere said to have b een regularly attacked, robbed,
w o m e n raped, and in so m e instances, m en from other tribes w ere killed. S om e o f them
w ere n otoriou s criminals, preying u p on the innocent, m ostly weaklings such as w o m e n and
the aged, in packs o f tw o to five you n g m en — som ething n o t to o different from w h at our
contem p orary

raskalgangs are doing.

It is said that o n e day, the K w i tribes, obviously up set b y the constant K awelka
belligerence, form ed in to a confederacy-type coalition and attacked the K awelka. A lth ou gh
the attack w as initially triggered by a particular incident in volvin g the death o f a Jika
A n d ap u n ts m an called W am napi, w h o se death w as blam ed o n the K awelka after h e w as
fou n d in his h o u se w ith a cassowary bon e-tipp ed spear lod ged in his ribs, the underlying
relations b etw een the Kawelka and their K w i neighbours had significantly deteriorated to
su ch a lo w level that peaceful avenues o f conflict resolution w ere n ever considered a viable
op tion . A ccord in g to o n e Kawelka inform ant, Jika W am napi w as n o t killed by the K awelka,
vet the K awelka w ere victim ’s o f their bad reputation; and he p oin ted o u t that the real killer
w a s in fact a Yam ka Pepka m an w h o w as the son o f a K awelka w om an .
T h e su b seq u en t war w as an absolute disaster for the K awelka w h o w ere com pletely
outn um b ered , overp ow ered and massacred. A n area near the o ld K uk D P I station, w h ich
w as initially expected to b ecom e a principal battleground, b ecam e a slaughter ground wh ere
hund reds o f K awelka are said to have b een killed. T h e D P I station itse lf w as b u ih in th e
1960s after the sw am p w as drained o f f into the W ahgi river. It w as here that hundreds o f
K aw elka are said to have had their skulls cracked op en w h ile h alf subm erged into th esw am p. O n ly a few m anaged to escape, telling each other: “Mbuklpa,

Mbaklapaf’ (‘G o

to
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M buk l, g o to M bakla1), the nam es o f the other K awelka territories in the Sepik-W ahgi
D iv id e .4

T h e presen t K aw elka territory at K uk w as reclaimed by Y ap’s father, G oim b a O n om b e,
th en a L ocal G overn m en t Councillor, in the early 1960s. T h e K awelka, as m entioned
a b o v e, w ere violently evicted from K uk after losing a war to a confederacy-style alliance o f
K w i grou p s, com prising m ainly Jika A ndapunts, som e M okei arid Y am ka clans. Y ap ’s
grandfather, O n o m b e, as a you n g m an fled — together with a few lucky o n e s (including
O n gk a’s father, K aipa, and Y ap’s great-grandfather, K und M end) — to M bukl, another
K aw elka setd em en t situated on the Jimi-W ahgi-Baiyer D ivid e. A fter hearing stories about
K u k and the war from his father, G oim b a decided to return to the form er K awelka
territory in the U p per W ahgi sb on after pacification had b een im p o sed by the Australian
colon ial adm inistration in the 1940s.

*. The Mbukl-Mbakh territories were colonised by a Kawelka man called Etemp Wantep, the founding
ancestor o f die Kawelka ‘Kopon-pei’ section of the tribe. A.J. Serathem (1972) provides a genealogy
of Etemp Wan tep’s descendants.
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A PP E N D IX XI: BACKGROUND TO EKTS DEATH
A fter graduating from the Adm inistrative College, W aigani, in N o v em b er 1984, Eki was
p o sted to th e Southern H ighlands P rovince as an E xecu tive O fficer to the K agua To ral
G o v ern m en t Council. A fter tw o years o f em ploym ent with the council, he w as transferred
to th e Baiyer-Lum usa Local G overn m en t Council in late 1986.
H ow ev er, th e outbreak o f the K awelka-M inem bi war in late 1986 prevented him from
taking up his n ew p ost. Eki, like his peers, took up arms and w en t to war with the rest o f
th e K awelka warriors. D u ring the Kawelka-M inembi war, n o n e fough t m ore bravely than
E ki, w h o w as feared and hated m ost by the enemy. Apart from being on e o f a n ew breed
o f warriors w ith k n ow led ge o f gun warfare, Eki’s main role, together w ith on e other fight
leader, w as that o f a roving shield-m an, w h ich m eans that h é personally did n o t kill anyone,
yet h e played a significant part in the overall Kawelka war effort. H e w as also involved in
the brutal eviction o f the M inem bi Elyipi, Papeke, E n gam b o and Ruprupkae clans from
their Tiki and neighbouring territories during the inception o f the war in late 1986.
D u rin g a m utually reached truce period in June 1988, W illiam Pik contested the W estern
H ighlands Provincial E lection s for the first time. This w as also the first tim e that Kawelka,
as a tribe, had ever sponsored o n e o f their ow n tribesman to con test in an election for
either provincial or national governm ent.5 Again, Eld felt obligated to offer his specialised
expertise in election campaigns. H e was used as a cam paign coordinator in Pik’s election
cam paign. Pik and the Kawelka gam bled and lost a lot o f m on ey and other resources
during the election. W hile the ideology o f group solidarity w as expressed in b lo c voting by
m em bers o f the K awelka clans, it was how ever believed that so m e Kawelka, together w ith
so m e T epuka tribesm en w h o reside with the Kawelka at K uk, defected to the opposition.
A s in 1995, Pik’s principal rival in 1988 w as Kar Kil, a T epuka K intke clansm an and a
protégé o f th e form er D e i M P, Parua Kuri.
A ccord in g to Pik’s supporters, Pik lost by 21 votes, a situation w h ich could easily have
resulted in victory i f h e had the support o f A c defectors and the Tepuka w h o live w ith
K awelka b u t v oted w ith their T epuka tribesmen. C onsequently, a punitive raid w as
organised by W illiam Pik’s supporters, during w hich a nu m ber o f h ou ses w ere burnt d ow n ,

5.

There was one other Kawelka candidate in a previous provincial government election, but he did not
have tribe-wide support Eki’s father, Kont, in fact, contested the Kotna-Tiki seat during the 1980
Western Highlands provincial elections, but was beaten by Tepuka Oklembo clansman, Kuma Rokla.
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a w o m a n w as allegedly raped, and som e people w ere assaulted. A rm ed with a shotgun, Eki
w as o n e o f the leaders o f the raiding party. A m on g th ose w h o lost houses and property
w ere

three prom inent Tepuka K eitipi clansmen,

K on ge,

Kuntil and R on om , all

polygam ists, each w ith three w ives. T h e Keitipi clansm en and their families fled to their
m ain territories in the Muka valley, leaving behind land, pigs, co ffee plots and food-crop
gardens.

P ik s supporters justified their actions by using the H agen ideology o f group solidarity,
expressed in the M elpa language as

Ur tilaptk, kutkona tila tek iti natitemon, (‘o n e

does n ot

live in o n e h ou se and have a toilet in another^, which im plies that the K eitipi clansm en and
their fam ilies should have voted with their Kawelka h osts in stead o f follow in g structural
lines.

A fter these even ts, Eki took a trip to Port M oresby on 2 2 A u gust 1988. O nly six hours
after his arrival in P ort M oresby, he w as murdered around 9:00 p.m ., ironically at the
Adm inistrative College, w here h e had received his training as a council adviser. A Tepuka
K eitipi clansm an w as charged with murder, but sentenced to less than five years for
m anslaughter, after the defence argued that it was an accid en t T h e Kawelka, how ever,
believed that this w as n o accident, but a pay-back killing for the defendant’s father, a
K eitipi big-m an, w h ose death was blam ed on the Kawelka big-m an, O ngka (w ho, to this
day, denies having anything to do with him). This b elief w as reinforced by the fact that Eki
w as direcdy involved in the election-related violence causing dam age to property ow n ed by
the three K eitipi clansm en, one o f w h o m was the defendant’s brother, and the other was
the father o f the man w h o allegedly instigated the brawl in w hich Eki w as killed.
A ccord in g to E ki’s brother, Ben K onts, on e o f the three M em b o w itnesses, they were
picked up in a taxi at the Jackson’s Airport around 3:00 p.m . by a K lam bo m an w h o drove
them to E ki’s uncle’s hou se at the Administrative College. U p o n arrival at the college they
discovered that the uncle, Kingal, also a Tepuka Keitipi m an, was n o t at h om e. In the taxi
w ere six men: the K lam bo driver, the four M em bo m en (including Eki), and a K eitipi man
(John Berum).
A s they turned around and w’ere o n their way o u t w h en stop ped outside the assailant’s
h o u se by a group o f Tepuka Keitipi m en, where the o n e o f them attacked Joh n Berum.
B erum ’s attacker, according B en K onts, was Mapa K on ge, the so n o f o n e o f the Keitipi
m e n w h o lost property during the 1988 post-polling violence. Eki and another M em b o
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(John Y ap) w ere the first to get out o f the car. B en maintains that Joh n Y ap tried to stop
th e figh t b etw een M apa and Berum w hile Eki was only a spectator. B en rlaiww l that Mapa
th en attacked him. D u ring the com m otion , Eld, according to J o h n Y ap, w as struck dow n
by the assailant, H ui Rom ba. W h en asked w h y Joh n Y ap did n o t warn Eki that h e was
ab ou t to b e struck, Joh n Y ap claims that h e thought H ui was only feigning. B en maintains
that E ki w as a marked m an and his death was n o a ccid en t IrTstead, his murder, Ben
b elieves, w as a ruthlessly calculated one; the fight betw een Mapa and Berum was
deliberately staged in order to cause confusion during w hich the target, Eki, w as easily
picked o u t by Rom ba. Kawelka inform ants, including Ben, believe that the assailant, Hui
R om b a, had sufficient m otive for killing Eki. T h e m urder w as w idely interpreted as
payback killing for both the assailant’s father’s death and m ore specifically for the m assive
lo ss o f property and hum iliation suffered by his brother and other K eitipi clansm en at the
han ds o f W illiam Pik’s supporters w h o w ere led by a gun -totin g Eki during the W estern
H ighlands provincial elections in June 1988.
T h e K lam b o taxi-driver and the tw o M em b o m en (including B en K onts) fled in the taxi,
leaving the u n con sciou s Eki behind. It is n ot clear w hat exactly happened to Joh n Yap,
w h o w as also left behind, but E ki was taken to Port M oresby G eneral hospital som e six
hou rs after the attack, around 3:00 a.m. o n the follow ing day, b y neighbours o f the
assailan t B ut h e died in less than three hours, around 6:00 a.m., at the hospital.
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